The security fence in the Northern West Bank helps to prevent suicide
bombings and shooting attacks inside Israel by terrorists in the area:
[IDF Background 5 December 2003]

Since the beginning of the Palestinian war of terror in September 2000, 117
suicide bombings and shooting attacks have occurred inside the state of
Israel, in which 477 people have been murdered and 3239 wounded. Many of
these attacks were perpetrated by the terrorist infrastructures in the
Samaria region. Prior to the establishment of the security fence, which
currently stretches from, Ram-On to Elkana, these infrastructures succeeded
in entering many suicide bombers into Israel from regions where the fence
now exists. The building of the security fence was intended to thwart and
prevent the terrorist infrastructures from entering terrorist into Israel to
carry out suicide bombings and shooting attacks against civilians.

Interrogations of operations in various Palestinian terrorist organizations
in Samaria, show that the security fence in this region, does indeed
comprise a considerable obstacle, affecting the ability of the terrorist
organizations in Samaria to enter terrorists into Israel. Thus the
organizations' attempt to send terrorists via areas where the fence has not
yet been completed and also divert them toward the Judea region, where the
fence does not yet exists.

During recent months there have been repeated attempts to enter terrorists
in areas where the fence has not yet been completed - the area south of
Elkana, close to Kfar Kasem; the area of Azun-Atma, and the Gilboa region.

* Amjad Abidi, head of the Islamic Jihad in Jenin, responsible for a series
of terrorist attacks and terrorist attack attempts, among them the Maxim
restaurant in Haifa, divulged in his interrogation details relating to the
affect of security fence on the execution of terrorist attacks he planned.
Abidi noted that if the fence had stretched all the way to the Jordan Valley
the operations of all terrorist organizations would have to think of
completely other ways to carry out attacks.

* Abdallah Basset Hassan Milham, a resident of Aanin, arrested in August
2003, admitted in his interrogation that he was to lead a suicide bombers
from Jenin to Baqqa al-Rarbiya, whereupon the suicide bomber was supposed to
board a taxi and enter Israel with the intent of carrying out a suicide
bombing on behalf of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Jenin. He noted that in
October 2002, (prior to the building of the fence) he could easily transfer
a suicide bomber from the village of Aanin to Um el-Fahem, and then into
Israel; today however, it is no longer possible to travel from Aanin to Um
el-Fahem due to the existence of the fence.

Increase in number of terrorist attacks carried out by terrorist
infrastructures in the area of Bethlehem and Hebron (Judea) in comparison to
the terrorist infrastructures in the area of the West Bank, north of
Jerusalem (Samaria).

The difficulties faced by the Samaria terrorist infrastructures to carry out
terrorist attacks due to the existence of the fence, have led to a sharp
decrease in the number of attacks they have been able to execute inside
Israel. At the same time, the Hamas infrastructures in Judea, a region where
the fence has not yet been built, has been able to perpetrate many "high
quality" inside Israel. The Hamas infrastructures in Hebron has carried out
four suicide bombings in Jerusalem (the suicide bombing on the number 6 bus
on French Hill in may 2003, the suicide bombing close to the Dahit al-Barid
checkpoint in May 2003, the suicide attack on bus number 14 close to the
clal building in central Jerusalem in June 2003, and the suicide bombing on
bus number 2 in august 2003 - all resulting in the murder of 46 Israelis and
239 wounded). This infrastructure is also responsible for the suicide
bombing on bus number 37 in Haifa (murdering 17 and wounding 42). The Hamas
infrastructure in Ramallah carried out the suicide attack at the bus stop in
Zerifin and the suicide bombing in the Hilel café in Jerusalem, both on
September 9, resulting in 16 murdered Israelis.

The Samaria Hamas infrastructure has not succeeded in carrying out a single
suicide bombing inside Israel since the attack on Bar-Ilan Junction in
October 2002.

Diversion of terrorist attacks from Samaria to the Judea region:

We have recently witnessed several incidents in which the Samaria terrorist
infrastructures have planned the attacks and supplied the explosives, but
the terrorist were planned to be sent by operatives from the Judea region -
where the fence does not longer exists.

Taufic Mustafa Hatib - a resident of Hizma (near Jerusalem) a Hamas
operative, arrested on October 30, 2003, admitted during interrogation by
the Israel Security Agency (ISA) that he was recruited to the Hamas by the
Hamas military infrastructure in Nablus. Two weeks prior to his arrest
Hatib was sent an explosive belt weighing 10 kg from Nablus to a candy store
in Ramallah. Hatib concealed the explosive belt in a closet next to his
baby daughter's crib. In his possession were manuals with instructions on
how to activate the belt.

Summary

We can see that the existence of the security fence in the Samaria region
poses a considerable obstacle for thwarting and preventing the terrorist
infrastructures from carrying out suicide attacks inside Israel. The fence
has led to a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks from the Samaria
region. The continuation of the fence to the Judea region, provides a
central and vital component of our ability to prevent terrorist attacks
inside Israel.