Gaza - the British are Coming - Co-Opting Terrorists
By SHMUEL BAR
AME exclusive - 4/11/2004 12:00 AM
http://accessmiddleeast.com/document.aspx?did=fca583b8-8efe-419d-9d1b-2daa283368f8

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan for unilateral disengagement from
Gaza has won a surprising champion -- Britain's Tony Blair. Indeed, the UK
government is considering possible British participation in "peace-keeping"
in Gaza after the Israeli withdrawal.

UK diplomats and security officials have formulated a proposal for a new
security plan for Gaza. The plan was drafted by officers of Britain's Secret
Intelligence Service (MI6) and was discussed during the meeting between
Blair and the Palestinian Authority Prime Minister, Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) in
London.

However, London is wary of getting embroiled in a mess similar to the
American troubles in Iraq. Consequently, the plan is based on "co-opting" of
all factions into a Gaza security regime. The quid pro quo for co-opting the
"militant" factions (the Fatah Tanzim and al Aqsa Brigades, Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad) would be a commitment on the part of the PA (and
the assisting international forces) not to attempt to disarm them or to
decommission their heavy weapons.

The British tendency to co-opt Hamas has already struck a sour chord in
Washington; The US State Department clarified that "We consider Hamas a
terrorist organization. Our view is that, far from being welcomed into any
partnership of cooperation, Hamas should be ostracized and disempowered as
an organization."

The British plan is spelt out in about 40 pages of detailed steps to be
taken by the Palestinians. It includes: forming joint situation rooms for
the various Palestinian forces; building 12 "task forces" (integrated
military units with representation of all PA factions) under British
auspices, for taking control upon the Israeli withdrawal; setting
unequivocal procedures for coordination between the various Palestinian
security services (but not their complete unification under one accountable
direction). The PA forces are expected to guarantee law and order in Gaza
and to prevent terrorist acts against Israel.

Israel, on the other hand, is asked to refrain from unilateral security
actions and to help bolster the PA security force by removing a few hundred
al Aqsa Brigade members from its wanted lists and to allow them to serve as
security forces inside Gaza (the Palestinians claim that most of the al Aqsa
members are not even on the Israeli list,) and to commit itself to refrain
from attempting to arrest or harm them.

On the PA side, the British plan is based on two Palestinian pillars: Gaza
strongman Mohammad Dahlan (now back from a two month "finishing school" in
Cambridge, England meeting with officials and "improving his English") and
Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat's economic advisor, Mohammad
Rashid (a.k.a. Khaled Salam).

The former is supposed to impose law and order in Gaza, while the latter is
supposed to "deliver" Arafat. The Palestinians (or some of them) are
demanding that the British convince Israel to release Arafat from the siege
of his headquarters in Ramallah and allow him to commute between Gaza and
the West Bank in order to calm Gaza with his presence. The argument that
Arafat's presence in Gaza is essential for preventing a Hamas takeover after
an Israeli withdrawal and is therefore in Israel's interest has been
presented by Palestinians to Israelis as well.

But the British are aware that Dahlan is not the only player on the field in
Gaza - even if he were to receive Arafat's complete and unqualified support.
The British plan "takes into account" that the PA security forces have been
decimated by Israeli actions and are no more than 20 percent of their
original force. Moreover, they realized from their meetings with the
Palestinians that Dahlan and his deputy, Rashid Abu Shubak who both have
strong personal ties with the Hamas leaders - Abdel Aziz Rantisi and
Mohammed Deif - cannot be expected to clamp down on Hamas.

The British authors of the plan believe that to withhold recognition from de
facto forces in the field - no matter how radical they are - will be
counter-productive. Therefore, during the process of the plan's compilation,
they met with leaders of the various Palestinian factions - including the
Islamic groups. The underlying axiom of the plan is that there can be no
international (i.e. British) involvement with troops or "advisors" without
an agreement on the ground between the rival Palestinian factions and
guarantees that the British forces will not be in the crossfire between them
or between Israel and the Palestinians.

While the present plan evolved in the context of Sharon's disengagement
plan, its underlying principles are not new. The same basic principles were
at the core of previous British initiatives since the outbreak of the
Intifada. Most of these initiatives were the brainchildren of security
advisor to the EU special envoy, Miguel Moratinos - Alistair Crooke.

Crooke, a former MI6 officer who served in Afghanistan in the 1980's and was
instrumental in cultivating the Mujahidin against the Soviet invasion, met
with PA, Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders in attempts to persuade them to put
a temporary hold on suicide attacks civilians inside Israel (but not against
Israeli military targets or settlers) in order to renew the Israeli-PA
negotiation process. While he is no longer in the field, the new British
initiative seems to bear his distinctive fingerprints: an attempt to involve
all possible "nuisance makers" -- including extreme radicals -- in order to
neutralize them and to make them interested in stability; and suspension --
not suppression -- of the terrorist threat.

The British plan is ostensibly a purely "security-oriented" plan without any
political overtones. However, it has, in fact, far reaching political
implications. The basic assumption of the plan is, therefore, that stability
will breed pragmatism and create an atmosphere within Gaza against a return
to chaos and conflict with Israel, thus creating "public pressure" on the
radical elements to refrain from provocative terrorist attacks against
Israel. If all goes well, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad will become
"domesticated" according to the precedent of Britain's negotiations with the
Sin Fein, which resulted in a ceasefire with the IRA.

But all may not go well. If implemented, the plan will preserve the status
quo on ground insofar as the terrorist infrastructure in Gaza is concerned.
This infrastructure will be a constant threat to Israel. The plan may
achieve a declared or tacit moratorium on terrorist attacks directly by the
co-opted organizations. But such a moratorium on terrorist attacks will be
contingent on the behavior of the PA towards Hamas and on Israel's
refraining from any security measures.

Hamas, which has already indicated its willingness to participate in a local
Gaza regime - a willingness echoed by Arafat's own recent statements - will
be a component of the PA and will win international respectability and -
more important -a certain degree of protection against Israeli security
measures.

The result will be enhancement of the movement's political and military
strength. The question will then be asked -- even if the plan is implemented
and the Hamas is co-opted -- what will become of the other "nuisance
elements" in Gaza affiliated with Iran? The concept of "coalitioning"
security in Gaza may easily extend to these elements as well, according them
a new status and a stronger foothold within the framework of the Gazan
authority.

Dr. Shmuel Bar is a senior research fellow at The Institute for Policy &
Strategy, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya