Peace Index: August 2004 [29% Kiryat Arba could be relinquished in final
settlement]
Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann

Even though no governmental decision has yet been taken on the future of the
settlements in the West Bank, a large majority support the state already
offering considerable financial assistance to those living in these
settlements who wish to move within the Green Line. Likewise, the widespread
assessment is that today the settlements weaken Israel's national interest
and the government is investing too much money in them and in development of
the territories there. Nevertheless, the Israeli Jewish public is divided
between those who believe that, in retrospect, the different Israeli
governments were right to allow and even encourage establishing the
settlements in the territories and those who think this was a political
error, with the former having a slight lead. However, despite the
disagreements about the historical justification for the government's
legitimizing the establishment of the settlements and despite the view that
their cost is too high and their benefit too scant, only a minority
currently favor, in the framework of a final peace agreement, evacuating all
or most of the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, whereas the majority
believe in evacuating only those settlements that are among or near
Palestinian settlements, or that none should be evacuated at all.
Furthermore, we found that the Israeli Jewish public's subjective definition
of what do or do not constitute "settlements in the territories" is not the
same as the "plain facts": when we move from the abstract level to the level
of specific settlements that could be candidates for evacuation, we find
that the majority not only define settlements that clearly are in the
territories as "settlements that are not in the territories" in terms of
negotiations with the Palestinians, but also think Israel should not
relinquish them and evacuate them. This holds true especially-though not
only-regarding the neighborhoods that were built in Jerusalem on land
conquered in the Six Day War.

In light of this finding about defining settlements as being or not being in
the territories, it is perhaps surprising to discover that a majority of the
Israeli Jewish public does see the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as "occupied
territories." At the same time, in keeping with the previous finding, the
rate of those who think Israel should not change its policy and accept the
Fourth Geneva Convention, as the attorney-general recommended, and thereby
officially recognize the territories as occupied, clearly exceeds the rate
of those who think such a change of policy and recognition would be
appropriate. And in this context, the widespread view among the Jewish
public is that the chances are low that international sanctions will be
imposed on Israel if it ignores the ruling on the fence by the International
Court in The Hague and declines to recognize the Geneva Convention.
Nevertheless, the common assessment is that when Israel decides on its
policy toward the territories, it should take into account, among other
considerations, the possibility of such sanctions being imposed on it.

Those are the main findings of the Peace Index survey that was conducted
from Sunday to Tuesday, August 29-31, 2004.

Even though, in retrospect, the public today is almost evenly split
regarding the encouragement or at least permission that Israeli governments
gave over the years for establishing settlements in the territories, with a
slight advantage for those who historically justify those governments'
policy - 48% believing this policy was right and 43% saying it was mistaken
(9% do not know) - today a clear majority of 72% support or strongly support
the government already offering financial assistance to those living in the
West Bank settlements and wanting to move within the Green Line (22% oppose
this and 6% have no clear opinion on the matter). Indeed, the majority
support offering financial assistance to those willing to be evacuated among
the voters for all the parties, including Mafdal (the National Religious
Party) (54.4% in favor, 45.5% against), with the exception of Shas voters,
among whom the rate of opponents (53%) is slightly higher than that of
supporters of offering such financial assistance (47%).

The minority who oppose providing state financial assistance to willing
evacuees cite, especially, the argument that the cost of such assistance
will be very high and the settlers, having gone to live there of their own
free choice, do not deserve money for evacuation. Much less favored
arguments are: that such assistance signals that parts of the homeland can
be relinquished; that the offer would unfairly add pressure to those who are
already in psychological distress; and that so long as no governmental
decision has been taken on the West Bank settlements, no compensation should
be offered to evacuees.

As for the support for giving financial aid to the willing evacuees, it can
be explained by the widespread view that today the settlements weaken (48%)
and do not strengthen (38%) Israel's national interest (14% do not know), as
well as the common assessment that the government is currently investing too
much money in the settlements and in the development of the territories
(44%; 25.5% believe it is investing the right amount there, and 13% that it
is investing too little; the rest have no clear opinion on the issue).

It seems that whereas willing evacuation is perceived as positive and
desirable in light of the above-mentioned view of the cost and benefit of
the settlements, evacuation because of a demand arising in the framework of
negotiations with the Palestinian side is perceived as negative. Thus,
despite the view that the cost of maintaining the settlements is too high
and their benefit too meager, only a small minority of 17% think that in the
context of a final agreement with the Palestinians, Israel should agree to
evacuate all the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, while 15% believe in
agreeing to evacuate most of the settlements there, 37% favor evacuating
only those settlements that are among or close to Palestinian settlements,
and 25% assert that no settlements should be evacuated even in the framework
of a final peace agreement. Overall, then, the rate of those who are
prepared for a substantial evacuation comes to 32%, whereas 63% are prepared
for a very limited evacuation or oppose any evacuation. A segmentation of
these two categories by voting for the Knesset in the recent elections
reveals, not surprisingly, that a majority among Meretz, Labor, and Shinui
voters (100%, 71%, and 60%, respectively) support a substantial evacuation,
whereas large majorities or all the voters for the rest of the parties -
Likud, Shas, Mafdal, United Torah Judaism, and the National Union - are in
the category of those supporting a limited evacuation or opposing evacuation
altogether.

We wanted to check the influence of moving from the abstract level (to
evacuate or not evacuate settlements in the framework of a final agreement)
to the level of the specific settlements that could be candidates for
evacuation or whose evacuation the Palestinians would demand if and when
real negotiations are held for a peace agreement. Hence, we presented to the
interviewees a list of settlements and asked two questions regarding each of
them: to what extent the interviewee sees or does not see it as a settlement
in the territories, and whether in the context of negotiations with the
Palestinians Israel should or should not give it up. The answers to these
questions starkly contrast with the "plain facts" and raise two
possibilities: either the public's level of geographical knowledge is
extremely low (which would explain the very high rate of those who chose the
"don't know" category), or perceptually, the Green Line has vanished from
the consciousness of most of the Israeli Jewish public.

Thus, in the eyes of a 62.5% majority, the Jerusalem neighborhoods that were
built on lands that were annexed after the Six Day War, such as Neve Yaacov
or Gilo, do not count as being in "the territories" in terms of negotiations
with the Palestinians (only 19.5% said they see them as "territories"). A
still larger majority of 71% think Israel should not give them up even in
the context of a final peace (only 11.9% said it is possible to give up
these neighborhoods). If such a position could perhaps have been expected
regarding the settlements in Greater Jerusalem, still it was surprising to
find that only a minority define Maale Adumim and Ariel (26.4% and 28.6%,
respectively) as "settlements in the territories" in the context of
negotiations with the Palestinians, with the widespread view being that
these are not "settlements in the territories" in terms of the negotiations
(50.4% and 48.8%, respectively). The opposition to relinquishing these two
towns is even larger: 66.5% say Israel should not give up Maale Adumim in
the framework of a final peace, and 63% say the same about Ariel.

Opinions are more divided about Kiryat Arba in Hebron, with a higher rate -
38% - defining it as "territories" compared to 31% who said for them it does
not count as "settlements in the territories" (31% do not know). As for the
Gush Etzion settlements (such as Efrat, Alon Shvut, or Cfar Etzion) and the
Jordan Valley settlements (such as Maale Efraim, Kalia, or Vered Jericho),
here too the opinions are divided, though with a tendency not to define them
as settlements in the territories: thus, 31% defined the Gush Etzion
settlements and 25% saw the Jordan Valley settlements as "settlements in the
territories" compared to 39% and 40%, respectively, who said these are not
"settlements in the territories" for purposes of negotiations with the
Palestinians. Could these settlements be relinquished in the framework of a
final agreement with the Palestinians? Here, too, the majority do not think
so - 42% (vs. 29%) in the case of Kiryat Arba, 53% (vs. 21.5%) in the case
of the Gush Etzion settlements, and 50% (vs. 19.5%) in the case of the
Jordan Valley settlements. The conclusion is that at the specific level as
well and not only at the abstract level, the assessment about the excessive
cost of maintaining the settlement enterprise in the territories and the
assessment about the scant benefit of this enterprise in terms of national
security does not imply - at least today - a readiness to evacuate
settlements even in the context of signing a final peace agreement with the
Palestinians.

We next clarified whether or not the interviewees regarded the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip as occupied territories. We found that a majority of 51% do
think or are sure that they are occupied territories, compared to 39% who
think or are sure that they are not. The segmentation by Knesset voting is
as expected: all or a majority of Meretz, Labor, and Shinui voters defined
the territories as occupied, whereas the majority or plurality of Likud,
Shas, Mafdal, and National Union voters did not define them as such. A
segmentation by level of religiosity also yielded foreseeable results: a
clear majority of those defining themselves as haredi or religious do not
view the West Bank and Gaza as occupied territories, while a majority of the
traditional and the secular do view them that way.

Yet, despite the widespread recognition of the territories as occupied, the
question of whether Israel should consider a change in its policy, according
to the attorney-general's recommendation, and apply the Fourth Geneva
Convention to the territories, denoting that they are occupied, elicited the
widespread response (44%) that Israel should not apply the Convention and
thus recognize the territories as occupied, compared to 34% who thought that
it should change the policy and apply the Convention with all that this
entails.

Although there was a correlation between personal views on whether or not
the territories are currently occupied and the question about applying the
Geneva Convention to them, the overlap was not total. Thus, a third of those
who saw the territories as occupied said Israel should not recognize this
publicly by applying the Convention, while among those did not see them as
occupied, 14% favored accepted the attorney-general's recommendation and
applying the Convention to them.

It seems most of the public does not view a collision course with
international law and international opinion as a dangerous thing. Thus, it
is commonly believed - 46% - that there is a quite low or very low chance
that if Israel ignores the ruling of the International Court in The Hague
about the legality of the separation fence and refrains from applying the
Geneva Convention to the territories, economic sanctions will be imposed on
it similar to those that were imposed on South Africa because of the
apartheid regime. Only 37% feared that there is a quite high or very high
chance that such sanctions will be imposed on Israel. Meretz voters showed
the highest rate (58%) of those seeing a high or very high chance of
sanctions, while Shas voters showed the lowest rate (only 25%).

Notwithstanding the view of the low probability of sanctions, the common
assessment - 43% - is that Israel should take into account, among other
considerations, the possibility of sanctions in formulating its policy
toward the territories. Some 28% think it should completely ignore this
possibility, while 18% say the possibility of sanctions should be a central
consideration when formulating a policy toward the territories.

This month support for the unilateral disengagement plan in Gaza stood,
similarly to the previous month, at 60.4. In other words, the erosion that
was observed in the previous months did not continue. This month the Oslo
Index came to 37.0 (Jewish sample, 34.2), and the Negotiation Index was 53.3
(Jewish sample, 51.0).

The Peace Index project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace
Research of Tel Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof.
Tamar Hermann. The telephone interviews were conducted by the B. I. Cohen
Institute of Tel Aviv University from August 29-31, 2004, and included 575
interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel
(including the territories and the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a
sample of this size is about 4.5% in each direction.