Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation

JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF
Vol. 4, No. 7 8 November 2004

Will a Gaza "Hamas-stan" Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and David Keyes

In light of Israel's planned disengagement from Gaza, to take place in 2005,
and the termination of Yasser Arafat's hold on power, the eventual take-over
of the Gaza Strip by Hamas certainly cannot be ruled out. Would a Gaza
"Hamas-stan" become another al-Qaeda sanctuary in the future? In the past,
al-Qaeda sought to establish itself wherever there was a security vacuum -
in remote mountain areas or in economically weak, failed states. Would a
security vacuum in a post-withdrawal Gaza facilitate al-Qaeda's entry there?

The affinity of Hamas for groups that are part of the al-Qaeda network was
dramatically demonstrated in 2004 when Hamas distributed computer CDs in the
West Bank and Gaza that express the organization's identification with
Chechen terrorists and with other "holy wars" in the Balkans, Kashmir, and
Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda and Hamas are often funded by the same people and organizations.
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, "Hamas [leaders]...often use
the very same methods and even the same institutions [as al-Qaeda] to raise
and move their money."

Both al-Qaeda and Hamas legitimize the use of suicide bombing based on the
same religious authorities: Sheikh Salman al-Auda (Saudi), Sheikh Safar
al-Hawali (Saudi), Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaibi (Saudi), Sheikh Sulaiman
al-Ulwan (Saudi), and Sheikh Qardhawi (Egypt-Qatar). All five clerics appear
on the Hamas website.

To prevent a safe haven for terrorism from emerging in Gaza, Israel must
maintain control over the strategic envelope around Gaza even after its
disengagement, particularly air, land, and sea access to the territory,
though Israel will face enormous international pressure to ease its grip as
a gesture to a post-Arafat regime.

Similarly, Western powers may seek to limit Israel's freedom of movement to
re-enter Gaza, should security conditions deteriorate (i.e., an increase in
Kassam rocket attacks on Israel). Ironically, by seeking to neutralize
Israeli military power, Western states would help create the very sort of
security vacuum in Gaza that al-Qaeda requires in order to establish a new
sanctuary.

The Second Generation of Terror Networks

Since the U.S. victory over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has
sought new sanctuaries around the world in the mountainous border regions of
western Pakistan, in remote parts of Kurdistan that stretch from Iraq into
Iran, and along the Saudi-Yemeni border. Similarly, al-Qaeda has sought to
establish itself in poverty-stricken Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and in
some of the weaker states in West Africa including Mali.1 Moreover, the
al-Qaeda network itself has changed considerably since the 9/11 attacks on
New York and Washington in terms of organization and strategy; a network of
loosely affiliated terrorist groups has replaced the heretofore
centrally-directed al-Qaeda of Osama bin Laden. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda is now
tending to provide support for new regional Islamic rebellions around the
world.2 The second-generation organizations of these regional movements are
bound together by a similar anti-Western worldview, a commitment to
Salafi/Wahhabi forms of Islam, and a clear identification with a
reinvigorated global jihad. As al-Qaeda attempts to reconstitute itself,
important questions need to be addressed, including who are these al-Qaeda
affiliates and where will they operate?

In light of Israel's planned disengagement from Gaza, to take place in 2005,
it remains to be seen what Palestinian political constellation is likely to
take control there, especially in the post-Arafat era. The eventual
take-over of the Gaza Strip by Hamas certainly cannot be ruled out, given
the enormous political clout it already possesses and the relative decline
of the Fatah movement in recent years. Even if the Hamas take-over is
partial and Hamas only shares power with Fatah in Gaza, the political
behavior of a post-withdrawal Palestinian government will have to be very
carefully monitored.

Three global security questions immediately arise. First, would a Gaza
"Hamas-stan" become another al-Qaeda sanctuary in the future? Second, is
there a significant ideological affinity between Hamas and al-Qaeda which
might support the emergence of such a sanctuary in Hamas-controlled
territory? Third, what security arrangements might exist on the ground to
act as a countervailing factor against the development of such a sanctuary?
In the past, al-Qaeda sought to establish itself wherever there was a
security vacuum - in remote mountain areas or in economically weak, failed
states. Would a security vacuum in a post-withdrawal Gaza facilitate
al-Qaeda's entry there?

Hamas and al-Qaeda: Common Ideological Roots and Early Cooperation

The affinity of Hamas for groups that are part of the al-Qaeda network was
dramatically demonstrated in 2004 when Hamas distributed computer CDs in the
West Bank and Gaza that express the organization's identification with
Chechen terrorists and with other "holy wars" in the Balkans, Kashmir, and
Afghanistan. Pictured together on these CDs are Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin, Chechen leaders al-Khattab and Shamil Basayev, and Osama bin Laden.
In its identification with the wider struggles of the global jihad, Hamas
sees itself playing a part in the global offensive of militant Islam. This
certainly provides the basis for cooperative relations emerging with
al-Qaeda, should their interests coincide and conditions permit.

Al-Qaeda and Hamas were both established in the period of 1987-1989 as
offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, though al-Qaeda is heavily influenced
by the Wahhabi roots of bin Laden in Saudi Arabia as well. Bin Laden's
mentor was Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian who headed the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan until he moved to Saudi Arabia and later to Pakistan.
Hamas grew out of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
Gaza Strip. While al-Qaeda is an anti-civilization movement that seeks the
total eradication of all non-Islamic governments, Hamas has historically
chosen to focus chiefly on one particular territorial region. Yet despite
differing focuses, al-Qaeda and Hamas share similar qualities.

In April 1991, leading Islamists from around the globe convened in Khartoum
to create an umbrella organization for a new global Islamist network. Among
those in attendance were Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, leader of the Afghan Mujahadin
faction, Ibrahim Ghawsha, spokesman of the Palestinian Hamas, Yasser
Arafat,3 and Osama bin Laden. Additional meetings followed in December 1993
and March-April 1995.4

One 1993 communique of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference was signed by
Hassan al-Turabi, the conference's general secretary, and Hamas leader Mussa
Abu Marzook.5 Al-Turabi, who organized many of these meetings in Sudan, was
funded largely by bin Laden and both shared the goal of fostering
anti-capitalist pan-Islamism through global jihad. That a financial
beneficiary and collaborator of bin Laden signed the official communique of
this Islamist conference with the Hamas leader underscores the history of
shared goals and communications between the two organizations.

U.S. security and administration officials told the Washington Post they had
received "multiple confirmations of a meeting in
March [2003] between al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hizballah figures."6 As already
noted, there are increasing signs of a growing Hamas identification with
figures associated with the global jihad. In the last year, additionally,
Hamas publications have been extolling the writings of Abdullah Azzam with
his message of global jihad, even though after 9/11 he is well known as the
mentor of Osama bin Laden.7

Al-Qaeda and the Palestinian Issue: Differences with Hamas

Nonetheless, al-Qaeda and Hamas have had distinctly different priorities.
Al-Qaeda's weltanschauung has been notoriously global; it seeks to overthrow
all non-Islamic governments and prioritizes its war on the United States. In
his 1998 declaration of war, bin Laden issued the command to "kill the
Americans and their allies - civilians and military," adding that it "is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it."8 Hamas, on the other hand, has focused primarily on the
"liberation of Palestine," a clear euphemism for the destruction of Israel.
Yet these differing missions are complementary. Al-Qaeda encourages local
Islamist groups worldwide to carve out for themselves autonomous Islamic
regions that can be linked together globally.9

To understand al-Qaeda's primarily global focus, it is important to remember
that historically the organization did not emerge from the struggle for
"Palestine" or any of the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948, 1967, or 1973. Instead,
al-Qaeda was born in 1989 right after the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan,
where Muslim militants defeated a superpower. As a result, its entire focus
has been global, right from the start. Al-Qaeda's narrative is based on
replicating the Islamic conquests of the seventh century; just as the
Byzantine and Persian Empires were crushed with the expansion of Islam, so
al-Qaeda sees itself defeating the superpowers of the twentieth century as
well, including the U.S.

Regionally, bin Laden's priorities were, first, the removal of the infidels
from the Arabian Peninsula; second, the protection of Iraq; and only third,
the liberation of Jerusalem, as Bernard Lewis noted in 1998.10 Only recently
has bin Laden been referring extensively to the Arab-Israeli conflict, like
in his November 2004 video prior to the U.S. elections. But this has been
more the exception than the rule for al-Qaeda. Ismail abu Shanab, a Hamas
leader in the Gaza Strip, discussed the difference in priorities, noting:
"Of course the world today is fighting al-Qaeda.al-Qaeda has a different
struggle from the Palestinian struggle. We are Palestinian people under
occupation and we are resisting the occupation."11

Additionally, while Hamas has been willing to strike tactical relationships
of cooperation with Shiite groups, like Hizballah, al-Qaeda and its
offshoots are fundamentally anti-Shiite. Ideologically, Wahhabis believe
Shiites to be apostates deserving of death. They call Shiites rafidha (those
who reject mainstream Islam), kuffar (unbelievers), and mushrikun
(polytheists). Not much has changed since the 1802 sacking of Kerbala - the
holy Shiite city - by Wahhabi warriors, who put 5,000 Shiites to the sword.
In contrast, Hamas has been willing to forge strategic ties with Hizballah
and with Shiite Iran. Because of their very different approaches to
cooperation with Muslim "sectarians" in the past, Sheikh Omar Bakri
Mohammed, an extremist cleric based in London, once stated that
al-Qaeda/Hamas cooperation was unlikely.

Yet the final 9/11 Commission Report asserted that "the relationship between
al-Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shiite divisions did not
necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist
operations."12 Thus, tactical cooperation between Sunni and Shiite Muslims
was possible in the past; there should be no constraint on al-Qaeda/Hamas
cooperation in the future when it serves mutual interests.

At the same time, Hamas consistently sides with Saudi Arabia against
al-Qaeda whenever a dispute arises because Hamas was bankrolled in the past
primarily by Saudi Arabia. Hamas's Sheikh Yassin had personally condemned
al-Qaeda attacks in Saudi Arabia as serving the interests of their mutual
enemies. Yet in his 1996 Declaration of War, bin Laden refers to five Muslim
authorities including Sheikh Yassin, as well as Sheikh Salman al-Auda and
Sheikh Safar al-Hawali, two Saudis who vociferously support Hamas.13

Furthermore, there is a long history of collusion between terror groups of
dramatically opposing ideologies. For example, bin Laden called for the
lifting of sanctions against Saddam Hussein, despite despising him as a
secular heretic. The 9/11 Commission was correct in highlighting that the
Sunni and Shiite divisions did not preclude operational cooperation. Thus,
to rule out collaboration between al-Qaeda and Hamas solely based on
sectarian differences is misguided when based on theoretical considerations,
historical facts, and empirical evidence.

Understanding Al-Qaeda's Structure

Al-Qaeda is not a single organization but rather a consortium of terrorist
groups with a similar outlook dedicated to a common strategic purpose - the
spread of a militant version of Salafi Islam and the collapse of the current
international order led by the U.S. In its present form, it grew out of a
merger between bin Laden's group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad of Ayman
al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda and its network collaborate on the tactical level,
sharing assets, capabilities, and talents. For example, al-Qaeda has used
the operational networks of the Algerian GIA (Group Islamique Arme) in
Europe and has coordinated with Chechen Islamist groups, Kashmiri
organizations, and the Jemaa Islamiya in Indonesia.

Gustavo de Aristegui, a conservative member of the Spanish Congress who
headed its Foreign Affairs Committee, described the multi-level al-Qaeda
network: "Al-Qaeda has four different networks," he said. "First, there is
the original network, the one that committed 9/11....Then, there is the
ad-hoc terrorist network, consisting of franchise organizations that
al-Qaeda created." He called the third network, "a strategic union of
like-minded companies...Hamas is in, or almost in [author's emphasis]."
Aristegui blamed the Madrid train bombings on the fourth network, which he
described as "imitators [and] emulators, whose ideological foundations are
similar to al-Qaeda's."14

Previous Al-Qaeda/Hamas Operational Cooperation

There is growing evidence of al-Qaeda/Hamas collaboration:

Bin Laden sent emissaries to Hamas in September 2000 and January 2001 after
the outbreak of the intifada.15
Israel arrested three Hamas militants in 2003 after they had returned from
an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.16
Jordanian security officials reported in 2003 that two Hamas agents traveled
to Afghanistan to recruit the remnants of al-Qaeda, in a Time magazine
story, "Hamas Goes Global."17

Hamas terrorists Eyad Bak18 and Nabil Ukal were also al-Qaeda members who
had trained and colluded with other al-Qaeda cells.19 After informing Sheikh
Yassin of his activities in Afghanistan, the Hamas leader paid Ukal
$10,000.20
According to IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Moshe Yaalon, suicide bombers
Mohammed Hanif and Omar Sharif were recruited to Hamas by al-Qaeda.21 Both
were British citizens of Pakistani descent who were responsible for the
bombing of "Mike's Place" in Tel Aviv in 2003.

Shared Sources of Funding

Al-Qaeda and Hamas are often funded by the same people and organizations.
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, "Hamas [leaders]...often use
the very same methods and even the same institutions [as al-Qaeda] to raise
and move their money."22 Both organizations often draw upon so-called
"social services" and "charities" to fundraise and recruit.

Prominent Yemeni cleric Sheik Mohammed al-Hasan al-Moayad boasted of
providing money, recruits, and supplies to both al-Qaeda and Hamas.23

The U.S. and UN say that Saudi businessman Yasin Qadi funded al-Qaeda and
Hamas through two non-profit organizations.24

Bin-Laden's financial manager, Wadi el-Hage, wrote "join venture" beside his
phone book entry for the Holy Land Foundation, a non-profit organization
that funded Hamas.25

The U.S. froze assets of the Benevolence International Foundation (for
funding al-Qaeda), which had agreements to work with the Holy Land
Foundation (which funded Hamas).26

The Treasury Department announced that Bank al-Taqwa, which in 1997 funneled
$60 million to Hamas, had also funded al-Qaeda. Al-Taqwa shareholders
include individuals linked to al-Qaeda and known members of Hamas.27

The International Islamic Relief Organization branch in the Philippines,
which was headed by bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, from
1986 to 1994, served as a conduit to the Abu Sayyef organization fighting
the Filipino Army. In at least one instance, the IIRO, a Saudi-based
organization, donated $280,000 to Palestinian charities linked to Hamas.28
Sheikh Omar bin Bakri Muhammad, a well-known link between bin Laden's
network and various Palestinian organizations, said that bin Laden's
International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders
supports Hamas with money, recruitment, and propaganda.29

According to a 2004 FBI affidavit, al-Qaeda had enrolled Hamas members to
conduct surveillance of American targets.30

Joint Religious Justification for Suicide Bombing

Today, both al-Qaeda and Hamas legitimize the use of suicide bombing based
on the same religious authorities: Sheikh Salman al-Auda (Saudi), Sheikh
Safar al-Hawali (Saudi), Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaibi (Saudi), Sheikh
Sulaiman al-Ulwan (Saudi), and Sheikh Qardhawi (Egypt-Qatar). All five
clerics appear on the Hamas website, as well.

Sheikh Salman al-Auda found great prominence in Saudi Arabia through his
Wahhabi-inspired taped sermons. Once called "the most influential preacher
in Saudi Arabia," he now runs the Islamic website www.islamtoday.net.31

Sheikh Safar al-Hawali headed the Islamic studies department at Umm al-Qura
University in Mecca. He is a vociferous critic of both Israel and the West,
and his taped sermons were distributed throughout Saudi Arabia.

Sheikh al-Shuaibi's teachings were cited by bin Laden as justification for
killing Jews and Christians. The current grand mufti of Saudi Arabia and
Abdullah al-Turki, a former minister of Islamic affairs, are just two of
al-Shuaibi's many well-known students. His writings appeared in the Great
Book of Fatwas, found in a Taliban office in Kabul, Afghanistan, by allied
forces. He also wrote the preface to the book The Foundations of the
Legality of the Destruction That Befell America - which justifies the
attacks of 9/11.32

Sheikh Sulaiman al-Ulwan of Saudi Arabia is cited in a 2001 al-Qaeda video,
and his writings have been found in at least one Hamas school in Gaza.33

Sheikh Qardhawi was the first Sunni Muslim scholar to grant legitimacy to
Hamas suicide bombings.34 Qardhawi heads the Sunni studies department at
Qatar University, and is a known member of the Moslem Brotherhood. Chechen
Islamist websites have also periodically posted his religious edicts.35 One
scholar wrote that Qardhawi's teachings are the most "likely to be listened
to by the entire Islamic world,"36 and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah
personally hosted Qardhawi in early 2002.
As recently as October 2004, Hamas published a statement on its official
website that "Hamas considers the U.S. as an enemy."37 Similarly, former
Hamas leader Rantisi wrote that Hamas attacking America was not simply "a
moral and national duty - but above all, a religious one."38 Even if
ultimately Hamas does not cross the Rubicon of attacking the U.S., like
al-Qaeda, these ideological and religious predispositions certainly provide
the groundwork for a Hamas-controlled Gaza harboring al-Qaeda cells in the
future.

Al-Qaeda's "Octopus Arms"

Al-Qaeda seems to be shifting its priorities, with more frequent attacks on
Jewish and Israeli targets. In the past two years, al-Qaeda has targeted a
synagogue in Tunisia, an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya, a Jewish center in
Casablanca, synagogues in Turkey, and has attempted to enter Israel via
Jordan. In a 2003 audio tape, bin Laden's number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
threatened more attacks against Jews.39 IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon
also reported that he had received information about al-Qaeda intentions to
target Israel.40 Similarly, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said,
"al-Qaeda has sent 'octopus arms' not only into countries on the other side
of the ocean, but also to our region; as such it has made infiltration
attempts into Israel."41

Sheikh Qardhawi, one of al-Qaeda's main ideological advocates, posted a
fatwa on the website he heads, Islamonline.net, entitled: "Attacking Jewish
Interests outside the Palestinian Territories." The fatwa legitimized
attacking Jews throughout the world if "the leaders of the Islamic
resistance in Palestine see that the benefit of Palestinians dictates
attacking the interests of the States and Israel outside the Palestinian
territories."42 For Qardhawi, a Jew anywhere is tantamount to a Zionist. He
once stated that "there is hardly any fundamental difference between Judaism
and Zionism."43 Thus, both are legitimate targets in his eyes.

While the vast majority of al-Qaeda members came from Saudi Arabia,
according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Palestinians have risen to
prominent positions in the organization in the past. Besides Abdullah Azzam,
bin Laden's mentor, Abu Zubaydah, a Palestinian born in Saudi Arabia, was
al-Qaeda's chief recruiter during the 1990s before his capture in Pakistan
in 2002. In addition, Sheikh Abu Anas al-Shami, a Palestinian, served as a
spiritual mentor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, until his death in a U.S.
air-strike in 2004. Al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, sought al-Qaeda funding in
mid-2001 to infiltrate Israel.44

Implications for Gaza Disengagement

Today, al-Qaeda is increasingly decentralized and in disarray. As President
Bush often notes, two-thirds of al-Qaeda's known leadership has either been
killed or captured.45 As al-Qaeda attempts to rehabilitate itself, a danger
exists that Hamas will provide a Gaza safe-haven for international terrorist
organizations, specifically al-Qaeda. Time, money, and persistence
transformed al-Qaeda into the massive terror network it had become - despite
its humble beginnings fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Hamas'
trends indicate a greater emphasis on anti-Western rhetoric and increased
collusion with al-Qaeda. While Israel continues its fight against
Palestinian terror, Hamas is undoubtedly looking for more sources of money,
recruits, and training. They are fueled by the same Wahhabi sheikhs, mostly
from Saudi Arabia. Significantly, they are also often funded by the exact
same people.

Clearly, a dangerous mix of conditions exists for the potential aid of
al-Qaeda to Hamas and vice versa. Though the operational cooperation between
the two groups may only be intermittent today, in the global fight against
terror it is prudent to maintain a global outlook. As Israel prepares for
its disengagement, a grave threat exists that Gaza will become an
international terror base. Just as lawlessness and terror rule in the
Afghan-Pakistan border region, conditions may be similar given Israeli
disengagement from Gaza. Without an effective anti-terror network with
freedom of movement in Gaza, conditions would be ripe for a bin
Laden/Hamas-based network in Gaza. And, just as Coalition forces have found
it difficult to enter the viper's nest of terrorism - the Afghan-Pakistan
region - so too would it be difficult to enter a terrorist-ruled Gaza.
Such was the case in Lebanon in the early 1980s as well. Terrorist groups
worldwide, from the German Baader-Meinhof faction to the Japanese Red Army,
found refuge in Lebanon. From that safe haven, dozens of terror
organizations aided one another without interference from abroad. It was
only the full-scale Lebanon war of 1982 that eradicated that international
terror safe-haven.

The Strategic Envelope of Gaza and the Threat of a Security Vacuum

To prevent a safe haven for terrorism from emerging in Gaza, Israel must
maintain control over the strategic envelope around Gaza even after its
disengagement, particularly air, land, and sea access to the territory. For
example, unless Israel controls the ports, weapons ships such as the Karine
A, that was sent from Iran to the Palestinian Authority with 50 tons of
illegal arms including a ton and a half of C-4 explosives, would become
commonplace. Israeli military control over the Philadelphia corridor along
the Gaza-Egyptian border is an imperative to stop the flow of heavy weaponry
to a myriad of Palestinian terror factions. Continued Israeli control of
air-space is also necessary to prevent massive smuggling of weapons through
Gaza's airport. In the past, the PA has proven itself to be totally
incapable, or more likely totally unwilling, to dismantle the terrorist
infrastructure.

The extent to which the Gaza Strip has unimpeded access to the outside world
without Israeli security controls will determine whether a
post-disengagement Gaza becomes a sanctuary for global terrorist groups like
al-Qaeda. Historically, insurgencies and terrorism campaigns have succeeded
wherever they have been able to maintain external lines of supply.
Conversely, insurgencies have been defeated when they have been isolated.
IDF control over Gaza's access routes is imperative in order to isolate the
terrorist infrastructure.

Another factor will be Gaza's dependence on Egypt. If Gaza requires use of
al-Arish airport in northern Sinai or other sorts of access to Egypt, its
behavior can be affected by pressure from Cairo.

A third factor affecting the behavior of Hamas in Gaza will undoubtedly be
its perception of victory over Israel, with its claim to have forced
Israel's disengagement through its military struggle. In Afghanistan, the
victory of the mujahidin over the Soviet Army in the 1980s led them to adopt
global goals and create al-Qaeda. In Egypt, security forces defeated
militant Islamists in the mid-1990s and, as a result, a national dialogue
was established between the Mubarak government and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hence, a prerequisite for a successful Israeli disengagement from Gaza will
be the crushing of Hamas militarily by the Israeli Defense Forces.

Yet the success of Israel in neutralizing the emergence of an al-Qaeda
sanctuary cannot be completely assured. Israel will face enormous
international pressure to ease its grip on the strategic envelope
surrounding Gaza. European diplomats have already inquired about Israel
abandoning the Philadelphia corridor in an effort to "improve" Prime
Minister Sharon's Gaza disengagement proposal. Similarly, Western powers may
seek to limit Israel's freedom of movement to re-enter Gaza, should security
conditions deteriorate (i.e., an increase in Kassam rocket attacks on
Israel) and further military measures become necessary.

Ironically, by seeking to neutralize Israeli military power, Western states
would help to create the very sort of security vacuum in Gaza that al-Qaeda
requires in order to establish a new sanctuary. The dangers of a
semi-sovereign "Hamas-stan" providing operational, logistical, financial, or
ideological sanctuary to al-Qaeda are too real and too deadly to limit any
effective steps to totally eradicate both of these terror organizations.
* * *
Notes
1. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 366.
2. Prof. Rohan Gunaratna, presentation at conference on "Terrorism's Global
Impact," September 11-14, 2004, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel.
See also James Risen, "Evolving Nature of Al-Qaeda is Misunderstood, Critic
Says," New York Times, November 8, 2004.
3. Ami Ayalon, ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey (Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press, 1991), pp. 182-183.
4. Ibid., p. 184.
5. Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 2002), p. 180.
6. Brian Ross and Pierre Thomas, "Attack Warning," ABCNEWS.com, May 20,
2003; http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/warning020520.html
7. "The Influence of the 'Global Jihad' Network on the Hamas Movement,"
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special
Studies; www.intelligence.org.il/sp/10_04/heritage.htm
8. "Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans," Al-Quds al-'Arabi,
February 23, 1998; http://www.ict.org.il
9. Maria A. Reesa, Seeds of Terror, An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's
Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003),
p. 12.
10. Bernard Lewis, "License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of
Jihad," Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 1998.
11. Sebastian Rotella, "Israel Probes for Al Qaeda Links," Los Angeles
Times, June 17, 2003;
http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/kpbs/news.newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE_ID=510241
12. Haytham Mouzahem, "Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda: Friends or Foes?" Beirut
Daily Star, August 20, 2004;
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=7532
13. "Bin Laden's Fatwah," Online News Hour: PBS;
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html
14. Lawrence Wright, "The Terror Web," New Yorker, August 2, 2004;
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040802fa_fact
15. Jacquard, "In the Name of Osama Bin Laden," p. 64.
16. Marc Perelman, "New Islamist Network Seen Emerging from Blasts,"
Forward, May 23, 2003;
http://www.forward.com/issues/2003/03.05.23/news1.html
17. Matt Rees and Jamil Hamad, "Hamas Goes Global," Time, May 26, 2003;
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/from_redirect/0,10987,1101030526-452768,00.html
18. Kelly Wallace, "Israeli Attack Kills Hamas Military Wing Leader," CNN,
May 8, 2003; http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/08/mideast/
19. Christopher Slaney, "Israel Seeks Al Qaeda Bogeymen," Middle East Times;
http://www.metimes.com/2K2/issue2002-50/reg/israel_seeks_al.htm
20. Yoni Fighel and Yael Shahar, "The Al-Qaeda-Hizballah Connection,"
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, February 26, 2002;
http://www.ict.org.il
21. Army Radio, May 7, 2003, as reported by Daily Alert;
http://www.dailyalert.org/archive/2003-05/2003-05-09.html
22. Matthew Levitt, "The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism," MERIA,
December 2002; http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue4/jv6n4a3.html
23. Grant McCool, "U.S. Charges Two with Aiding al Qaeda and Hamas," Yahoo!
News, March 5, 2003; http://in.news.yahoo.com/030304/137/21rx2.html
24. Rita Katz and James Mitre, "Collaborating Financiers of Terror,"
National Review Online, December 16, 2002;
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-katz-mitre121602.asp
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Matthew Levitt, "Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism."
28. Matthew Levitt, "Untangling the Terror Web: Al-Qaeda is Not the Only
Element," Policywatch, October 28, 2002;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch2002/671.htm
29. Fighel and Shahar, "Al-Qaeda-Hizballah Connection."
30. Erick Stakelbeck, "Hamas in America," New York Sun, September 28, 2004;
http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=15248
31. Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York:
Paalgrave, 1999), p. 93.
32. See www.saaid.net/book/kotop.htm
33. Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi, "Al-Qaeda's Intellectual Legacy: New
Radical Islamic Thinking Justifying the Genocide of Infidels," Jerusalem
Viewpoints, #508, December 2003; http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp508.htm
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Raphael Israeli, The Iraq War (Portland: Sussex, 2004), p. 229.
37. "Hamas Designates the US 'An Enemy'," International Policy Institute for
Counter-Terrorism, October 6, 2004;
http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=1021
38. Erick Stakelbeck, "Hamas vs. America," New York Post, April 22, 2004;
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=13100
39. Marc Perelman, "New Islamist Network Seen Emerging."
40. "Al Qaeda Tried to Infiltrate Israel: Defense Chief," ABC News Online
(Australia), December 3, 2002;
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s739374.htm
41. Ibid.
42. "Attacking Jewish Interests Outside the Palestinian Territories," Islam
Online Fatwa Bank, March 25, 2004;
http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=69085
43. "Al Jazeera Programme Debates Arab Stand on Intifadah, Suicide Bombers,"
BBC Monitoring report on "Life and Religion," Al-Jazeera TV, April 28, 2002.
44. Craig Whitlock, "A Grisly Path to Power in Iraq's Insurgency,"
Washington Post, September 27, 2004.
45. "Hunt for al-Qaeda," September 9, 2003, CNN;
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0309/09/ltm.02.html
* * *
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror is former commander of the IDF's National
Defense College and the IDF Staff and Command College. He is also the former
head of the IDF's research and assessment division, with special
responsibility for preparing the National Intelligence Assessment. In
addition, he served as the military secretary of the Minister of Defense.
David Keyes is specializing on terrorism at the Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs and assisting Dr. Dore Gold. The authors would like to thank Dr.
Gold and Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi for their invaluable assistance in
preparing this study.

Dore Gold, Publisher; Yaakov Amidror, ICA Program Director; Mark Ami-El,
Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Registered Amuta), 13
Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-5619281, Fax. 972-2-5619112,
Email: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community
Studies, 5800 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21215 USA, Tel. (410)
664-5222; Fax. (410) 664-1228. Website: www.jcpa.org. © Copyright. The
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of
Fellows of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) is dedicated to providing a
forum for Israeli policy discussion and debate.