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Wednesday, January 5, 2005

(Communicated by the GPO)
Jerusalem 5 January 2005

[IMRA: Data presented by the GPO in graphs presented here in tables]

The following information was published by the Israel Security Agency (ISA,
Shin Bet)


2004 was the fourth year of the current round of the conflict with the
Palestinians. It was characterized by several trends, the most prominent of
which was a 45% drop in the number of those killed: 117 as opposed to 214 in
2003. There was a similar 41% drop in the number of those wounded: 589 as
opposed to 1004 in 2003.

This decline in the number of those wounded stems from the foiling and/or
disruption, mainly of suicide attacks. Thus, there were 15 suicide attacks
in 2004, 0.4% of the total number of terrorist attacks, which caused 55
deaths, 48% of the total number of those killed. This is in contrast to 26
suicide attacks in 2003, which caused 144 deaths. However, the number of
rocket and mortar attacks increased, with the number of deadly attacks among
them declining.

It must be pointed out that the decline in the number of suicide attacks
does not indicate any difference whatsoever in the motivation of the
terrorist organizations to attack Israeli targets. Regarding the number of
warnings throughout 2004, there was no significant change in the number of
warnings from month to month.

Number of warnings:
Jan 49 Feb 47 March 48 Apr 51 May 45 June 37
July 51 Aug 49 Sept 41 Oct 44 Nov 43 Dec 44


In 2004, the security forces foiled 367 suicide attacks in Judea and

352 Arrested in their homes(Agreed to perpetrate terror attack and were
waiting to be sent to attack)
13 Intercepted on the way to attack

In 2004, the security forces foiled an additional 159 terrorist attacks that
were on the verge of being perpetrated.

Last minute foils:

Jan 9 Feb 11 March 21 April 16 May 16 June 12
July 14 Aug 14 Sept 10 Oct 15 Nov 13 December 7


The security fence ( www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/default.htm )
continues to prove its effectiveness in Samaria-based terrorist
infrastructures from preventing large-scale deadly terrorist attacks. In
2003, these infrastructures succeeded in perpetrating 12 large-scale deadly
terrorist attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 74 people and the
wounding of 374. In 2004, these infrastructures succeeded in perpetrating
two large-scale deadly terrorist attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 14
people and the wounding of 106.

The terrorist infrastructures are trying to overcome the obstacle of the
security fence in several ways. Thus, for example, terrorist elements are
trying to bypass the fence via areas in which there is still no fence, via
the agricultural gates along the fence, via going under/over the fence, etc.
Most prominent is the trend of moving the departure points for terrorists to
Judea, where there is no fence, by using terrorist infrastructures there as
a forward platform for dispatching terrorists to Israel.

Judea had been marked approximately one year ago by Samaria-based terrorist
infrastructures as a significant weak point that must be utilized in order
to bypass the security fence. This is because extensive parts of the fence
have not been completed which enables the dispatching of terrorists to
Israel along several potential infiltration routes without Israeli tracking
systems and because the absence of a significant obstacle in the area
between Samaria and Judea allows for the relatively free movement of
terrorists and war materiel between the two areas. An example of this are
the two of the more recent suicide attacks in Israel - the 1.11.04 attack at
the Carmel Market in Tel Aviv (http://tinyurl.com/7yjr4) and the 22.9.04
attack at French Hill in Jerusalem (http://tinyurl.com/5zy5k) - and in a
series of planned attacks that have been thwarted in recent months after the
perpetrators had already gone from Samaria to Judea.

Today, the main routes for dispatching terrorists are: From Samaria via
Ramallah to Jerusalem, or from Samaria via Jerusalem's northern
neighborhoods to into the city. In this context, it should be pointed out
that 1.11.04 Tel Aviv suicide attack was perpetrated by a terrorist who -
accompanied by another terrorist - had gone from Nablus to Tapuah junction
to Kalandia to the Abu Dis area (where he joined up with an eastern
Jerusalem taxi driver) to Highway #1 to Tel Aviv. Three Israeli citizens
were murdered in the attack. The Tel Aviv bombing is a clear indicator of
the trends which strengthened among the terrorist organizations regarding
the perpetrating of attacks: Using weaker populations (the Tel Aviv attack
was perpetrated by a 16-year-old minor), and exploiting the population of
eastern Jerusalem, to perpetrate terrorist attacks.


With the construction of the security fence, which makes it difficult for
the terrorist organizations to perpetrate attacks, the terrorist
organizations have increasingly used minors and women to perpetrate suicide
attacks by exploiting their innocent appearance, in an attempt to fool
security force personnel at the various checkpoints.

2004 saw a 64% increase in the number of minors involved in terrorism, as
opposed to 2003. The innocent appearance of children and young people
arouses less suspicion and enables them to more easily blend in crowded
places. Moreover, children and teenagers are seen by the terrorist
organizations as more easily influenced and constitute an easier recruitment
base for suicide attacks.

Women are also seen as arousing less suspicion than men. In each instance
in which women were involved, the terrorists were aware of their need for a
disguise that would allow them to blend in on the Israeli street. The
terrorists tried to give themselves an overall Western appearance, including
by wearing non-traditional clothing such as short clothes, pregnancy outfits
and modern hairstyles. In most of the aforementioned incidents, the women
were from the margins of Palestinian society and did not usually fit the
"accepted" profile of "the average Palestinian woman", with the main motive
for the involvement of women in terrorism being personal (alongside the
basic nationalistic motive). Thus, for example, there is the romantic
motive (i.e. romantic links with the militants involved in recruiting them)
and the personal distress motive (i.e. suicidal tendencies in the context of
despair over life and parental opposition to the daughter's marriage).

The integration of women in terrorism is divided among various levels with
the uppermost being the involvement of women as suicide bombers or intended
suicide bombers whose intentions were foiled before they could be realized.
Moreover, women have served as assistants for terrorist activity regarding
both planning and perpetration.


2003: 59 Women 102 Minors
2004: 61 Women 168 Minors


Approximately 250,000 Palestinians (most of them residents) with Israeli
identity cards live in the Jerusalem metropolitan area, with approximately
150,000 living in eastern Jerusalem and the rest in areas adjacent to the
city. In 2004, there was a 62% increase in the involvement of eastern
Jerusalem Arabs in terrorism: 32 residents of eastern Jerusalem were
involved in terrorism in 2003, 52 in 2004.

As the terrorist organizations find it more difficult to independently
infiltrate terrorists inside the "Green Line"/Jerusalem, especially upon the
establishment of the security fence, the residents of eastern Jerusalem have
become a preferred recruitment target for the terrorist organizations,
especially Hamas, for perpetrating attacks inside Israel and the Green Line.
This is in light of their obvious advantages: freedom of movement within
Israel, knowledge of the area (especially the Jerusalem area) and the
ability to blend into the Israeli milieu.

The terrorist organizations' motive in recruiting these populations is
two-fold: On the one hand, like other Israeli citizens, they hold Israeli ID
and driver's licenses, which gives them freedom of movement and access to a
greater range of targets. Moreover, their familiarity with the Hebrew
language and Israeli culture enables these residents to succeed in creating
social and economic ties with Jews and in integrating with them. On the
other hand, they continue to be loyal - and maintain ties - to the

The involvement of eastern Jerusalem also features in the logistical
planning ahead of perpetrating terrorist attacks and mainly includes renting
safe flats to serve as jumping-off points, purchasing vehicles and war
materiel, setting up explosives laboratories and preparing suicide
terrorists before they set out.


Another noticeable trend in 2004 was increased involvement in Palestinian
terrorism by Iran and Hezbollah, as Iran's forward military arm against
Israel. Hezbollah has activated dozens of terror cells in the Gaza Strip
and in Judea and Samaria; in 2004, these cells perpetrated 68 terrorist
attacks in which 24 Israelis were murdered and 52 wounded. This represents
21% of the total number of fatalities.

Hezbollah has organized itself in a similar way to Palestinian terror groups
such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Specifically noticeable are
instructions to perpetrate large-scale deadly attacks within Israeli
territory, negotiating between terrorists active in a variety of different
types of terror activity, and a concentrated effort to upgrade its terrorist
capabilities, which is seen in three main channels: information-sharing on
explosives, weapons smuggling, recruiting new terrorists. In addition
Hezbollah transfers large amounts of money to various terrorist

Funding terrorism

The large funds transferred by Hezbollah, as well as by Hamas and Islamic
Jihad HQs in Syria, are the fuel for motivating terrorism. Terrorist
leaders often make a living from their terrorist activities, despite the
fact that they are not involved in it for ideological reasons. Moreover,
suicide terrorists are often recruited due to financial or social problems,
and are promised that their families will be looked after, after their

In 2004 a number of senior Tanzim terrorists were arrested, and during their
investigations they told the ISA about a 'price list for suicide terrorist
rates' including:

Ahmed Sa'ari Hassin, Islamic Jihad terrorist from Tulkarm:

He was involved in the 30.3.03 suicide terrorist attack in Netanya in which
32 citizens were wounded. He received NIS 10,000 up front from the Islamic
Jihad in Tulkarm. A Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist told him that he would
receive more money only after he perpetrated the attack.

Va'il Ah'naam, Tanzim terrorist from Tulkarm refugee camp.

Ah'naam had connections with a Lebanese terrorist who gave him:
$7,000 to prepare explosives.
$1,500 to purchase weapons. (The money was transferred to his sister's bank
$10,000 to finance his military operations. (The money was transferred to
various women's bank accounts with whom he had a relationship.)

Muntsar Abu-A'liyon, Tanzim leader in Jenin

He was involved in targeting and financing many terror attacks, including
four shooting ambushes in June 2003 in which four civilians were murdered.
During his investigation he said that the base cost of perpetrating a terror
attack is between NIS 3,000 - NIS 5,000.



2003 Civilians 153 Security forces 61 Total 214
2004 Civilians 76 Security forces 41 Total 117


2003 Civilians 796 Security forces 208 Total 1004
2004 Civilians 394 Security forces 195 Total 589


2003: Attacks 26 Victims 144
2004 Attacks 15 Victims 55


Shooting: 2003: 2111 2004:
Kassam rockets: 2003: 105 2004: 309
Mortar shells: 2003: 708 2004: 1231
Explosives: 2003: 463 2004: 592


Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
Stabbing attacks and grenades: 2003: 5 2004: 2
Anti-Tank missiles & RPG: 2003: 7 2004: 6
Shootings: 2003: 83 2004: 31
Mortars: 2003: 3 2004: 11
Explosives: 2003: 14 2004: 33
Suicide shootings: 2003: 5 2004: 4
Rockets: 2003:0 2004: 8
Car bombs: 2003: 0 2004: 2

In 2004, the Tanzim perpetrated 97 terrorist attacks, as opposed to 117 in
2003. The data shows that the Tanzim began the year with rocket attacks as
part of the terrorist organizations' general effort to launch rockets at
Israeli targets even though no rocket attacks were attributed to it in 2003.
Similarly, it is possible to discern a massive decline in the number of
Tanzim-perpetrated shooting attacks.

Stabbing attacks and grenades: 2003: 2 2004: 5
Anti-Tank missiles & RPG: 2003: 13 2004: 78
Shootings: 2003: 25 2004: 27
Mortars: 2003: 45 2004: 275
Explosives: 2003: 34 2004: 44
Suicide shootings : 2003: 13 2004: 3
Rockets: 2003: 86 2004: 122
Car bombs: 2003: 0 2004: 1

In 2004, Hamas perpetrated 555 terrorist attacks, as opposed to 218 in 2003.
In 2004 we witnessed a massive increase in the number of attacks perpetrated
by Hamas, along with a change in the character of the attacks. The increase
was seen in the number of Kassam rockets and mortar shells launched, while
there was a marked decrease in the number of suicide attacks. In 2004 there
was a 500% increase in mortar fire and a 40% increase in Kassam rocket fire
in comparison with 2003. There was a 77% decrease in the number of suicide
attacks in comparison with 2003.

Islamic Jihad
Grenades: 2003: 1 2004: 3
Anti-Tank missiles & RPG: 2003: 12 2004: 19
Shootings: 2003: 30 2004: 34
Mortars: 2003: 5 2004: 16
Explosives: 2003: 13 2004: 17
Suicide: 2003: 6 2004: 0
Rockets: 2003: 2 2004: 17
Car bombs: 2003: 2 2004: 0

In 2004, Islamic Jihad perpetrated 106 terror attacks as opposed to 71 in
2003. Islamic Jihad did not realize one suicide attack in 2004, as opposed
to the six attacks it perpetrated in 2003. Islamic Jihad did increase its
activities in high-trajectory weapon fire from two terrorist attacks in 2003

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