[IMRA: Focus on the demographic issue appears to take as axiomatic that the
right of self determination for the Palestinian population residing in the
Gaza Strip and West Bank cannot be realized via an autonomy within an
Israeli envelope, as Rabin , Peres and almost all Israelis thought only a
few years ago. Looking back over the last ten years it can be noted that
the "demographic issue" took prominence when the miserable failure of Oslo
along with the growing effectiveness of Israeli security forces against the
"intifada" stripped withdrawal advocates of the security justification for
withdrawal.]
Jerusalem Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family Foundation
Vol. 4, No. 19 - 10 March 2005
What is the True Demographic Picture in the West Bank and Gaza?
- A Presentation and a Critique
Bennett Zimmerman and Prof. Sergio DellaPergola
Bennett Zimmerman, Dr. Roberta Seid, and Dr. Michael Wise of the
American Research Initiative presented their demographic findings on January
23, 2005.
A critique of their findings by leading Hebrew University demographer
Prof. Sergio DellaPergola followed.
American Research Initiative:
* Based on PA population projections, it is claimed that we have
reached a point of population parity between Jews and Arabs in the land
between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea, and that with such a high
Arab growth rate, Jews would soon become a minority in the land.
* Instead of looking at a demographic projection, our methodology was
to go back every year to 1990 and find the actual number of births, deaths,
who entered and left the country, and add up the number. Putting it all
together, we come to a final figure of 1.35 million in the West Bank and
1.07 million in Gaza, for a total of 2.4 million instead of 3.8 million
claimed by the PA.
* The PA projected that in 2001, the success of the Oslo process would
mean 50,000 immigrants a year streaming into the territories. According to
border data, since 1994 there has been a net emigration of 10,000-20,000
people per year leaving the land. If 50,000 were expected to arrive and
instead 10,000 are leaving, this would account for an exaggeration of 60,000
a year in the PA's population forecasts.
* Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics does not count as part of the
country's population those who leave the country and have not returned after
one year. However, the Palestinians counted those who had been abroad for
five or ten years.
Professor DellaPergola:
* There are more than 1,300,000 Arabs who are a part of the State of
Israel, and I estimate there are another 3.4 million Palestinians in Judea,
Samaria, and Gaza (based on Israeli data and not on the Palestinian census),
bringing the Arab total to 4.7 million, out of a total population between
the river and the sea of 10,263,000. Of these, 51 percent are Jews.
Furthermore, the high level of fertility of the Arabs gives them demographic
momentum.
* By 2020, on the whole territory, according to a medium projection
which assumes decline of Arab fertility, Jews will be about 47 percent of
the total and by 2050 they might be 37 percent.
* The Jewish fertility rate has not fallen as in other advanced
societies, especially in Europe, and stands today at 2.7 children. However,
the fertility rate of Israeli Muslims has remained virtually constant since
1985 at 4.5 children.
Bennett Zimmerman:
Who Has a Majority in the Land of Israel?
The basis for most of the population statistics for the West Bank and Gaza
are currently numbers that come from the Palestinian Authority's Central
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). In December 1997 the PA announced the results
of a census in which they set the population in the territories at 2.9
million people, including eastern Jerusalem. At the same time, the PA issued
a chart which projected a population growth of 4-5 percent a year, which in
2004 would give them a total of 3.83 million. Analysts then took that 3.8
million figure, added the 1.3 million Israeli Arabs, and concluded that we
have reached a point of population parity between Jews and Arabs in the land
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. It was also observed
that with such a high Arab growth rate, Jews would soon become a minority in
the land.
The American Research Initiative team decided to examine the published
population figures of the PCBS from a number of perspectives, and concluded
that both the base figure and the population growth rates issued by the PCBS
were dramatically different from our actual measurements. A 1.4 million gap
emerged, with our research indicating that the PA population is closer to
2.4 million than to the 3.8 million figure reported by the PCBS. These
numbers indicate that the Jewish population between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea stands at 60 percent Jewish to 40 percent Arab, similar to
the ratio that existed in 1967.
There are four main sources for Palestinian statistics: the PCBS, which
conducted the census and reports the population projection; the Palestinian
Ministry of Health (MOH), which reports every year on births and deaths, by
district; the Palestinian Ministry of Education, which reports on the number
of children entering first grade; and the Central Election Commission,
offering its data from the parliamentary elections of 1996 and from the
recent municipal and presidential elections in the Palestinian Authority,
which contained a wealth of information about the number of adults eligible
to vote in those elections.
Israel also collected statistics on the West Bank and Gaza during the period
when the civil administration was in existence there, and the last figures
were published in 1996. There is also Israeli data on border crossings.
Counting Actual Births, Deaths, and Exits, Instead of Using Projections
Instead of looking at a demographic projection, our methodology was to go
back every year to 1990 and find the actual number of births, deaths, who
entered and left the country, and add up the number. Then we sought to
corroborate those numbers with the most recent data available from the
Palestinian Authority.
In 1997, the PA projected that births in the territories would now be at a
level of over 140,000 per year. Yet the PA Ministry of Health has reported
birth rates at a level significantly below those projected. In addition,
Palestinian data showed a dramatic decline in the natural growth rate (birth
minus deaths) in the Palestinian territories until 2002, when the rate went
back up.
Furthermore, the Palestinian statistics were out of sync with the Arab
growth rate in Jordan and other Arab countries. It was the only society in
the world reporting a high life expectancy at the same time as an
astronomically high birth rate.
Because the Palestinian birth rate started to decline, in order to maintain
the 4-5 percent growth assumption, the PA said, starting in 1997, that once
the year 2001 comes, the success of the Oslo process will mean 50,000
immigrants a year streaming into the territories. Now according to the
border data, since 1994 there has been a net emigration of 10,000-20,000
people per year leaving the land. If 50,000 were expected to arrive and
instead 10,000 are leaving, this factor alone would account for an
exaggeration of 60,000 a year in the PA's population forecasts.
Israel's last public statistic for the Palestinian population in the West
Bank and Gaza was 2.1 million. The Palestinian Ministry of Health's number
in December 1996 was 2.27 million, a difference of only 150,000 from
Israel's figure. Then, with the release of the data in mid-1998 for the
December 1997 census, the PA claimed a population of 2.895 million - a huge
jump. Part of this increase is definitional, and includes the population of
eastern Jerusalem.
Including Overseas Palestinians in the Count
There is more than one way to count population. There is the de facto
population of those who actually live in the territories, and the de jure or
legal population, those who have ID with the right to come back but might
not be in the territories at the time. In its census, the Palestinian
Authority said it was reporting the de facto number and also including
Palestinians who have lived abroad for more than one year. Israel's Central
Bureau of Statistics does not count as part of the country's population
those who leave the country and have not returned after one year. However,
the Palestinians counted those who had been abroad for five or ten years.
The Palestinian census resulted in a 300,000 jump - which corresponds to the
World Bank's report in September 1993 that some 300,000-350,000 Palestinians
with Israeli-issued IDs were living abroad. Furthermore, in October 2004 the
Palestinian Central Election Commission said that 200,000 adults - which
translates into approximately 400,000 people or 13 percent of the
Palestinian Arab population - were living abroad, again confirming that very
gap. The Commission also reported that the number of eligible voters over
the age of 18 who were living in the territories was only 1.3 million, not
the 1.85 million predicted and still claimed by the PCBS.
Explaining the 1.4 Million Gap
The American Research Initiative calculated a population of 1.35 million in
the West Bank and 1.07 million in Gaza for a total of 2.42 million in the
territories at the beginning of 2004 by correcting the following errors:
* Fewer births: The PA MOH recorded fewer annual births between 1996
and 2003 than the PCBS had predicted for each of those years. Reduction:
238,000
* Retrospective alterations of recorded birth data: The MOH
retroactively changed the number of births that were recorded in prior
years. For example, in 2001 it changed the previously reported birth data
for 1996, 1997, and 1998, increasing the number of births by approximately
11 percent. These alterations increased the number of Palestinian births
between 1996 and 2003. Reduction: 81,000
* Net emigration: Instead of the large immigration originally forecast
by the PA, the territories experienced a steady net emigration. The PCBS
predicted 236,000 would move into the territories between 1996 and 2003.
Instead, 74,000 left. Reduction: 310,000
* Internal migration: Other emigration occurred from the West Bank and
Gaza into Israel itself. Our study accounts for those immigrants who have
legally received Israeli IDs according to the Israel Ministry of Interior.
Once they are included in the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics reports,
they must be removed from the PA count. Reduction: 150,000
* Illegal immigration: Our report did not account for illegal migrants
from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel because there are no reliable
sources documenting this migration.
* Double counting: Jerusalem Arabs who are already counted in Israel's
population survey were also counted in the PA 1997 census. Reduction:
210,000
* Inclusion of non-residents: The PCBS included people who had been
living abroad for over one year - in many cases for several years - if they
ever held residential identity cards. They comprised 13 percent of the PA's
reported population. Reduction: 374,000
* * *
Sergio DellaPergola:
Jews Total 51 Percent in the Land of Israel; Arabs Have Demographic Momentum
Between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River the estimated population
includes about 5.2 million Jews and another 300,000 non-Jews who are
immigrants under the Law of Return and sociologically quite integrated
within the mainstream of Israeli society. There are also more than 1,300,000
Arabs who are a part of the State of Israel within the "green line." I
estimate there are another 3.4 million Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and
Gaza, bringing the Arab total to 4.7 million, out of a total population
between the sea and the river of 10,263,000. Of this number, 51 percent are
Jews and 3 percent are non-Jewish members of Jewish households, for a total
of 54 percent. Eastern Jerusalem residents are not double counted in these
estimates. Were we to include the temporary foreign workers, the share of
Jews would be reduced by 2 percent. Furthermore, the high level of fertility
and young age-composition of the Arabs gives them demographic momentum.
By 2020, on the whole territory, according to a medium projection which
assumes decline of Arab fertility, Jews will be about 47 percent of the
total and by 2050 they might be 37 percent. No migrations of Palestinians
were taken into account in these projections. Any net migration since 1995
and the natural increase pertaining to those migrants should be factored
into the projections.
Also, the Jewish population worldwide has increased very little over the
last 50 years. It is close to zero population growth, whereas the
Palestinians have a high rate of fertility. Since 1990, Israel has absorbed
1.2 million immigrants, mostly from the former Soviet Union. However, that
large reservoir is now nearly depleted. The prospects are quite distant for
large-scale immigration from Western countries where most diaspora Jews
live. There exists a significant negative correlation between the standard
of living in a country and the propensity of Jews from the same country to
immigrate to Israel.
Using the official data of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, there is
a net balance of Arabs who have joined Israeli society within the "green
line" since the 1990s, but this barely totals 20,000 people, whereas most of
the increase in the Muslim population in Israel is due to the difference
between the birth rate and the death rate - the natural increase. Even if
the number of Arabs crossing the "green line" is higher - as Israel's
Ministry of Interior maintains - this does not affect the total demographic
balance between the Mediterranean and the Jordan.
Jewish Fertility Higher Than in Europe
The fertility rate is obtained by computing the number of children that
would be born on the average to a woman if the trend of that year remained
constant, though trends are not constant and there are fluctuations. There
is extraordinary stability in the fertility rate of the Jewish population.
Unlike other advanced societies, especially in Europe and to some extent
also in North America, the fertility rate did not go down. This is explained
in terms of the peculiar social and cultural framework of Jewish society.
Also, there are sub-groups with higher fertility and sub-groups with lower
fertility.
The fertility rate of Israeli Christians, who are Arab ethnics, has indeed
gone down to a level which is even less than that of the Jews.
Interestingly, the Druze birth rate has declined from a high plateau that
was maintained up to the 1970s, and has converged down to the level of the
Israeli Jewish population, which stands today at 2.7 children. This is a
very high level considering that a Catholic country like Italy has 1.2,
Spain the same, Greece the same, and Russia even less.
Israeli Muslim Fertility Quite High
The fertility rate of Israeli Muslims within the "green line" reached a
spectacular peak in the 1960s of about 10 children on the average,
diminishing sharply to 4.5 by 1985, and then remaining virtually constant
for the next twenty years, notwithstanding the very significant
modernization and the rise in education of Muslim women in Israel. Today the
fertility of Israeli Muslims is significantly higher than that of Arabs in
many neighboring countries. Fertility of the Palestinians in the territories
seems logically more connected to that of Israeli Muslims than to that of
other Arab countries.
The population base I used for the Palestinians comes from Israeli data and
is not based on the Palestinian census of 1997. I took the base population
from the Israeli authorities that were responsible for data collection in
the territories. At the point they stopped collecting the data, I updated
the figures based on the rate of growth that was prevalent at that time.
Thanks to the Israeli presence in the territories, infant mortality there
declined dramatically and life expectancy went up to a level comparable to
some European countries and definitely much better than most Arab countries
and even Russia.
Furthermore, we are aware that during not only the 1970s but also during the
1960s, much before the Israelis entered at all, there was a definite
negative migration balance between the Palestinian territories and other
countries, including the formation of large communities not only in Jordan
but also in the Gulf countries. That has been a very significant process in
keeping the population growth lower. However, after the Gulf War some people
reentered, and opportunities for leaving have diminished significantly.
The fundamental issue in this debate is not the specific percentage of the
current Jewish majority, or the specific date at which Jews will lose their
majority over the whole territory. The crucial demographic dimension
concerns the quality of Israel as a Jewish and democratic society. This
cannot be preserved under the present and foreseeable demographic trends
unless significant decisions are made concerning Israel's territorial
definition.
* * *
The American Research Initiative is headed by Bennett Zimmerman,
former strategic analyst at the international management consulting firm
Bain & Company; Dr. Roberta Seid, historian and researcher in the non-profit
sector; and Dr. Michael Wise, founder and director of a number of public
companies in the high technology sector.
Prof. Sergio DellaPergola, of the A. Harman Institute of
Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is senior fellow
and project head at the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute in
Jerusalem. This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based on their presentations at the
Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem on January 23, 2005.
This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:
www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-19.htm
Dore Gold, Publisher; Yaakov Amidror, ICA Program Director; Mark Ami-El,
Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Registered Amuta), 13
Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-5619281, Fax. 972-2-5619112,
Email: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community
Studies, 5800 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21215; Tel. 410-664-5222;
Fax 410-664-1228. Website: www.jcpa.org. C Copyright. The opinions expressed
herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Fellows of the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) is dedicated
to providing a forum for Israeli policy discussion and debate.
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