Peace Index: April 2005
Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann

Although a clear majority of the Jewish public supports the disengagement
plan, in recent months a certain erosion has occurred in the rate of the
support. Moreover, in light of the proposal to postpone the plan's
implementation from July to August, only a minority think it will be carried
out on the new date, especially if the opponents of the evacuation succeed
in mobilizing masses of people at the moment of truth-a mobilization that a
large majority of the public, including disengagement supporters, views as a
legitimate action. Although only a very small minority believes such a
mobilization will foil the plan, many, especially among the plan's
supporters, fear the possibility that at the moment of truth the evacuation
opponents among the settlers will use weapons against IDF soldiers.

The pessimistic atmosphere surrounding the disengagement plan is apparently
augmented by the widespread assessment that if it is ultimately implemented,
the Palestinian Authority will not succeed in creating a well-functioning
regime and chaos will prevail in the Gaza Strip, with violent struggles
erupting between the different organizations. Indeed, a majority believes
that after the departure of IDF forces from Gaza, attacks against Israel
from the area, such as Kassam rocket fire, will intensify. At the same time,
despite and perhaps because of the pessimistic expectations about the
situation in the Strip after the IDF's withdrawal, most of the public
believes that regarding the houses and other property of the settlers that
will remain behind, it suits Israel's interests to reach an agreement with
the PA and not to destroy all of it and thereby worsen the Palestinian
hostility.

As for the possibility of introducing a "third party" to help the PA control
the situation after the IDF's withdrawal, a majority of the Jewish public is
prepared to accept only U.S. involvement while rejecting the intervention of
other bodies such as Russia, Egypt, the European Union, the Quartet, or the
United Nations, in that order of rejection.

Those are the main findings of the Peace Index survey for April that was
conducted on Monday and Tuesday, May 2-3.
The rates of support and opposition to the disengagement plan among the
Jewish public are currently 56% and 38% (6% have no clear position on the
issue). In the previous month these rates were 59% and 36%, and in February
they came to 62% and 29%. In other words, the past three months have seen a
small but consistent and significant trend of declining public support for
the plan, though it continues to enjoy a clear majority, including among
Likud voters.

In light of the proposal to postpone carrying out the plan from July to
August, it turns out that only 35% now believe it will be implemented on the
set date. Some 37% think it will be postponed again, and 12% do not expect
it to be carried out at all (16% do not know). The uncertainty regarding the
date for implementing the disengagement plan is increased by the possibility
that its opponents will be able to mobilize masses of people at the moment
of truth: 51% of the Jewish public believe a mobilization of this kind will
cause the postponement of the plan, compared to 36% who think it will
nevertheless be carried out on time. However, only 7% believe a wide-scale
mobilization could totally subvert the plan's implementation. As for the
question of whether such a mass mobilization is a legitimate action by
opponents of government policy in a democratic regime, it turns out that a
large majority of the public-65.5%-hold the view that it is indeed
legitimate, with only 28.5% saying it is not (the rest have no position).
Furthermore, a segmentation of the positions on this issue between
supporters and opponents of the disengagement plan shows that even among the
supporters a clear majority regards such an action as legitimate (61% vs.
34%), while among the opponents of the plan the corresponding rates are 74%
and 20%.

Beyond, however, the possibility that the settlers and their supporters will
use legitimate measures, a considerable portion of the Jewish
public-40%-fear that there are medium or high chances that at the moment of
truth, settlers will use weapons against IDF soldiers in the course of the
evacuation (55% say the chances of this are low, and 4.5% do not know).
Interestingly, the fear of use of weapons by the settlers is higher among
the supporters of the disengagement plan (48%) than among its opponents
(32%).

Another source of worry about the disengagement plan concerns assessments of
the situation in the Gaza Strip after the departure of IDF forces. A
considerable majority of the public-64%-think that if the plan is ultimately
carried out, the PA will not be able to establish its rule in the area and a
state of chaos will reign, with violent struggles between the different
organizations. Only 23% believe the Authority will succeed in establishing
its rule, and 14% do not know. The view that the PA will not be able to set
up a well-functioning regime encompasses most of the opponents as well as
supporters of the disengagement plan, although, perhaps not surprisingly, it
is more widespread among the former. Thus, 86% of the opponents think that
after the IDF withdrawal the situation will be chaos, 6% believe the
Authority will be able to establish its rule, and 8% do not know. The
corresponding rates among the supporters of the plan are 50%, 34%, and 16%.
Negative assessments are also widespread regarding the security situation
within Israel after the withdrawal from Gaza. Thus, 63% of the entire Jewish
public share the view that the chances of intensified attacks against Israel
from this area (for example, Kassam missile fire) are very high or
moderately high, compared to only 29% who think such chances are very low or
moderately low. It is interesting that even among the plan's supporters a
majority, albeit small, shares this assessment. As expected, the majority
holding this opinion among the opponents is much larger .

As for the position Israel should take regarding the future of the houses
and other property of the settlers that will stay behind after the
evacuation, it turns out that a small but significant majority (51% vs. 40%)
believes that from the standpoint of Israel's interests, it is preferable to
reach an agreement with the PA rather than to destroy all of it. An analysis
of the findings reveals that the positions on this issue are closely related
to the positions on the disengagement plan: among the supporters of the
plan, 64% favor reaching a settlement with the Authority, 29% prefer
destroying all the property, and 7% do not know, whereas among the
opponents, 60% favor destruction, 32% prefer an agreement, and 8% do not
know. Presumably, those who support reaching an agreement on the issue of
the settlers' property, instead of destroying it, believe such an approach
will help in establishing the PA's rule and reduce the danger that Gaza will
serve as a base for attacks against Israel.

On the background of the pessimistic assessments about the situation in Gaza
after the IDF leaves, we checked the Jewish public's views about the
possibility of "third-party" involvement that would be aimed at helping the
PA prevent disorder and attacks against Israel. We presented to the
interviewees a list of bodies that could play such a role and asked whether
each one was acceptable or unacceptable to them. The findings show that from
a list that included six bodies-the United States, Russia, the Quartet, the
European Union, Egypt, and the United Nations-only the first is acceptable
to a majority of the public, with 68% in favor, 29% against, and 3% lacking
an opinion. As for all the other bodies, there are higher rates of rejection
than acceptance, in the following order: Russia-70% rejection and 24%
acceptance; Egypt-62.5% and 32.5%; the European Union-59% and 35%; the
Quartet-55% and 38%; the United Nations-51% and 44%. In other words, the
Jewish public is prepared to trust only American involvement, while
expressing distrust of all the other states and bodies included in the list.
A similar pattern of opinions on other issues where the possibility of
third-party involvement in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was
raised, emerged in earlier inquiries in the Peace Index framework.

Indexes:
Oslo: General-40.3; Jews-36.8.
Negotiation: General-58.0; Jews-54.9.

The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace
Research and the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution of Tel
Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann. The
telephone interviews were conducted by the B. I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv
University on May 2-3, 2005, and included 578 interviewees who represent the
adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and
the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5%
in each direction.