The Imperative to Use Force Against Iranian Nuclearization

By Prof. Efraim Inbar

BESA Center Perspectives No. 12, December 15, 2005

www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives12.html

Executive Summary: A nuclear Iran constitutes a serious threat, not only to
the Middle East, but also to the entire world.. Diplomatic efforts have
failed to halt Iran's nuclear program. As the Iranian acquisition of a
military nuclear ability nears, the threat of using force, and even the
actual use of force, seem to be the only viable preventive measures. Israel
cannot live in a nuclear 'balance of terror' with Iran. Military action
against Iranian nuclear installations has many risks and is complicated, but
the difficulty is exaggerated, and inaction is bound to bring about far
worse consequences.

Introduction

Iran is growing closer every day to acquiring nuclear weapons. Teheran has
managed to cheat on the IAEA inspections and has built a
militarily-significant nuclear program. Iran has resisted all diplomatic
pressures to discontinue its progress towards nuclearization and currently
seems intent on producing highly-enriched uranium, which constitutes the
final and critical stage in building a nuclear bomb. Moreover, Iran
possesses Sheehab-3 long-range missiles (range: 1,500 kilometers) that can
probably be nuclear-tipped, and is currently working on further extending
the range of its ballistic arsenal.

For Israel, the tripartite combination of a radical Islamic regime,
long-range missile capability and nuclear weapons is extremely dangerous.
Indeed, Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, recently termed the Iranian
program "a grave threat" stressing that Israel "cannot accept a nuclear
Iran" (December 1, 2005). The Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Force
(IDF), Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz offered a similar evaluation (December 4, 2005),
while a few days earlier the Chief of the IDF Intelligence Department, Maj.
Gen. Aharon Zeevi (Farkash) warned that March 2006 constitutes the 'point of
no return'; i.e., after that date, any diplomatic efforts to curtail the
Iranian nuclear program will be pointless.

This article analyzes the nature of the Iranian threat, the available
options for halting that country's nuclear program, and the viability of a
military strike aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear effort.

The Nature of the Threat

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the greatest and most urgent threat to the
new regional order in the Middle East and to American hegemony in world
affairs. Iran actively supports the insurgency in Iraq against the
establishment of a pro-American regime that is clearly more liberal than
that of Saddam Hussein. Teheran encourages the radical Shiite elements in
Iraq in order to promote the establishment of another Islamic republic. It
opposes a more liberal regime that could potentially serve as a catalyst for
democratization in the area.

Moreover, Iran is allied with Syria, another radical state with an
anti-American predisposition, and seeks to create a radical corridor from
Iran to the Mediterranean. Iran also lends critical support to terrorist
organizations such as Hizbullah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Indeed, the Iranian nuclear program is primarily designed to provide a
strategic response to American hegemony in world affairs. Teheran wants to
be able to continue to oppose American policies and to deter possible
American action against the radical Islamic regime.

At the same time, its nuclear program threatens regional stability in the
Middle East. The emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran would inevitably have a
chain-effect, generating further proliferation in the region. Mideastern
leaders, who invariably have high threat perceptions, are unlikely to look
nonchalantly on a nuclear Iran. States such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and, of course, Iraq would hardly be able to resist the temptation to
counter Iranian influence by adopting similar nuclear postures.

A multi-polar nuclear Middle East would be a recipe for disaster.

A nuclear Iran would also enhance Iranian hegemony in the oil-rich Persian
Gulf area, as well as in the Caspian Basin. Giving revolutionary Iran a
handle over this energy reservoir, which contains much of the world's
hydrocarbon reserves, would further strengthen Iran's position in the energy
market. Because such a position would also make Iran's containment even more
difficult, it would necessarily embolden Islamic radicals everywhere.

The nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran are, of course, a
challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime (the NPT)
and to American attempts to curb proliferation in other parts of the world.
Further improvements in Iranian missiles would initially put most European
capitals, and eventually, the North American continent too, within range of
a potential Iranian attack. Uzi Rubin, the father of the Israeli Arrow
missile program, said last week (at a conference organized by the BESA
Center) that the Iranian capability to launch a satellite - an ability that
Iran is aggressively pursuing -- amounts to the country's possession of
intercontinental missiles.

The Inadequacy of a "Balance of Terror"

As noted, Israel has shown deep concern about developments in Iran. The
despicable statements made by new Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedinijad
calling for the obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East
(October and December 2005), only reinforced Israel's fears. Such Iranian
statements from high-ranking officials cannot be dismissed as pure rhetoric;
they reflect a policy preference.

Israeli fears stem from deep skepticism regarding the possibility of
achieving stable deterrence with a nuclear Iran. Unfortunately, there are
policy wonks in Israel, the U.S. and elsewhere who belittle such fears by
releasing rosy evaluations regarding a potentially stable "balance of
terror" between Israel and Iran, modeled on the relationship between the two
superpowers during the Cold War.

Such a bilateral relationship, where the two sides deter each other, cannot
be easily emulated in the Middle East. A "balance of terror" between two
nuclear protagonists is never automatic, and could not be taken for granted
even between the US and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the situation in
the Middle East is even less stable.

A second-strike capability, which allows a state to respond in kind after
being subjected to a nuclear attack, is critical in establishing credible
deterrence. During the Cold War, submarines were the main platform for any
second-strike capability; the difficulty in locating them under water
rendered them less vulnerable to an enemy first-strike attack. Indeed, the
Soviet Union and the US relied primarily on the survivability and mobility
of submarines, characteristics that would enable them to carry out a
second-strike with nuclear-tipped missiles.

While the superpowers possessed large submarine fleets, it is doubtful that
Israel owns enough submarines to do the job. It is unclear whether the
country's current fleet of three Dolphin-class submarines, to be augmented
by the end of the decade by two additional vessels just purchased in
Germany, is adequate. Do the Israeli submarines carry enough punch to deter
adversaries?

In this context, it is important to note that no fleet can ever be fully
operational. Some vessels are in port for maintenance, while others are en
route to the designed attack area, or on their way back to the homeport.
Furthermore, the most appropriate launching area in the Indian Ocean is far
away from Israel.

More significant is the fact that maintaining a second-strike capability is
an ongoing process requiring continuous improvement, which depends to a
large extent on the adversary's actions. Such a process is inherently
uncertain and ambiguous. Moreover, before an initial "effective"
second-strike capability is achieved, a nuclear race may create the fear of
a first-strike nuclear attack, which might in itself trigger a nuclear
exchange. This is all the more probable because adequate warning systems
cannot be erected when the distances between enemies are so small, as is the
case in the Middle East. The influence of haste and the need to respond
quickly can be extremely dangerous.

While it can be argued that Mideastern leaders behave rationally, their
sensitivity to costs and their attitudes to human life hardly conform to
Western values. Iranian leaders have said that they are ready to pay a heavy
price for the destruction of the Jewish state. Such an inclination raises
questions as to the effectiveness of Israeli nuclear deterrence.

The Inadequacy of a Defensive Posture

The uncertainties surrounding Israel's ability to parry a nuclear missile
attack are an additional factor leading Israeli strategists to fear a
hostile nuclear Iran. Missiles are the most effective means of delivering
nuclear weapons. In 1991, Israel was subject to several attacks by
conventionally armed Scud-C missiles from Iraq.

It is true that since the late 1980s Israel has been engaged in developing
its own ballistic missile defense system based on the Arrow missile, which
is designed to intercept the family of Scud missiles. Since 2000, the
country has deployed two operational batteries of Arrow missiles.

Just this month (on December 2), Israel launched an Arrow missile that
successfully intercepted a mock-up of an Iranian Shihab-3 missile (a
derivative of the Scud). The goal of the test was to expand the range of
Arrow missiles to a higher altitude and to evaluate the interface between
the Arrow and the American improved Patriot missile system, which is meant
to go into operation if the Arrow fails to shoot down its target. The
interception of a missile armed with a nuclear head at a lower altitude by
the Patriot system is, of course, problematic.

While this test and others have proven that that the Arrow does hit its
target, no defense system is foolproof. And indeed, those who developed the
Arrow do not claim a one hundred percent interception rate. Moreover, it is
not clear how the Arrow will function if enemy missiles are equipped with
countermeasures.

Israel has hitherto had the upper hand in the technological race, but there
are no assurances that this will always be so. The difficulties Israel faces
in dealing with Katyushas, Qassams and tunnels show that Israeli ingenuity
may not come up with immediate adequate responses. Even if solutions are
eventually devised, there may be windows of vulnerability, which could be of
catastrophic dimensions in a nuclear scenario.

In summary, the uncertainties regarding Israel's ability to establish stable
deterrence and the technological uncertainties of a defensive system lead to
the inescapable conclusion that Israel's security is best served by denying
Iran a nuclear bomb. Teheran's military nuclear program must be stopped.

Blocking Iran's Nuclear Aspirations

There are several ways to deal with the Iranian nuclear challenge.

Diplomacy

The current European approach, which Washington decided to go along with for
a while, is to provide incentives to Iran to cooperate on the nuclear issue.
Yet, this policy, that cannot but be termed appeasement, has little chance
of halting the progress of those components in the Iranian nuclear program
that are significant in producing a bomb. Indeed, the Iranians have rejected
the European "carrots" offered to them.

The naked truth is that the West has nothing to offer that can dissuade the
Ayatollahs from going nuclear, particularly since their nuclear program is
viewed as the best insurance policy for the current leadership, and is
probably the single most popular policy associated with this regime.

The US probably decided to go through the motions required by the Europeans
in order to secure their support for a more militant approach when
appeasement runs its course. Washington prefers to raise the issue of Iran
at the UN Security Council in order to impose economic sanctions and
eventually secure international legitimacy for military action against the
nuclear installations.

While the US was successful in bringing the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to recognize Iran's non-compliance with its treaty obligations
(September 2005), the Board of Governors of the IAEA that met again in
November 2005 postponed the referral of the Iranian case to the UN Security
Council, in order to allow more time for negotiations. This postponement
serves Iranian interests in gaining time as its strategy is one that can be
termed "talk and build".

Even if the matter is brought to the UN and sanctions are imposed, the
efficacy of such measures is doubtful. Economic sanctions rarely result in a
change of policies. In this case, Islamic Iran seeks a nuclear bomb
primarily to allow it to oppose a Pax Americana, and it is ready to pay a
high price for its foreign policy orientation.

Indirect Pressure on Iran

The Iranian challenge could also be dealt with by adopting an "indirect
strategy." This requires focusing on Lebanon -- the weakest link in the
Iran-Syria-Lebanon nexus -- that harbors radical Shiite strategic challenges
to the West in the form of terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

It is in the Lebanese arena that much of the future direction of Iranian
foreign policy will be decided. Liberating Lebanon from Syria will in turn
weaken the Damascus regime, possibly even leading even to its demise. This
process will also weaken and isolate Tehran. An isolated Iran might be more
susceptible to Western pressures. Lebanon is indeed the most vulnerable
point for the rollback of the radical forces in the Middle East.

In accordance with the tenets of the indirect approach, the US can and
should aim for regime change in Teheran. If Natan Sharansky is right in his
recent book, The Case for Democracy, that human beings prefer to live in
freedom than in fear, and that many of them are ready to take personal risks
to realize their preferences, Iran could be ripe for removing the yoke of
the mullahs.

Iran is more advanced than other Arab states according to almost every
socio-economic criterion, and is therefore a better candidate for
democratization. American diplomacy, aimed at strengthening the dissenting
voices in Iran, might be successful in fostering an effect similar to the
one that brought about the disintegration of the Soviet empire.

The indirect strategy is advantageous as it rests on regional and domestic
dynamics, and minimizes Iranian antagonism towards the American activist
approach. Yet, the fruition of such a strategy may take too much time.
European procrastination and past diplomatic failures to delay the Iranian
nuclear program may leave no other choice but the military option to prevent
the worst-case scenario - a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Threat to Use, or the Actual Use of Force

Many experts exaggerate the difficulties in dealing a severe military blow
to the Iranian nuclear program.

While it is probably true that intelligence services cannot provide military
planners with an exact and comprehensive picture of the locations of all
Iranian nuclear installations, what we know seems to be enough to allow the
destruction of a large part of the country's nuclear program. Partial
destruction would be enough to cripple Iran's ability to build a nuclear
bomb in the near future. Moreover, no large-scale invasion is needed in
order to do the job, but only surgical air strikes combined with limited
ground operations conducted by special forces.

The American military definitely has the military muscle and the
sophistication needed to perform a preemptive strike in accordance with its
new strategic doctrine. American public opinion can be enlisted to back a
military strike on Iran, despite the difficulties faced by the
administration with regard to its Iraq policy, if a clear-cut case is made
that all other options have been exhausted in the quest to prevent a very
dangerous development.

In fact, a clear American ultimatum that includes an unequivocal threat to
use force might be enough to convince the Iranians to freeze their nuclear
program and wait for better times to complete it. This is exactly what most
of the states in the region expect. Nobody wants a nuclear Iran and most
Mideastern rulers hope to see the hegemonic superpower take a resolute stand
on the matter. Whatever the public reaction may surface in the region, in
private everyone will clap and savor such an American demonstration of
leadership and determination in obstructing the Iranian nuclear program.

Any decision to use force must take into consideration the Iranian reaction
to a military strike and prepare for it. The Iranians can influence the flow
of oil from the Gulf, launch a counter-attack with ballistic missiles (with
conventional warheads), and/or use proxy terrorist organizations to attack
the US and its allies, in particular Israel.

In my estimation, the West (including Israel) can bear the limited 'cost'
likely to be exacted by conventional missile attacks and terrorism.

Meddling with the oil flow is an affront to the well-being of the
international community and would put Iran in conflict with most of the
world. Such Iranian behavior, before the state has acquired the bomb, might
be deterred by a clear American commitment to use its military power to
assure the security of the oil routes. Even without such a commitment,
American inaction when confronted by Iranian attempts to block the Hormuz
Straits is improbable.

If the US refrains from action, Israel will face the difficult decision of
whether to act unilaterally. While less suited to do the job than the US,
the Israeli military is capable of reaching the appropriate targets in Iran.
The 'cost' issue is not really relevant for Israel, because it also will
suffer the wrath of Iran if America bombs the Iranian installations.

Conclusion

A nuclear Iran is a serious threat to the Middle East. Moreover, a nuclear
bomb in the hands of the mullahs may have far-reaching repercussions, far
beyond the Middle East. Iran's deeply rooted ideological hostility towards
Israel, coupled with its emerging military capabilities puts the Jewish
state in a particularly vulnerable spot. Diplomacy is doomed to fail,
leaving only the threat to use force and the actual use of force as viable
options to delay the fruition of the Iranian nuclear program.

If the US does not act in accordance with its international duties as a
superpower, Israel will have to face the difficult choice of how to respond.
Since June 1981, Israel's position has been that a military nuclear program
implemented by a hostile state constitutes a casus belli warranting
preemptive action. It remains to be seen whether Jerusalem will be forced to
act in accordance with its strategic doctrine.

Resolute action against Iranian nuclear installations involves many risks,
but inaction, it seems, will lead to far worse consequences.

The author is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and
Director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.