Excerpts: Syrian and Lebanese dangers.5 January 2006

+++THE DAILY STAR (Lebanon)
Thursday, January 05, 2006
"From Khaddam, a disquieting Saudi warning"
By Michael Young, Daily Star opinion editor.
QUOTES FROM TEXT:
"Against the Syrian-Shiite alliance in Lebanon, the Saudis have resorted
to two
prominent sunnis"

"Khaddam's implying that Assad would have had to sign off on Rafik
Hariri's assassination
was devastating"

"It is a priority of Syria's ruling Alawite minority to maintain good
relations with the country's
Sunnis."

"Khaddam ... noticeably avoided calling into question the fundamentals of
the Baath system."
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EXCERPTS:
... the former Syrian vice president, and newly-ordained "traitor,"
Abdel-Halim Khaddam on the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiyya last week ... seemed
relaxed ... making his testimony about his former employer so compelling.
... ..
Was Khaddam's testimony a mortal blow to Syria's President Bashar Assad? ...
Assad is likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future, with no
alternatives to replace him. However, there were a pair of dangers in what
Khaddam said, and their implications could substantially corrode the Syrian
president's standing at home while also decisively limiting his margin of
maneuver in Lebanon.
The interview was, in part, a Saudi riposte against the recent mobilization
by Syria of its Lebanese allies against the government of Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora. Together with Saad Hariri's interview broadcast on
Al-Arabiyya a week earlier - which served, among other things, to wreck an
Egyptian initiative to mediate a Lebanese-Syrian deal - it also contained an
unmistakable, if unstated sectarian message. Against the Syrian-Shiite
alliance in Lebanon, the Saudis have resorted to two prominent Sunnis (with
Khaddam once the paramount Sunni prop of Syria's Baath regime) to help
reaffirm their own "project" for the country, which they began preparing
starting from last summer's parliamentary elections.
Khaddam's revelations gave new momentum to the United Nations inquiry,
although they generally confirmed previous suspicions rather than offered
radically new information. In a case where much evidence will require
grasping the intricacies of hierarchical relationships in Damascus,
Khaddam's implying that Assad would have had to sign off on Rafik Hariri's
assassination was devastating - beyond his confirming that the president had
threatened Hariri on several occasions. After hearing what Khaddam had to
say, it suddenly became much more difficult for Hizbullah to argue against
"internationalization" of the Hariri investigation without appearing to
cover up Syrian responsibility.
... Khaddam also issued a specific Syrian message, and this is where Assad
must be careful. It is a priority of Syria's ruling Alawite minority to
maintain good relations with the country's Sunnis. If the president is
judged on anything, it is on his capacity to avoid domestic communal
tension. In recently mobilizing Syria's Druze against Walid Jumblatt, Assad
riskily manipulated minority sensitivities, breaking a cardinal rule of his
father that Alawites must not fiddle with minority issues, since this only
highlights their own minority status. The president also erred in allowing
his former vice president to travel to Paris. Khaddam's credibility may be
nil at home, but that only makes the Assads look bad for having used him for
so long to acquire Sunni communal legitimacy.
Nor could anyone miss how Khaddam reserved his most scathing words for two
members of his own community: Foreign Minister Farouq al-Sharaa and the
former intelligence chief in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh. In describing how
mediocre or brutal both men are, Khaddam was also commenting on the decline
in Sunni fortunes under the current leadership.
If Assad becomes vulnerable on the Sunni front, Khaddam and the Saudis may
be calculating, then his authority among his own coreligionists could take a
hit. Theirs seems less a project for regime change than for personnel
change. It might indeed be true that there are no alternatives to the
present leadership; but what about those who are already on the inside? ...
Can Assad be so sure that those on whom he relies most for his power today,
but who are also not in his immediate family, will follow him down a path of
perdition if things get worse for Syria?
Khaddam personalized his denunciation of the regime, focusing on Assad's
shortcomings, but noticeably avoided calling into question the fundamentals
of the Baath system. In the longer version of his interview, he spent an
inordinate amount of time explaining how he had proposed reform from within
the party's institutions. This was probably a signal to those still
influential in Damascus that, at the end of the day, the problem is the
president, whose removal need not bring down the system as a whole. Get rid
of Assad, Khaddam hinted, and we can all recreate a better version of what
we had before he came to power.
The implications of Khaddam's disturbing insinuation of communal symbolism
do not bode well for Lebanon. From the moment the Syrians left the country
last April, it became apparent that two contending visions would come to
define the aftermath: one defined by the Saudis and Saad Hariri, speaking
for most Sunnis, which sought to complete what Rafik Hariri had been unable
to. Friendly to the West, impatient with militancy, pursuing free markets,
this vision clashes daily with a second one, the more militant, statist,
anti-Western outlook of Hizbullah, which for better or worse speaks for many
in the Shiite community. This face-off transcends the Sunni-Shiite religious
dichotomy and involves broadly defining the post-Syrian Lebanese state. It
need not turn violent; however both sides will have to make fundamental
concessions to avert this.
Both the Syrian regime and its regional foes must be cautious in the coming
months. Playing communal politics, as the Syrians have done so recklessly in
Lebanon of late, will only invite a communal backlash in Syria. Abdel-Halim
Khaddam if just one instrument in that counterattack; more can easily be
found if needed. The Syrians should remember that while Lebanon is
vulnerable to sectarianism, it also has the means to absorb its worst
repercussions. But does Syria? From Paris, Khaddam impertinently tossed that
disturbing question Assad's way.

Dr. Joseph Lerner, Co-Director IMRA