[IMRA: It is unfortunate that, for some reason,. Ephraim Lavie opts to
ignore Israel's retreat from the Gaza Strip in his narrative. If he
believes that his colleagues are wrong in asserting that the retreat served
to significantly bolster Hamas' standing then he should have spent a
paragraph explaining his take on why retreating didn't help the Palestinian
radicals. This is particularly important as retreat supporters, undaunted
by the consequences of the last retreat, push for additional retreats
regardless of the Palestinian scene.]

Tel Aviv Notes No. 159
January 29, 2006

Hamas' Victory in the Palestinian Elections: What Does it Mean?

Ephraim Lavie
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

To the surprise of most observers, Hamas has won the Palestinian Legislative
Council elections by a large majority. For the first time in almost forty
years, leadership has passed, through democratic means, from those who
created the national movement and have dominated it ever since, and the
Palestinian political system is now entering a period of profound
uncertainty.

Fatah's defeat is grounded in several factors, particularly its political
failures and its shortcomings as a governing party responsible for public
welfare. Widespread anarchy during the years of the intifada undermined the
foundations of society and the legitimacy of the national struggle and
prompted the younger-generation leadership in Fatah to demand from Yasir
Arafat and his contemporaries a program of reforms that could create the
foundations of an effective non-violent civil struggle to underpin the
political struggle with Israel. They also demanded a profound change in
governance that could produce a democratic "state of institutions" and
rehabilitate Fatah as the leading national movement and credible governing
party worthy of public support. These demands, however, were not met,
largely because Arafat blocked every attempt to constrain his own authority.
The younger generation of Fatah leadership saw in Arafat's departure from
the scene and the more pragmatic approach of his successor a golden
opportunity to assert itself more effectively and put Fatah's house in
order. But Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) quickly proved impotent in the face of
the old guards' resistance to any organizational reform that would
jeopardize their standing. And in the months preceding the elections, when
Abu Mazen tried - under pressure from his contemporaries - to entrench
discredited old figures in Fatah's list, the younger generation, led by
Marwan Barghouti in the West Bank and Muhammad Dahlan in Gaza, cooperated
with each other in an effort to impose change, even to the point of
provoking a crisis by setting up a separate list (al-Mustaqbal).

Meanwhile, Hamas was able to capitalize on the social-religious
infrastructure and military force it had built up during the intifada. Its
immediate objectives were to persist in its campaign of violence in order to
preclude any possibility of reviving the political process with Israel and
to strengthen its standing as a legitimate political actor in anticipation
of "the day after," i.e., after Arafat's departure from the scene, so that
any future regime could not function without Hamas support.
However, Hamas was forced to reexamine its policy in light of the new
reality created by Arafat's death and Abu Mazen's more pragmatic approach.
The movement's leadership was fully attuned to the public mood, which
increasingly preferred an end to the military confrontation, and it was
forced to compromise its basic principles in order to preserve its improved
public standing and translate that into political power. These
considerations provided the background for the decision to enter the arena
of institutional politics, in the expectation that gains in municipal
elections and an impressive showing in the PLC elections would confer
important benefits: influence on legislation, oversight of government, and
jobs and budgets.

But developments in the last year, especially an unexpected degree of
success in municipal elections, produced a shift in rhetoric and image,
based on the belief that Hamas actually had a chance of winning the PLC
elections and taking over leadership of the PA and the Palestinian people.
In contrast to Fatah, Hamas managed a smooth transition from older
leadership (many of whom were killed or arrested by Israel) to younger
successors. Coupled with the incorporation into the list of senior
personalities who still carry moral authority, this process allowed Hamas to
project an image of responsibility, sobriety and pragmatism that helped
insure its victory.

Hamas is a relatively young political force that has dominated the Islamist
camp since its establishment in 1988. But notwithstanding its sweeping
victory, its fundamental principles, articulated in its Covenant and its
election platform, complicate its chances of forming a government and
managing by itself the domestic and foreign affairs of the Palestinians.
Part of the challenge arises from the fact that the Abu Mazen comes from the
ranks of Fatah and was himself elected President of the PA less than a year
ago on the basis of a much more pragmatic platform. A Legislative Council
dominated by Hamas and presumably guided by entirely different principles
appears to be a recipe for constant wrangling, if not complete paralysis.

As a result, the Hamas leadership - fully aware of the national burden it
will now assume - is already trying to convey to Fatah and other, smaller
factions a sense of "national destiny" and a desire to form a broad
coalition to ensure the stability of the PA. It has offered Fatah a
partnership in government and suggested that its main priorities will be
social and economic reconstruction. It has also indicated that it is
prepared to maintain the tahdia (relaxation of tensions) provided that
Israel reciprocates and has declared its intention to coordinate with other
factions regarding the character of "resistance" to the occupation, which it
insists is a legitimate right. At the level of national politics, Hamas
apparently intends to establish a "new PLO" with different representation in
the national institutions (Palestinian National Council, Central Committee
and Executive Committee). Hamas' purpose is to initiate a new debate about
the "Palestinian national principles," different from those elaborated by
the PLO in 1988 and more acceptable across the Palestinian political
spectrum.

However, it is already apparent that the Fatah leadership prefers not to
join a Hamas-dominated coalition. Instead, it wants to focus on
rehabilitation of the movement (convening the long-delayed 6th Congress,
choosing new institutions and elaborating a new platform) while forcing
Hamas to test its actual ability to manage Palestinian society and the PA.
This approach may well reflect a desire to frustrate Hamas at every turn and
produce a political deadlock that might prevent Hamas even from forming a
government. If that turns out to be the case, the loss of Fatah's hegemonic
position or some dramatic development (e.g., Abu Mazen's resignation)
could - despite the Palestinian consensus against civil strife - lead to
widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas.
___________________________________________________________________
Tel Aviv Notes is published by
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies www.tau.ac.il/jcss/
& The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
http://www.dayan.org/
through the generosity of Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia

KEYWORD: Palestinians