Disengagement lessons

Flawed pullout predictions should make Olmert rethink his plan
Sever Plocker YNET (04.16.06, 16:40)
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3240374,00.html

Eight months after the withdrawal from Gaza, or what was referred to as a
"unilateral disengagement," things are not developing according to the early
scenario marketed to the public.

Almost nothing has materialized in the way pullout supporters promised us
would happen.

The Gaza Strip did not calm down and the Palestinian Authority did not take
matters there into its own hands in order to establish the Middle Eastern
Hong Kong. Gaza is a no-man's land, the country of nobody. The Strip lacks a
civilian regime, no currency, no enforcement of law and order, and most of
the system tasked with providing the population with basic services is
paralyzed, aside from the one run by the United Nations.

Armed gangs rule the narrow, derelict refugee camp streets. The only
manufacturing activity is the industry of flying iron tubes that are
launched to short distances. The point of launching them at Israel is
unclear to anyone, including the launching cells themselves.

Yet when you have nothing to do and you're young and filled with energy, and
since your birth had only known poverty, occupation, and unemployment, you
find an outlet in belonging to those ridiculous "Qassam cells."

The handing over of the border crossing with Egypt to Palestinian control
also failed to lead to the expected results. The border is rather porous,
checks are inadequate, and smuggling is rampant. There too, the Palestinians
failed to implement their sovereignty.

Egyptian Border Guard troops received one kind of order: Preventing at any
price the turning of Gaza into part of Egypt. They're carrying out this job,
but nothing beyond.

The Palestinian Authority did not use the months between Israel's withdrawal
and the general elections in order to reinforce its hold among Gaza
residents. It was busy with internal power struggles. The elections were
decided in favor of Hamas.

Fatah's armed spine was broken, some of the senior security officials left
to the Gulf, and others quickly changed their political loyalty. For a while
Gaza became Hamas land. Now, it's not even that: In fact, even the official
Hamas has given up in the face of Gaza's collapse and left it to face its
destiny.

And Israel, even though it removed its army and settlements, and even though
it closed down the crossings to the movement of goods, is still stuck with
Gaza as if it was a huge bone in its throat.

Rethinking convergence

We didn't disengage: What is happening, and particularly what is not
happening, in Gaza, continues to haunt us.

The responsibly over it, in the eyes of the world and in some ways in our
own view, has not been lifted from Israel. This is complemented by the
ongoing military activity against targets in the Strip, both in response to
Qassam fire and in the form of targeted killings. In the eyes of Gaza
residents, Israel continues to control the sea, air, and land. Only the
settlers disappeared. This is good, but not enough.

Even the removal of the settlements is no longer perceived as such a huge
victory by the Palestinian people. The thousands of good jobs at the
settlements have disappeared, and instead unemployment and poverty grew. The
ruins of Israeli communities were not cleared, even though the Israeli
government pledged (or rather, was forced to) pay for the clearing. It's
unclear who the guilty party is, the PA, or Egypt, or International groups.

Did Israel gain from the disengagement? Less than what its planners hoped.
The United States didn't grant us even one cent in economic aid, even though
in various phases of preparation for the withdrawal and upon the pullout,
much was said about a special USD 2 billion grant. As of today, there's no
grant.

For a short while, Israel enjoyed international sympathy, with the pullout
perceived as the start of a large-scale unilateral withdrawal. Yet the
sympathy is slowly evaporating, particularly following Ariel Sharon's
illness.

Ehud Olmert may discover that the attitude to a Sharon-made disengagement is
very different than the world's approach to an Olmert-made one. The first
one fascinated the world because it appeared to be a personal sea change by
a hawkish leader tired of war. The second one, Olmert's pullout, would look
like - and already looks like - as an act by a centrist politician whose
party received about a quarter of the vote in the recent elections.

The Qassams, of course, do not constitute a danger to Israel, but they're
bothersome, annoying, and made the daily life of Gaza-area residents very
difficult. And dangerous. Eventually, even if only due to the laws of
probability, a rocket would land in a crowd concentration and lead to
disaster.

The disengagement did not cause a rift within Israel society and didn't lead
to one kind of self-reflection or another. Eight months later, its memory is
vague and its lessons unclear. We prefer not to talk about it and not to
mention it.

Was there a disengagement? Was there a (Gaza settlement of) Netzarim? The
fact that the post-disengagement reality does not resemble the earlier
scenarios and predictions should make Ehud Olmert rethink his diplomatic
plans.

Would Israel really be able to unilaterally set its border vis-à-vis the
Palestinians, a border they or the world would not accept? Would Israel be
able to "converge" into "settlement blocs" in the West Bank and annex them?
Who would finance such a move, which would cost tens of billions of shekels
and not be perceived as a solution to anything? Who would prevent a tragic
rift among the people? And what would be left behind in Palestine following
a pretend-Israeli-withdrawal coupled with pretend-annexation?

Eight months after disengagement, the pregnancy only gave rise to question
marks.

====
Sever Plocker is chief economics editor and deputy editor-in chief of Yediot
Aharonot