[IMRA: While civil servants employed in other democracies might feel
compelled to resign when they realize that they are involved in a
disaster-in-the making so that they may warn the public, there is no such
tradition in Israel.]

Eiland: 'The disengagement was a missed opportunity of historic proportions'
By Ari Shavit Haaretz 4 June 2006
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/722351.html

In an interview to Haaretz, the outgoing head of the National Security
Council (NSC), Major General Giora Eiland describes the disengagement from
the Gaza Strip as a "missed opportunity of historic proportions." The man
whose last posting in the IDF was as head of operations, also warns that the
convergence plan will not bring stability to the Middle East. After two and
a half years at the NSC, Eiland also comments on the informal way strategic
decisions are made in Israel.

You planned the disengagement for former prime minister Ariel Sharon. Was
the disengagement a right move or a mistake?

Eiland: "The disengagement was a missed opportunity of historic proportions.
I would like to explain. The disengagement contributed nothing to the
solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."

In the government establishment, in which you were a member, was there an
organized discussion on whether the disengagement was the right move?

"No. When I assumed my office, on 18 January, 2004, there was only an
amorphous term 'disengagement' from a speech in Herzliya. I asked Sharon how
much time I had to formulate a plan and he told me, four months. But very
quickly it became clear to me that [PM Sharon's adviser] Dov Weissglas had
already met with the Americans and committed us to a major unilateral step
both in Gaza and the West Bank.

"Immediately after, Sharon committed himself to the evacuation of 18
settlements in the Gaza Strip in an interview to [Haaretz's] Yoel Marcus,
and at that point the game was up. The planning process I had began blew
up."

Was the question of what we could get in exchange for the Gaza Strip asked?

"That question was raised much later."

Was that not a strategic mistake?

"Condoleezza Rice told us, 'Let me explain to you what the meaning of a
unilateral step is. You make a unilateral step when it is good for you.
Therefore, you do not expect to receive anything in return for a step that
you are doing because it is good for you.'"

And this is the crux of the missed opportunity in your view?

"Yes. The disengagement was a missed opportunity of historical proportions
because at the end of 2003 both Israel and the world had reached the
conclusion that on the one hand it was important to end the conflict
quickly, and on the other hand, in the existing paradigm it is impossible to
solve it.

"Why is it impossible to solve? Because the maximum that Israel can give is
less than the minimum that the Palestinians must accept. I think that was a
rare opportunity to offer a new paradigm. But the disengagement simply said
the occupation was bad, that there is no chance for an agreement so long as
there is occupation, and therefore, let us narrow the occupation.

"The same is said by the convergence. There is logic in the thinking, but it
does not lead to long-term stability. The move along a unilateral path leads
us to the classic solution of two states for two peoples, and I think this
is an impossible solution."

Explain it to me.

"When we talk of a solution of two states for two peoples we make two
assumptions: that it is possible to solve the conflict in the area between
the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, and that the reference for a border
between the two states are the 1967 lines with minor changes. I reject these
two assumptions. I think that between the sea and the river there is not
enough area to contain two states, and I think that in order to maintain a
defensible border, Israel needs at least 12 percent of the West Bank. The
1967 lines, even the Clinton Plan, do not give Israel defensible borders."

And a Palestinian state in only 88 percent of the West Bank territory is a
viable state?

"That is the second mistake. I argue that even a Palestinian state with 100
percent of the Gaza Strip and 97 percent of the West Bank is not viable.
Such a country will be poor, radical, restive, where the demographic
pressures will be unbearable. In 2020 there will be 2.5 million people in
the Gaza Strip, in area of 365 square kilometers. This will inevitably lead
to pressure against the fences."

Do you have an alternative proposal?

"My proposal from 2004, which I put forth to Sharon, calls for a regional
solution. Adding 600 square kilometers to Gaza in northern Sinai, to allow
for the construction of an international port and airport, and a city in
which millions of Palestinians can live. Granting 600 square kilometers to
Israel in the West Bank in order to guarantee defensible borders. Compensate
Egypt with 150 square kilometers in the southern Negev, and compensation in
the form of international economic aid and a tunnel connecting Egypt with
Jordan, north of Eilat. The transfer of about 100 square kilometers on the
east bank of the river to the Palestinians, granting them 105 percent of the
territory they are asking today."

Are the Palestinians willing to consider your proposal?

"All the Fatah people who saw the plan expressed interest. Abu Ala, Mohammed
Dahlan and others. The Palestinians are more practical than we tend to
think."

Egypt? The Jordanians?

"I believe it is possible to make them a sufficiently attractive offer."

Do you see the convergence creating conditions of stable coexistence with
the Palestinians?

"The convergence will not bring stability. It will not solve the conflict.
But it will encourage Hamas to keep the calm. There is a convergence of
interests between the government of Israel and Hamas."

What kind of reality will there be after the withdrawal?

"A reality of two states without an agreement. The Palestinian state will be
a radical Hamas state, not satisfied and not viable. There will be
continuous instability."

Did you talk with Olmert about the convergence?

"No."

How is that?

"I read about it in the papers like every other citizen. I have no problem
with this. The prime minister is a very intelligent man, capable of making
decisions, and is handling the situation in an impressive manner. I am sure
he consulted with other people."

But in the government establishment there has not been a discussion on
whether the convergence is good for Israel.

"Right."

Not related to Olmert or Sharon specifically, the decision-making process in
Israel appears to be sound to you?

"No."