Text: Ari Shavit interviews MK Yossi Beilin - slams the disengagement

A matter of opinion

By Ari Shavit Haaretz magazine section 7 July 2006
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/735513.html

MK Yossi Beilin

"I hate being in a position of 'I told you so.' But a great many of those
who warned against the consequences of the disengagement were right. People
on both the right and the left believed a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza
would strengthen the extremists, who do not want dialogue and peace. That is
exactly what happened. From the point of view of many Palestinians, the
withdrawal proved it is possible to achieve with violence what cannot be
achieved by negotiation. Ten years of dialogue did not produce the results
of four years of intifada.

"No Palestinian bought the spin according to which the disengagement was due
to some deep political consideration on the part of Sharon. The
disengagement was perceived as capitulation to terrorism. It played into the
hands of Hamas, which used it to show that it was the only one that could
liberate territories. Did Hamas win only because of the disengagement? No.
But the disengagement gave it a tremendous advantage. Certainly the
disengagement strengthened Hamas.

"As a result of the disengagement and as a result of the waste of an entire
year in which Abu Mazen was in total control in the PA - from January 2005
until January 2006 - many Palestinians formed the impression that the Jews
understand only force. Those Palestinians concluded that only the use of
force and more force and more force would get Israel out of the West Bank in
the same way that Israel left Gaza. Even before the Hamas victory, pragmatic
Palestinian leaders asked me in closed meetings what in the world Israel was
doing to them, why Israel was rendering them irrelevant. After all, it is
very difficult to persuade the Palestinian public to embark on the oath of
compromise and negotiations when Israel is giving everything for free, as a
consequence of violent pressure.

"Not long ago one of the most senior and most moderate of the Palestinians
told me even harsher things. For years, he said, we have been struggling on
the Palestinian street for an Israeli-Palestinian peace. We explain that we
have to accept the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and an exchange of
territories and agree to demilitarization and make a compromise on the
question of the refugees, so that in the end there will be a Palestinian
state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But if Israel leaves all of Gaza
and 90 percent of the West Bank, do you think we will be able persuade any
Palestinian to agree to these painful concessions in return for the
remaining 10 percent of the area? It is, then, completely clear that the
cumulative result of the disengagement and the realignment will not be the
hastening of a political process, but a forgoing of a political process. I
say this unequivocally: the unilateral withdrawals distance the prospect for
peace. We are asking the Palestinians to forgo quite a lot in a peace
agreement. They will not agree to that in return for 10 percent of the West
Bank.

"The disengagement had two virtues. One was that, as a result, we rule fewer
Palestinians. The second was that it created the precedent of the evacuation
of settlements on a massive scale. In both of those senses, it succeeded.
But if anyone thought it would bring calm, the disengagement failed. If
anyone thought it would bring us closer to a political process, it failed.
It was the most idiotic way to leave Gaza. The most idiotic. It gave the
Palestinians the feeling that there is no reason to make concessions and it
gave the Israelis the feeling that withdrawals do not produce quiet. And now
both of those feelings are mutually reinforcing each other. The Palestinians
say that only force leads to withdrawal and are using force, and the
Israelis see that use of force and conclude that withdrawal only heightens
the violence.

"I foresaw this. I knew the disengagement would strengthen Hamas and that if
it was not followed by negotiations, it would also heighten the violence. As
a result, I faced a harsh dilemma over whether to support the disengagement.
What tipped the scale is that a party like Meretz could not vote against the
ending of occupation, however partial, or against the evacuation of
settlements. A party like Meretz has no choice in this matter.

"So I supported the disengagement and wept, supported and wept. I supported
it even though I knew it was the most wrongheaded move in the world. Now
Olmert is talking about convergence. It?s clear that convergence is the most
idiotic way to leave the West Bank. To leave 90 percent of the area? To
leave without negotiations? Without a quid pro quo? Without an agreement?
Last week I met Olmert and I told him: Benjamin Netanyahu is sitting here.
He says the partner is weak and he doesn?t trust him and therefore he is not
budging. I think he is wrong but I understand his logic. What I don?t
understand, Olmert, is your logic. It?s not a provocation - I really don't
understand it. What are you saying? That I have a weak partner whom I do not
trust and therefore I am giving him 90 percent of the area for free? It?s
clear, you know, what will happen in the territories if we implement the
convergence. We will have Hamastan on both sides. While the whole world is
fighting Islamic terrorism, we lend a hand to the development of a terror
source. And we will make a historic concession of recognition of Jerusalem
as the capital of Israel, and on recognition of our eastern border, and on
the removal from the agenda of the refugee problem. So this time it might be
a death blow. Anyone who gives up 90 percent of the area and thinks this is
an opening to future negotiations is hallucinating. A unilateral withdrawal
from 90 percent of the West Bank means that there will be no incentive for a
Palestinian leader ever to reach an agreement with us. The convergence means
the most dramatic possible diminishment of the chance to reach a peace
agreement in our lifetime.

"The convergence is worse than the disengagement from another point of view
as well. In the disengagement, at least there was the complete evacuation of
the settlements. Not one settler remained in the Gaza Strip. In the
convergence, in contrast, the intention is to sweeten the pill for the
settlers by allowing 70,000 of them to live in the 10 percent of the
territory that will remain in Israel?s hands. That means building 15,000
homes across the Green Line. It means a building boom in the settlement
blocs. We will not lend a hand to that. At most we will vote in favor of
disengagement in the West Bank; we will not vote in favor of convergence. If
the departure from the West Bank is conditional on the building of
settlement blocs, we will vote against the convergence. Under no
circumstances will we raise our hands to support massive building in blocs.

"Therefore, the convergence plan will not pass. Without Merertz, Olmert has
55 supporters on a clear day. With us, he has 60 and the prospect of support
or abstention by the Arab parties. If we vote against the convergence, there
is no chance that an Arab party will support it or abstain. On the other
hand, if we vote for disengagement, there is a chance that some of them will
vote in favor or abstain, in which case Olmert might have a narrow majority.
So I say that there will be no convergence. Politically, there cannot be
convergence. It is utterly absurd. But there might be disengagement.
"It is possible that in the end I will again support and cry. We are liable
to undertake a historic move, which I will support, and which will prevent
the attainment of the Zionist goal: a Jewish state living in peace with its
neighbors. That could happen. But Ehud Olmert is intelligent. I respect him.
So I hope he knows that he bears a heavy responsibility.

"And I insist that before leading us into such a wrongheaded move that he
give us an explanation. An explanation of the logic. After all, he knows
today that he will not get international recognition for the West Bank line.
The Europeans told him explicitly that there is no chance that Europe will
recognize his border as a permanent border. And if he said 90 percent as an
opening position, he will get to 95 percent, too. In my opinion, he will not
be able to get to less than 100 percent. And, if so, why not try an
agreement? If you are ready to pay a Beilin price, why not try to get a
Beilin quid pro quo?

"Take the worst-case scenario. Take the scenario in which, on the day after
the signing, the Palestinian partner leaves for Paris and does not implement
anything. You will still have foreign embassies in Jerusalem. You will still
have diplomatic relations with Arab states. You will have international
recognition of the eastern border. You will have no refugees on your head.
So why not do it? For 10 percent? For 530 square kilometers? This is an
incomprehensible approach. Incomprehensible. So I say that you can be Bibi.
That has logic to it. And you can be Beilin. I certainly think that has
logic. But you cannot be Olmert. Olmert's unilateral conception lacks all
logic."