Tel Aviv Notes No. 183 August 13, 2006

Iran at the Nuclear Crossroads

Ephraim Asculai
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

On July 31, 2006, the UN Security Council (SC) adopted resolution 1696,
which makes it mandatory (under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter)
for Iran "to take the steps required by the International Atomic Energy
Agency Board of Governors. which are essential to build confidence in the
exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme".[1] The IAEA was
requested to report by August 31 on whether Iran has established full and
sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution, as well
as on "the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the
IAEA Board". Thus, Iran has much less than a month in which to comply in
order to enable the IAEA to verify its compliance and present a positive
report to the SC.

In his address to the SC following the adoption of the resolution, the
Iranian ambassador to the UN did not give any clue as to Iran's intentions,
although he did state that "they [i.e., Iranians] had also showed, time and
again, their resilience in the face of pressure, threat, injustice and
imposition". He did, however, insist that the sole reason for the Council's
action was "that Iran had decided, after over two years of negotiations, to
resume the exercise of its inalienable right to nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes." Many Iranian leaders also spoke of the humiliation that
Iran would suffer if it were forced to abandon its uranium enrichment and
other programs of a military potential. It is quite probable that Iran will
not heed the SC request. It is not yet certain whether the SC will be
willing to impose sanctions against Iran, but Iran almost certainly cannot
depend on SC passivity as a long-term strategy. It would seem that Iran's
play for time is nearing its end.

What are Iran's options? Iran is a wily opponent which has often acted
unpredictably in the past. However, it now appears to face a difficult
choice: it can acquiesce to the SC demands; it can simply ignore the SC
demands and hope for the best; it can continue to play for time; it can
suspend inspections or rescind the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA; or it
can withdraw from the NPT, following the North Korean precedent. One thing
should not be in doubt: it will persist in its quest for nuclear weapons, if
not under IAEA inspections then clandestinely.

It will be very difficult for Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, for a
variety of reasons. The first is the need to deter several perceived
threats: US armed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Gulf pose a danger
from almost every direction; Iraq, though currently incapable of threatening
any of its neighbors, could eventually reemerge as a regional force; and
Israel is seen as a hostile nuclear-weapons state. Secondly, there is an
internal factor: the current Iranian regime has been successful in rallying
the nation around its nuclear program, which is perhaps the only policy
uniting the population, and undoing this could help hasten its downfall.

Finally, there is an evolving regional aspect which is much more complex.
According to recent media reports, Iran was unhappy with Hizbullah's
initiation of the July 12 incident that rapidly developed into a full-scale
confrontation with Israel. Iran's displeasure probably stemmed from the
fact that it was not in control of developments and that the timing was
premature from its perspective. Iran and Syria have armed Hizbullah with a
vast arsenal of short- medium- and longer-range rockets. However, Iran's
role as an arms supplier has been secondary, and it cannot be satisfied
unless it is the lead actor. This would have been the case if the
confrontation had been deferred until Iran had acquired a military nuclear
weapons capability. In that case, an Iranian nuclear weapon could have
served as a deterrent against a major Israeli strike or counter-attack
against Hizbullah and/or Syria. Even more ominous is the possibility of a
decisive nuclear strike against Israel. That might appear to some to be a
far-fetched scenario, but given the proclamations of Iran's leaders,
especially President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it cannot be categorically
excluded.

Given Iran's determination to secure a military nuclear capability, the
moment of truth is approaching, not only for Iran but also for the Security
Council. Unless the Council imposes severe penalties, Iran will use any
available time to complete the construction of its uranium enrichment plant
and start producing weapons-grade enriched uranium. Although Iran's program
can be suspended or reversed at almost any given time, it becomes more
difficult to do so as their work progresses. The first significant step has
been taken at the UN, by threatening Iran with sanctions. The time for the
next step is nearing, but if SC members such as Russia and China refuse to
do so, they will play directly into the Iranians' hands. Failure to impose
sanctions, beginning with suspension of direct trade in scientific and
technical materials, equipment and know-how that could assist in the quest
for nuclear weapons and then moving, if necessary, to even more severe
measures such as an embargo on refined oil products, would signal to Iran,
rhetoric notwithstanding, that the rest of the world is actually prepared to
live with an Iranian nuclear weapon.
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KEYWORD: Iran

[1] Quoting Article 40 of Chapter VII is a first step "before making the
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for [in other
Articles]."