Casualty intolerance
EFRAIM INBAR, THE JERUSALEM POST Nov. 19, 2006
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One of the strategic misconceptions demonstrated by Israel's military and
political leadership during the war against Hizbullah in the summer of 2006
was the exaggerated fear of casualties. Indeed, OC Manpower Maj.-Gen. Elazar
Stern, complained after the war that the IDF had displayed
"over-sensitivity" to loss of lives and disclosed the fact that one of the
battles during the 2006 Lebanese war was called off because of a few
casualties.

Yet, given the clear threat posed by Hizbullah, there was enthusiastic
public backing for offensive operations, even when military casualties were
inevitable. A huge majority of Israelis lent full support to the war. They
wanted an unequivocal victory and were ready to pay a high price for
achieving it. Many who were living in bomb shelters during the war expressed
such a view. Even parents who had lost a child in the war backed the
operation's expansion.

While the need to avoid reckless loss of human life is self-evident, Israeli
society has in fact shown great resilience in war, as documented by several
studies. It stood strong in the face of the terror campaign launched by the
Palestinians in September 2000, designed to break the spirit of Israeli
society. Similar determination and willingness to carry the brunt of the
battle was exhibited by the Israeli home front during the recent war in
Lebanon.

The reluctance to commit ground troops to battle betrays a terrible gap
between Israel's leadership and its people. Israel's political and military
leaders mistakenly believe that Israeli society is tired of the protracted
conflict and is unwilling to pay the price of continuous war.

Ehud Olmert said as much in the past, reflecting a sense of weariness at the
leadership level. Decision makers in the Oslo process, particularly Yitzhak
Rabin, were also motivated by such sentiments and by a similar misperception
of Israeli society. The Four Mothers movement that advocated unilateral
withdrawal from Southern Lebanon (probably one of the factors that led to
the government's May 2000 decision to pull out) was an additional
manifestation of the same syndrome.

THIS MOOD, which has prevailed among Israel's political leadership since the
1990s, affected the military command during the recent war against
Hizbullah, and casualty aversion became a main feature of Israel's military
modus operandi.

Academics argued that Israel, like other Western democracies, has difficulty
waging war because of casualty aversion.

However, such an assumption about the Western style of war, at times
described as "post-heroic" warfare, is not grounded in fact. Actually, many
studies show that casualty phobia is not a dominant characteristic of the US
general public. On the contrary, the American political leadership can tap
into a large reservoir of support for military campaigns that entail a high
human price, provided that those operations have a chance to succeed. The
public is defeat-phobic, not casualty-phobic. Moreover, mounting casualties
are bearable if the goals of the military missions are seen as politically
important. This is patently true of Israel as well.

Strategically, Israel's reluctance to commit troops in battle is
counterproductive because it signals weakness. The widespread perception
within the Arab world that Israeli society is extremely sensitive to the
loss of human life, invites aggression. It was largely this perception that
motivated the Palestinians to start a terror campaign against Israel in
September 2000. This view is also the basis of the "spider web" theory
concerning Israel, propagated by Hizbullah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah -
namely that Israel's emphasis on the value of human life as well as its
self-indulgent Western values render it weak and vulnerable.

The fear of military casualties and the subsequent hesitation on part of
Israel's leadership to conduct military operations also constitute a
violation of the basic social contract around which a state is built. In
accordance with the social contract, citizens give up some of their
liberties and are prepared to be taxed in exchange for the state's
commitment to provide them with security. The state is a social institution
whose raison d'etre is to provide its members with security by using its
coercive organs, such as the police and the military.

The Zionist rationale was founded on the desire to end the helplessness of
the Jew in the Diaspora by building a Jewish state whose main function was
to defend its Jewish citizens - by force if necessary. Recently, we have
seen an incredible inversion of the Zionist and the statist rationale. There
is greater tolerance of civilian casualties than of military losses. While
foolproof defense is not always a realistic goal, the Jewish state seems to
have difficulty in fulfilling its most basic function - providing security
to its citizens.

Four thousand Katyushas during the last summer as well as the continuous
downpour of Kassams on Israeli settlements in the Northern Negev raise the
question: Why should Israelis pay taxes to build and strengthen an army, if
the state is reluctant to use the military force at its disposal for the
protection of its citizens?
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The author is professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University and
director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic
Studies.