ANALYSIS: Military confrontation with Hamas in Gaza is inevitable
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff Last update - 03:49 25/04/2007
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/852023.html

From Israel's perspective, the timing of Hamas' attack on southern Israel on
Monday was problematic. With the government and army virtually paralyzed by
fear of the upcoming publication of the Winograd Committee's report, Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert cannot easily order a harsh reprisal in Gaza. And this
time, good intelligence and the army's preparedness foiled what was
apparently another kidnapping attempt, which ostensibly enables Olmert to
make do with a limited response.

Yet the premier must ask himself whether this would not be a mistake. Just
as Hamas did in its kidnapping of Gilad Shalit last June, the organization,
or parts of it, is signaling that all its promises of a cease-fire are
nonbinding. Since Hamas agreed to the cease-fire in Gaza, more than 200
Qassam rockets have been fired at Israel from Gaza and some 50 bombs have
been planted along the border fence. Hamas' military wing was involved in
many of these attacks.

On the tactical level, the lessons of Shalit's kidnapping were learned: For
instance, the army is now allowed to penetrate a few hundred meters into
Gaza in order to thwart kidnappings. Yet it must be remembered that last
July's kidnapping of two soldiers along the northern border by Hezbollah was
preceded by many attempted kidnappings that Israel successfully foiled; it
was Israel's muted response to these attempts that convinced Hezbollah that
it would only pay a minimal price for a successful abduction.

Unlike its response to previous thwarted kidnappings, the army refrained
from celebrating on Monday. This was partly due to the two successful
abductions that occurred last year, but also to awareness that a major
escalation in Gaza is likely relatively soon.

Olmert will remain unenthusiastic about a large-scale operation in Gaza even
after the Winograd report is published. But for years, Israel's response to
Palestinian attacks has been based on one thing only: the attacks' results.
A successful kidnapping, or a Qassam rocket that causes multiple deaths,
will hasten the decision to act.

Olmert is well acquainted with the situation assessment of GOC Southern
Command Yoav Galant: that a military confrontation with Hamas is inevitable.
The organization's ideology, its ongoing attacks and its military buildup in
Gaza all lead to this conclusion. And from Israel's perspective, Galant
believes, the sooner the better, before Hamas' military might grows any
further.

Meanwhile, the army is preparing, and on a scale that some liken to the
preparations preceding the first Lebanon War in 1982. In Israel, such
preparations tend to be self-fulfilling prophecies.

Hamas' claim of responsibility for Monday's rocket and mortar fire was
unusual. Since November, it has refrained from such announcements. This
time, Hamas was apparently motivated by a desire to regain its fighting
image in the eyes of the Palestinian public. Its statement even exaggerated
the number of rockets and missiles fired. The attack was apparently timed
for Independence Day to maximize its effect.

Palestinian security officials on Monday claimed that Hamas deliberately
aimed at open areas, in order to prevent a massive Israeli response, but
fired enough rockets to create the impression that it is once again leading
the fight and to divert attention from the failures of the new Palestinian
unity government. This government has not managed to end the bloody gang
wars in Gaza, nor has it ended the Hamas-Fatah rivalry: Both sides are
busily arming and recruiting in preparation for renewed infighting. It seems
the only thing that can save the Gazans from civil war is a large-scale
Israeli military operation