Jerusalem Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family Foundation
Vol. 7, No. 1 17 May 2007
The Growing Hamas-Al Qaeda Connection
Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi
Al-Qaeda generally thrives wherever central authority of governments is
collapsing and therefore its current success in the war-torn Gaza Strip
should not come as a surprise.
Just after Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August
2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the new security vacuum
that had been created and begun to dispatch its operatives to this
territory. By March 2006, no less than the president of the Palestinian
Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) told the London Arabic daily, al-Hayat,
"We have signs of the presence of al-Qaeda in Gaza and the West Bank."
In the meantime across the Middle East the external Hamas leadership
maintained close ties with well-known figures associated with the al-Qaeda
network, like the leader of the Kashmiri organization, Hezb ul-Mujahidin,
Sayyid Salahal-Din, in Pakistan and Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden
loyalist, in Yemen. The latter met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006.
Significantly al-Hayat reported on April 4, 2006: "a definite presence" of
al-Qaeda operatives in Gaza, who had infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and
Yemen. Moreover, a little over a month later Egypt's Ministry of the
Interior disclosed that two terrorist operatives involved in the April 2006
attack on the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Dahab, underwent military training
in the use of weapons and explosives in the Gaza Strip.
On May 9, 2007 the "Army of Islam" organization (Jaish al-Islam) published,
on a website identified with al-Qaeda (www.alhesbah.org), an official
announcement in which it took responsibility for the kidnapping of the BBC
journalist Alan Johnston and called for the release of the Palestinian
sheikh, Abu Qatada, who is considered one of the main ideologues of al-Qaeda
in Europe and is known to be the one with whom the heads of the group that
carried out 9/11 consulted. Hamas spokesperson, Ayman Taha, acknowledged the
fact that Hamas and "Army of Islam" had cooperated on the military
operational level.
Increasingly, there are signs that al-Qaeda is gaining strength in the Gaza
Strip. In the midst of the decaying internal situation in Gaza, with its
regular gun battles between the well-established Hamas and Fatah militias,
there are more incidents reported of attacks against symbols of any Western
presence from a UNRWA school to a Christian bookstore. Al-Qaeda generally
thrives wherever central authority of governments is collapsing and
therefore its current success in the war-torn Gaza Strip should not come as
a surprise.1 Seeming to copy the operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the
militants in Gaza belonging to these new terrorist organizations are
targeting Western reporters, like the famous cases in which journalists from
FOX News and the BBC were taken hostage. Even external appearances show
al-Qaeda's growing influence as members of its affiliate movements in the
Gaza Strip will often wear the same black head covering that was a trademark
of the late al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. All the evidence
indicates that rather than challenge al-Qaeda's bid to expand its presence
in the Gaza Strip, Hamas prefers to collaborate with these new militant
groups.
Al-Qaeda Enters Gaza
Just after Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August
2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the new security vacuum
that had been created and began to dispatch its operatives to this
territory. The Hamas leader who would later become its first foreign
minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, admitted to Corriere della Sera, on September
13, 2005 that "...a pair of men from al-Qaeda has infiltrated into Gaza."
Within a month an organization calling itself "Al-Qaeda in Palestine" was
distributing leaflets in a Gaza mosque. By March 2006, no less than the
president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) told the
London Arabic daily, al-Hayat, "We have signs of the presence of al-Qaeda in
Gaza and the West Bank."
While Abbas described this as a "very dangerous situation," no Palestinian
security service subsequently took any measures against al-Qaeda. Indeed,
this became official Palestinian Authority policy especially after Hamas
swept the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 and formed a
new government. A Hamas official, Said Sayyam, who became the Palestinian
Authority Interior Minister at the time, stated openly that he would not
order the arrest of terrorist operatives who would attack Israel; this
essentially amounted to an open invitation to global jihadi organizations
that they could find a new sanctuary in post-withdrawal Gaza, under Hamas
rule. It was the first clear indication that Hamas could work together with
elements from al-Qaeda coming into the Gaza Strip. In the meantime across
the Middle East the external Hamas leadership maintained close ties with
well-known figures associated with the al-Qaeda network, like the leader of
the Kashmiri organization, Hezb ul-Mujahidin, Sayyid Salah al-Din, in
Pakistan and Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden loyalist, in Yemen.2 The
latter met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006.
Gaza Becomes an International Terrorist Base
There was one question about al-Qaeda's presence in the Gaza Strip during
2006 that needed to be answered. Did it involve a foreign presence of
al-Qaeda operatives from other Arab countries or was this Palestinian
al-Qaeda affiliate just a group of Gazans who ideologically identified with
global jihad, but had no actual operational links with Osama bin Laden's
organization? Significantly al-Hayat answered this question when it
reported on April 4, 2006: "a definite presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in
Gaza, who had infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen.
Moreover, a little over a month later Egypt's Ministry of the Interior
disclosed that two terrorist operatives involved in the April 2006 attack on
the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Dahab, underwent military training in the use
of weapons and explosives in the Gaza Strip. They confessed to belonging to
an organization called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which was also an earlier name
for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's organization before it became al-Qaeda Iraq.3
Thus al-Qaeda related groups in Gaza appeared to have become involved in
military operations and were not just propagating their religious worldview
alone.
"The Army of Islam" and al-Qaeda
This year a new aspect of the al-Qaeda presence in the Gaza Strip became
evident. On May 9, 2007 the "Army of Islam" organization (Jaish al-Islam)
published, on a website identified with al-Qaeda (www.alhesbah.org), an
official announcement in which it took responsibility for the kidnapping of
the BBC journalist Alan Johnston and called for the release of the
Palestinian sheikh, Abu Qatada, who is being held in a British prison. Abu
Qatada is Sheikh Omar Mahmoud Othman, who is considered one of the main
ideologues of al-Qaeda in Europe and is known to be the one with whom the
heads of the group that carried out 9/11 consulted.
The announcement by the "Army of Islam," which also appeared in a recording
delivered to al-Jazeera, made these additional points:
"We will not sit idle in the face of the Crusader attack. . .Britain more
than any other state wanted to humiliate the Muslims...it settled the 'sons
of monkeys and pigs' in Palestine.it fights against Islam and the
Muslims.and is a partner to the Crusader war against Islam.
There is no protection for the British subjects in the Muslim states because
the British government is fighting the Muslims, and therefore all of them
are fighters [i.e.-they have no protection and can be killed].
Alan Johnston is being held under the laws of the Islamic shari'a concerning
prisoners.Britain must release our prisoners and particularly the
Palestinian Abu Qatada.We do not forget our prisoners in other countries and
we say to release all of them, otherwise we will behave the same way toward
all of them without exception."
The form and content "Army of Islam" recording generated press speculation
about al-Qaeda in Gaza. A Palestinian security source confirmed yet again in
an interview to Al-Quds Al-Arabi (May 12, 2007) that al-Qaeda branches
indeed have been set up in the Gaza Strip. In fact, it emerges from his
statements that there is close cooperation between al-Qaeda in Gaza and the
Hamas movement. He identified the "Army of Islam" directly with al-Qaeda,
and also noted that it is the one responsible for kidnapping the BBC
journalist Alan Johnston and for publishing the demand to release Abu Qatada
from the British prison. The same source verified that the local branch of
al-Qaeda was established by activists from various Arab states who came into
the Gaza Strip from outside the Palestinian Authority The organization was
also responsible for blowing up internet cafes, barbershops, pharmacies, and
cellular telephone stores.
The "Army of Islam" was indeed one of the three organizations that kidnapped
the Israeli solder Gilad Shalit in the summer of 2006 together with Hamas
and the Popular Resistance Committees which also had contacts with
al-Qaeda.4 This means Hamas and an al-Qaeda branch in Gaza have joined
together for operational cooperation in terror attacks against Israel. This
fact has been largely overlooked by observers of Middle Eastern affairs.
Indeed, Musa Abu Marzuk, the deputy political secretary of Hamas, has
commented in the newspaper, al-Liwa (April 10, 1007) that it is an honor for
the Hamas government "that it did not arrest a single jihad fighter nor
condemn a single action against the Zionist enemy."
Hamas did not want the impression to be given that it had any coordination
at present with local al-Qaeda affiliates. The Hamas leadership was
probably relieved when the deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri
lashed out at it for agreeing to a Palestinian unity government. But its
defensive response indicated that it was still committed to the goals of
al-Qaeda, namely resistance and jihad: "Be assured, Dr. Ayman.Hamas is still
the same movement it has been since its foundation." 5
Hamas spokesperson, Ayman Taha, acknowledged the fact that Hamas and "Army
of Islam" had cooperated on the military operational level. However he
claimed that "the contacts between Hamas and 'Army of Islam' existed only in
the beginning while abducting the (Israeli soldier Gilad) Shalit, I think it
was ended a while ago."6
Nevertheless, Muhammad al-Madhoun (Hamas), a political adviser to Prime
Minister Ismail Haniyeh, confirmed (Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, May 10, 2007) that
the demands that were made in the "Army of Islam's" recording detailing the
terms for Johnston's release were the same ones the group conveyed
clandestinely to the Hamas government. For Hamas it was clear who was
responsible for the abduction. In an official announcement after the video
clip was broadcasted Hamas said: "taking responsibility of Johnston's
abduction made it clear and didn't leave any room for speculations with
regard to the organization responsible for the abduction, which we had known
from the first moment."7
Just after the British journalist was abducted Hamas on its website called
on the Palestinian government "to issue immediate orders and to chase the
criminal group which caused harm to the supreme national interest of our
people, to arrest them and to beat strongly on their hands in order to make
them a lesson for others."8 However, Hamas kept quiet and never took any
actions against "Army of Islam." In other words Hamas knew right from the
start about the "Army of Islam" operation yet did not intervene to free the
British reporter and dismantle the "Army of Islam."
The Palestinian government, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, has for some time been
involved in contacts aimed at freeing Johnston. Haniyeh disclosed in
mid-April that there is close cooperation with British officials, who are
given relevant information obtained by Palestinian security operatives.
The Johnston affair reveals, then, the complexity of the reality of
Palestinian terror. The Hamas prime minister is working for the release of a
British journalist who was kidnapped by al-Qaeda, which is maintaining close
operational cooperation with Hamas. Since it came to power, Hamas has had no
interest in acting against the al-Qaeda branch that is functioning in the
Gaza Strip but is interested in preventing an international crisis that
would likely harm the Palestinian Authority, and it criticizes the "Army of
Islam" only for its "mistaken choice" of a target. The Palestinian Authority
thereby shows that it has no moral legitimacy to demand to be recognized as
a political entity like other nations and that it is an entity providing
sanctuary for international terrorism.
* * *
Notes
[1]Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007.
2 Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, "Understanding the Direction of the
New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and al-Qaeda Jihadism" in
Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 5, No. 22, Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs/Institute for Contemporary Affairs, April 6, 2006.
3 "The Egyptian Interior Ministry exposed operative collaboration between
terrorist elements in Sinai (connected to the Global Jihad and suspected of
involvement in the attacks at Dahab) and Palestinian terrorist elements in
the Gaza Strip (whose identity is unclear)," Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), May 26, 2006.
See:
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/dahab_250506.htm.
4 http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-24.htm
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50340http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3388249,00.html
5 "Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at the Hamas movement once again, accusing
it of abandoning jihad and 'selling Palestine' for seats in the Palestinian
unity government. Hamas spokesmen defended their political activity,
stressing the continuing adherence of the movement to its radical
principles, namely 'resistance' and 'jihad,' and non-recognition of Israel."
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence
Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), March 22, 2007. See:
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/al_zawahiri_e.htm.
6 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), May 10, 2007.
7 http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=ar&DSNO=981543
8
http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7HL2orUHY2IGeTpHIV52PkmUmWJfKM6CzaZSnKT1mY3s02bMI60Bkxu9dnAj4HPB9Xb6kuLh8ig0MGZqlvOnwllzdBmnMFGfTzfcn5pbwbrw%3d
* * *
Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi is a senior researcher of the Middle East
and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is a
founder of the Orient Research Group Ltd. and is a former advisor to the
Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:
http://www.jcpa.org
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