[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Shalom Brom has been advocating the "Oslo
religion" of withdrawal for years and in this article demonstrates how a
"true believer" can deal even with a reality that flies in the face of the
policies he holds so near and dear to his heart.

Brom soberly presents the reality that only a massive operation in the Gaza
Strip followed up for a continuous operating presence would actually work
but then recovers his bearings by inculcating that holy "demographic issue".

Brom, of course, won't explain that the validity of the "demographic issue"
(given one rejects the copious evidence that accurate demographic
projections are hardly as terrifying as withdrawal advocates claim) hinges
on the assertion that Palestinian self determination must be achieved by
their voting for the leadership of a sovereign Palestinian state rather than
a Palestinian autonomy. But since the "demographic issue" has been the
argument of last resort for withdrawal (arguing that withdrawal brings peace
and security is so preposterous that it is rarely relied upon in a policy
debate) one cannot expect him to undermine it.

After genuflecting before the holy "demographic issue" Brom starts to
regain his confidence - playing fast and lose with the facts to bolster his
faith based policy recommendations.

A few examples:

"From this point of view the IDF's action following Gilad Shalit's
kidnapping is a positive model. It exacted a heavy price from Hamas and
motivated the organization to return to maintaining the limited
ceasefire." - Shalit is still being held and Hamas used proxies to fire
rockets they supplied while they themselves continued to smuggle in weapons,
manufacture rockets and otherwise prepare for war. That's what Brom calls
"positive"

"Experience has shown that intensive diplomatic activity vis-a-vis Egypt
motivates it to undertake more vigorous action and helps to limit smuggling
from Sinai to Gaza." - Experience has shown that Egypt undertakes a few
photo ops in response to diplomatic activity while at the same time the bulk
of the smuggling continues.

It is important to read articles such a Shlomo Brom's piece because it
serves as an important reminder to those who think that reality in and of
itself can serve to clear out dogmatic policy recommendations.

It doesn't.]
================

Is an Expanded Military Operation in Gaza the Option of Choice?
Shlomo Brom
INSAS Policy Brief No. 5 May 27, 2007

At the Israeli cabinet meeting on May 13, the primary topic of discussion
was the need to expand military operations in Gaza in light of the ongoing
Qassam rocket fire and the increasing strength of armed groups in the Gaza
Strip. The cabinet meeting ended with a decision to step up preventive
actions against Qassam fire, including targeted killings and the entry of
small forces into territories near the border. No decision was made to
undertake wide scale land operations in the Gaza Strip, as recommended by
some elements in the IDF (in the Southern Command). In the meantime Qassam
fire has continued, and there is growing pressure to expand the operations.

Following the cabinet decision and the continuing Qassam fire, a view common
in certain circles both inside and outside the IDF has garnered new
momentum: that wide scale land operations in the Gaza Strip are unavoidable,
and that only the trauma from Lebanon is preventing the Israeli government
from making this necessary decision. These expanded operations are
unavoidable, the theory goes, because first of all there is no other way to
stop the Qassam fire, which is exacting an unbearable price from Israel. A
sovereign state cannot tolerate a situation in which residents of its towns
are harassed on an ongoing basis by rocket fire and cannot maintain a normal
routine, even if the damage and the number of casualties are limited.
Another reason is that the continuing, uninterrupted flow of weapons to the
Gaza Strip and the avoidance of action against armed groups in Gaza together
allow these groups to grow stronger, to organize, to train, and to become
further entrenched, and thus gradually to build a threat in the Gaza Strip
akin to the Hizbollah threat that Israel was hard-pressed to confront in
Lebanon. It follows that Israel must adopt a policy of wide scale preventive
operations with the goal of causing serious harm to armed groups in Gaza and
preventing them from turning into such a threat. Some even claim that Israel
must acquire complete freedom of action in the Gaza Strip, similar to the
freedom of action it enjoys in the West Bank. Such freedom of action can be
attained only by operations like Defensive Shield, whereby the military
power of the armed Palestinian groups is broken in the initial stage by
comprehensive attacks by the IDF, which assumes control of extensive
territory in the Gaza Strip.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether military actions of this
kind in the Gaza Strip are indeed essential, and if so, whether it is
worthwhile to conduct them as soon as possible.

There are two ways to examine whether wide scale operations of this kind are
necessary. One is to examine the supposition that the security and political
dynamic in Israel will necessarily force the decision to carry out such
operations. A second way is to examine the strategic logic of such
operations. Even if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative,
which means there is a high probability that the government of Israel will
reach such a decision, there is still reason to undertake the second
examination because it will aid in planning operations, which will serve
Israel's best interests.

The Security and Political Dynamic

As a result of the Second Lebanon War there is a negative mood among the
Israeli public, and the lack of confidence in the government is
unprecedented. The chief lesson from the war, emphasized in the Winograd
Commission's interim report, is the need to weigh carefully whether
decisions on military operations are compatible with the ability of these
operations to achieve realistic military objectives that will realize Israel's
strategic goals. All of these were added to the basic Israeli reluctance,
dating from before the war in Lebanon, to be drawn back into the "Gazan
swamp," and in fact they have prompted the
government to hesitate and deliberate seriously before making a decision on
any comprehensive military action in Gaza.

As long as there are almost no casualties from the Qassam fire it is easy
for the government to hesitate and proceed cautiously and judiciously. The
problem is that while the Qassams are not a very effective weapon and the
warning systems also reduce the chances of fatal casualties, the ongoing
firing of Qassams increases the statistical probability that ultimately
there will be one incident with a relatively large number of casualties
(where a school or kindergarten is hit, for example) or an accumulation of
casualties. In addition, the unimpeded and growing power of the
organizations in Gaza is facilitating a gradual
improvement in the range and effectiveness of the warheads of locally
manufactured rockets. It is also facilitating the smuggling of limited
numbers of rockets of military quality (Katyushas). This process increases
the probability of more casualties and in the longer term places additional
areas within range of the rockets. There is also a possibility of additional
Palestinian actions that will not be successfully foiled, like the one that
led to the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit. In such situations the government
would come under heavy pressure for a strong response.

The conclusion is that in fact, there is a not insignificant probability
that the government will be forced at a certain stage to decide on wide
scale military operations in the Gaza Strip.

The Strategic Logic

Israel's strategic interests, which must be taken into account with every
decision, are as follows:
- Continued separation from the Gaza Strip population
(the demographic issue) and less friction with the population
- Ensuring normal life for the Israeli population in
areas bordering Gaza
- Strengthening Israeli deterrence, or at least
maintaining it
- Stopping the armed groups in the Gaza Strip from
growing stronger, or at least curtailing them

There are several reasons for the rocket fire that has emanated from the
Gaza Strip since Hamas took upon itself a limited ceasefire (tahdiya):
- The ceasefire's restriction to the Gaza Strip: the
understanding between Israel and the Palestinians on a ceasefire was limited
to the Gaza Strip only. Israel's continued preventive actions in the West
Bank lead to Palestinian deaths from time to time. There will always be
groups in Gaza who will respond with rocket fire at Israel in order to take
revenge and to try to create an equation of mutual deterrence with Israel.
- The clashes between Palestinian organizations and the
state of anarchy in Gaza: not all the organizations were parties to the
tahdiya. Prominent among them was Islamic Jihad, which continued its
terrorist attacks along with a variety of groups that have no clear
organizational and political identity. The anarchy, the non-functioning
Palestinian government, and the continuation of often violent clashes
between Fatah and Hamas made it entirely impossible to impose the ceasefire
on the turbulent groups. The state of anarchy also generated motivation to
fire rockets at Israel as a tool in the internal struggles. The rockets
fired in recent rounds of violence are a typical example. Their purpose is
to divert attention from the reciprocal lethal violence, to place the blame
for the deterioration on Israel, and perhaps even to push Israel toward
action that would contain the internal clashes.
- In addition, it can be posited that Hamas, which is
also frustrated that the establishment of the national unity government has
not yielded the hoped-for results - removal of sanctions and the government's
ability to function effectively - is interested in continuing a limited
level of violent activity against Israel, even if there is a tahdiya. In
this sense its behavior is similar to Hizbollah's, which - though it
transferred most of its activities to the domestic political realm after the
IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon - was interested in maintaining a
limited level of violent confrontation with Israel. The more Hamas is
convinced that Israel, the West, and Fatah have pooled their efforts to
prevent the government from functioning and ultimately to reverse the
results of the elections, the greater its motivation to continue firing at
Israel.

There are no military ways of completely preventing rocket fire at Israel by
returning fire from within Israel. However, it is possible to strike at some
of those involved in rocket fire and at the rocket manufacturing and storage
infrastructure, and thereby to reduce the extent and effectiveness of the
rocket fire. It is possible to prevent rocket fire almost completely by
taking control of the launching areas and clearing them of armed elements, a
process that is necessarily relatively extended because the territory is
saturated with armed operatives. This means that even after an area is taken
over, it will continue to serve as an area for launching rockets until it
is cleared through a slow, sustained process, yet once Israeli forces leave
the area, the threat will be renewed in its previous form. At the same time
the intensity of the rocket fire from areas the IDF has not taken control of
will increase. This has two main implications:
- In order to prevent rocket fire by military means,
permanent military control over wide areas of Gaza will be required for the
long term.
- These areas will be expanded as the range of the
rockets increases, and they are likely to include almost the entire
territory of the Gaza Strip.

A broad military operation in Gaza connotes the total collapse of the
tahdiya and full mobilization by Hamas to fire rockets. This means that in
the initial stage, the military operations will result in a significant
expansion of the scope of rocket fire and the damage it causes.

A significant blow to the increasing power of the organizations also
requires a broad action over time. This means taking control over wide
territories in the Gaza Strip and retaining a permanent presence in at least
some of them, such as the area of the Egyptian border, in order to allow
action against the weapons-smuggling tunnels. If the goal is a security
situation similar to that in the West Bank, a broad action is needed against
all the armed groups, i.e., taking control of most of the Gaza Strip and
operating there for an extended time.

The Gaza Strip is a military challenge of a different kind from what the IDF
faced in the West Bank just prior to Operation Defensive Shield. The
Palestinian forces that confront it are on a much larger scale, with a
higher level of organization, arms, and training. The physical setting is
also different: a crowded urban expanse that covers a large part of the Gaza
Strip. It is impossible to separate the armed elements from the population
because the population has nowhere to escape to. The various groups,
especially Hamas and Fatah, are now engaged in a violent confrontation, but
a wide scale Israeli operation will stop the confrontation between them and
unite them all in the struggle against the "Israeli invasion." This means
that the fighting will be more difficult and involve greater losses.

This analysis suggests that only a comprehensive military operation that
brings about the conquest of a large part of the Gaza Strip and whose forces
subsequently remain in the territory - initially for a prolonged period of
mopping-up operations, and later to maintain control over the area - can
achieve by military means the objectives of: preventing rocket fire and
assuring normal life in areas of Israel near the Gaza Strip; dealing a
significant blow to the power of the organizations in the Gaza Strip; and
restricting the smuggling of weapons to them. The problem is that the price
of the operation is liable to be high, both in direct losses from the
fighting and in the price the civilian population will have to pay in being
subject to widespread rocket attacks for a not insignificant period of time,
until the territory is taken over and cleared.

As for the effect on the balance of deterrence, it can be assumed a
successful operation will aid in preserving Israeli deterrence, but the
risks involved in a
wide scale operation and the price Israel is liable to pay are likely to
harm the achievement of this objective. This is because in the region's
perception, as well as the domestic Israeli mindset, the ability of the
organizations to harm Israel is seen as a victory for them even when they
are defeated. Wide scale operations might also elicit a tough international
response, because the international community does not understand why Israel
reacts in a way that seems disproportionate to the provocation.

[IMRA: the following "declaration of faith" is in a box in the original:]

Start of box:

However, all these prices pale in comparison to a calculation of the damage
that will be inflicted on the strategic objective of separation from the
Palestinians, whose goal is to preserve Israel as the democratic state of
the Jewish people. Israel will be drawn back into the Gaza Strip. It is also
possible that the chaos that will be created in Gaza will cause the collapse
of the Palestinian Authority and will require Israel to renew its military
administration of the Gaza Strip, including the elements of civil
administration, in order to provide services to the population. In any case,
large forces will have to continue to remain within the Gaza Strip.

End of box---

Conclusions

The main conclusion is that in light of the limited damage caused by the
export of violence from the Gaza Strip, Israel would do well to be cautious
and not succumb to the illusion that there is a comprehensive solution to
the Gaza Strip problem. It is not clear what advantage Israel enjoys if
dragged back into the Gaza Strip and forced to pay a much higher price for
an achievement that harms a key Israeli interest.

Even if the political-security dynamic leads to a situation where the
Israeli government would feel obligated to respond very harshly and take
control over territories in the Gaza Strip, there is no reason to advance
that moment. The argument that a preventive action must be launched to keep
the organizations from growing even more powerful is not sufficiently
convincing. First, in the past even an Israeli presence in the Philadelphi
Corridor did not prevent weapons smuggling and only limited it to some
extent. Second, Israel can also exploit the time remaining until the moment
when the confrontation seems inevitable. One lesson Israel would do well to
learn from the war in Lebanon is that the unsatisfactory results of the
ground war stemmed largely from the lack of sufficient preparedness by
Israel, and not just from Hizbollah's preparedness. It is not inevitable
that the Palestinians, who suffer from sanctions and heavy financial
constraints along with increasing numbers of violent clashes among the
various groups, would exploit this time for the better. It is also unclear
if Hamas's turning into a force with more attributes of a regular military
force will necessarily be to the IDF's detriment. For a military force of a
state, dealing with this kind of armed force may be easier.

A better understanding of the price of a comprehensive operation to conquer
extensive territories in the Gaza Strip must also influence the definition
of objectives of the operations if and when Israel needs to engage in more
massive responses to stop the escalation of rocket fire. It must lead to an
understanding that it is better to adopt more limited objectives with a
lower cost, even if that means partial solutions that only limit Qassam
damage, the lack of a comprehensive solution to the problem, and the
continued existence of armed groups in Gaza. So, for example, continuing
action to hunt down rocket launching squads; continuous strikes at the
organizations involved in rocket fire, their assets, and their leadership;
and taking control over confined launching areas can be effective in
reducing the continuity and effectiveness of the rockets, and at least in
pushing Hamas to want to renew the limited ceasefire. From this point of
view the IDF's action following Gilad Shalit's kidnapping is a positive
model. It exacted a heavy price from Hamas and motivated the organization to
return to maintaining the limited ceasefire.

Although Israel is now in the eye of the storm of the escalation in Gaza, it
must take into account that even this wave can subside. As in the past,
Hamas and Fatah can be deterred from sliding into a full scale civil war and
can calm the violent confrontation between them. Then Hamas's interest in a
ceasefire will also be renewed, especially if it pays a heavy price during
the process. In such an event Israel will have to examine whether there are
not also political and diplomatic means of reducing the threat from the Gaza
Strip. In this context the following points are worth noting:

· - Action to strengthen and expand the tahdiya to areas
in the West Bank can make a significant contribution to reducing the number
of Qassams fired. There are many risks in extending the ceasefire to areas
in the West Bank, and it is necessary to examine what arrangements and
understandings can be reached with the Palestinians that can neutralize
these risks.
· - The chaos and civil war in the Gaza Strip do cause
damage to the armed groups in the short term, but they also harm Israel's
interests. This situation prevents any chance for the development of a
Palestinian interlocutor that can interact with Israel, and this internal
situation is also one of the main reasons for the recent Qassam fire. Israel
must examine how it might contribute to stop the process of deterioration in
Gaza. In this context it should examine how the following factors
contributed to this deterioration: the unwillingness to work with the
Palestinian unity government; the continuing sanctions against it; and at
the same time, the encouragement of Fatah elements to engage in a
confrontation with Hamas.
· - Experience has shown that intensive diplomatic
activity vis-a-vis Egypt motivates it to undertake more vigorous action and
helps to limit smuggling from Sinai to Gaza.

Finally, in light of the increasing probability of wider scale military
confrontations in the Gaza Strip, it is appropriate for the IDF and the
political establishment to start intensive preparations for this
eventuality. They should not make do with only detailed military planning,
equipping the troops, and training them for these operations. The top
political and military echelons also need to prepare conceptually by
engaging in defining realistic objectives and the means of achieving them,
and in examining various scenarios through war games as well.