Fatah Isn't the Answer
By MICHAEL OREN
The Wall Street Journal June 20, 2007; Page A17
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118230210250741414.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

America and its Middle Eastern allies have every reason to panic. The green
flags of Hamas are furling over Gaza and the al-Fatah forces trained and
financed by the United States have ignominiously fled. Fears are rife that
Iranian-backed and Syrian-hosted terror will next achieve dominance over the
West Bank and proceed to undermine the pro-Western governments of Lebanon,
Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf.

To avert this catastrophe, the U.S. has joined with the Israelis and the
Europeans in resuming the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars in
financial aid to the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of its Fatah
president, Mahmoud Abbas, and accelerating talks for the establishment of a
West Bank Palestinian state. The goal is to provide Palestinians with an
affluent, secular and peaceful alternative to Hamas, and persuade Gazans to
return to the Fatah fold. But the policy ignores every lesson of the
abortive peace process to date as well as Fatah's monumental corruption,
jihadism and militancy. Indeed, any sovereign edifice built on the rotten
foundations of the Palestinian Authority is doomed to implode, enhancing,
rather than diminishing, Hamas's influence.

Gunmen from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Is funding them the path to peace?

Since its creation by the so-called Oslo Accords of 1993, the PA has
garnered more international aid than any entity in modern history -- more,
per capita, than the European states under the Marshall Plan. The lion's
share of this fortune has been siphoned into the private accounts of Fatah
leaders or used to pay off the commanders of some 16 semi-autonomous
militias. The PA also maintains an estimated 60,000 uniformed gunmen on its
payroll, giving the West Bank the world's highest percentage of
policemen-to-population.

The Palestinian people, meanwhile, languish in ever-deepening poverty and
unemployment, while lawlessness plagues Palestinian streets. The unbridled
corruption of the PA and its Fatah headmen served as a principal cause of
Hamas's electoral victory in 2006, as well its takeover of Gaza. Viewers of
Hamas television have recently been treated to tours of the lavish villas
maintained by Fatah officials in the Strip, and video clips showing PA
policemen, more abundantly armed and more numerous than Hamas's troops,
fleeing at the first sign of battle.

Though Fatah originally aspired to replace Israel with a secular, democratic
state in Palestine, the organization refashioned itself in 1990s as an
Islamic movement, embracing the lexicon of jihad. Hundreds of mosques were
built with public funds, and imams were hired to spread the message of
martyrdom and the hatred of Christians and Jews. These themes became the
staple of the official PA media, inciting the suicide bombings that began in
2000 and poisoning an entire generation of Palestinian youth. Ironically,
the Islamization of Fatah legitimized Hamas and contributed to the cadres of
religious extremists who are now defying its authority.

In addition to its fiscal malfeasance and Islamic radicalism, Fatah has
never fulfilled its pledges to crack down on terror. Though Mahmoud Abbas
routinely criticizes Palestinian terrorist attacks as "contrary to the
Palestinian national interest" -- not an affront to morality and
international law -- he has never disavowed the al-Aqsa Brigades, a Fatah
affiliate responsible for some of the bloodiest attacks against Israeli
civilians.

In the past, such assaults have served as a means of maintaining Fatah's
legitimacy as a resistance movement and countering charges that the
organization sold out to America and Israel. In fact, a distinct correlation
exists between the amount of support that Fatah receives from the West and
its need to prove its "Palestinianess" through terror.

In view of its performance over the past 14 years, the Palestinian Authority
under Fatah can be counted on to squander most or all of the vast sums now
being given to it by the U.S. and the international community. More gunmen
will be hired and better weapons procured, but in the absence of a unified
command and a leadership worth fighting for, PA soldiers will perform no
more credibly than they did in Gaza. Mr. Abbas will continue to denounce
terror while ignoring the terrorist units within his own organization, while
PA imams will persist in preaching their jihadist sermons.

In response, Israel will be precluded from lifting the checkpoints that not
only block suicide bombers but hinder communication between Palestinian
cities. Impeded by Palestinian attacks and Israeli countermeasures, the
peace talks will inexorably grind to a halt. In the end, the Palestinian
people will remain impoverished, divided and stateless, and more than ever
amenable to the purist polity of Hamas.

If funding and empowering Fatah is not a viable option for the U.S., what
other courses might the administration take? Clearly no progress toward
Palestinian statehood can be made before Fatah has reformed itself
financially, ideologically and structurally. Even under the most propitious
circumstances this process is certain to take many years -- longer if
economic aid and political support are provided to the PA unconditionally.
Similarly, proposals for containing
Hamas's influence by stationing an international force along the Gaza border
are unlikely to succeed if for no other reason than Hamas's avowed
determination to resist such a deployment. Yet the need to combat Hamas and
provide Palestinians with an attractive diplomatic horizon remains acute.
There is, fortunately, an interim answer.

The U.S., together with its Quartet partners, can work to establish areas of
extensive Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank. Within these districts,
local Palestinian leaders will be fully empowered to manage all aspects of
daily life including health, education and resource management. A national
assembly, comprised of representatives from each district, will meet
regularly to deliberate issues of West Bank-wide concern. Security, however,
will be jointly administered by Israel and Jordan. The Jordanian involvement
is crucial to convincing Palestinians that the status quo of occupation has
ended and they may in the future assume full responsibility for their
internal defense. Such an arrangement will benefit Jordan as well, by
facilitating its efforts to fight radicalism and stem the flight of
Palestinians over its borders.

Visiting Washington this week, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described
the Hamas conquest of Gaza as an opportunity for the Palestinians. This
indeed may be the case, but not by resurrecting long-failed policies and
imposing a state structure on a corrupt and incompetent Fatah. Doing so is
tantamount to investing in the Titanic. Significant opportunities do,
however, exist for policy makers -- American, Israeli, and Palestinian --
who are willing to consider new paradigms and incremental steps toward the
realization of a durable peace.
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Mr. Oren is a senior fellow at the Shalem Center and the author of "Power,
Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present"
(Norton, 2007).