Jerusalem Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family Foundation
Vol. 7, No. 5 24 June 2007
The Risks to Regional Security from International Forces in Gaza
Pinhas Inbari
With the total collapse of Fatah in Gaza and the territory's takeover by
Hamas, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has been giving serious consideration to
the deployment of international forces in the Gaza Strip generally, and more
specifically in the sensitive Philadelphi Corridor separating Gaza from
Egyptian Sinai.
A deeper look reveals that the international-forces idea is very dangerous
with potentially grave results for Israel. Prof. Yehezkel Dror, a member of
the Winograd Commission investigating the Second Lebanon War, asked Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni "hypothetically" what future historians would say about
an international force that hindered Israel in operating against Hizbullah
and would set a precedent for an international force in the Palestinian
territories.
What Dror seemed to suggest was that the international-forces idea marked a
sharp departure from the widely admired principle that Israel does not rely
on foreigners for its defense and only wants to be able to handle it alone.
This doctrine yielded massive U.S. military assistance and political backing
for Israel.
Once Israel changes its approach and starts asking for foreign troops to
defend all its borders, the perception of Israel may well also change - from
asset to burden.
Whereas the Europeans now identify Israeli-imposed movement restrictions on
the Palestinians as the key problem, the Israeli view is the opposite: it is
not
the lack of free movement that is causing terror, but terror that is
creating the need for inspections that limit movement.
Once Israel formally asks the Europeans to send troops to Gaza, they will
not do so free of charge. They will probably prefer to send their troops to
the West Bank instead of Gaza as a way of imposing their positions on
Israel - not only regarding the checkpoints but also regarding other Israeli
security requirements such as the separation fence.
Israel Studies the Impact of International Deployment
With the total collapse of Fatah in Gaza and the territory's takeover by
Hamas, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has been giving serious consideration to
the deployment of international forces in the Gaza Strip generally, and more
specifically in the sensitive Philadelphi Corridor separating Gaza from
Egyptian Sinai. This narrow border zone has been the main route through
which Hamas and other terrorist organizations have smuggled vast amounts of
weaponry and trained operatives into Gaza over the past several years.
In his testimony to the Winograd Commission, Olmert said he had asked the
head of the National Security Council to study the issue of international
forces.1 He did not go into further detail but presumably was not only
referring to Lebanon, or only to Gaza, but to all the territories -
including the West Bank in particular and possibly even the Golan as well.2
Indeed, soon after the upgrading of UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon,
Olmert's coalition ally, Strategic Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman,
raised the idea of sending NATO forces to Gaza.
European sources confirmed to the author3 that Israel also looked into the
prospects of international forces in the West Bank, but Europe shelved the
idea because it has no enthusiasm to send troops either to Gaza or the West
Bank. However, Javier Solana, the European Union's high representative for
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, stated in an address to the European
Parliament on June 6, 2007, that stationing an international-observer force
in Gaza is now a possibility, although Egypt "will find it difficult to
accept." Solana said that for the first time after many years the notion of
international forces "is not unreasonable."4 Israel, the Palestinians, and
Egypt are considering the option.
With the Hamas takeover of Gaza, the idea of international forces might
sound good to many Israelis. Why should Israeli soldiers die in Gaza if
European troops are ready to do so instead? Italy and Spain have already
volunteered to send troops to Gaza, though they did not push the idea too
ardently.
Not only Lieberman but also two MKs of the Meretz Party, Avshalom Vilan and
Zehava Gal'on, have prepared a detailed plan centering on the dispatch of
international forces to Gaza and inviting the Arab League to take Gaza under
its auspices.5 Attorney Ram Caspi, who is close to Kadima leaders and to
Labor leader and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, portrayed a scenario in which
Israel would choke Gaza economically so as to force the international
community to take responsibility for the Strip, including international
forces.6
Although in Israel the idea is being raised only in connection to Gaza,
among the Palestinians the idea is being debated as a whole, the West Bank
included. Dr. Ahmad Yusuf, adviser to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh,
suggested sending inter-Arab troops as a wedge between Hamas and Fatah
fighters. Fatah's former Deputy Prime Minister Azzam al-Ahmad, however,
rejected this and suggested that international forces, once dispatched, be
stationed on the borders between the Palestinian Authority and Israel rather
than within the PA territories.7 Former Palestinian Information Minister Dr.
Mustafa Barghouti, head of the Mubadara Party, rejected the Meretz MKs' idea
on the ground that it conflicted with the notion of a Palestinian state.8
Will Multinational Forces Hinder IDF Operations?
In any case, a deeper look reveals that the international-forces idea is
very dangerous with potentially grave results for Israel.
During Olmert's testimony to the Winograd Commission investigating the
Second Lebanon War, Prof. Yehezkel Dror, a member of the commission, hinted
at reservations about the idea: "One question about [UN Security Council
Resolution] 1701 [is that] a precedent is set of Israel substantially
relying for its security needs on a multinational force that has advantages
or disadvantages and one cannot tell how it might develop. We found no
thorough and genuine discussion on the subject."9 Dror further pursued this
line during the testimony of Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. He asked her
"hypothetically" what future historians would say about an international
force that hindered Israel in operating against Hizbullah and would set a
precedent for an international force in the Palestinian territories as a
"solution" that was not to Israel's satisfaction.10
What Dror seemed to suggest was that no adequate, in-depth discussions had
been held on altering Israeli doctrines, and that the international-forces
idea marked a sharp departure from the widely admired principle that Israel
does not rely on foreigners for its defense and only wants to be able to
handle it alone. That is, Israel only demanded recognition of its right to
self-defense. This doctrine yielded massive U.S. military assistance and
political backing for Israel. Israel was perceived by and large as an asset
to the free world and a strategic ally of the United States. Once Israel
changes its approach and starts asking for foreign troops to defend all its
borders, the perception of Israel may well also change - from asset to
burden. Not only will Washington reevaluate its relationship with Israel,
but the European countries may begin a policy of coercing Israel to adopt
the European positions in the dispute with the Palestinians.
The main point of contention between European perceptions and Israeli
perceptions concerns the cause of the problem. Whereas the Europeans now
identify Israeli-imposed movement restrictions on the Palestinians as the
key problem, Israel sees it as the Palestinian terror assault and justifies
the regime of barriers and checkpoints as a necessity response. Both the
latest World Bank report on the PA's economic deterioration and the U.S.
"benchmarks paper" also point to the barriers and checkpoints as a major
hindrance to the "peace process" and the viability of the Palestinian
economy. Again, the Israeli view is the opposite: it is not the lack of free
movement that is causing terror, but terror that is creating the need for
inspections that limit people's movement.
It is also an argument over what comes first. The Europeans say peace
enables security; Israel says security enables peace.
Europeans May Prefer Stationing Troops in West Bank
Once Israel formally asks the Europeans to send troops to Gaza, they will
not do so free of charge. They will probably prefer to send their troops to
the
West Bank instead of Gaza as a way of imposing their positions on Israel -
not only regarding the checkpoints regime but also regarding other Israeli
security requirements such as the separation fence. The collapse of Israel's
security strategy could well have disastrous consequences for Israel, the
Palestinians, and Jordan alike.
An indication that sending EU troops to Gaza will be conditioned on sending
them to the West Bank was implied in a statement by Fatah spokesman Jamal
Nazza during an interview with German TV Channel 3 on 31 May 2007, as quoted
by the Dunia Watan agency of Gaza: "The idea...is Arafat's - to create an
international monitoring mechanism for the...occupation and to protect the
Palestinians from the Israeli aggression....As for Fatah, its guiding
principle is that Gaza and the West Bank are one entity, and if the spread
of international forces is part of a peace agreement with Israel, the issue
is worth studying and the Palestinians will not reject an international
monitor of the occupation's behavior."11
Whoever needs proof that Europe is likely to demand stationing its troops in
the PA territories can find it in a June 2007 Amnesty International report
on human rights violations in the PA.12 The report fully endorses the notion
that Israel's checkpoints system is the root of all evil, but what is
important here is the operative recommendation to "Deploy an effective
international human rights monitoring mechanism across Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories to monitor the compliance of each party
[Israel and the PA]13 with its respective obligations under international
law; report publicly; and recommend corrective measures to be adopted by the
parties, other countries or international organizations."14 In essence, a
hasty and undeliberated Israeli decision to invite international forces to
the PA territories may lead to the total collapse of the Israel security
doctrine and the protections against terror for Israel, Jordan, and - as the
latest Gaza events proved - for the Palestinians themselves.
Dangers of a "Safe Passage" Corridor Linking Gaza and the West Bank
The checkpoints within the West Bank are arguably a legitimate issue. They
indeed create an onerous burden on the Palestinians and should be constantly
examined. The problem arises with the "safe passage" plan that gives the
Palestinians an extraterritorial corridor between Gaza and the West Bank,
far from Israeli security control and out of reach of Israeli sovereignty.
No similar example exists of a country willingly yielding an
extraterritorial corridor to another party, let alone an enemy, let alone
for free. In this special case the proposed corridor risks cutting off the
Negev Desert from the rest of Israel. And since it would pass through
sovereign Israeli territory, it could inspire the renewal of Palestinian
claims for the 1947 partition-plan borders.
Contrary to the expectations of Oslo's architects in 1993, Gaza did not
develop into a peace-loving entity with flourishing economic activity that
needed border crossings and a passage to the West Bank to maintain its
economic growth; instead it turned into another center of global jihad.15 It
does not require a vivid imagination to understand that once the
Palestinians have free movement in the West Bank and a safe passage from
Gaza to the West Bank, al-Qaeda will soon establish itself along the axis
that stretches from Sinai through Gaza to Ramallah, posing existential
threats to the Palestinians, Israel, and Jordan combined.
Egypt appears to understand far better than Israel the regional dangers
inherent in sending Europeans troops to the PA territories. The head of the
Egyptian security delegation in Gaza, that has now moved to Ramallah, Gen.
Burhan Hamad, told reporters: "The Israeli request to have international
forces deployed along the borders between Gaza and Egypt is sheer nonsense.
There are peace agreements and no way Egypt will accept those forces, and
there is no need either.this will not happen." As for the idea of stationing
NATO or Arab League forces in Gaza, he said: "I am against any [foreign]
control of the liberated land."16
There are real concerns that Christian troops, as part of international
forces, may attract al-Qaeda elements from Sinai and within Gaza to operate
against them. In the case of the UNIFIL forces in Lebanon, the al-Qaeda
group Fatah al-Islam has already threatened them.17
The Precedent of International Forces in Southern Lebanon
To what extent did Olmert's decision to approve a ground attack in the final
stages of the Second Lebanon War derive from the aim of encouraging a UN
decision to send international forces? Israeli security sources told this
writer that Israel was disturbed by the international insistence on sending
forces only in the framework of UNIFIL, strictly within Lebanese
parameters.18 The sources said Israel demanded a force that would be well
outside the UNIFIL mandate. Resolution 1701 on an upgraded UNIFIL force was
a compromise between Israeli insistence and international reluctance.
Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, in their new book Prisoners in Lebanon,19 quote
a protocol of a discussion between then-Defense Minister Amir Peretz and
then-IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz20 in which Peretz said: "The war effort
ended. The talk now is about a multinational force. But it will not enter
the territory unless we are there. [So] we have to take control on the
ground in southern Lebanon." In other words, IDF soldiers were not sent to
the battlefield to win the war but to give the international forces the
pretext to enter.
"What the dispute was all about," Olmert said to the Winograd Commission,
"was that we do not leave when a ceasefire is reached but only when the
international forces enter. There is no vacuum....This was not achieved
before the 11th of July and this operation [the final ground attack] saved
[us]."21
* * *
Notes
1. Olmert testimony to Winograd Commission, p. 53.
2. The testimony of Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni revealed that the National
Security Council supported the idea of international forces in places other
than Lebanon. Livni testimony to Winograd Commission, p. 21. It is not clear
whether this position only applied to Gaza or to the West Bank as well.
3. Meeting in Tel Aviv, 27 May 2007.
4. See note 15.
5. Ha'aretz, 30 May 2007. MK Vilan added to Israeli Radio on 31 May 2007
that international forces in Gaza might bolster Gaza's economy.
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=864926&contrassID=2&subContrassID=21&sbSubContrassID=0
6. Globes, 15 May 2007.
7. Kyodo News, 26 May 2007.
8. Ma'an news agency, 31 May 2007.
http://www.maannews.net/ar/index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=69588
The Palestinian government formally rejected the Meretz initiative, stating
that it was an Israeli attempt to provoke disputes between the Arabs and the
Palestinians and evade its obligations according to the Arab Peace
Initiative. Sama news agency, 30 May 2007.
9. Olmert testimony to Winograd Commission, p. 51.
10. Livni testimony to Winograd Commission, p. 2. Livni argued with Dror,
saying: "You speak about a precedent...for other areas and there is some
hidden assumption that this is bad for Israel. I suggest that we leave it
for now for further study." p. 3.
11. Interview with German TV Channel 3, 31 May 2007, as quoted by Dunia
Watan agency of Gaza.
12. "Enduring Occupation: Palestinians Under Siege in the West Bank," June
2007. http://www.amnesty.org/resources/pdf/Israelreport.pdf
13. The PA was asked to "Take effective measures to prevent attacks on
Israeli civilians by Palestinian armed groups and bring to justice those
responsible for such attacks," ibid., p. 45.
14. Ibid.
15. As Colonel Jibril Rajub, a senior PA security authority, described it:
"We wanted Gaza to become another Singapore, but it turned into another
Mogadishu." Lecture together with Minister Gideon Ezra, Ambassador Hotel,
Jerusalem, 30 May 2007.
16. Al-Quds, 3 June 2007. Solana, in his address to the European Parliament,
expected Egypt to have trouble with this proposal because it might cast
doubt on its effective control of the Egyptian side of the border.
17. Al-Quds al-Arabi, 4 May 2007.
http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=yesterday\03z30.htm&storytitle=ff%C7%D4%CA%C8%C7%DF%C7%CA%20%E4%E5%D1%20%C7%E1%C8%C7%D1%CF%20%CA%E4%CA%DE%E1%20%E1%DA%ED%E4%20%C7%E1%CD%E1%E6%C9%20%E6%20%DD%CA%CD%20%C7%E1%C7%D3%E1%C7%E3%20%20%CA%E5%CF%CF%20%C8%D6%D1%C8%20%20%C7%E1%ED%E6%E4%ED%DD%ED%E1%20fff
18. In a private meeting during the war.
19. Tel Aviv, 2007, 437 pp. [Hebrew]
20. Ibid., p. 207.
21. Olmert testimony to Winograd Commission, p. 75.
* * *
Pinhas Inbari is a veteran Palestinian affairs correspondent who formerly
reported for Israel Radio and Al Hamishmar newspaper, and currently reports
for several foreign media outlets. He is the author of a number of books on
the Palestinians including The Palestinians: Between Terrorism and
Statehood.
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