A license to kill
By Moshe Arens - Haaretz(OpEd) 17 September 2007
www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=904137&contrassID=2&subContrassID=4

To the innumerable excuses the Olmert government has offered for not using
ground troops to push the Qassam rockets launched from the Gaza Strip out of
range, and finally fulfilling its obligation to provide security to the
Israeli citizens in Sderot and the neighboring settlements, has now been
added another lame excuse: We do not want to open a second front, in
addition to the one up north. After all, we do not want to get caught
fighting a two-front war.

This will remind those who still remember World War II of the two-front
issue then. Hitler did not want to fight a two-front war so he signed, to
the amazement of all, the Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact with the
Soviet Union. The pact gave him the chance to knock France out of the war
before taking on the Soviet Union. After the Germans plunged into the Soviet
Union, Stalin and his many admirers campaigned for the opening of a "second
front" in the west so that Hitler would be forced to fight a two-front war.

But this is where the similarity with Israel's present predicament ends.

It so happens that Israel has had experience with fighting two-front wars,
and even three-front wars. It was tough, but Israel had no choice - and it
won them all. But to describe the Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists in the
Gaza Strip as a "second front" that Israel must at all costs avoid, even if
it is at the expense of the school children in Sderot, is ridiculous. Does
anybody seriously suggest that Israel is incapable of dealing with the Gaza
terrorists while simultaneously remaining alert and prepared in the north?
That such a challenge would bring the IDF to the limits of its capability?
In the north we face the Syrian army, not the best army in the world, but,
nevertheless, a substantial military force. In the south we face a rag-tag
terrorist force in the Gaza Strip, which the IDF knows how to handle. To
propose that dealing effectively with them would prejudice our ability to
handle the Syrians, if that were required, is disingenuous.

In essence, what government spokesmen are suggesting is that as long as
Syria or Hezbollah in Lebanon represent a potential threat we cannot deal
effectively with the Qassam attacks in the south. If you add the concern for
what is happening in Iran, the children in Sderot may never be able to go to
school in safety. Israel's enemies have presumably brought Israel to the
limits of its capability. Anybody who does not take seriously the plans that
are being made for putting everybody into shelters and for developing rocket
interception systems that will shoot down anything that flies, must be
seriously concerned for Israel's future if this strategy is to prevail.

What is this strategy doing to Israel's deterrence? We evidently are unable
to deter the launchers of Qassam rockets in the Gaza Strip, but the shoe is
actually on the other foot. With this strategy, it is the Syrians who are
deterring us from doing anything about the Qassams from Gaza. All they need
to do is to keep up a semblance of tension in the north and they've got the
IDF immobilized in the south. Even hints by government spokesmen about the
dangers of "miscalculations" will do the same.

But worst of all is the effect this is having on the terrorists in the Gaza
Strip. They feel that they can go on endangering the lives of Israeli
civilians with impunity. Even launching Qassams at an Israeli army base or
at "strategic targets" near Ashkelon won't get the IDF to act. They have
been given a license to kill.

Deja vu? Of course. The same thing that happened with Hezbollah in the north
for a number of years is now happening with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the
south. And as in the north, it will not become easier to do what needs to be
done as time goes by. Smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip, training with
the aid of Iranian instructors, fortifying their positions, Hamas and
Islamic Jihad are steadily preparing themselves for what they know will be
coming sooner or later. And later it will be much more difficult than it is
now. It may yet end up really being a second front.