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Saturday, November 3, 2007
New Satellite Surveillance System Was Key Israeli Tool In Syria Raid

New Satellite Surveillance System Was Key Israeli Tool In Syria Raid
Nov 2, 2007 David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie/Aviation Week &
Space Technology
www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/ISRA110207.xml&headline=New%20Satellite%20Surveillance%20System%20Was%20Key%20Israeli%20Tool%20In%20Syria%20Raid&channel=defense

Israel pulled out all the stops technologically in its recent raid on Syria,
employing several new intelligence-gathering and strike systems in a chain
of events stretching from satellite observations to precision bombing of a
target thought to be a nuclear facility.

Syria's internal politics might have contributed to the apparent success of
the Sept. 6 mission. The target was so highly classified in Damascus that
the military wasn't briefed and, therefore, air defenses were unprepared,
says an Israeli official.

But the absence of a dense air defense around the facility didn't stop
Israel from digging deep into its technology quiver, drawing on the newest
technologies in its arsenal.

The first piece of the puzzle is linked to the launch of a new
reconnaissance satellite this summer. It allowed the integration of several
advanced technologies, including electro-optical imaging from space, image
enhancing algorithms, scene-matching guidance for precision weapons, and the
use of advanced targeting pods carried by the Israeli air force's two-man
F-16Is, which are not yet available on its F-15Is.

Israeli and U.S. officials will not reveal operational details or even the
actual target under threat of criminal prosecution. Political and military
leaders in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem don't want to humiliate or anger Syria by
providing details of the attack. The desire to avoid any discussion of the
event extended to an apology for violating Turkish airspace. Turkey found
unmarked drop tanks inside its border with Syria that officials believe came
from Israeli warplanes conducting the raid.

"If Israeli planes indeed penetrated Turkish airspace, then there was no
intention thereby, either in advance or in any case, to -- in any way --
violate or undermine Turkish sovereignty," said Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
He apologized for "any violation that may have occurred." Egyptian and
Syrian press reports had accused Turkey of either turning a blind eye to the
operation or actively cooperating. In past years both the U.S. (warplanes)
and Syria (an errant Scud missile) have made similar apologies to Turkey.

But in a series of interviews with Aviation Week & Space Technology, various
specialists explained several of the technologies and how they were used.
"Reality is more impressive than your imagination in some areas," says a
senior military officer.

Space observations provided early planning details for the raid.

The key satellite for the Syrian raid was Ofeq-7 launched on June 11. It has
multispectral and high-resolution electro-optical sensors and a resolution
far better than a half-meter, although exact figures are classified. The
spacecraft also provides a tactical downlink to transmit imagery directly to
combat forces, industry officials note.

The orbiting of Ofeq-7 improved the Israeli Defense Force's operational
capabilities by dozens of percent, said Brig. Gen. Haim Eshet, director of
space programming at Israel's Defense Research and Development Directorate
(AW&ST Sept. 17, p. 28). The space images were then improved by specialized
imagery enhancement algorithms to sharpen pictures for planning precision
bombing attacks.

Israel also is in the process of further upgrading its space intelligence
operations. It plans to launch the nation's first Polaris/TecSat military
imaging radar satellite from India as part of a cooperative effort between
the two countries. The new satellite will have an electronically steered,
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) with 1-meter resolution in high-resolution
mode. In strip mode, the system could deliver a resolution of 3-8 meters.
The spacecraft should be able to gather 40 images per pass of a target, with
most of the processing done on the ground.

The primary aircraft for the Syrian raid were some of the new, two-man
Lockheed Martin F-16Is (Sufa or Storm) that Lockheed Martin began delivering
to the Israeli air force (IAF) in February 2004. The backseater is a weapon
systems officer who can focus on targeting and electronic warfare while the
pilot focuses on flying and evading air defenses (AW&ST Oct. 8, p. 28).
Conformal fuel tanks give the fighters an unrefueled combat radius of more
than 500 mi., which almost matches the unrefueled range of F-15Is that would
normally escort a flight of strike aircraft. However, the F-16I can carry
both the Derby medium-range radar missile and the shorter-range Python 4 and
5 infrared air-to-air missiles.

Sensors on the $45-million F-16I includes an APG-68(V)9 radar with
high-resolution synthetic aperture radar mapping capability and about 30%
more range that other mechanically scanned radars. But more importantly for
this raid, the fighter has the Litening targeting pod. Its EO imagery can be
used for seeker cueing. Litening is so far deployed only on the IAF's
F-16Is, not the F-15s. It was the sensor of choice partly because of its
image-stabilization algorithms coupled with the 1,000 X 1,000-pixel
charge-coupled device detector to provide high-resolution imagery.

That imagery can be used for scene-matching with the observations made by
the satellite. The pod also can provide the scene matching for images sent
by the precision weapons carried by the F-16Is -- in this case the
Spice-2000 missile. However, in planned scenarios, the military would draw
on enhanced satellite imagery for the weapon. The satellite pictures also
can be provided in flight and, after a few minutes of manipulation, be
uploaded into the weapon; but in the Syria scenario, that capability was
apparently not required.

The Spice-2000 is part of a family of weapons being developed by Rafael, but
it's the only one currently operational with the Israeli air force (the
Spice-1000 is in final qualification trials). Owing to a wing kit, the
2,000-lb. version has a standoff range exceeding 60 km. (37 mi.), which is
considerably longer than the standard U.S.-build Joint Direct Attack
Munition.

The IAF considers standoff capability a must since "Syria has the biggest
air defense capability in the Middle East," says a senior Israeli military
official.
"They've been investing in it, they're investing today, and they'll invest
in the future. They're trying to get the best. The Tor is a very good air
defense system, and they chose it because they could get 29 systems for the
same cost as one-and-a-half S-300 surface-to-air missile systems."

The Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) is a mobile point defense system, while the
S-300 (SA-10/SA-20) provides a medium- to long-range air defense capability.
Israeli officials continue to monitor discussions between Damascus and
Moscow about a potential S-300 sale, and are quietly working diplomatic
channels to stop that from happening. One military planner notes that even
though the S-300 is a formidable air defense system, after several months of
watching it operate in Syria, solutions to defeat it would quickly emerge.
It would not alter the strategic balance, he asserted.

Although Spice is preferred when there's time to plan the mission (as was
the case in the recent attack), for fast response strikes, the IAF would
rely on its lineup of laser-guided weapons. The service recently announced
it had bought the Eblit Systems Lizard LGB. In general, the air force has
decided to depend less on GPS-navigation weapons because of fears that the
satellite signal could be jammed, altered or turned off. There's also
concern that using GPS bombs leaves much room for error. Target location
inaccuracies introduced during planning and by the GPS-kit itself (around 10
ft.) could lead to a miss.

By contrast, Spice-2000 has an EO guidance sensor for terminal-phase target
updates. It matches a large scene with what the seeker sees, so even if the
precise target is obscured by smoke or clouds, the weapon can determine its
impact point. Only if the seeker cannot make a match does the weapon default
to GPS navigation.

"We can work with or without GPS [because] there's a real-time
scene-matching algorithm [and] midcourse navigation [adjustments via Link-16
data communications]," says a specialist. "It takes a few minutes to
manipulate the data on the aircraft [and] make a mission planning file. We
can use regular satellite data. An auto-reference to the bomb's [internal
guidance system] creates a launch envelope. It goes to GPS if there's no
match."

That doesn't mean Israel is backing away from GPS-guided weapons. "From the
operational point of view, we want alternatives," the senior officer says.
"I believe we must have GPS, but we have unique and good alternatives with
platforms, weapons and systems that are better than GPS. We're developing
new combinations all the time."

In addition to the military objective of destroying the target, the raid on
Syria also had important international and domestic political overtones,
notes one Israeli official. The goal was to send a strategic signal to the
region about Israel's willingness to act. Moreover, for the IAF, the mission
was an important step. The armed forces are grappling with lessons learned
from last year's Lebanon war and a potential budget shift to the ground
forces. As a result, the air arm wanted to signal its continued importance
to national defense.

Copyright © 2007 Aviation Week, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies.
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