Jerusalem Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family Foundation
Vol. 7, No. 27 7 January 2008

The Bush Visit and Tensions in the U.S.-Israel Relationship

Gerald M. Steinberg

· The December "surprise" resulting from the publication of the U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate disrupted fifteen years of Israeli policy
based on working with the international coalition to pressure Iran to drop
its nuclear weapons program through sanctions and the threat of military
action, and has reminded Israelis of the limits of American security
guarantees and strategic cooperation.

· Within two weeks following publication of the NIE report, China
signed a major contract on energy development and supply with Iran, and
Russia quickly dispatched two shipments of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr
nuclear reactor. Egypt moved to improve relations with Iran, and Saudi
Arabia welcomed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Mecca for the Haj.

· Prime Minister Olmert had explained the logic of the "Annapolis
process" in terms of the coalition to stop Iran, but two weeks after
Annapolis, with the release of the NIE report, this rationale has lost much
of its relevance.

· Another source of stress comes from differences over renewed U.S.
efforts to forge a quick agreement with the Palestinian Authority at a time
of continued terrorism, the violent conflict between Fatah and Hamas, the
failure to develop functioning Palestinian institutions, and the PA's
ongoing incitement and rejection of the legitimacy of a Jewish state.

· In addition, the overall decline of U.S. influence, as reflected in
Iraq, the return of Russia as a world power, the chaos in Pakistan, and
other developments, has highlighted the limits of Israeli reliance on
American assistance, and the need for Israel to maintain an independent
capability to act when necessary.

President Bush's first visit to Israel since taking office in 2001 comes at
a time of strain in the usually cooperative relationship between Jerusalem
and Washington. In particular, the December "surprise," resulting from the
publication of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) summary report
on Iran's nuclear weapons program,1 reminded Israelis of the limits of
American security guarantees and strategic cooperation. Other sources of
stress come from differences over renewed efforts to forge a quick a
greement with the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas and Salam
Fayad, in parallel to escalating attacks from the Hamas-controlled Gaza
Strip. In addition, the overall decline of U.S. influence, as reflected in
Iraq, the return of Russia as a world power, the chaos in Pakistan, and
other developments has highlighted the limits of Israeli reliance on
American assistance, and the need for Israel to maintain an independent
capability to act when necessary.

The Impact of the NIE Report on Israeli Security

For Israel, the Iranian nuclear weapons program is the most acute strategic
threat, and December 2007 NIE report (of which only a short summary was
declassified) was a major shock. The summary, and the subsequent headlines
in the major media outlets, declared: "We judge with high confidence that in
fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."2 While a footnote and
subsequent paragraphs explained that this assessment was limited to only one
aspect of the Iranian program ("weaponization") and that the other more
basic and important aspects, including uranium enrichment, were continui ng,
the headline took the urgency and the justification out of the U.S.-led
international coalition on Iran.

These developments disrupted fifteen years of Israeli policy based on
working with the international coalition to pressure Iran to drop its
nuclear weapons program through sanctions and the threat of military action,
if necessary. Within two weeks following publication of the NIE report, the
momentum of the sanctions regime to contain Iran, built up slowly over the
past three years, was suddenly reversed. In short order, China and Malaysia
signed major contracts on energy development and supply with Iran, and
Russia, which had withheld the fuel rods for the large Bushehr nuclear
reactor for at least one year, quickly dispatched two shipments. In
parallel, the leaders of the Sunni Arab component of the coalition to
prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state also concluded that the
U.S. had changed course. Unsure of the future course of U.S. policy on Iran,
Sunni Arab states that attended Annapolis, including Egypt, have been
scrambling to broaden their contacts with Iran, and Saudi Arabia w elcomed
Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Mecca for the Haj pilgrimage.

The headline of the NIE report asserting that Iran had "halted its nuclear
weapons program" appeared to signal that a U.S.-led military attack on
Iran's nuclear installations was extremely unlikely. This was perhaps the
main objective of the officials who wrote the published summary - to make it
all but impossible for President Bush to order an attack on Iran's nuclear
facilities in the last year of his administration.

Despite the central importance of these issues, the years of strategic
coordination meetings, and repeated American assurances, Israeli
policy-makers were apparently not consulted on the decision to release the
NIE report, its timing, or its very contentious wording. Israel could do
nothing as the U.S. crippled the primary source of pressure which had
contributed to the Iranian decision to close (or hide) the blatant aspects
of its nuclear weapons development in 2003.

As a result, in his visit to the region - including Israel, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and other Gulf states - President Bush will be pressed to find ways
to reverse the damage from the NIE report. Beyond statements of continued
concern about the dangers that will be created if the radical Iranian regime
acquires nuclear weapons, the U.S. administration will be asked to consider
measures that will revive the stalled sanctions regime, and to consider the
possibility of military action, if all other means have been exhausted.

Differences Over the "Annapolis Peace Process" and Security Measures

While Israel is focusing primarily on Iran, President Bush, Secretary of
State Rice, and others are emphasizing Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts and
the declared goal of negotiating the terms of a peace agreement based on a
Palestinian state by the end of 2008. The two issues are closely connected,
however, and on his way to Annapolis at the end of November, Prime Minister
Olmert explained the logic of the "Annapolis process" in terms of the
coalition to stop Iran, and t he need to involve the Saudis and other Arab
states by demonstrating movement and hope on the Palestinian track. But two
weeks after Annapolis, with the release of the NIE report, this rationale
has lost much of its relevance, as has the case for Israeli security risks
related to negotiations with the Palestinians. The murder of two Israelis on
December 28 by Fatah gunmen - connected with the same security forces that
are armed and trained as part of the Annapolis framework promoting
Palestinian statehood - is a stark reminder of these risks.

Public opinion polls show that while most Israelis support peace
negotiations based on a "two-state solution," they are also realistic about
the obstacles and failures of the Palestinian leadership to work towards
this objective. Continued terrorism, the violent conflict between the Fatah
and Hamas factions, the failure to develop functioning institutions, and the
ongoing incitement and rejection of the legitimacy of a Jewish state
reinforce these concerns. Palestinian negotiators have already rejected the
Israeli requirement that any future Palestinian state be demilitarized.
Furthermore, there is no indication of Palestinian readiness to revise what
they refer to as "the right of return" for refugees, which is a euphemism
for the destruction o f Israel through entry of millions of Arabs.

Similarly, the failure of even moderate Palestinian and Arab leaders to
accept Jewish rights in Jerusalem is a deal breaker. Over half of the
Knesset's members, including more than a dozen members of Olmert's Kadima
Party, signed a petition last year requiring a special majority of the
Knesset to alter Jerusalem's municipal borders. There is also strong
opposition to re-dividing Jerusalem in Olmert's own cabinet. Thus, serious
negotiations on these "permanent status" issues have not started, and when
they do begin, progress will be slow and difficult. And unt il the
Palestinian Authority proves that it can deliver on pledges to advance
political and security reform, the Bush Administration's determination to
proceed increases the likelihood that the result will be the creation of a
failed Palestinian state.

In addition, in Israel, President Bush will face widespread public protests
over pressures for a unilateral halt to construction in communities built
beyond the pre-1967 "green line" (the 1949 armistice line). This position is
seen as incompatible with the April 14, 2004, letter from President Bush to
then Prime Minister Sharon,3 and the repeated American pledges endorsing
Israel's right to "secure and recognized borders." These pressures, and the
resulting friction with Israel, also reflect the American determination to
proceed quickly with the "momentum established at Annapolis," thereby
ignoring the obstacles created by Palestinian failures.

In anticipation of pressure on Israel to ease movement for Palestinians as
part of the massive economic development plan, and Secretary of State Rice's
statements that echo traditional Arab and European emphasis on Palestinian
victimization, Defense Minister Barak declared that Israel cannot and will
not remove checkpoints that are vital to preventing ongoing terror. Israeli
officials have emphasized that in negotiations during the peace process,
freedom of military action in the West Bank must be maintained. They have
also made the case for continued Israeli military presence in th e Jordan
Valley. While President Bush and other U.S. officials have backed Israel on
these issues in the past, the American desire to obtain a quick agreement
may lead to changes in these policies and more tension.

A U.S.-Israel Defense Treaty Will Not Resolve These Issues

America remains the only global superpower and Israel's main ally, as seen
both in the extent of military cooperation and in the political dimension.
However, in addition to the sources of friction over Iran and negotiations
with the Palestinians, the relationship between the U.S. and Israel is also
affected by the decline in U.S. influence, particularly in the Middle East.
The ongoing conflict in Iraq, the return of Russia as a world power, the
chaos in Pakistan, and other developments highlight the need for Israel to
limit the degree of its dependence on Washington for insuring its vital
security requirements.

For these reasons, any discussion of yet another effort to conclude a
U.S.-Israel defense treaty is unrealistic, and further tensions may develop
if Israel decides on the need for unilateral military action to disrupt
Iran's nuclear weapons development efforts. While the military assistance
provided by the U.S. since the 1973 Yom Kippur War may be unprecedented, it
cannot substitute for an independent Israeli military capability when vital
interests are at stake. The political maneuvering in Washington that
apparently led to the wording of the NIE summary report on Iran, and the
differences emerging over demands to relax Israeli security measures in the
hope of achieving a breakthrough in negotiations with the Palestinians, are
pointed reminders of the limits of even the closest of alliances between
sovereign nations.

* * *

Notes

1. Gerald M. Steinberg, "Decoding the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on
Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 7, No. 24, 5
December 2007.

2. "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," National Intelligence
Estimate, National Intelligence Council, November 2007,
http://www.odni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf

3. The April 2004 letter from President Bush to then Prime Minister Sharon:
"The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security,
including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen
Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any
threat or possible combination of threats....As part of a final peace
settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should
emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC
Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including
already existing major Israel i populations centers, it is unrealistic to
expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and
complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to
negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is
realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on
the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities."

* * *

Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg is the head of the Political Studies Department at
Bar-Ilan University, a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
and Executive Director of NGO Monitor.

This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:

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