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Friday, June 20, 2008
The Hamas Interest in the Tahdiya (Temporary Truce) with Israel

The Hamas Interest in the Tahdiya (Temporary Truce) with Israel
Jonathan Dahoah Halevi
Vol. 8, No. 4 19 June 2008
www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=375&PID=0&IID=2181&TTL=The_Hamas_Interest_in_the_Tahdiya_(Temporary_Truce)_with_Israel

Hamas regards the temporary cease-fire as a tahdiya and not a hudna. A
tahdiya - "a period of calm" - is used by Hamas to describe a simple
cease-fire. A hudna implies recognition of the other party's actual
existence, without acknowledging its legitimacy.

In an interview with Al-Jazeera (April 26, 2008), Hamas leader Khaled
Mashaal clarified that for Hamas, a tahdiya is "a tactic in conflict
management." He added that it "is not unusual for the resistance...to
escalate sometimes and to retreat a bit sometimes as the tide does....The
tahdiya creates a formulation that will force Israel...to remove the
siege...and if it happens it will be a remarkable achievement."

Official sources in Israel have explained that Hamas' interest in a lull in
the fighting is a result of its "distress." But the organization did not
experience "distress." Hamas has introduced and maintained law and order in
Gaza, strengthened its overall control, suppressed opposition, and achieved
broad popular support for its policies.

An important objective for Hamas is winning the Palestinian presidential
election, which will be held when Mahmoud Abbas finishes his term of office
in December. The lull will permit Hamas to prepare the field to take over
from Abbas. Hamas is liable to claim that, according to Palestinian law,
administrative authority should be passed on to the chairman of the
parliament, who is a Hamas leader, or should be decided by the parliament
itself, where Hamas has an overwhelming majority.

One diplomatic consequence of the tahdiya will be increasing pressure on
Israel to accept a future reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. That could
lead to increasing demands on Israel to negotiate a permanent status
arrangement with a joint Hamas-Fatah government, while Hamas remains
committed to its political program of the elimination of Israel.

The cease-fire also grants Hamas a golden opportunity to expand its military
build-up for the next round of terror and violence. Emulating Hizbullah's
strategy, Hamas is striving to acquire longer-range and more destructive
missiles to be used for deterrence and as a sword on Israel's neck.

After eight years of armed Intifada, countless Palestinian terrorist
attacks, and more than 7,000 rockets fired against civilians in Israel, the
Egyptian government succeeded in securing an agreement by Israel and Hamas
for a cease-fire that took effect at 6:00 a.m. on June 19, 2008. Officially,
the Israeli government argues that there is no understanding with Hamas, but
only with Egypt. However, that formalism is not necessarily the perception
of the international community.

The main terms of the unwritten agreement include the following:

All Gaza-Israel violence stops for six months. After three days, Israel will
ease its blockade of Gaza, allowing more vital supplies in.

A week later, Israel will further ease restrictions at cargo crossings.

In the final stage, talks will be conducted about opening the Rafah crossing
between Gaza and Egypt and for a prisoner exchange to free IDF soldier Gilad
Shalit, held by Hamas for two years.1

Hamas regards the temporary cease-fire as a tahdiya and not a hudna. The
difference between the two Arabic terms is substantial. Hudna means "truce,"
which is more concrete than tahdiya - "a period of calm" - which Hamas often
uses to describe a simple cease-fire. In traditional Islamic thought, a
hudna is negotiated between an Islamic entity and a non-Islamic entity, but
it can be reversed the moment the Islamic side has gained sufficient
strength to resume fighting. Nevertheless, a hudna implies recognition of
the other party's actual existence, without acknowledging its legitimacy.

A tahdiya has less standing than a hudna. Khaled Mashaal, Hamas' leader, and
his deputy in leadership, Musa Abu Marzouq, elaborated in recent months
their interpretation of a tahdiya. In an interview with Al-Jazeera (April
26, 2008), Mashaal clarified that for Hamas, a tahdiya is "a tactic in
conflict management and a phase in the framework of the resistance [meaning
all forms of struggle]." He added that it "is not unusual for the
resistance...to escalate sometimes and to retreat a bit sometimes as the
tide does....The tahdiya creates a formulation that will force Israel...to
remove the siege...and if it happens it will be a remarkable
achievement....We are speaking of a tactical tahdiya....As long as there is
occupation, there is no other way but resistance."2

When asked about Mashaal's "tactical tahdiya," Musa Abu Marzouq explained
that "the tahdiya is not a strategy or a goal itself, but it is a tactical
step in this conflict....Our goal is to liberate our land and to bring about
the return of our people. The resistance is a tool to reach this end."3

Official sources in Israel have explained that Hamas' interest in a lull in
the fighting is a result of the "distress" it has suffered from the extended
blockade of Gaza.4

Israel's policy did in fact cause difficulties for Hamas, but these
hardships do not explain Hamas' strategic motives for the lull. The
organization did not experience "distress" - neither in a strengthening of
the opposition to the Hamas administration, nor in an increase of popular
protests against it. In fact, the opposite is true.

Even the official Israeli evaluation of Hamas' first year of rule since its
military takeover in June 2007 suggests that Hamas has managed to introduce
and maintain law and order in the Gaza Strip, strengthen its overall
control, suppress opposition, and achieve broad popular support for its
policies.

Hamas' Motivation: Legitimacy and Recognition

Hamas' motives have nothing to do with "distress," but rather with
"opportunities" - that is, the objectives it seeks to attain in the
international arena and especially in its own internal political arena.
First, the lull in the fighting is meaningless for Hamas; it is not a
cease-fire or a truce, but a "temporary" cessation of hostilities with
Israel. Next, Hamas is not committed to continuing the lull when the six
months run out, and it can use any excuse it chooses to continue its
terrorist campaign: Israeli building in the settlements, Israeli measures
taken in Jerusalem, or IDF anti-terror measures in the West Bank. Hamas can
also send other Palestinian organizations to do its dirty work.

The tahdiya agreement for a lull is an important achievement for Hamas.
Hamas will gain the recognition it wants as the legitimate ruler of the Gaza
Strip. Despite the fact that the Israeli government has defined Hamas-ruled
Gaza as a hostile entity, Israel agreed to the continuation of trade with
it, and even recognized the hostile entity's authority to operate the Rafah
crossing. Hamas regards that as immensely important and wants to exploit it
as a lever to open the door to official relations with Europe, and to have
itself removed from the various lists of terrorist organizations.

Another important objective for Hamas is winning the Palestinian
presidential election, which will be held when Mahmoud Abbas finishes his
term of office in December. Hamas wants to present itself in the contest as
a legitimate ruling body worthy of inheriting the presidency. High-ranking
Hamas figures have already stated that the organization will not recognize
Abbas' authority as president after December 2008.5

Hamas is liable to claim that, according to Palestinian law, administrative
authority should be passed on to the chairman of the parliament, who is a
Hamas leader, or should be decided by the parliament itself, where Hamas has
an overwhelming majority. In other words, for Hamas, the lull in the
fighting will permit the movement to prepare the field to take over from
Abbas, thereby complementing its military takeover of Gaza. Hamas' challenge
is also the motivation behind Abbas' desire to talk to Hamas about reaching
an understanding about new elections, and it explains why Hamas has rejected
the suggestion.

Main Implications of the Tahdiya

Hamas wants to exploit the lull in the fighting to upgrade its status in the
international community in order to gain legitimacy for its campaign for the
presidency after Abbas' term is over in December 2008.

The cease-fire grants Hamas a golden opportunity to expand its military
build-up for the next round of terror and violence. Emulating Hizbullah's
strategy, Hamas is striving to acquire longer-range and more destructive
missiles to be used for deterrence and as a sword on Israel's neck.

Israel has acknowledged Hamas, albeit unwillingly, as the de facto ruling
power in Gaza. Israel's acceptance of the cease-fire is a blow to the
international war on terror and gives immunity to Hamas and other terrorist
organizations in Gaza, including al-Qaeda affiliates.

Another diplomatic consequence of the tahdiya will be increasing pressure on
Israel to accept a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah in the
future.

That could lead to increasing demands on Israel to negotiate a permanent
status arrangement with the joint Hamas-Fatah government, while Hamas
remains committed to its political program for the elimination of Israel. It
is important to recall that the entire Israeli-Palestinian negotiating track
since the convening of the Annapolis conference was premised on the
exclusion of Hamas and the ultimate achievement of an agreement between the
Israeli government and the government of Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah alone.

Delaying the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit to a later phase of the
Israel-Hamas arrangement can have a demoralizing effect in Israel, for it
sends a message that the recovery of captured soldiers is not the highest
priority.
* * *
Notes
1.
http://www.startribune.com/world/20167939.html?location_refer+World:highlightModules:3
2. http://aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/41C8CBD6-5D3A-4F4B-B952-CFBF766D6B6F.htm?
wbc_purpose=basic_current_current_current_Current
3. http://www.alwatan.sy/dindex.php?idn=32872
4. http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/22/1291534
5.
http://www.al-sharq.com/DisplayArticle.aspx?xf=2008,June,article_20080608_103
&id=worldtoday&sid=arabworld
* * *
Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi is a senior researcher of the Middle East
and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is a
founder of the Orient Research Group Ltd. and is a former advisor to the
Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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