[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Put another way, Israel can reach a deal with
Hamas that in return for allowing Hamas to continue to grow in strength
unchecked, the currently ruling Israeli leadership may enjoy a "re-election
window" in which the absence of substantial attacks makes it easier for the
ruling parties to win at the ballot box.]

Hamas' nearly complete takeover of the Gaza Strip gives Israel better tools
to manage the conflict with Hamas in the Strip because now the movement
bears full responsibility for everything that happens there and has to
account for every development. This new situation allows Israel to arrive at
stable understandings with Hamas if it is so inclined. On the other hand, if
the basic premise of Israel's strategy is that the Hamas government in the
Gaza Strip must be brought down, the ability to realize this strategy has
been severely damaged, and the sole remaining option is occupation of the
Gaza Strip, a course of action that would certainly incur a steep price.

Hamas Tightens Its Hold on the Gaza Strip
INSS Insight No. 66, August 10, 2008
by Shlomo Brom The Institute for National Security Studies

The violent confrontation between Hamas and Fatah that occurred in the Gaza
Strip after the July 25th explosion of a car carrying Hamas activists has
brought about a significant strengthening of Hamas' control of the Gaza
Strip and an almost total elimination of Fatah's presence there.

After Hamas' June 2007 takeover of Gaza, the Islamic movement allowed Fatah
to continue its local activities. Fatah leaders were able to travel between
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, officials working for PA president Mahmoud
Abbas continued to operate in Gaza, and Fatah's organizational frameworks
continued to function. Among the several reasons for this were Hamas'
reluctance to burn all its bridges with Fatah and the PA; the hope of
renewing the dialogue with Fatah; and the fact that Mohammad Dahlan's rivals
within Fatah in the Gaza Strip cooperated with Hamas in its takeover of the
area.

The assassination of five senior members of Hamas' military wing presented
Hamas with the opportunity to wipe out Fatah's presence in the Strip. Even
if the assassination was the immediate catalyst, it is safe to assume that
Hamas decided on this objective long ago because all attempts at dialogue
with Fatah had failed: the PA in the West Bank, under Abbas' leadership and
in cooperation with Israel, is engaged in an ongoing effort to destroy the
Hamas infrastructure there, and Fatah operatives in the Strip continued to
challenge Hamas, in part through firing rockets into Israel in order to
demonstrate that Hamas control of the Gaza Strip is weak.

Hamas has now forbidden Fatah activity in the Gaza Strip. Hundreds of Fatah
members have been arrested, including the entire cadre of senior leaders
there, and Hamas has taken control of all Fatah assets. The confrontation
peaked with the clash between Hamas and the Hilles clan in the Seja'eya
neighborhood. Ahmed Hilles, the senior figure in the clan, had served as
Fatah's director-general in Gaza and is Dahlan's biggest rival. He headed
the group of Fatah operatives who cooperated with Hamas, but this did not
help him in the current confrontation. It was important to Hamas to break
the clan's military strength, the only locus of Fatah power left in the
Strip.

An interesting aspect of Hamas' actions, though it did not attract much
attention, was its use of the opportunity to consolidate its power by
dealing with power centers of other rivals not necessarily connected to
Fatah. Hamas successfully imposed its rule over clan-based and other loci of
power in Gaza. The most prominent among these were the Durmush clan in the
Sabra neighborhood that used to operate under the name "Army of Islam,"
which surrendered to Hamas forces, and the Ahmad Abu-Reish Brigades, a
militia of the Abu-Reish clan active primarily in the southern part of the
Strip and a major player in the tunnel smuggling industry. This clan
suffered a heavy blow when dozens of its members were arrested and stripped
of their weapons. In addition, Hamas closed down the Popular Front's radio
station in the Gaza Strip, the only opposition media left in Gaza and the
only voice criticizing Hamas policies.

In Israel, attention focused on the photographs of wounded and destitute
Fatah members fleeing into Israel, including some involved in terrorist
attacks against Israel in recent years. However, this aspect of the latest
development is secondary to the fact that Hamas has now attained full
control of the Gaza Strip. If in the period since Hamas' takeover of Gaza
there were cracks in its hold and there was still the possibility that Hamas
would fail in the same way Fatah had failed and would not be able to prevent
local axes of power from undermining its policies, it is now clear that
Hamas' pattern of control is different and much more efficient. Hamas'
governing problems were apparent to a certain degree in its inability to
force various elements to comply fully with the ceasefire. In the new
situation, it is clear that violations of the ceasefire will result from
Hamas indifference rather than an inability to enforce the ceasefire.

This will presumably influence the stability of the ceasefire. As long as
Hamas is interested in continuing the ceasefire, it will likely be upheld
without significant violations. By the same token, Hamas will also be able
to fulfill any understanding it might reach with Israel or other parties,
such as Egypt and the international community. This may have important
implications for the possibility of reaching agreements regarding the
Gaza-Egypt border. The containment of the Abu-Reish clan strengthens Hamas'
control of the smuggling industry and of all that takes place along the
Egyptian border. It will be possible to take advantage of this to arrive at
understandings with Hamas if it receives something in return that serves its
interests, such as opening the Rafiah crossing.

The sole challenge remaining to Hamas' uncontested control of the Gaza Strip
is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. There are two possible scenarios here: in
one, the organization will learn the lessons of the recent events and not
confront Hamas, which will thereby allow it to continue to operate in the
Gaza Strip; in the other, the organization will sooner or later find itself
clashing with Hamas, whereupon Hamas will force it to surrender. Secret
Fatah cells that continue to operate in the Gaza Strip will be weak and not
pose a significant challenge to Hamas.

These recent events all indicate that it will only be possible to bring down
the Hamas government in Gaza through a military takeover of the Gaza Strip.
As a result, the separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank becomes
even more pronounced. The developments in Gaza strengthened the
determination of the PA and Israel to destroy the Hamas infrastructure in
the West Bank. The PA's security apparatuses went on high alert because of
concerns that Hamas would retaliate in these areas, and PA forces stepped up
its arrests of Hamas operatives. Similarly, there were efforts to prevent
Islamic demonstrations and marches, and preachers were arrested at the
mosques.

Will these developments affect the chances of reaching a deal to secure the
release of Gilad Shalit? Hamas' increased self-confidence as a result of its
recent success might make its negotiating posture even more rigid; on the
other hand, it will also reduce Israel's willingness to soften its stance.
Therefore, the chances for concluding the deal in the near future are not
very good.

Hamas' nearly complete takeover of the Gaza Strip gives Israel better tools
to manage the conflict with Hamas in the Strip because now the movement
bears full responsibility for everything that happens there and has to
account for every development. This new situation allows Israel to arrive at
stable understandings with Hamas if it is so inclined. On the other hand, if
the basic premise of Israel's strategy is that the Hamas government in the
Gaza Strip must be brought down, the ability to realize this strategy has
been severely damaged, and the sole remaining option is occupation of the
Gaza Strip, a course of action that would certainly incur a steep price.
==========
INSS Insight is published through the generosity of Sari and Israel Roizman,
Philadelphia