Sarkozy in Syria: Discrepancies in French Mideast Policy
Tsilla Hershco
BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 48, September 10, 2008
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives48.html

Executive Summary: France is seeking to upgrade its status in the
international arena and enhance its influence and presence in the Middle
East. France perceives Syria as a key to resolving central regional issues
such as the crisis in Lebanon, the Iranian nuclear problem and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Sarkozy's visit to Syria in early September
and the summit he convened of the leaders of Syria, France, Turkey and
Qatar - all are part of this turbo-charged Sakozian diplomacy. However, deep
skepticism is in order as to the utility of Sarkozy's Syrian courtship.
There is a disturbing discrepancy in French diplomacy between firm rhetoric
and acceptance of fait accompli, as has been the pattern in the Lebanese
crisis. This suggests to countries such as Syria that the West is weak and
ready for far-reaching concessions in return for vague Syrian declarations
of good intent. France is acting as if "dialogue" and a "diplomatic role"
(for France) are significant objectives in and of themselves, while the
efficacy and results of its diplomacy are very questionable.

France, Syria and Lebanon

France has deep historical, cultural and emotional ties to Lebanon. In
February 2005, Lebanon became a bone of contention in French-Syrian
relations. Syria was widely regarded as responsible for the assassination of
Rafiq Hariri, former Prime Minister of Lebanon and close friend of French
President Jacques Chirac. Subsequently, France unequivocally demanded that
Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon, refrain from meddling in internal
Lebanese affairs, and cooperate with the UN international tribunal
established to investigate the Hariri assassination. In addition, France
demanded that Syria abide by the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701
and prevent the transfer of arms from Iran to Hizballah.

The accession of French President Nicolas Sarkozy in May 2007 was marked by
continuity in French attitudes towards Lebanon and Syria. Much like his
predecessor, Sarkozy emphasized his uncompromising support for Lebanon's
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. Therefore France
refrained from engaging Syria through high-level diplomatic contacts as long
as Syria did not demonstrate its willingness to contribute to France's
intensive efforts to promote a dialogue between the opposing Lebanese
factions, in order to end the political stalemate and prevent the outbreak
of a new civil war in Lebanon. The crisis was aggravated in November 2007
by the opposition's refusal to vote for a newly elected presidential
candidate following the end of the tenure of former Lebanese President Emil
Lahoud.

Hizballah's armed onslaught on government positions in May 2008, as well as
against pro-governmental Sunni and Druze factions, went unopposed by the
army and left 65 dead. As a result, Signora's government yielded to
Hizballah's demands. In the Doha Accord of May 2008, it was agreed that
Michel Suleiman, former Lebanese army commander, was to be elected
President, that a new government was to be formed in which 11 of 30
ministerial portfolios were to be assigned to the Hizballah bloc
(effectively granting Hizballah veto power), and that a change in the
election system would be effectuated leading up to the general elections in
2009. Moreover, following pressure by Hizballah and in defiance of UN
Security Council Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government agreed that
Hizballah maintain its weapons arsenal and even authorized it to proceed
with its independent military struggle against Israel.

France embraced these developments, presenting the Doha Accord as an
achievement of French diplomacy and praising it as a symbol of hope, despite
the fact that it was imposed by Hizballah's undemocratic coup de force,
backed by its Iranian patron. France probably regarded the accord as a
scenario that, while imperfect, was still preferable to the far worse
scenario of bloody civil strife. Sarkozy, in a demonstration of friendly
support, visited Lebanon in June 2008, accompanied by Prime Minister
Francois Fillon, Defense Minister Herve Morin, Foreign Minister Bernard
Kushner, as well as by leaders of main opposition parties, and expressed his
political and economic commitment to Lebanon.

The Doha Accord and the creation of a unity government in Lebanon served as
a pretext for French rapprochement with Syria. Basher al-Assad was warmly
welcomed by Sarkozy to the inaugural conference of the Mediterranean Union
in July. Assad was given a red carpet reception as Sarkozy's honored guest
at the Elysee Palace and even watched the traditional French military parade
of July 14 from the front row of dignitaries, thus reaping the benefits of a
diplomatic campaign to pull Damascus out of its recent isolation. The
Israeli-Syrian indirect talks being held in Turkey also contributed to the
end of Syria's diplomatic isolation.

Suleiman's historical visit to Damascus in July provided Paris with further
evidence of Syria's good will towards Lebanon, as Syria offered to establish
diplomatic ties with Lebanon. Nevertheless, no concrete timetable of
implementation was fixed. It seems that France probably regarded the
agreement as a means of promoting a future solution concerning the disputed
areas of Shebaa farms and Rager village, which Israel occupied in the 1967
war. Both Syria and Lebanon claim ownership over these territories, while
Israel asserts it would return them only following a peace agreement with
both countries. The French stress the urgency of resolving the issue so as
to deprive Hizballah of its pretext of its continued struggle against
Israel. Israel, on its part claims that Hizballah will find another pretext
for proceeding with its declared war against Israel, since this is its
raison d'être, which ostensibly justifies its existence as a separate armed
militia.

Despite the international honors Sarkozy conferred on Assad in Paris and the
upgrading of Syria's international status by Sarkozy's visit to Syria, Assad
has nevertheless declared that he is not going to end Syria's support for
Hizballah as a resistance organization. The Syrian president's declaration
indeed must be regarded as a rebuff of Sarkozy by Assad. Sarkozy has
pointedly also failed to stop Syrian arms transfers to Hizballah.

France, Syria and Iran

In contrast to the Lebanese context, in which France ought to appease Iran's
allies, Hizballah and Syria, Sarkozy continues to lead a hard line against
Iran's nuclear project. Sarkozy perceives Iran's nuclear aspirations as a
major threat to world security. Consequently, France advocates further UN
and EU sanctions. However, Sarkozy explicitly has expressed his objection to
military action against Iran, asserting that both an Iranian bomb and an
Israeli bombardment of Iran would constitute catastrophic developments.

Sarkozy's rapprochement with Syria might represent Sarkozy's objective to
distance Syria from Iran, thus neutralizing or reducing Iran's influence in
the region. Sarkozy has asked the Syrian president to make use of his close
ties with Iran in order to convince Ahmadinejad to comply with the
international community's requirement that Iran renounce its nuclear
project. Sarkozy stressed, though, that Iran has the right to posses
civilian nuclear technology for peaceful means and even offered French
cooperation, as he had done in the past for a range of Arab countries.

Assad indeed spoke to Ahmadinejad about the issue - but not in the way
Sarkozy was hoping. During his two-day visit to Teheran in August, Assad
announced the strengthening of the economic relations between the two
countries and expressed his support for Iran's right to enrich uranium. He
stressed that Syria opposes the introduction of nuclear arms into the
region, but said that the problem is not Iran but rather the West's lack of
trust towards Iran.

It is possible that the Syrian president is trying to move in diametrically
opposed directions: on the one hand by renewing economic relations with the
West, particularly the EU through France's proposed Association Agreement,
while on the other hand concurrently maintaining a close relationship with
Iran. It appears that Sarkozy's Syrian gamble, aimed at weakening Iran's
position, has not succeeded and that the Syrian initiative has not borne any
positive fruits regarding the Iranian nuclear project.

France, Syria and Israel

Another central objective of Sakozy's visit to Syria was his involvement in
peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, which are currently taking
place under the auspices of Turkey. Sarkozy declared his satisfaction that
France, thanks to the amelioration of its relations with both Syria and
Israel, could serve as a trusted mediator. Indeed, Assad invited Sarkozy to
take part in the peace negotiations; however, he rejected Sarkozy's
proposals to conduct direct dialogue with Israel. Assad equally refused to
recognize Israel before its formal commitment to comply with prerequisite
Syrian demands, that would first lead to direct dialogue, next to a peace
treaty, and finally to formal recognition. The Syrian president also
declared he was waiting for the new US administration before moving forward
toward concrete stages of the negotiations. It seems that even on this
issue, Assad did not give his full commitment to grant French diplomacy a
leading role, probably as a result of a lack of trust in France's ability to
guarantee implementation of any such agreement.

Conclusion

At present, French-Syrian rapprochement appears to be more rewarding for
Syria than for France. Despite his country's newly gained international
legitimization, Assad has not rewarded the French by breaking his ties with
terrorist organizations, most notably Hizballah. Neither has he distanced
himself from Iran. Seemingly, no tangible, unequivocal commitment was given
by Syria throughout its renewed high level contacts with France or
throughout the indirect peace talks between Syria and Israel.

There is a disturbing discrepancy in French diplomacy between firm rhetoric
and acceptance of fait accompli, as has been the pattern in the Lebanese
crisis. This suggests to countries such as Syria an undesired image of
Western weakness; a Western readiness to far-reaching, unbalanced
compromises in return for vague Arab/Syrian declarations. France is acting
as if "dialogue" and a "diplomatic role" (for France) are significant
objectives in and of themselves, while the efficacy and results of its
diplomacy are but secondary. As demonstrated above, the results of such
French diplomacy are, to date, very questionable.

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Dr. Tsilla Hershco, a Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center
for Strategic Studies, specializes in Franco-Israeli relations and French
Middle East policy.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Littauer
Foundation