Invading Georgia: The Opening Shot in a Grand Russian Strategy to Challenge
the West Through the Domination of the Energy Market

Efraim Inbar

BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 49, September 16, 2008
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives49.html

Executive Summary: Moscow's military intervention in Georgia must be
understood through the prism of global strategy and energy politics. Moscow
seeks to intimidate energy producing countries once part of the Soviet
Union, such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and to develop a grand
anti-American energy coalition that spans from Iran to Venezuela. This poses
a significant challenge to the West, and may yet require muscular Western
counter-action.

Russian Oil Ambitions and Implications

The small state of Georgia is a fledgling pro-Western democracy that seeks
to join NATO and other Western political structures. Georgia, located next
to powerful Russia, committed a grave mistake in its foreign policy this
August 2008. Tbilisi ignored the main virtue advocated by the great
practitioners of international relations from Niccolo Machiavelli to Henry
Kissinger - prudence - by attempting to regain military control of a
seceding region which was supported by Moscow. Russia exploited the Georgian
miscalculation to strike back and to remind everybody that Russia will flex
its military muscles in areas considered to be its backyard. Moscow views
with trepidation the expansion of NATO, of which it is not a member, toward
its borders. Georgian accession to NATO is simply unbearable from a Russian
perspective. Russia is threatened by the Western security architecture and
will oppose encroachment on areas once Russian-controlled.

Yet, this understandable aspect of Russian behavior hides a more ambitious
foreign policy goal of controlling the global energy sector, and using such
leverage to challenge America in world affairs. The immediate goal of
Moscow's military intervention in Georgia was to intimidate the
energy-producing countries once part of the Soviet Union, such as Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan, to return to the Russian sphere of influence. The
Finlandization of the Caucasus and Central Asia will allow Russia, a great
oil producer itself, greater influence over the world's energy.

Oil and gas constitute a strategic commodity that is different from coffee
or refrigerators. Control of this commodity bestows considerable political
influence. The Russians understand that such leverage can be effective
against the energy-hungry European states who are already dependent to
various degrees on Russian energy. By its actions in August, Russia decided
to challenge America. Putin seeks to create a wedge between the US and
Europe by further increasing the European dependency upon Russian-controlled
oil.

Georgia in itself does not produce oil, but hosts several pipelines
transferring oil from Azerbaijan in the Caspian Basin. The Georgian
territory helps bypass Russian land and prevents Russia from having a
greater handle on moving oil from the Caspian to the West. Therefore,
following the invasion, Russian troops took control of the Baku-Supsa
pipeline (ending on the Black Sea), which runs close to present Russian
military lines. The Russians also threatened control of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (ending on the Turkish Mediterranean shore) by
attacking its vicinity from the air. If the Russians remain in Georgia, they
maintain control over great amounts of oil slated for the West that hitherto
were unaffected by Russian preferences.

The Moscow-Teheran-Caracas Axis

Russia aims to strengthen key alliances with countries such as Iran and
Venezuela in its quest for energy supremacy. Russia's refusal to cooperate
with the West in isolating Iran in order to curb its nuclear ambitions has
remained an enigma to realpolitik observers, who expect Russia to prefer
non-proliferation. Yet, if Russia's grand strategy is to challenge the US,
then one of its main tools is the political economy of energy. With a much
greater nuclear arsenal, Russia is ready to tolerate a nuclear Iran. Russia
believes it is strong enough to deter the Ayatollahs if they can be
harnessed under Russian grand strategy.

Moscow nourishes hopes to coordinate anti-Western policies with oil-rich
Iran. A nuclear Iran may serve the Russian interest in detaching Gulf oil
from American influence. This has been a long-standing goal of the Soviet
Union. Facing an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, most oil producing
countries in the Gulf will slither into the Iranian orbit. The Shiite areas
are most vulnerable to Iranian influence. Noteworthy, the southern portion
of Iraq as well as the northern province of Saudi Arabia, where significant
amounts of oil are located, are heavily populated by Shiites (as is Iran). A
nuclear Iran will also dominate the Persian Gulf and its energy output. A
nuclear Iran may also destabilize Turkey, which serves nowadays as an energy
corridor for the West. An emboldened Iran will be less reluctant to meddle
in Turkish affairs and help the Islamic radical elements in order to create
political turmoil and even an Islamic takeover of Turkey. Secular Turkey has
been an anathema to the Ayatollahs.

Further evidence for an anti-American grand strategy is the Russian behavior
toward Venezuela, another major exporter of oil. Russia capitalized on the
extreme anti-Americanism displayed by Venezuela's leader, Hugo Chavez. We
already see a minor Russian military presence in Venezuela and the
Caribbean. The Moscow-Teheran-Caracas axis is currently in formation. Moscow
is harnessing the oil riches of these two countries to challenge US hegemony
in an increasingly energy dependent world. Iran and Venezuela cooperate
willingly to see American influence reduced.

The West's Options

The West must recognize the challenge ahead. Pavlovian responses urging
engagement, which often is a euphemism for plain appeasement, are to be
expected. Yet, it is an illusion to believe that the Russians will change
their mind. Expansion of the EU and of NATO already has progressed too far
from the Russian point of view. Russia's security concerns, coupled with
Russian historic imperialism, drive the Russian strategy.

Therefore, if the West does not want to succumb to dependence upon a
Russian-led energy coalition it has to act as soon as possible. Alternatives
sources of energy should be explored. Conserving energy is similarly
important. At the same time, Western leaders should be aware that what
Kissinger called in the mid-1970s "economic strangulation" might also
require military responses. Soft power may not be sufficient to prevent the
rise of an effective anti-Western energy coalition.

The West must be prepared to defend countries such as Georgia or Azerbaijan
in order to prevent their falling into the Russian orbit. The West cannot
afford procrastinating regarding Iran to ensure Teheran does not acquire the
bomb. Finally, Washington ought to update its contingency plans for
conquering the oilfields if necessary.

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Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and
the director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Littauer
Foundation