Ahmadinejad and the Mahdi
by Mohebat Ahdiyyih
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2008, pp. 27-36
www.meforum.org/article/1985

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad surprised not only many Westerners but
also many Iranians when, during his first speech at the United Nations, he
prayed for the hasty return of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, Shi'i Islam's
messianic figure.[1] Demonstrating his priorities, he repeated the prayer in
December 2007 when addressing Arab leaders at the Gulf Cooperation Council
meeting in Doha[2] but did not object when they described the Persian Gulf
as Arab, a diplomatic swipe at Iran's place in the region. Ahmadinejad's
messianism is no ploy; it is very serious indeed.[3] Ayatollah Ahmad
Jannati, chairman of the Guardian Council, credits Ahmadinejad with "being
inspired by God."[4]

The Mahdi and the Islamic Republic

The inspiration for Ahmadinejad's thinking can be found in traditional
Shi'ism.
As with other monotheistic religions, Shi'i teachings promise the return of
a messiah. For Twelver Shi'a, the messiah will be Muhammad al-Mahdi, the
Twelfth Imam, who went into occultation in 874 CE and is expected to return
before the Day of Judgment to lead the righteous against the forces of
evil.[5] Such ideas pervade Iranian culture, even beyond the Islamic
context. The idea of the Mahdi has historical precedence, for example, in
ancient Zoroastrian beliefs.[6] Persian literature and poetry are awash with
the notion of a promised savior. Abol-Ghasem Ferdowsi (935-1020), the author
of Shahnameh (The book of kings), Iran's national epic, wrote that a "noble
man" would appear in Iran from "whom will spread the religion of God to the
four corners of the world."[7]

After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic incorporated the idea of
Mahdism into its complex system of governance. Under Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini's concept of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent),
Khomeini became the "guardian of Muslims" and representative of the Mahdi in
the "first government of God" on earth. He allowed the election of a
parliament, the Majlis, but then commanded the elected deputies in May 1980
to offer their "services to Lord of the Age [the Mahdi], may God speed his
blessed appearance."[8]

Khomeini and the framers of the Islamic Republic's constitution established
an important precedent: Both rationality and irrationality can be employed
in the governance of a nation. This approach explains how the Islamic
Republic has survived in the modern world even as it pursues a
millennium-old philosophy in the face of a skeptical international community
and despite a largely progressive and enlightened Iranian population.

Paying lip service to the Hidden Imam has been, since the time of Khomeini,
a standard practice for Iranian officials. For example, shortly after
leaving office, former president Mohammad Khatami delivered a philosophical
and relatively rational speech about civilizations intended to lessen the
adverse international reaction to Ahmadinejad's messianic statements.
Nevertheless, during the course of his speech, Khatami asserted that the
"Lord of the Age will bring about a world government" even as he claimed
that "we have no mission to change the world."[9]

If past Iranian presidents have mentioned Mahdism, Ahmadinejad has made it a
focal point of his rhetoric. In September 2005, he sponsored the first
annual International Conference of Mahdism Doctrine in Tehran. The
conference presented Mahdism as an ideology that could form the basis for
world peace and unity across religions. Addressing the conference,
Ahmadinejad said that the "Islamic Republic and the system of velayat-e
faqih have no other mission but to prepare for the establishment of a world
government . . . as the Imam [Mahdi] runs and manages the universe." He
repeated the same idea but modified his language at the second conference in
2006, saying the "Mahdavi perception [Mahdism] and view are the perfect
method for the administration and direction of the world." In follow-up
seminars, speakers defined Mahdism as the "defining strategy of the Islamic
Republic," a "comprehensive plan and strategic policy," and a "political
regime and world view." Within that context, the conference determined not
only that the Mahdi's advent is "inevitable" but also that it can be
"accelerated" through human action. Discussants spoke about the Iran-Iraq
war as a practical example of the application of Mahdism since "combatants
were moved by the love of the Mahdi's representative, Khomeini, to sacrifice
their lives." Attendees also spoke of Iran as the "Umm al-Qura" (mother of
villages), suggesting that the Islamic Republic had replaced Mecca-which
uses that same title-as the rightful center of Islam. [10]

Ahmadinejad's View of the Mahdi

Ahmadinejad's concept of Mahdism derives from the same sources that have
inspired other Iranian leaders across the Islamic Republic's political
spectrum. Aside from Khomeini's teachings on the subject[11] and the
writings of Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari[12] (1920-79), a prominent ideologue
of the Islamic Republic, a number of other Iranian authors have been
influential. In the nineteenth century, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97)
sought to unite the Islamic world and demonstrate the utility of Islamic
teachings in the modern world. He hid his true identity as a Shi'i believer
under the rubric of taqiyya (dissimulation) and pretended to be a Sunni from
Afghanistan. Indeed, he contributed not only to Islamist reform inside Iran
but also helped lay the groundwork for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[13]

Ahmadinejad may also have derived inspiration from Navvab Safavi (1924-55),
founder of Fadayan-e Islam, a group that assassinated a number of more
liberal Iranian politicians and intellectuals. The writings of both Jalal
Al-e Ahmad[14] (1923-69) and Ahmad Fardid[15][16][17]; and he may even have
been influenced by such anticlerical writers as Fereydun Adamiyat
(1920-2008), the most popular modern historian of Iran and a senior diplomat
in the late shah's government, whose decades of work[18] have vastly
influenced generations of Iranian intellectuals but are now being
scrutinized after the exposure of a number of falsifications,[19] such as
his intentional misrepresentation of facts about nineteenth-century
religious and political movements and the early twentieth-century Iranian
constitutional revolution.[20] Although he was prevented from writing or
engaging in political activity after the 1979 revolution, major organs of
the Islamic Republic-the Kayhan and Jam-e Jam dailies, for example-continue
to amplify parts of Adamiyat's work that support their positions often
without citing his name. So, too, does the Majlis Research Center and the
Islamic Revolution Documentation Center, whose director is an advisor to
Ahmadinejad, as well as major political and religious websites such as
Tebyan. (1909-94), popular anti-American writers, may have influenced
Ahmadinejad in his formative years, as would have 'Ali Shariati (1933-77),
an Iranian sociologist who helped meld leftist thought with political Islam
and popularized the notion of Islamic revolution in the years before
Khomeini's return. Ahmadinejad may also have drawn upon Ehsan Tabari
(1916-89), the theoretician of Tudeh, the Iranian communist party, who after
a lifetime of indoctrinating Iranian leftists confessed to "erroneous" ideas
after the 1979 revolution

Further coloring Ahmadinejad's world-view, even if not his Mahdism, has been
German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Iranian intellectuals react favorably
to Heidegger's real or perceived anti-American sentiments, anti-Semitism,
and his criticism of traditional Western thought. His grand theory of
existence and his objection to attaching great significance to logical
reasoning and intelligibility, as well as his theories of the value of
nothingness, are concepts that have made him the darling of many Iranian
intellectuals.

The Hojjatieh

But what surely has had the greatest influence on Ahmadinejad and his peers
is systematic indoctrination by the Hojjatieh Society. The name Hojjatieh
derives from Hojjat (proof), one of the titles of the Mahdi; the society was
founded in the mid-twentieth century by clerics to combat the Baha'i faith,
founded in the nineteenth century by a prophet whom Muslim clerics have
labeled and opposed as a false mahdi. The Hojjatieh grew with the help of
prominent clerics and assistance from the late shah, who sought to curry
favor with the clerics. It soon became a powerful nationwide organization of
fundamentalists trained in Mahdism and proved a menace to the late shah.

The Hojjatieh played an important role in radicalizing Ahmadinejad and other
secular Muslim youth, students, teachers, government bureaucrats, and even
some members of the armed forces prior to the 1979 revolution. Many
Hojjatieh activists participated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. But in the
early 1980s, Khomeini moved against the society, both because it challenged
his velayat-e faqih doctrine of leadership and because it was poised to take
the reins of power in Iran. The ensuing purge of its members from the
Islamic regime forced numerous aspiring advocates of the new Islamic regime,
such as Ahmadinejad, to renounce or hide their membership in or sympathy for
the Hojjatieh.[21]

As a result, the Hojjatieh went underground. Accusations of membership were
enough to taint aspiring politicians with disloyalty to the supreme leader.
In recent years, several critics of Ahmadinejad's tenure have suggested that
his administration is Hojjatieh-inspired and bent on settling scores with
Khomeini's allies.[22] Such charges may not be baseless, as some Ahmadinejad
supporters have publicly called for rehabilitation of the Hojjatieh and
resumption of its activities against the Baha'i faith. For example, the head
of the powerful Islamic Propagation Organization (IPO) in East Azerbaijan
called for the "revival and strengthening of Hojjatieh Society."[23]

Here, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi's role is notable as Iranians
believe he leads the new Hojjatieh.[24] A member of the Assembly of Experts
and director of the Imam Khomeini Institute, Mesbah-Yazdi is a leading
proponent of Mahdism and a powerful senior cleric with great influence over
Ahmadinejad, his government, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),
and security forces.[25] He is also allegedly a trainer of hard-line clerics
at the Haqqani theological college in Qom, some of whom have joined
Ahmadinejad's cabinet.

Outspoken, Mesbah-Yazdi opens a window into Ahmadinejad's beliefs. He
advocates the use of violence to promote the interests of Islam and seeks to
purge the republican aspect of the Islamic Republic system in favor of a
pure Islamic system, which his publications refer to as the nucleus of a
Mahdi-led world. The October 2005 issue of his monthly publication Ma'refat,
for example, argued that the "superiority of Islam over other religions is
stressed in Qur'an, which calls on believers to wage war against unbelievers
and prepare the way for the advent of the Mahdi and conquering the world."
According to Pasdare Islam, the monthly publication of the powerful Islamic
Propagation Organization, an institution in tune with Mesbah-Yazdi's ideas,
Khomeini himself elucidated this idea by saying that the "Mahdi will fill
the earth with justice" and that "all institutions in our country and their
extensions worldwide must prepare the way to receive the Mahdi upon his
advent."[26] Mesbah-Yazdi even attributes Ahmadinejad's election to the
presidency to the will of the Mahdi.[27] Mesbah-Yazdi is not the only senior
cleric who endorses Ahmadinejad's messianism. Jannati and Ayatollah Mohammad
Yazdi, the secretary-general of the Qom Seminary Lecturers' Association,
both members of Assembly of Experts, have also endorsed the president's
beliefs.[28] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself characterized Ahmadinejad's
election to the presidency as the fulfillment of the "prayers of the Lord of
the Age."[29]

A close examination of the statements and activities of Ahmadinejad and his
supporters point to their intimate knowledge of Shi'i traditions about the
Mahdi's expected appearance in Iran and the fierce opposition and violence
against him and his followers by clerics, issues that have been closely
guarded and rarely mentioned by the ecclesiastics for obvious reasons. For
example, following the establishment of the Islamic Republic, clerics
directed the purging and editing of statements in books of the sayings and
traditions attributed to Prophet Muhammad and his Shi'i successors about the
circumstances surrounding the future advent of the Mahdi. Media coverage of
such statements was also tailored in the same manner. In one case, the
redactors did not even exempt the most famous 110-volume book called
Biharu'l-Anwar (Oceans of light), a standard textbook compiled by the
Safavid-era scholar Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (1616-89). Major portions and
traditions were stripped of materials deemed detrimental to the Islamic
Republic's interests.

Ahmadinejad's Interpretation

No matter how unorthodox Ahmadinejad's interpretation of Islamic theology
and prophecies are, he appears sincere in his beliefs. Ahmadinejad's motto
of "justice-nurturing government," together with the often-cited promise of
the Qur'an about the righteous inheriting the earth, is meant to evoke the
idea of a savior in the name of the Mahdi as Iranians are well-versed in the
tradition promising the Mahdi will "fill the earth with justice after it has
been filled with oppression." As minority Shi'i Muslims, Iranians also
expect vindication of their beliefs against the "false" Sunni majority
belief.[30] Furthermore, Ahmadinejad's characterization of his government as
"jihadist" and "basiji" (militia), further inflames emotions in more radical
believers about the militancy of his administration in pursuing Mahdism.
Ahmadinejad seeks an Islamic government in Iran that is free from democratic
pretenses and devoid of modern concepts of human rights and the equality of
the sexes; that seeks the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the elimination of
Israel, the destruction of liberal democratic states and Western capitalism,
and an end to the United States as a superpower, which is perceived as the
greatest threat to the Islamic Republic's survival and the main obstacle to
the accomplishment of its objectives. The achievement of these
preconditions, Ahmadinejad believes, will enable Shi'i domination and the
establishment of a world government.[31] When Ahmadinejad declares
frequently that his government represents a return to Khomeini's
revolutionary ideals from which previous governments have allegedly
deviated, he is suggesting that he believes it is time to return Mahdism-and
the achievement of its precursor steps-to its rightful place among the
Islamic Republic's priorities.[32]

It is an attractive idea for the masses, nurtured on more than two decades
of state-sponsored incitement. Khomeini, after all, called for the Islamic
world to "rise up and destroy Israel,"[33] and said of the United States,
"We will fight them with all our might until the last drop of our
blood."[34]

Ahmadinejad's acolytes find his lack of inhibition in speech and his fiery
populism a fresh breeze of honesty compared to the deceptive discourse of
Rafsanjani and the philosophizing of Khatami. While both Rafsanjani and
Khatami might pay rhetorical heed to the goal of eliminating Israel or
countering U.S. influence,[35] both prefer to finesse their rhetoric not to
antagonize outside powers.

Mesbah-Yazdi's role as a central figure in promoting Mahdism is important
because both he and at least one influential disciple, Hojjatu'l-Islam
Mohsen Gharavian, openly endorse the Islamic Republic's acquisition of
nuclear weapons. In September 2005, for example, Ma'refat declared that
"deterrence does not belong just to a few superpowers but also to other
countries," and argued that "The Qur'an calls on the faithful and the Muslim
nation to acquire maximum power to be able to deter the enemies of religion
and humanity: 'Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your
power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of enemies
of God and your enemies.'"[36] In February 2006, Gharavian reiterated this
position, as reported by the international media and a number of news
agencies in Iran, by stressing the "necessity of using nuclear weapons as a
means to retaliate," adding that "there is no religious constraint in using
nuclear weapons to retaliate."[37] Although he later denied his statement,
his original argument is consistent with those made by others.[38] For
example, Hojjat ul-Islam Saidi, Khamenei's representative to the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, a powerful supporter of Mesbah-Yazdi, is often
cited in the Revolutionary Guards' Sobh-e Sadegh weekly arguing that the
nuclear program "transforms Iran into the dominant regional power."[39]

Mesbah-Yazdi's views and influence over Ahmadinejad and other spiritual
pupils grows in importance because his religious edicts are obligatory for
his followers. Even if Khamenei has indeed issued a fatwa (as some have
argued despite its lack of publication) declaring that making nuclear
weapons are contrary to Islamic teachings, Mesbah-Yazdi is theologically
permitted to issue a contrary fatwa binding on his followers. As for the
Mahdism context of these developments, Khamenei's own words as commander in
chief as cited on his website are a sufficient guide: "Becoming equipped
with power is a lesson derived from belief in Mahdi. The expected justice,
justice of Mahdi for the whole world, is not attained through admonition and
preaching . achieving justice requires that just and righteous people have
the power to confront the bullies . messengers of God preach to the people,
but they are also equipped with weapons."[40] An editorial in Hemayat, a
daily publication close to Iran's judiciary, went further and declared that
"we need to prepare for ruling the world" and "carrying the flag of Islam to
the hands of the Mahdi."[41] Such statements are often repeated in the
government-sponsored press. Referring to a "great event leading to mankind's
salvation," Ahmadinejad presented his vision again in November 2005 by
saying, "Iran must become the platform for the appearance of the Lord of the
Age."[42]
Can Ahmadinejad Win a Second Term?

Ahmadinejad's comprehensive and literal application of Mahdism has led him
to call openly for the "elimination of Israel"[43] and otherwise assume a
posture of intense confrontation toward Israel and the United States.
Domestic opponents argue that Ahmadinejad has committed the cardinal sin of
revealing the Islamic Republic's intentions, that he has broken with Iran's
traditional enigmatic approach and Shi'i dissimulation (taqiyya). The
influential Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Tavassoli, former member of the
Expediency Discernment Council and a chief of staff of Khomeini's office,
for example, censured Ahmadinejad for openly calling for the destruction of
Israel and added that "we all believe in that but there is no need to reveal
it." Khatami admonished Ahmadinejad not to "speak of matters that cause
economic and political problems for us."[44]

The Islamic Republic has survived because the elected branches of government
live alongside those institutions that are not popularly elected and fall
under the supervision of the supreme leader-bodies such as the Supreme
National Security Council, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, armed forces,
security forces, judiciary, Council of Guardians, Expediency Council, state
media, and economic foundations (bonyads). The supreme leader may
technically claim divine power incumbent in his representation of the Mahdi,
but, in practice, he governs by balancing institutional interests and ever
shifting alliances with other powerful personalities and factional
interests.

Ahmadinejad has upset that balance by exceeding the limits allowed for a
transient, elected official. His exclusion of some powerful figures from
government, recourse to outright Mahdism, and reliance on a band of
like-minded advisers have cracked the semblance of unity that had emerged
among the "principle-ists," as pro-theocracy Iranian fundamentalists prefer
to call themselves.

Some former supporters of Ahmadinejad have now turned on him. For example,
Mohammad Reza Bahonar, the deputy speaker in the last parliament and long
one of Ahmadinejad's staunchest defenders, criticized the president for
suggesting that the Islamic Republic is "bent upon destroying the prevailing
global management"[45] Others, such as former parliamentary speaker Ali
Akbar Nateq-Nouri, himself a hard-line fundamentalist and someone who often
praises the Mahdi, expressed anxiety that Ahmadinejad's "promotion of such
superstitions in recent years" might endanger the nation.[46] Hassan
Rowhani, a member of the Supreme National Security Council and former chief
nuclear negotiator, characterized Ahmadinejad's views on the Hidden Imam as
"superstitious" and "charlatanistic" and called his circle of close allies a
"bunch of misguided children."[47] Rumors abound that Ahmadinejad has even
dismissed Khamenei's legitimacy. On July 1, 2008, Etemad-e Melli cited
Ahmadinejad as having said at the start of his presidency that Khamenei
chastised him for claiming that the "Lord of the Age will appear in two
years." Ahmadinejad responded by chiding Khamenei: "[He] thinks I am
appointed president by him while I am the president appointed by the Lord of
the Age."[48]

This has left Ahmadinejad only the support of the Islamic Republic's most
hard-line factions-a core group of supporters calling themselves the
Pleasant Scent of Servitude (Rayehe-ye Khosh-e Khedmat), followers of
Mesbah-Yazdi, and some IRGC elements[49]-a position not conducive to
long-term political survival in Iran.

For that reason, Ahmadinejad's tenure beyond the 2009 presidential election
is in doubt, as it is opposed not only by longtime rival and newly-elected
parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani but also by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the
mayor of Tehran and presidential aspirant, and an emerging alliance between
Rafsanjani, who represents traditional clerics and technocrats, and Khatami,
who represents the business community and reformists. Galvanized by
Ahmadinejad's excesses, this pragmatist-reformist alliance made gains in
2007 city council and Assembly of Experts elections. They will face
challenges, however, should the Guardian Council and Interior Ministry
manipulate candidacies and balloting in the 2009 presidential election.

But elections may not even be necessary to oust Ahmadinejad: By implicitly
challenging the supreme leader's authority by channeling the Hidden Imam,
Ahmadinejad may have sealed his fate. In theory, Iranians elect their
president, but in reality, the supreme leader uses his control over the
Islamic Republic's various institutions to manipulate results. The Guardian
Council, for example, vets candidates, sometimes disqualifying more than 90
percent of challengers before a single vote is cast. Ahmadinejad's election
surprised Iranians almost as much as it surprised the international
community. After all, when Mehdi Karrubi went to sleep on election night, he
was well ahead in the vote count. When he awoke, he had lost. He openly
accused authorities of fraud.[50] Such incidents should not surprise
observers. The supreme leader calculates the domestic and international
needs of the Islamic Republic and plans the general composition of factional
representations in elected offices accordingly.

Alternatively, Ahmadinejad's allies among hard-line fundamentalists may try
to retain power, a tactic that could risk the existence of the Islamic
Republic's system. Ahmadinejad and his allies showed their intolerance for
any dissent when they forced the replacement of 'Ali Larijani, at the time
Iran's relatively pragmatic though still hard-line nuclear negotiator and
secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, with Said Jalili, a
devout believer in Mahdism whose lifetime interest has been the application
of principles derived from millennium-old Islamic traditions to Iran's
foreign policy.[51]

Ahmadinejad versus the Clergy?

While Ahmadinejad enjoys the support of Mesbah-Yazdi and his circle, the
president's Mahdism has severe repercussions for the clerical basis of the
Islamic Republic. Incumbent in the belief in the Mahdi's return is the
notion that he will be opposed by the clergy. Says one such prophesy, the
"religious leaders of that day will be the most evil religious leaders under
the heavens as sedition and dissension will go out from them and to them
will it return."[52]

Ahmadinejad may see competitors such as Rafsanjani as among these "most evil
religious leaders" who must be neutralized. Another prophecy characterizes
the clerics as "faithless" and points to the great suffering of the Mahdi at
their hands.[53] Referring to such traditions, one Ahmadinejad adviser
asserted that the Mahdi would slaughter such clerics, who are destined to
rise against him. The issue is serious enough that some critics accuse
Ahmadinejad of trying to eliminate the clergy.[54] A number of prominent
clerics have expressed dismay and anger at Ahmadinejad's treatment of them.
Former prime minister Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, secretary
general of the Militant Clergy Association, for example, has "warned the
president not to take the clergy for granted" as "we have been combatants
for the revolution and against corruption."[55] Many Iranians suspect that
the traditional clergy's decline after Ahmadinejad's election and the rise
of an extremist faction was deliberate IRGC strategy. Statements such as
those of Joint Chiefs Commander Hasan Firuzabadi, who warned Ahmadinejad's
critics to cease their opposition lest the "enemy . take advantage of
them,"[56] underscore suspicions of the IRGC role.

Already, a conflict is occurring. Ahmadinejad has encouraged a class of lay
clerics (maddah) much more in tune with his folk belief than formal Shi'i
theology. They staunchly support Ahmadinejad and promote Mahdism, recalling
dreams about and sightings of the Mahdi.[57][58] Such developments have
fueled widespread rumors of Ahmadinejad's campaign against "corrupt"
official clerics and his attempt to strengthen the hand of non-clerical
hard-liners. The most conspicuous example of such attempts were the May 3,
2008 revelations by Abbas Palizdar, an Ahmadinejad supporter, who, while
addressing students at the University of Hamadan, listed corrupt clerics by
name, raising suspicion in one newspaper's assessment that "Ahmadinejad and
his military base are bent on eliminating, or at least weakening, the
clergy."

The proliferation of hundreds of websites and weblogs that support
Ahmadinejad's Mahdism doctrine has become a Pandora's box for the
traditional clerics and the Islamic Republic as an increasing number of
people learn about the issue. For example, among the traditions repeatedly
cited on the web in Persian is the story of Prophet Muhammad's sobbing grief
at the fate of the Mahdi and his followers. According to accounts on such
sites, Muhammad identified the Mahdi's future followers as "brothers"[59]
and differentiated them from his disciples whom he only labeled
"companions." Asked by his disciples from among which people the Mahdi's
followers will appear, he pointed to his only Iranian disciple, Salman, the
Persian (Salman al-Farsi).[60]

Ahmadinejad's opposition to traditional clerics, who are circumscribed in
their statements about the Mahdi with a view to concealing from the public
the implications of such beliefs, fits perfectly with the tenets of Mahdism
that identify Iran as the battleground where the Mahdi appears.

The Iranian nation's fascination with its glorious ancient civilization was
the subject of exploitation by the Pahlavi monarchs preceding the Islamic
Republic. They sought to project Iran's glorious past into the present and
future. Ahmadinejad has perfected the shah's art by relying on a religious
version of the same concept. The path is fraught with risks, though.
Ahmadinejad has integrated practically all the revolutionary ideals of the
regime, open and secret, and their supposed Islamic and historical roots,
real and imaginary, into one school of thought and strategy for action; it
is inspired by his messianic zeal, and he has proudly and publicly revealed
its details. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the genie is out of the
bottle.

Mohebat Ahdiyyih is the senior Iran analyst at the Open Source Center, a
U.S. government agency, where he focuses on Iran and the implications of
Shi'i
doctrine.

[1] Emrooz (Tehran), Dec.14, 2005; Entekhab (Tehran), Sept. 17, 2006;
Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran), Oct. 14, 2006.
[2] Rooz Online (Tehran), Dec. 5, 2007.
[3] Fars News Agency (Tehran), June 30, 2008; Etemad (Tehran), June 18,
2008.
[4] Emrooz, Sept. 17, 2006.
[5] Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1987), p. 166.
[6] Abbas Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal (Ithaca: Cornel University Press,
1989), p. 2; "Comparative Study of Islamic-Zoroastrian Eschatology," Haft
Aseman, University of Religions, Qom, Fall 2007; Shoghi Effendi, God Passes
By (Wilmette, Ill.: Baha'i Publishing Trust, 1987), pp. 57-8.
[7] Rooholah Mehrabkhani, Elhame Shoara (Darmestadt, Ger.: Asre Jadid
Publishers, 2004), p. 75.
[8] "Declaration of the Islamic Republic by Imam Khomeini" and "Imam
Khomeini's Message on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the Majlis," The
Dawn of the Islamic Revolution (Tehran: The Ministry of Islamic Guidance,
Apr. 1, 1979, May 28, 1980), p. 51, 113.
[9] Sharif News (Tehran), Oct. 30, 2005.
[10] Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "President Ahmadi Nejad: Turning to Mahdism is the
only way for the survival of humanity," accessed July 24, 2008. His first
speech and the follow-up seminar presentations were recently removed from
the permanent website of the annual conference.
[11] Ayandeh-ye Roshan news agency (Qom), Jan. 31, 2006.
[12] Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari, The Awaited Savior, Rise and Revolution of
the Mahdi, and Qa'miyat.
[13] Nikki Keddie, Sayyid Jama?l ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
[14] Roy Mottahedeh, Mantle of the Prophet (Oxford: Oneworld Publications,
2000), p. 287-336.
[15] Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 106-9.
[16] Ervand Abrahimian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), p. 296.
[17] Ervand Abrahimian, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public
Recantations in Modern Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999), p. 204.
[18] Andisheha-ye Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani [Ideas of Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani]
and Amirkabir va Iran [Amirkabir and Iran] (Tehran: Kharazmi Publications,
1976).
[19] Masha'allah Ajodani, interviews on Radio Farda, Mar. 30, 2008, and
Radio Deutsche Welle, Apr. 1, 2008; "Fereydun Adamiyat: Movarrekhe
Khanehneshin" [Fereydun Adamiyat: historian under house arrest],
BBCPersian.com, Mar. 4, 2008.
[20] Fereydun Adamiyat at va Bahaian, Goftman Iran, Nov. 24, 2006, accessed
July 29, 2008; Masha'allah Ajodani, Mashrutih Irani va Pishzamineh-haye
Nazariyeh Velayat-e Faqih (London: Entesharate Fasle Ketab, 1997).
[21] Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader, p. 15.
[22] See, for example, Hojjat ul-Islam Ali Akbar Motashamipur, former Majlis
majority leader, Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA, Tehran), Feb. 18,
2008.
[23] Entekhab News (Tehran), Oct. 29, 2007.
[24] Entekhab News, Jan. 11, 2006.
[25] Entekhab News, June 4, 2008.
[26] Pasdare Islam (Qom), Oct. 12, 1981.
[27] Partow Sokhan (Qom), June 8, Nov. 9, 2005.
[28] Emrooz, Sept. 17, 2006; Noandishnews.com, Apr. 13, 2008.
[29] Emrooz, Sept. 17, 2006; Noandishnews.com, Apr. 13, 2008.
[30] H. M. Balyuzi, Muhammad and the Course of Islam (Oxford: George Ronald
Publisher, 1976), pp. 165-7.
[31] Mehr News Agency (Tehran), Oct. 26, 2005; "Text of Iranian President
Ahmadinejad's Letter to President George W. Bush," Islamic Republic News
Agency (IRNA), May 9, 2006; Mehr News Agency, May 9, 2006.
[32] "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Personal Memos," June 11, 2008.
[33] The Dawn of the Islamic Revolution (Tehran: Islamic Republic Ministry
of Guidance, Feb. 11, 1980), p. 25.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Rafsanjani, quoted in Iran (Tehran), Dec. 13, 2005 and Islamic Republic
of Iran Radio, Nov. 23, 2001; Khatami, quoted in BBC Persian, Sept. 11,
2006.
[36] Qur. 8:60.
[37] IRNA, Feb. 14, 2006; Rooz, Feb. 14, 2006.
[38] Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari, quoted in Kayhan (Tehran), July 11, 2004.
[39] Sobh-e Sadegh (Tehran), Apr. 16, 2007; Islamic Republic of Iran Radio,
Dec. 14, 2001.
[40] Sayyid Ali Khamenei website (Tehran), Jan. 30, 2006.
[41] Hemayat (Tehran), Jan. 7, 2006.
[42] Shargh (Tehran), Nov. 12, 2005.
[43] Financial Times (London), May 30, 2008.
[44] Shargh, Oct. 31, 2005.
[45] Aftab (Tehran), May 25, 2008.
[46] ISNA, Dec. 10. 2007.
[47] Farda News (Tehran), Feb. 19, 2008.
[48] Etemad-e Melli (Tehran), July 1, 2008.
[49] Kargozaran (Tehran), July 1, 2008.
[50] Gooya News Online, June 19, 2005.
[51] Farda News, Oct. 25, 2007; Ansar News (Tehran), Oct. 25, 2007; Iran
Diplomacy (Tehran), Oct. 23, 2007.
[52] Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, cited in Momen, An Introduction
to Shi'i Islam, p. 168.
[53] Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, p. 167.
[54] Sharif News, Apr. 29, 2006.
[55] Kargozaran, Apr. 19, 2008.
[56] Rooz, Aug. 26, 2007.
[57] Etemad, Dec. 31, 2007.
[58] Mosharekat (Tehran), July 2, 2008.
[59] Biharu'l-Anwar, vol. 52, p. 132, vol. 13, p. 1011, 1128; Usul al-Kafi,
vol. 2, p. 487.
[60] Nuru ath-Thaqalayn, vol. 1, p. 642.