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Sunday, June 25, 2000
English translation of 23 June letter from Sharansky to Barak (translated by Sharansky's office)

by Sharansky's office)

Ehud Barak
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem
June 23rd 2000
Mr.English translation of 23 June letter from Sharansky to Barak (translated
by Sharansky's office)

Ehud Barak
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem
June 23rd 2000
Mr. Prime Minister,

Based on what I have learned in recent days, both from my own sources and
from the Israeli and foreign media, I have reached two conclusions.
First, that the team responsible for negotiations with the Palestinians
has crystallized the Israeli position in a future agreement. Second, that
you have developed a 'clever strategy' to ensure the agreement's
acceptance by the Israeli people.

The elements of an agreement are even more problematic then I had assumed
a few weeks ago, and include among them:

1. Jerusalem - Concessions on Israeli control in parts of Jerusalem.

2. Right of Return - A vague formulation acceptable to the Palestinians
which I interpret as granting the right of return to Palestinian refugees
within the Green Line.

3. The Jordan River, its bridges and the Jordan, Valley will be
transferred to Palestinian Authority.

The 'clever strategy' is based on the following considerations.

A. It is clear to you that the elements outlined above are not acceptable
to a number of coalition partners, I among them. At the same time, you
believe, and rightly so, that without these partners, you do not possess
the broad public support necessary to attend a summit in America,
Therefore, you have attempted to include the coalition partners in a
summit they oppose by claiming that "in fact, there is not yet an
agreement, and in any case, any difference of opinion that will be found
among us at the time of the summit will be addressed there."

B. With regard to the summit talks in America, you are the only one who
knows what you expect to achieve in the negotiations, while your
coalition partners are left in the dark. To bridge the wide gaps between
you and your coalition partners requires patience, time and discretion,
none of which are afforded by the atmosphere of a summit. Quite the
contrary - the disagreements between us, and perhaps even an internal
conflict, will take place under the glare of the cameras. In the end, we
will be left with only one choice - to agree to an accord to which we are
opposed, or to reject it and return home. This may sound simple in
theory, but I know and you know that the option to reject an agreement is
unrealistic and would lead to the disgrace of Israel before the world.

C. The agreement will then be brought to a referendum. Let's assume for
a moment that the Israeli people will reject such an agreement. But after
the worldwide ceremonies and celebrations that can be expected to come in
the wake of an agreement, such a rejection would result in Israel finding
herself in her most isolated international position since the founding of
the State. The fear of this possibility will silence many of the
agreement's opponents from voicing their opposition - which perhaps is
precisely what advocates of your current strategy are counting on.

This is indeed a clever strategy. But it is not the way to deal with
either coalition partners or with an Israeli electorate that has chosen
you to lead them - particularly not with an issue that may determine the
fate of this country and the fate of the Jewish people in this generation
and for many generations to come.

In my opinion, the aboveboard and responsible approach is to go to the
summit with a plan that has the backing of a majority of Israelis,
expressed in a national unity government, through which the debate over
the principles of an agreement will take place before you depart for a
summit and not while you are there. In doing so, you will arrive at the
summit with the strength and backing necessary for this fateful and
complex undertaking, enjoying the broad and open support of a majority of
the Israeli people - and look them confidently in the eye upon your
return.

Mr. Prime Minister, this is the only approach of which I am aware which
can lead to a peace agreement which I can support, and this is the only
approach to which my party and I can be partners.

I call on you once again to stop your race toward a summit that is based
on a "clever strategy' for dealing with your coalition partners and with
the Israeli public, and instead to go to a summit when you will enjoy the
support of the people of Israel and when the vast majority of their
representatives will be partners to the process. If you do this, I will
be happy to work at your side to forge consensus and agreement within the
nation. Unfortunately, if you continue on your present course, it will
mean the end of the partnership between us.

Respectfully Yours
Natan Sharansky



000625100006256/25/00 0:00:0012/30/99 19:56:34US Embassy Spokesman Larry Schwartz denies existence of American "nonpaper" declines to confirm or deny if reflects the notes of a meeting participantUS Embassy Spokesman Larry Schwartz denies existence of American "nonpaper"
declines to confirm or deny if reflects the notes of a meeting participant

Aaron Lerner Date: 24 June, 2000

US Embassy Spokesman Larry Schwartz told IMRA this morning regarding the
document published in Yediot Ahronot that "this was not a U.US Embassy Spokesman Larry Schwartz denies existence of American "nonpaper"
declines to confirm or deny if reflects the notes of a meeting participant

Aaron Lerner Date: 24 June, 2000

US Embassy Spokesman Larry Schwartz told IMRA this morning regarding the
document published in Yediot Ahronot that "this was not a U.S. Government
"nonpaper" or document of any kind."

While IMRA learned from a source that the document appears to have been
written by a native English speaker and may reflect the notes of someone who
participated in the meetings in Washington, Schwartz declined to confirm or
deny if the document may reflect the notes of someone who participated in
the meetings in Washington.

The original item is repeated below:

DOCUMENT: FULL TEXT OF AMERICAN "NONPAPER" DESCRIBING ISRAEL/PA
POSITIONS
Aaron Lerner Date: 23 June, 2000

The following is IMRA's translation of the "non-paper" prepared by
the Clinton Administration outlining the positions of Israel and the
Palestinians before the summit as published in Hebrew in Yediot
Ahronot today:

AMERICAN REPORT - FULL TEXT

1. Jordan River and bridges: Under Palestinian sovereignty, but an
international observer force, that will include a large Israeli unit,
will be stationed there. The Palestinians have proposed UN forces
instead of the above force.

2. Jordan Valley: Under Palestinian sovereignty, but Israel leases it
under a long-term lease (the Palestinians have yet to agree to this).
Likewise, it will be agreed in advance that in the case of an Arab
attack from the East, Israeli military forces stationed in Beit Shean
and Maaleh Adumim can redeploy to three to four areas in the Valley
without requiring Palestinian consent.

3. Right of return: We have the apparatus and the programs. The
problem is solved for all practical purposes. We have a vague
wording that meets Arab demands for the right of return but it will
be so limited in numbers and additional limitations that it will not
have any real significance such that it will meet the needs of the
Palestinians without causing concern to Israel.

4. Jerusalem: The Prime Minister [Barak] is still torn between the
"interim agreement" approach of [Chaim] Ramon and the alternative
approach proposed by [Shlomo] Ben Ami and [Oded] Eran. There has
however been progress in convincing the Prime Minister that an
interim solution of the eastern Jerusalem issue by classifying it as
a kind of Area B will not suffice. Barak is beginning to understand
that the People of Israel are ripe for a permanent agreement within
which there is the transfer of Arab neighborhoods to Palestinian
sovereignty with the annexation of Jewish areas by Israel. This will
improve the demographic balance. It should also be understood that
it is impossible to call an agreement that leaves the problem of
Jerusalem unresolved as "an agreement ending the conflict".
Everyone, even [Minister] Yitzchak Levy [NRP], understands that in
the end it will be necessary to draw new borders - so why not deal
with this reality now. In any case, this matter requires a Knesset
vote in accordance with the law ("Kahalani Law" [Golan Law]), that
sets that the transfer of territory subject to Israeli law,
jurisprudence and sovereignty requires a 61 MK majority and a
national referendum.

5. Land swap: The Prime Minister still virulently opposes this, but
Indyk [American Ambassador] believes that Barak will have to reassess
his position if he want to reach an agreement. The swapping of
territory is difficult to implement in accordance with Israeli law
and may open a Pandora's box, but the negotiators understand that
without it the chances of reaching an agreement are slim. [Mohamed]
Dahlan [head of Preventive Security in Gaza] says that if there is a
land swap the Palestinians would be prepared to accept settlement
blocs covering 4% of the area of the [West] Bank.

6. National referendum: The United States receives the internal polls
done by the Prime Minister according to which Barak can attain a
72-75% majority for an agreement with three elements: an end to the
Palestinian-Israeli dispute; leaving most settlers under Israeli
sovereignty; leaving Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. A national
referendum will be carried out according to the French example [of
1962], when De Gaulle won a national referendum [on withdrawal from
Algeria] after he declared that "a vote against the national
referendum is a vote against me and if I lose I will resign."

7. Financial aid from overseas:

+ Refugees: Over 100 billion dollars will be invested in the
rehabilitation of refugees over the course of 10 - 20 years according
to the following breakdown: 40 billion for the Palestinians, $40
billion for Jordan, $10 billion for Lebanon and $10 billion for
Syria. The funds, of which 25% is American, will go to a new
international body (and not the World Bank or the IMF), that will
replace UNWRA [that today deals with the Palestinian refugees]. This
body will transfer the funds for collective and individual
compensation.

+ Israel's security: Israel will receive less than the $17 billion it
asked for for leaving the Golan, but not much less than that. The
aid will include the main elements of the Golan package that were not
specifically earmarked to the Golan as well as funding for the
erection of fences and additional costs directly associated with the
agreement in the West Bank and Gaza.

+ Palestinian infrastructure: The amount of aid for the establishment
of a new state is not set. The allocation of less than $5 billion
for water infrastructure over a 20 year period is not a serious
problem.

8. Settlers not in settlement blocs: We are struggling for the rights
of the 40,0000 settlers living outside of the settlement blocs to
remain in their homes under Palestinian sovereignty - if they so
desire. There is still no answer to the question as to if it is
possible to get Palestinian agreement on this matter. It is also
true that the continued presence of settlers in the area transferred
to the Palestinians is likely to be a landmine that will explode the
agreement.

9. The paper: The parties developed a joint "nonpaper" in Stockholm
but the Palestinians later claimed that it only represents the
Israeli position. This paper will be the opening point of the
summit.

Yediot Ahronot 23 June 2000

Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director
IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Tel 972-9-7604719/Fax 972-9-7411645
INTERNET ADDRESS: imra@netvision.net.il
pager 03-6750750 subscriber 4811
Website: http://www.imra.org.il




000625110006256/25/00 0:00:0012/30/99 19:57:23Ha'aretz: Sharansky threatens to bolt unless Barak alters his positions and tactics in negotiations with the PalestiniansHa'aretz: Sharansky threatens to bolt unless Barak alters his positions and
tactics in negotiations with the Palestinians

By Yossi Verter Ha'aretz Political Correspondent Ha'aretz 25 June 2000

Yisrael b'Aliyah chair Natan Sharansky is threatening to resign from the
government should Prime Minister Ehud Barak not alter his positions and
tactics in negotiations with the Palestinians.Ha'aretz: Sharansky threatens to bolt unless Barak alters his positions and
tactics in negotiations with the Palestinians

By Yossi Verter Ha'aretz Political Correspondent Ha'aretz 25 June 2000

Yisrael b'Aliyah chair Natan Sharansky is threatening to resign from the
government should Prime Minister Ehud Barak not alter his positions and
tactics in negotiations with the Palestinians.

Interior Minister Sharansky is calling on Barak to defer his departure to a
three-way summit with U.S. President Clinton and PA Chairman Yasser Arafat
in Washington; the Yisrael b'Aliyah leader wants such a fateful summit to be
preceded by the formulation of Israeli policy by a new, national unity
government.

Writing to the prime minister on Friday, Sharansky accused Barak of
maneuvering for the confirmation of a soon-to-be formulated agreement with
the PA by "devising an ingenious ploy" at the expense of coalition partners.

As Sharansky sees it, Barak's ploy has three stages: 1) His own
incorporation, and the inclusion of NRP chair Yitzhak Levy and Shas chair
Eli Yishai, in the contingent participating in the Washington summit; 2)
forcing these three summit partners to choose between embracing an agreement
reached in Washington, or rejecting it and traveling home (this second
option, Sharansky wrote, is not really feasible, because an ugly pull-out of
contingent members in Washington would make Israel appear "ignoble" in the
eyes of the world); 3) holding a referendum after a celebratory
agreement-signing ceremony.

Rejection of an agreement after the holding of a widely-watched signing
ceremony would isolate Israel in the world; thus, Israelis who oppose the
agreement's contents might be reluctant to express their view in referendum
balloting, Sharansky contends.

Summarizing this three-part ploy, Sharansky wrote "this is no way to act
toward your true [coalition] partners, and the citizens of the state who you
were elected to lead."

In response, the Prime Minister's Office declared that Sharansky's
description of the state of negotiations with the Palestinians is
inaccurate. Barak wrote back to Sharansky, promising to brief heads of
coalition factions soon about the negotiations. He also noted that "as long
as the government has been in power, I have been ready to form a wide-based
government" so long as all members adhere to "policy guidelines and
commitments I've made to the public.

000625120006256/25/00 0:00:0012/30/99 19:58:38Ha'aretz: Teddy Kollek, A.B. Yehoshua, Yehuda Amichai and S. Yizharasks PM to stop Temple Mount building - fear dammage to archeological treasuresHa'aretz: Teddy Kollek, A.Ha'aretz: Teddy Kollek, A.B. Yehoshua, Yehuda Amichai and S. Yizharasks PM
to stop Temple Mount building - fear dammage to archeological treasures

By Nadav Shragai Ha'aretz Correspondent Ha'aretz 25 June 2000

A group of noted Israeli authors and former Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek
sent an urgent letter to Prime Minister Ehud Barak on Friday asking him to
intervene in order to stop any further construction on the Temple Mount.

Among the petitioners are A.B. Yehoshua, Yehuda Amichai and S. Yizhar, who
asked that any further entry of construction materials and heavy equipment
into the Temple Mount be stopped until a solution is reached with the Waqf
(Islamic Trust).

The Islamic Movement in Israel and the Waqf have undertaken extensive
construction and renovation projects on the Temple Mount, causing
significant concern over the possibility that damage will be caused to the
site and its archaeological treasures and that the status quo which
effectively keeps a fine balance at the contested site may be violated.

In their letter, the petitioners also ask that the government allow the
press to enter the Temple Mount and cover the construction there, and that
the Department of Antiquities be allowed to investigate whether the
renovations at the site have caused damage.

000625130006256/25/00 0:00:0012/30/99 20:00:37Ha'aretz: Beilin sends Syria signal with PM's approval that Syria would have its border on the north-eastern bank while promising not to contaminate or use the lake's waterHa'aretz: Beilin sends Syria signal with PM's approval that Syria would have
its border on the north-eastern bank while promising not to contaminate or use the lake's water

By Aluf Benn Ha'aretz Diplomatic Correspondent Ha'aretz 25 June 2000

Justice Minister Yossi Beilin yesterday proposed that Syria consider a
suggestion made by British journalist Patrick Seale, an expert on Syria, who
called for a compromise agreement on the control of the northeastern
beachfront of Lake Kinneret as a possible starting point for the renewal of
peace negotiations between the two countries.Ha'aretz: Beilin sends Syria signal with PM's approval that Syria would have
its border on the north-eastern bank while promising not to contaminate or use the lake's water

By Aluf Benn Ha'aretz Diplomatic Correspondent Ha'aretz 25 June 2000

Justice Minister Yossi Beilin yesterday proposed that Syria consider a
suggestion made by British journalist Patrick Seale, an expert on Syria, who
called for a compromise agreement on the control of the northeastern
beachfront of Lake Kinneret as a possible starting point for the renewal of
peace negotiations between the two countries.

Beilin sent out what appeared to be a feeler to Damascus during an interview
on Channel Two's "Meet the Press" program. Prime Minister Ehud Barak had
been informed of Beilin's planned appearance on the program, and has not
rejected Seale's idea in the past.

During the interview, Beilin said that the heir-apparent to the Syrian
Presidency, Bashar Assad, should consider Seale's proposal, which he is
familiar with. Seale, who was close to Hafez Assad and his family, published
his proposal as a call on the leaders of both Israel and Syria, following
the stalled negotiations between them. Among the main points of Seale's
proposal is that the Kinneret's water remain under Israeli sovereignty and a
joint committee divide the water of the Jordan River at the Banias source.
In addition, citizens of both countries would have access to the road
circumventing the lake, and Syria would have its border on the north-eastern
bank while promising not to contaminate or use the lake's water.

Barak's official position on the issue of the eastern coastline of Lake
Kinneret is that the sovereignty over it and the Jordan river should be in
Israel's hands, and that the basis for any agreement with Syria should begin
with the 1923 international boundary, to which agreed changes would be made.

Among the considerations behind the idea of restarting the negotiations with
Syria is the belief that it would be best to reach an accord with the
northern neighbor during the tenure of the outgoing U.S. President Bill
Clinton. Beilin believes that it is possible to reach agreements with the
Syrians and the Palestinians in two months, and bring the agreements to a
"double referendum" for a total peace.

A source at Barak's office expressed doubt at the possibility of reaching an
agreement with the Syrians and said: "It is clear that in the coming weeks,
emphasis will be laid on the Palestinian track.

000625140006256/25/00 0:00:0012/30/99 20:01:02Ha'aretz: 'Nimrodi paid Peres $150,000 out of Irangate profits'Ha'aretz: 'Nimrodi paid Peres $150,000 out of Irangate profits'

By Amir Oren Ha'aretz Correspondent 25 June 2000

Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein and State Prosecutor Edna Arbel are
looking at claims made by an Israeli businessman, who claims that Ya'akov
Nimrodi told him in 1992 that he had paid Minister Shimon Peres $150,000
from the profits of the sale of Israeli weapons to Iran in the Irangate
affair in 1980s.Ha'aretz: 'Nimrodi paid Peres $150,000 out of Irangate profits'

By Amir Oren Ha'aretz Correspondent 25 June 2000

Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein and State Prosecutor Edna Arbel are
looking at claims made by an Israeli businessman, who claims that Ya'akov
Nimrodi told him in 1992 that he had paid Minister Shimon Peres $150,000
from the profits of the sale of Israeli weapons to Iran in the Irangate
affair in 1980s.

Arbel and Rubinstein are taking "at face value" the claims made by
businessman Yitzhak Tuviahu, who currently resides in London. It is too soon
for a criminal investigation, since they are examining "secondhand hearsay
that is old and has been said before."

Peres' attorney said on the weekend that the claims were "fabrication,
verging on libel." Peres, said attorney Moshe Shalit, is sorry "for the
gossip that certain sources are interested in spreading at this time" - when
he is the leading candidate for the presidency.

Ya'akov Nimrodi, when asked to respond to Tuviahu's statement, vigorously
denied the claims. Although Nimrodi said he is well acquainted with Peres
and he became involved in the Irangate affair after he was approached by
then-prime minister Peres, it was also Peres who suddenly decided to end the
involvement of Nimrodi and businessman Al Schwimmer and to transfer the
matter to his adviser Amiram Nir. This damaged Nimrodi greatly, Nimrodi
said.

Ever since Nimrodi was questioned as a suspect in the disappearance of $2
million of the Irangate funds, he has held a grudge against Rubinstein, then
cabinet secretary and the leader of his enemies, according to Nimrodi. The
grudge grew significantly when Rubinstein headed the prosecution team when
his son, Ofer Nimrodi, was tried for wire-tapping. Rubinstein must now
decide whether the alleged Nimrodi-Peres affair warrants an investigation on
the basis of Tuviahu's claims alone.

In a conversation with Tuviahu last night, he said that he had provided the
authorities with the information "four or five times" - the first time when
Alex Ish-Shalom investigated the financial aspects of the Irangate affair;
once again following a affidavit presented to a London court; once again in
a letter to then attorney general Michael Ben-Yair and again last year in a
meeting in Europe with the head of the Vice Squad, Moshe Mizrahi. Nimrodi's
attorney Shuki Stein and his assistant heard Nimrodi tell Tuviahu that he
had paid Peres $150,000 and a senior official $60,000, Tuviahu said.

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