[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: US army Gen. Keith Dayton knows that he really
doesn't have a decent answer to give to Israeli concerns that the army he is
training will end up using their skills against the Jewish State if Israel
doesn't give the Palestinians what they want at the negotiating table.
Dayton is stuck on this because even model PA "moderate" Abbas says that the
killing Israelis is most definitively an option ("resistance") if he
doesn't get what he wants from Israel.]

Editor's Notes: This time, it will be different
David Horovitz , THE JERUSALEM POST Dec. 11, 2008
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US army Gen. Keith Dayton is quietly overseeing the recruitment and training
of a seven-battalion Palestinian National Security Force. Already partially
deployed in the West Bank, the NSF is intended to confront the bad guys -
not the Israelis. The general well understands why Israelis may doubt the
viability of this effort. And he fully believes the skeptics will be proved
wrong.
Keith Dayton is a modest, no-nonsense man. The bio sent out by his office
runs to just three tight paragraphs. It briefly notes his more than three
decades of US army service - from artilleryman to lieutenant-general. The
periods he spent as the US defense attaché in Russia, commanding the Iraq
Survey Group, and as the army's chief strategic planner, are dispatched in a
couple of sentences.
In person, Dayton is similarly precise and unpretentious. He suffers the
attentions of our photographer with good grace, then gets down to business.
He is speaking to The Jerusalem Post because he has been working here for
exactly three years and the time has come, he has decided, to tell us what
he has been up to.
Unlike some other Middle East envoys, who fly in, meet prime ministers and
presidents, give a press conference and head back to wherever it is they
really belong, Dayton has lived here for the duration - an ocean away from
his wife and family.
He has been trying, almost entirely out of the headlines, to change the
reality on the Palestinian ground. And he now feels confident that he is
succeeding.
Dayton is charged with supervising what he calls "the transformation and
professionalization of the Palestinian security forces."
To that end, the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) hierarchy that he
heads, with some three dozen American, Canadian and British personnel, is
overseeing the training, in Jordan, of battalions of young new recruits to
the Palestinian Authority's National Security Forces - an enhanced
"gendarmerie" for the intended state of Palestine.
The general, with typical care, has prepared for our interview by typing
out, in considerable detail, what he wants to say. The theme can perhaps
best be summed as: This time, it's different. This time, the Palestinian
forces will prove genuinely capable - of taking on Hamas and other
extremists... and of refraining from taking on their Israeli counterparts.
Obviously, Dayton is highly invested in these young Palestinian security
personnel. Still, it is striking to register the emphatic belief he places
in their ability to bolster security for their people and in so doing, to
enhance security for ours.
He acknowledges wide expanses of Israeli skepticism, and then marches
decisively across them. These are Palestinian fighters Israel can trust,
Dayton insists. And you can bet that this highly credible three-star general
is delivering the same upbeat message to his superiors in Washington.
DAYTON BEGINS by telling me how honored he is to serve here - traveling the
country, meeting its people, making friends. And he hopes "that when the
history of this period of this region is written, it will be said that the
USSC team did a little bit to advance the peace process in this holy land."
Next he talks me briskly through his 38 years in the US army, stressing that
he has had "a lot of experience being what we would call a foreign area
officer, a soldier diplomat," including those 13 months "on the ground" in
the Middle East leading the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
He's highlighting this as a preemptive defense against charges of naïveté:
"There are some people who would suspect that 'this guy doesn't know
anything about international relations. You know, he's very naive.'" In
fact, Dayton notes, "I've had at least 10 years of international relations
type assignments, where I deal with very serious national security issues at
a pretty high level."
His mission, Dayton reminds me, was generated by President Bush's vision of
two states living side by side in peace and security. Organizing competent
Palestinian security forces, within that framework, is intended to enable
"improved law and order in the territories, increased safety and security
for the Palestinian people, and improved security for Israel."
Again and again, he repeats that "nothing I or my team do here will
jeopardize the security interests of the State of Israel. Period. Full stop.
We won't do it. It's not what we do as Americans."
Being here long-term, Dayton says, has enabled him to "build the confidence
and trust of all the sides, which is not an easy feat." It also means he's
been "able to tell an Israeli or a Palestinian interlocutor, when he makes a
commitment to me, that, 'OK, I'm going to be back in three days to see if it
came true.'"
As a consequence, he goes on, "We are, in our progress with the
Palestinians, making significant strides now. We have hit a momentum
period - something that I think will bear fruit very rapidly."
Reading now from the text he's prepared, Dayton states slowly: "This is a
new Palestinian security force that we're dealing with. Guided by the vision
of President Mahmoud Abbas of one authority, one law, one gun, we now have
in place new thinking Palestinian leaders like Prime Minister Salaam Fayad
and Minister of Interior Abdel Razak al-Yahya, new heads of the security
services and a generation of new field commanders...
"I strongly believe that each and every member of the new Palestinian
security forces is a state builder. This new generation of leaders and men
understands what is at stake and they are determined to succeed."
Dayton divides his time here into three phases. First, between January 2006
and June 2007, when the PA was run by a Fatah-Hamas unity government, his
focus "was on the Karni crossing [between Israel and Gaza] and on trying to
get the Gaza economy going."
Then came the coup, and a very different phase two. In July 2007, the US
Congress approved $86 million for programs Dayton had developed for the
training of Palestinian security personnel. With that money, 1,100 recruits
have been trained by the Jordanian police, and the program is ongoing.
"The training has emphasized human rights. It emphasizes the appropriate use
of force. It emphasizes the rule of law," Dayton stresses. Many of the
graduates "are already on the streets in Jenin and in Hebron." And they
constitute, says Dayton, "the most capable Palestinian security forces that
have ever been fielded here. That's something that we're very proud of."
The American money has also been used to organize training courses for
senior Palestinian security personnel - highlighting ways to coordinate
effectively. The first such class has just graduated - "36 officers of the
rank of major, lieutenant-colonel and colonel." At the graduation, Dayton
enthuses, "the pride in what they've achieved was something that even I was
not expecting."
Some money has also been spent on equipment, but nothing lethal, Dayton
stresses. "If you ever hear or read that the USSC has been equipping people
with guns or ammunition, it is simply not true."
Rather, the spending has focused "on mobility, on personal gear and on
protective equipment" - protection, that is, "against the armed groups that
they run against... And I emphasize, that's not the Israeli Defense Forces.
They are orienting their efforts totally on the lawless elements within
Palestinian society."
In every presentation given by senior Palestinian officials to the trainees
in Jordan, says Dayton, "the theme is stated over and over again: You are
here to provide protection to the Palestinian people, so that Palestinian
families can walk down the streets at night and not be intimidated or
threatened by either criminals or men with guns. Specifically it is said:
'You are not here to learn how to fight against the Israeli occupation.'"
Money has also been allocated for infrastructure projects, including a
training college for the Presidential Guard at Jericho, and the current
construction of "an operational camp" for up to 1,000 members of the
National Security Forces, also near Jericho, due to be ready for occupancy
at the end of January.
Dayton's self-described third phase, which began in October and runs through
September, is a continuation of the second, with another $75m. allocated for
more senior leadership courses, more infrastructure, and training in Jordan
for another 1,000 recruits to the National Security Forces. "We currently
have 500 training in Jordan right now in the middle of their program, and
another 500 are expected to start at the end of December, beginning of
January."
You've set out an incredibly robust defense of the mindset of the people
whose training you oversee. But what do they really think about Israel? You
say they are "not here to fight the occupation," but the two sides are
disputing the parameters of the two-state vision and the core elements of a
permanent accord. How can you be so confident in them?
In talking with senior Palestinian security leaders, this may come as a bit
of a surprise, they are not focused on Israel or on the IDF. They are
focused on reestablishing the authority of the Palestinian Authority in the
Palestinian West Bank. They are focused on a vision that says, "If the
people believe us, and they believe in us, and they see us present, and if
we can get these criminal gangs and these drug dealers and thugs and
militants off the streets, people that are walking around carrying guns,
many, many things are possible and it will also enhance our ability to form
a state." Their job is to provide security and safety for their people. They
let the politicians worry about the questions you're asking here.
For some of them, cousins and brothers are committed to a very different
vision of Palestine. There are members of Hamas who they are required to
stand up to. How do they reconcile that?
In Jenin you have Palestinian villages that haven't seen a uniformed
Palestinian policeman since 1967. People are coming to them and they're
saying, "We know what you're trying to do, and these people here are the
ones you're looking for." There have been a lot of Hamas people turned in by
Palestinian citizens who perceive them as part of the problem.
The [Palestinian leaders] emphasize in the training in Jordan: "You are
loyal not to a clan, not to a family. Not even to a political movement. You
are loyal to the Palestinian flag and you are going to build a state if you
do it that way." The Palestinian security establishment has also decided
that they will recruit these people from the different regions to help
alleviate the [family clan] problem...
These are also very young people. The average age of the new forces is
between 19 and 21, and they're checked out before they're sent to training.
We check them for known connections to any terrorist organization. We check
them for human rights violations.
It is still early days, but it is proving itself in Jenin where they have
not been afraid to go after Islamic Jihad. They have actually fired on
Islamic Jihad. They've injured Islamic Jihad and they've taken fire from
these people. In Hebron, their focus has been reestablishing the authority
of the Palestinian Authority. And if that means that militants from Hamas
are challenging them, then they are certainly within the purview of the
security forces.
The instinctive Israeli response would be: We've been down this road before.
We've seen Palestinian forces being trained. To a certain extent, we
subcontracted our security to them, and when push came to shove, weapons
which we had allowed them to receive, were used against our own forces. Why
would we believe this wouldn't happen again?
Remember what I am emphasizing here. These are new security forces. They're
the most capable you've ever seen. There hasn't been a program like this
before. The United States, for example, never mounted an organizational
effort like we're doing now...
I understand that many Israelis are skeptical of this. But six months ago,
and I do read your newspaper, my good friend General Amos Gilad would not
have said in an interview to the Post that the Palestinian forces are
effective. That's what he said. (Gilad, the head of the Defense Ministry's
Diplomatic-Security Bureau, told the Post last month that the Palestinian
forces were "working more effectively than in the past, in Jenin. Lately
they've started to operate in the Hebron area as well. There's certainly an
improvement.")
I've got to tell you, and my MoD and IDF colleagues feel the same way, that
something new is out there. It's worth encouraging. And yeah, we can all be
skeptical, but let's not stop it. Let's keep it going.
Can you give me an unequivocal statement?: I find it inconceivable that
these people would under any circumstances use their weapons against Israel.
Can you comfortably say that?
What I can say is that so far, in their operations since May, there has not
been a single incident of Palestinian security force engagement with
Israelis. Either Israeli civilians or IDF, even in Hebron, a very complex
environment with settlers. Ok? I think that speaks for itself.
Do you think that in Israel we've been slow to internalize that something's
changed here, and that the army has been reluctant, specifically in your
field, to allow room for Palestinian forces to take greater responsibility?
David, I understand, as a career officer in the American army, the concerns
of the Israeli army... Of course, I would like them to move more rapidly.
Everybody would. But I understand. Again, let's look backward. The IDF has
reduced its operations in the Jenin governorate by about 30 percent - maybe
a little more than that - in the last six months. Now, I believe the IDF is
taking some risk here, but I think it's risk that is manageable. And in my
discussions with senior IDF officers, I do not find that I am complaining
about anything about their approach.
Can you give me a concrete sense of timescale and numbers. There's a certain
NSF presence in Jenin, in Nablus, in Hebron and imminently in Bethlehem,
correct?
Probably, yes...
Keep in mind that the police, the largest of the Palestinian security
forces, is being handled by the European Union under their EU cops
program...
We are focusing our efforts on the NSF - the National Security Forces - the
gendarmerie. And of those, 700 or so have been trained already in Jordan.
There are 500 more of those training currently and another 500 will start at
the end of the year. That will give us at least 1,700 by next summer. We
have a vision of seven battalions [in all for the West Bank]. That will be
[the first] three battalions of the seven. Provided we get the funding for
that, we should have [all seven] done within the next two years...
We have long term plans that would include two battalions in Gaza. But
that's not on the table right now.
The Presidential Guard has two or three battalions currently operating. One
of their battalions was given refresher training by the Jordanians in
Jordan. Came out of it extremely well. Currently there's about 100
Presidential Guards and I think about 200 of the NSF that are
Jordanian-trained, operating in Jenin. There's about another 250 operating
in Hebron. Now if you do the numbers there's still several hundred who are
in reserve. They are currently based in Jericho. They will probably be
called upon, I suspect - it's a Palestinian decision, not mine - to
reinforce Bethlehem.
There was an array of security forces in the past. Some could be trusted
more and some less. Are there are other apparatuses still that would say of
themselves, we are part of the Palestinian security apparatus?
There are a couple of intelligence services existing. Civil defense, first
responders. But most of the consolidation has already occurred.
You know, I'm talking about the Arafat era.
Oh I know. Yes, absolutely. Let me give you a great example of this. It's
kind of a Palestinian joke. A couple of months ago someone had come to me
with a question like this and they had alleged that there were 17
Palestinian security forces still out there. And the minister of interior
looked at me and he smiled and he said, "No, we're down to the half dozen or
so that you know about. But we had a Force 17 at one time and the person
must be confused." Of course Force 17 was one of these that was loyal to a
political movement. That organization was completely eliminated in the past
12 months.
The end state is very clear: national security, policing and what they're
calling their intelligence apparatus. That's it. Three branches, that's what
the road map said they had to get to. They understand that and that's
clearly where they're moving to.
And former members of those forces. Some of them have gone through your
training? Or what has happened to them?
No, no, no. They have been simply released, fired if you will. Some of them
have retired... There've been a very few who have reentered the services,
but they have not been successful and they've been flushed out of the
system.
So almost nobody from the previous Palestinian security forces is still
being deployed, back in uniform and out there again?
None of the ones that were in these sort of militia-based groups. No. Those
are all gone. Of course, you have people who were in the National Security
Forces five years ago. They still are. But they aren't the ones that we're
training, they aren't the new ones...
Are there thousands of people from the old National Security Force still
there?
It's hard to know... Eventually it will be a replacement process. We bring
in 500, and 500 leave out the other end...
Long term, is the vision here for a demilitarized West Bank? What kinds of
arms are necessary? What kinds of arms should be in the possession of the
National Security Forces and any other part of the Palestinian security
apparatus?
That will be a decision that goes on at the political level.
If you have the battalions deployed and trained, does that obviate the need
for other forces including international forces to secure the West Bank?
What the United States has asked me to do is to help the Palestinians
develop a tool box that they can use to achieve statehood. The actual
modalities of that, as you well know, David, are going to be decided by
politicians and by security experts, but in a different forum than what I'm
doing.
You had no responsibility for overseeing the training of anybody in Gaza
before and at the time of the June 2007 violence?
We had no responsibility for training anyone in Gaza. We didn't provide them
any weapons or any ammunition, or any of that sort of thing. There was a
small program we had an interest in. It dealt with the Presidential Guard at
the border crossing at Rafah. That was it. I didn't have any money - you can
check back - to do anything, even if we had been asked to do it. But we were
not asked to do it.
It was said to me by someone in the Israeli military hierarchy that what
happened in Gaza was that Fatah people were neither prepared to kill or to
be killed, whereas the Hamas people were prepared for both. This person was
skeptical, when push comes to shove, about the degree of motivation of
forces local to Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank, in a strong, bitter struggle
against Hamas.
What Gaza showed very clearly is that we are now on the right track. What
Gaza showed was that the Palestinian security forces need to be organized,
well led, well trained, responsible to a civilian authority. That was the
lesson the Palestinians learned from the fall of Gaza. They didn't do very
well. It's being fixed.
The Palestinian Authority security forces in Gaza lost 250 dead. These
aren't people that just simply, immediately raised their hands and
surrendered. I know this. It took five days. One could say, 'Well, they
overran them in five days.' Baloney. They were clearly outgunned and still
they stood their ground for five days. They lost 250 killed and probably
five times that many injured. Ok? So this wasn't the surrender that is often
portrayed. And people tend to lose sight of that.
The Palestinians didn't lose sight of that. But they also didn't lose sight
of the fact that organization matters. Training matters. It's no coincidence
that the Palestinian Authority embraced the idea of sending their young men
to Jordan, despite all of the challenges that presents, with getting them
out of the West Bank and back in again. They were willing to go through all
that because, they said, this is how we establish our state and this is how
we keep something like June 2007 from occurring again.
You spoke about a future potential deployment in Gaza as well.
No, what I said was in long-term plans... It would be irresponsible not to
at least plan for it. But the likelihood of execution at this point, I don't
see...
How then is Gaza to be revived under the control of the Palestinian
Authority?
I don't have the answer to that.
There is no planning for enabling a force that is capable of restoring PA,
Abbas-loyal control to Gaza?
Not that I'm aware.
The change of administration in the United States - is that likely to have
any kind of impact? Might there be more money forthcoming? Would you want
there to be more money and for it to move a little faster?
I can't speak for the next administration but the indications I've got are
that they're certainly well aware of the success that's going on now.
Finally, do you have any reasons for concern about a possible change of
government in Israel - that you might encounter a leadership that is less
supportive and invested in this?
No, look, I have worked with three ministers of defense, ranging from Shaul
Mofaz to Ehud Barak. The relationship between your country and mine is
unshakeable... Any change in Israel's government, my government will react
to appropriately. This is not a problem.
Including in the specifics of what you're doing here?
I think so. Because it's succeeding.