PSR - Survey Research Unit: Palestinian - Israeli Joint Press Release
www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2009/p33ejoint.html
20 August 2009
PRESS RELEASE
Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, August 2009
Israelis are more apprehensive and Palestinians somewhat more favorable
about US involvement in the Peace Process compared to their expectations
last December after Obama's election
These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry
S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research in Ramallah, between August 9-15, 2009. This joint survey was
conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.
Following the intensified American diplomatic activity in the region in
recent months, a majority of Palestinians think that Obama's policy is more
supportive of Israel (64%). Among Israelis 40% think Obama's policy is more
supportive of the Palestinians; only 12% think it is more supportive of
Israel. Compared to a poll conducted December 2008, in proximity to Obama's
election, Israelis are less enthusiastic about American involvement in the
region, more worried about the continuation of American support, and less
willing to accept American pressure. Palestinians see now American
involvement somewhat more favorably than in December.
Following Fateh's Sixth Congress held last week, 27% of the Palestinians
think the new Fateh leadership will be more able than the previous one to
end Israeli occupation, 28% think it will be less able, and a plurality of
38% think there will be no difference. In light of the resolutions taken by
the Fateh Congress, a majority 59% of Israelis do not believe Israel has a
partner for peace negotiations.
Given the recent emphasis the US attaches to the Arab League (Saudi) plan,
our poll examined the two publics' attitudes toward it, as well as their
attitudes toward the Clinton (Geneva) parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian
final status agreement. A majority of 64% of the Palestinians support the
Saudi plan, up from 57% in June. Among Israelis, 40% support the Saudi plan
in the current poll, up from 36% in June. The support in both publics for
the overall Clinton package and for most of its components has been steadily
declining, with a minority of 38% supporting the package now among
Palestinians, and 46% among Israelis.
The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the
West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations
between August 13 and15 , 2009. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli
sample includes 600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or
Russian between August 9 and13, 2009. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll
was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of
Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil
Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
(PSR).
For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof.
Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email
pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel.
03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.
MAIN FINDINGS
(A) US policy toward the conflict following the intensified involvement of
the US in the region
In December 2008, immediately after the election of Barack Obama for
president, we obtained Palestinians' and Israelis' expectations regarding
the policy the new Obama administration will implement in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Eight months later things begin to clarify
somewhat with numerous visits of US officials in the region, demands
directed toward Israel to accept a two-state solution and cease all
construction in the settlements and requests from Arab leaders to take
confidence building steps toward Israel. We decided therefore to repeat some
of the December questions to see how these steps have affected the two
publics.
Our findings indicate that Israelis are now more apprehensive and
Palestinians somewhat more favorable about American involvement compared to
their expectations in December.
12% of Israelis and 64% of Palestinians think that Obama's policy is more
supportive of Israel; 40% and 7% respectively think it is more supportive of
the Palestinians, and 38% and 23% respectively think it is supportive of
both sides equally.
49% of Israelis and 61% of Palestinians want now the US to play a more
active role in the conflict, 34% of Israelis and 29% among Palestinians do
not want the US to intervene, and 14% and 6% respectively want the US to
continue to play its current role in the peace process. In December 2008,
49% of Israelis and 57% of Palestinians wanted the US to play a more active
role in the conflict, 31% of Israelis and 35% among Palestinians did not
want the US to intervene, and 18% and 4% respectively wanted the US to
continue to play its current role in the peace process.
If indeed the US plays a more active role, 42% of the Israelis and 56% of
the Palestinians expect this involvement to be successful, while 30% and 26%
respectively think it will be a failure. 18% of the Israelis and 15% of
Palestinians think it will have no impact. In December 2008, 49% of the
Israelis and 49% of the Palestinians expected in December 2008 this
involvement to be successful, while 22% and 30% respectively thought it will
be a failure. 23% of the Israelis and 16% of Palestinians thought it will
have no impact.
61% of Palestinians think that Israel would benefit more if the US
intervened strongly in the peace process. In December 66% of Palestinians
thought so. Among Israelis, 35% say that both sides would benefit, 33% -
that the Palestinians would benefit and only 12% - that Israel would benefit
from such intervention. In December 2008, 39% said that both sides would
benefit, 25% - that the Palestinians would benefit and 14% - that Israel
would benefit from such intervention.
36% of Israelis think that the US will decrease its military economic and
political support of Israel if Israel continues to be reluctant about US
policy in the region; 7% think US support will increase and 51% think it
will not change. This compares to 19% of Israelis who thought in December
that the US will decrease its support of Israel; 15% who thought US support
will increase, and 59% who thought it will not change
(B) 2009 Fateh Congress
Following Fateh's Sixth Congress held last week, Palestinians' views of
Fateh's prospects are quite mixed. 39% of the Palestinians expect Fateh to
emerge stronger and unified, 22% expect it will emerge weaker and
fragmented, and 34% think it will remain as it is today.
40% of the Palestinians think the new leadership of Fateh will be more able
than the previous leadership to achieve reconciliation with Hamas, 22% think
it will be
less able, and 32% think it will the same as the previous one.
43% of the Palestinians think the new leadership of Fateh will be more able
than the previous leadership to fight corruption within Fateh, 21% think it
will be less able, and 30% think it will be the same as the previous one.
27% of the Palestinians think the new leadership of Fateh will be more able
than the previous leadership to end Israeli occupation; 28% think it will be
less able, and 38% think it will be the same as the previous one. In light
of the resolutions taken by the Fateh Congress, 59% of Israelis do not
believe Israel has a partner for peace negotiations; 27% think it has a
partner.
(C) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda
The Saudi Plan
54% of the Israelis oppose and 40% support the Saudi initiative which calls
for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it
ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the
establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat
from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank,
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian
state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just
and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return,
all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will
sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In
our June 2009 poll 56% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 36% supported
it. Among Palestinians, 64% support the plan and 34% oppose it; 57%
supported it in June and 40% opposed it.
40% of the Israelis support yielding to American pressure to accept and
implement the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative, while 52% oppose it. Among
Palestinians 58% accept such pressure while 39% will reject it. In December
2008, 44% of Israelis thought Israel should accept such American pressure
and 50% thought it should reject such pressure. Among Palestinians 56%
believed they should accept American pressure to adopt and implement the
Saudi Plan, 39% said they should reject such pressure.
As to their assessments of the other side's response to such pressure: 29%
of the Israelis believe Palestinians will reject and 58% think they will
accept it, while 49% of the Palestinians think Israel will reject and 46%
think it will accept it. In the December 2008 poll, 39% of Israeli believed
that the Palestinians would reject American pressure, and 48% believed that
the Palestinians would accept American pressure. 43% of Palestinians thought
that most Israelis would reject such pressure, 49% believed that most
Israelis would accept it. These changes in perceptions reflect both sides'
beliefs that the recent American activity in the region has turned against
Israel.
Clinton/Geneva Parameters
The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were
presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian
officials almost nine years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the
collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along
similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters
address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3)
Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements;
and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past
since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial
issues following the intensified diplomatic activity of the US with regard
to the conflict and the efforts to resume the peace talks between the
parties.
The findings indicate a decline in support over time for the overall package
and most of its components on both sides.
Israelis are now split half between support and opposition to the overall
package. This minority level of support (46%) represents a significant
decline compared to the consistent majority support for the package among
Israelis since December 2004 .
Among Palestinians 38% support the overall package in the current poll, a
decline from 41% support in December 2008.
Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once
majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly
after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and
considerable moderation in both publics. Among Israelis there was consistent
majority support for the Clinton package since 2004 through 2008, but this
majority has been shrinking over time.
Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the
Clinton permanent status package.
(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange
Among Palestinians 49% support or strongly support and 50% oppose or
strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank
that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in
accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The
map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2008, when
support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 54% and opposition at
44%.
Among Israelis 47% support and 48% oppose a Palestinian state in the
entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large
blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to
Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians
will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In
December 2008, similarly 46% of the Israelis supported this component while
48% opposed it.
(2) Refugees
Among Palestinians, 37% support and 61% oppose a refugee settlement in which
both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and
242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These
are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the
Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no
restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas.
Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and
Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its
decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to
third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees
would be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of
property. In December 2008, 40% agreed with an identical compromise while
58% opposed it.
Among Israelis 36% support such an arrangement and 58% oppose it. In
December 2008, 40% supported it and 54% opposed.
(3) Jerusalem
In the Palestinian public 31% support and 68% oppose a Jerusalem compromise
in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state
with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish
neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al
Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception
of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli
sovereignty. In December 2008, an identical compromise obtained 36% support
and 63% opposition.
Among Israelis, 34% agree and 62% disagree to this arrangement in which the
Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount
will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including
the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty,
East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West
Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2008, 40% supported this
arrangement and 60% opposed it.
(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State
Among Palestinians 24% support and 76% oppose the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a
strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to
ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to
end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise
received in December 2008 27% support, and opposition reached 73%.
This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the
refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention
in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling
block in the efforts to reach a settlement.
Among Israelis 56% support and 40% oppose this arrangement compared to 64%
support and 33% opposition obtained in December 2008.
(5) Security Arrangements
In the Palestinian public 34% support and 64% oppose a compromise whereby
the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and
airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace
for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the
West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the
Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of
time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the
implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and
coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international
crossings. In December 2008, 35% of the Palestinians supported this
parameter while 64% opposed it.
In the Israeli public 49% support and 44% oppose this arrangement compared
to 56% who supported it and 40% who opposed it in December 2008.
(6) End of Conflict
In the Palestinian public 55% support and 44% oppose a compromise on ending
the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is
fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further
claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and
Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. These figures are
identical figures to those received in December 2008.
In the Israeli public 68% support and 28% oppose this component in the final
status framework. In December 2008, similarly, 67% of the Israelis supported
it while 29% opposed it.
The Whole Package
Among Palestinians 38% support and 61% oppose the whole package combining
the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2008, 41%
supported and 57% opposed such a package.
Among Israelis 46% support and 46% oppose all the above features together
taken as one combined package. In December 2008, 52% supported and 43%
opposed such a package.
It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package
is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people's calculus is
compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations
regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives
greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the
chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the
undesirable parts.
33% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the
Clinton parameters as a combined final status package; 47% believe that the
majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public
opinion and indicate that the package has not acquired widespread normative
legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 43% believe now that a
majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined
final status package and 50% believe that the majority opposes it. In
addition a majority among Palestinians correctly assumes that the majority
of Israelis oppose the package, while the assessment of Israelis of the
Palestinian majority is incorrect: 45% of Israelis think that a majority of
Palestinians supports the parameters, and 36% think that a majority opposes
them.
45% of Israelis think Israel should accept such American pressure and 44%
think it should reject such pressure. Among Palestinians 45% believe they
should accept American pressure to adopt and implement the Plan, 52% say
they should reject such pressure. In December 2008 51% of the Israelis
supported yielding to such pressure while 43% opposed it. Among Palestinians
47% accepted such pressure while 49% rejected it.
Among Israelis, 54% believe that the Palestinians would accept American
pressure on this issue, and 32% believe that the Palestinians would reject
it. In December 2008 the comparable figures were 48% and 39% respectively.
Palestinians are split half in their assessment of Israeli response to
American pressure: 48% think Israel would accept and 47% think Israel would
reject it. The comparable figures in December 2008 were 56% and 36%.
Consistent with these results, Palestinians and Israelis do not consider it
likely that an independent Palestinian State will be established next to the
State of Israel in the next five years. 69% of the Palestinians and 69%
among Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent
Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 30%
and 28% respectively believe the chances are medium or high. In June 2009,
70% of the Palestinians and 61% among Israelis thought that chances for the
establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of
Israel are non-existent or low.
In addition to our systematic assessment of the two sides' support of the
Clinton parameters we also examine periodically Israelis' and Palestinians'
readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status
agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a
Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 64% of the
Israelis support and 31% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state
for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.
Among Palestinians, 49% support and 49% oppose this step.
(D) Conflict management and threat perceptions
Following the American increased involvement in the conflict in recent
months, 61% of the Israelis and 47% of the Palestinians expect that
negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. 25% of the
Israelis and 29% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will
not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 9% of the
Israelis and 21% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume
soon enough and armed confrontations will stop.
54% of Israelis support concessions on Israel's part (such as stopping the
expansion of settlements) in response to Arab countries' confidence building
steps toward Israel, such as commercial relations; 39% oppose such steps.
Among Palestinians, 41% support and 56% oppose Arab states taking confidence
building measures, if it was shown that such measures were necessary to push
Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians. 61% among them also do not
believe that if Arab countries were to take such measures, this will
encourage Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians.
38% of Israelis support and 58% oppose the American demand to fully cease
all construction in the settlements including that intended to solve needs
of natural growth. 63% of Israelis support and 31% oppose the removal of the
illegal posts in the West Bank.
52% of the Israelis support and 44% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to
reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2009 poll,
50% supported and 48% opposed such talks.
A sizeable Israeli majority (66%) support and only 30% oppose talks with a
national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a
government is reestablished. In June these figures were 62% and 31%
respectively.
63% of the Israelis support and 27% oppose the release of Israeli Arabs who
carried out violent attacks within Israel in return for the release of Gilad
Shalit.
Among Israelis, 50% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by
Arabs in their daily life, compared to 61% in June. Among Palestinians 40%
fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured
compared to 45% in June.
| 
