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Sunday, January 10, 2010
[Solution at all costs?] Eiland calls for Jordanian troops next to Kfar Sava

Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA

The solution to the Israel's security concerns is to turn the West Bank and
Gaza Strip into sovereign Jordanian entities with Jordanian troops deployed
in those territories.

Sounds neat.

Another thorny problem solved.

It's Miller Time.

Now let's think for another moment.

Oh no. You mean think for a minute beyond the idea?

You mean actually think through some possible scenarios.

Say beyond a day.

Maybe even a year. Or more.

Gee.

That's not fair.

We Israelis didn't do that when we went into Oslo.

And we certainly didn't do it when we retreated from Gaza.

So why be a party pooper and actually think beyond the moment.

Here's a few hints:

#1. We don't know who or what will rule in Jordan in another year, let alone
another decade.

#2. Putting the West Bank and Gaza under Jordanian control might contribute
to and/or encourage the destabilization of Jordan, making #1 even a bigger
concern.

#3. The deployed Jordanian troops could readily, even possibly against their
will, become human shields for Palestinian terror activity against Israel -
with Israel facing an extremely complicated challenge addressing the
security challenge when any move over the line is a move that violates
Jordanian sovereignty.

#4. There are numerous scenarios that have a cumulative probability
considerably greater than 10% in the next decade that we could find
ourselves, if this proposal were to be implemented, with Jordanian troops
poised as the advanced forces for invading Arab armies literally a few
hundred yards away from Israeli population centers.

Now here's the scary thing.

The above proposal doesn't come from someone who spent his years a faculty
cocktail parties.

This is former National Security Adviser Giora Eiland.

He is a former head of the IDF's Planning Department

And with all the respect and admiration for the achievements of Giora
Eiland, the idea that he could make such a proposal makes me wonder...]

Eiland calls to establish 'US of Jordan'
Herb Keinon , THE JERUSALEM POST Jan. 9, 2010
www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1262339436935&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull

Forget a two-state solution, the way to solve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is to create a United States of Jordan that would include three
states governed by a federal government in Amman: the East Bank, West Bank
and the Gaza Strip.

That, at least, is one of two solutions that former National Security
Adviser Giora Eiland presents in a monograph called "Regional Alternatives
to the Two-State Solution," released Thursday by Bar-Ilan University's BESA
Center.

In the 41-page booklet, Eiland - a former head of the IDF's Planning
Department and today senior researcher at the Institute for National
Security Studies - argues that the conventional wisdom of how to deal with
the conflict is stale and mistaken.

What is needed, he argues, is a completely new way of looking at possible
solutions, widening the lens to come up with fresh ideas beyond the idea of
a two-state solution.

The first option is what could be called the US of Jordan, a variation on
the old Palestinian-Jordanian federation theme. The second option indeed
envisions a Palestinian state, but one with territory that would be enhanced
by 720 km. given by Egypt, which would in turn be compensated by a similar
amount of land taken from the Negev.

These new ideas are necessary, Eiland writes, because in 2010 an
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, based on a two-state model, seems less
likely than in 2000 at Camp David, or when the Oslo process was launched in
1993.

Among the elements making it more difficult now than in the past to solve
the conflict, Eiland writes, are the ascendancy of Hamas; the complete lack
of trust between the sides; the absence of a Palestinian leader like Yasser
Arafat who is recognized by his people as speaking on their behalf; an
Israeli leader not convinced that achieving a permanent settlement is
possible; and demographics that now have 290,000 Israelis living beyond the
Green Line, as opposed to 190,000 on the eve of Camp David.

"It is hard to believe that the diplomatic effort that failed in 2000 can
succeed in 2010, when most of the elements in the equation have change for
the worse," he states.

Eiland argues that over the years Israeli leaders have erred by creating the
impression that Israel alone could take upon itself the task of solving the
Palestinian issue.

For instance, at Camp David in 1979 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat wanted to
hear Israel's position on the Palestinian problem. "Begin hastened to
volunteer: Israel would give the Palestinians autonomy and both sides would
be satisfied. This implies that the Palestinians are Israel's problem and
Egypt has no reason to get involved."

Similar missteps were made all the way down to Ariel Sharon's disengagement
and Ehud Olmert's convergence plan, he claims. The problem with these
unilateral steps, he argues, was that they sent a message that "the
Palestinian problem is Israel's problem and Israel alone will know how to
solve it."

The new US administration, Eiland argues, has also made a number of errors
based on misconceptions. "The Obama administration errs in believing that
resolving the conflict is currently possible."

Among America's misguided assumptions, Eiland notes, are the following:

· The supreme Palestinian aspiration is to attain independence along the
1967 borders.

· The gap between the sides' positions is small and bridgeable.

· Moderate Arab states are interested in ending the conflict and therefore
will assist in its solution.

· The end of the conflict will bring about stability.

· Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is vital to obtaining Arab
assistance on the Iranian issue.

· There is currently an opportunity to resolve the conflict and it must not
be squandered.

· There is only one solution to the conflict, and that is the solution of
two states with the 1967 border between them.

As an alternative to becoming locked into the two-state mindset, Eiland
proposes a Jordanian-Palestinian federation whereby Gaza and the West Bank
would be states in a Jordanian kingdom, much like Pennsylvania and New York
are American states.

"They will have full independence on domestic issues as well as a budget,
governmental institutions, laws, a police force, and symbols of
independence, but similar to Pennsylvania or New Jersey they will not have
responsibility for two issues: foreign policy and military forces. Those two
areas, exactly as in the United States, will remain the responsibility of
the 'federal' government in Amman."

Eiland says the benefits of this proposal to the Palestinians are enormous.
First and foremost it would ensure that an independent Palestinian state
would not be ruled by Hamas. In addition, he writes, "the Palestinians also
understand that under a two-state alternative, they will become citizens of
a tiny state. Such a small state is not viable and will have security
limitations (for example, conceding sovereignty over its airspace). It is
preferable to be equal citizens in a large, respected country where the
Palestinians will form the demographic majority."

Jordan would benefit, he continues, because the way to prevent instability
in Jordan, which would be fueled by a future Hamas regime in the West Bank,
is through Jordanian military control over this territory.

And Israel would gain, he says, because it is more likely to get the
security it desires if the territories are incorporated into a greater
Jordanian state, rather than if a new - and most likely failed - mini-state
is created on its doorstep.

Eiland's other model, based on territorial exchange, calls for Egypt
transferring some 720 km. of land - including 24 km. along the Mediterranean
coast toward El-Arish - to the Palestinians, in order to allow them to build
a million-plus city and a sustainable port and airport.

Egypt would be compensated by an equal amount of land taken from the Negev,
and a tunnel at Israel's southern tip from Egypt to Jordan, which would
connect Egypt with the Arab countries to the east. The 720 km. are equal to
12 percent of the West Bank, which would be the percentage of West Bank
territory to remain in Israel's hands.

The enlargement of Gaza is necessary if it is to be a viable entity, Eiland
argues, and it could enable the region to become an international trade
center, which is impossible with the current dimensions.

Egypt would benefit primarily from the 10 km. tunnel to Jordan, which would
give it important physical and economic access to the main eastern part of
the Middle East, and Jordan would get - via the tunnel - an important
passage to the Mediterranean.

As far as Israel is concerned, this type of arrangement would give the
Palestinians a much better chance of viability and, by involving Jordan and
Egypt, would create "stronger guarantees for the upholding of the
agreement."

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