Can the US Contain a Nuclear Iran?
INSS Insight No. 171, March 24, 2010
Landau, Emily B.
www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=3909

With any hope of a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran now
postponed until June, and the understanding that if at all, these will be
weak and ineffective measures, Obama's diplomatic initiative is slowly
grinding to a halt. Taking into account Iran's steady progress in developing
fissile material, its work on producing a nuclear warhead, and its
ever-improving missile capabilities -- together with low expectations that
anything in this dynamic will impress upon the Obama administration the need
to ultimately take military action -- part of the discourse on this topic is
changing track. Instead of focusing on the stinging failure to curb Iran's
nuclear ambitions, some are arguing that it's now time to move on. They say
that in the likely scenario that Iran becomes the next nuclear state, the US
will simply resort to its ultimate strategy that has worked in other cases:
it will contain a nuclear Iran.

But will the US indeed be able to contain a nuclear Iran? The answer to this
question involves two levels: first, US credibility vis-à-vis Iran, and
second, what the US will be seeking to contain. On both counts, there is
little room for optimism.

Containment (and deterrence) of an adversary necessarily depend on a state's
ability to transmit to the adversary credible threats of consequences for
certain behavior on the part of the adversary. In this regard, the idea that
the US can contain Iran cannot be divorced from what has transpired over the
past year vis-à-vis the diplomatic initiative that Obama has pursued from
his first day in office. The lesson that Iran has learned from the Obama
administration is that while there has been no shortage of threats of
consequences, there have been little to no actual consequences. Iran has
seen that the US sets red lines and deadlines that in practice are virtually
meaningless. The US has undermined its own ability to present a credible
threat by saying outright that it has no intention of taking military action
because it is overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it has clarified
through its actions that broad multilateral agreement is more important than
demonstrating resolve to Iran in the economic realm as well. Why should we
assume that the US will be any more successful in projecting credibility
toward Iran when this state becomes a nuclear state than it has been in the
period before Iran crossed this line?

One could argue that while it is difficult to deter a state from advancing a
nuclear program within its own borders, it's a different ball game
altogether when we consider the scenario of Iran contemplating attack of
another state. Here the threat of US consequences will still be credible,
regardless of its past record. There is reason to believe that this is
indeed the case. The problem is that a potential nuclear attack is not the
major cause for concern with regard to Iran becoming a nuclear state.

This brings us to the second level of analysis. What the US might expect to
contain depends on the assessment of what Iran will likely seek to achieve
with its nuclear capability. Here too it is instructive to first consider
how Iran has behaved since 2002 in the unfolding nuclear crisis. Iran has
learned over the past eight years of dealing with the international
community that the best way to advance its goals in the nuclear realm is
very carefully, even if it takes a little more time. Being very careful has
the double advantage of no one action sparking too strong a reaction from
strong international actors, and gradually conditioning the international
community to accept the inevitability of the new reality that it is
establishing on the ground. Unlike North Korea, Iran is not prone to
crisis-creation or clear brinkmanship - it will resist provocations until it
has tested the waters and is fairly certain that they will not engender a
harsh response.

This is likely to be the Iranian approach as a nuclear state as well. Not
only does this seem to be the preferred Iranian tactic, but it also fits
well with Iran's expected strategic goal in the nuclear realm. If one
accepts the premise that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability for
the much enhanced regional clout that it will gain thereby yet that the
likelihood of its actually using nuclear weapons against one of its
neighbors is quite low, Iran will not be prone to crossing a clear line in
the nuclear realm that might elicit a nuclear response. Rather, Iran will
prefer to continue to work in more indirect ways, passively depending on the
image of nuclear capability that it will acquire to underscore its new
regional standing.

How does one contain Iran from consolidating its hegemonic hold over the
Arab Gulf states due to their fear of their now much stronger neighbor? Does
it even make sense to talk about containment in such a scenario? And how
will the US contain Iran from having a seriously negative impact on Israel's
ability to defend itself in a war provoked by Hizbollah or Hamas, with the
backing of Iran?

These are the likely scenarios of Iran going nuclear, not nuclear attack. In
these scenarios, recognizing its inability to have any influence on Iran,
the US is unfortunately more likely to fall back on attempts to look for
solutions elsewhere, such as targeting the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as the source of regional tensions and troubles. Until the US has
real answers to containing these kinds of Iranian threats, there is not much
value to talking about US containment of a nuclear Iran. Containment is
certainly not a "solution" to the severe implications of Iran becoming a
nuclear state.

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