[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Consider the significance that the words
"sovereign" and "independent" have absolutely never been included in PM
Binyamin Netanyahu's description of a Palestinian "state". Perhaps because
the only realistic solution is that a Palestinian "state" be an "autonomous
state".]

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Netanyahu and Direct Talks with the
Palestinians INSS Insight, July 19, 2010
Shalom, Zaki
www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=4247

Listening to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s remarks the past few months
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, one cannot help but wonder:
Netanyahu seems to be going out of his way to open direct negotiations with
the Palestinians as soon as possible. The prime minister has said he is
aiming for intensive negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement (the
“agreement in stages” approach, explains Netanyahu, has failed and will not
resume). According to Netanyahu, the situation in the Middle East is “fluid”
and the future of key states like Iran, Turkey, and Egypt is unclear. This
volatile state of affairs, he stressed, provides a window of opportunity to
reach an agreement, and therefore it is incumbent on the Palestinians to
abandon their belief/illusion that a third party, i.e., the United States,
will drop a ready-made agreement into their hands. There is no substitute
for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

From this it might appear that Netanyahu believes that an
Israeli-Palestinian agreement is within reach; that the Palestinian side is
actually capable of implementing an agreement; and that Netanyahu and his
government have the capability to implement an agreement at an acceptable
political price. However, it is highly doubtful that these assumptions drive
Netanyahu’s assessment.

An experienced leader like Netanyahu is no doubt aware of the enormous gaps
between the two sides that are little likely to be bridged in the
foreseeable future. Neither is he blind to the considerable skepticism as to
the power and ability of Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas to
implement such an agreement even if he wanted to. Above all, Netanyahu is
certainly aware of the serious constraints he must face in implementing such
an arrangement, as well as the associated risks to his government and
political future. An agreement of this nature will probably require the
evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis from Judea and Samaria, a
process that would almost certainly involve violence of an unknown extent.
Moreover, an arrangement of this sort will inevitably prompt the disbanding
of the current coalition, a rift in Netanyahu’s Likud party, new elections,
and possibly the end of Mr. Netanyahu’s political career.

Where, then, is Netanyahu attempting to go with his repeated calls for the
resumption of direct negotiations with the Palestinians? Netanyahu’s July 8
appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations, a prestigious think tank in
New York, may provide an answer, albeit partial, to the questions presented
above.

In his speech Netanyahu chose to relay a positive message regarding the
relationship that currently exists between Israel and the United States.
Netanyahu echoed President Obama, describing the “unbreakable bond” that
supersedes the occasional disputes that arise between them. These disputes,
he explained, are tactical disagreements over the best way in which to
maintain the peace process; there is no question as to the necessity for
intensive and direct negotiations. Netanyahu is well aware that his
relationship with the Obama administration, even now, is much less rosy than
what he describes to his listeners. It seems he believes that a mantra on
his desire to open direct negotiations with the Palestinians will create a
comfortable environment in his relationship with the administration, which
sees the negotiations as a supreme United States interest.

Netanyahu issued a number of demands of the Palestinians that all bore the
same two distinct characteristics:

a. The demands seem reasonable for a negotiated peace agreement between
states. Netanyahu can assume, with much confidence, that the Obama
administration cannot reject them – or at least most of them – out of hand.
He can also assume that the demands will be accepted by other figures,
especially Congress, in the media, and among public opinion, which may even
be sympathetic to them. These positions will also likely have a broad
consensus among Israeli public opinion and political circles, including the
left.

b. At the same time these demands are not likely to be accepted (or even
able to be accepted) by the Palestinian Authority, and most certainly not in
the way presented by Netanyahu.

At the outset, Netanyahu made it clear that Israel rejects Palestinian
preconditions for direct negotiations between the parties, which included:
negotiations will begin from the point they left off under the Olmert
government; and Israel will continue the building freeze in Judea and
Samaria, East Jerusalem included. Netanyahu insisted that negotiations must
be conducted without preconditions, as since the Oslo accords.

Netanyahu emphasized that the essence of the agreement is the principle of
“two states for two peoples,” whereby the State of Israel recognizes the
Palestinian state as the national state of the Palestinian people, while the
demilitarized Palestinian state recognizes the state of Israel as a Jewish
state. This recognition implies an end to the conflict and end of claims,
not only by the Palestinian Authority but also from Israeli Arabs (i.e., a
demand for autonomous status in the Negev and/or the Galilee). Netanyahu did
not elaborate on how he intends the Palestinian Authority to exercise
authority over Israeli Arabs.

Israel’s national security following the withdrawal that will most likely
accompany any Israeli-Palestinian agreement must be guaranteed. Israel,
explains Netanyahu, has had bad experience in withdrawing from territories,
e.g., Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. In both cases, militant elements
associated with Iran have entered the area and launched rockets into Israel.
Israel must thus ensure that this phenomenon does not repeat itself and
incur a risk to Israel’s cities, airports, and important military
installations. For Israel, according to Netanyahu, "the pillar of security
has to be enormously powerful, cast…like concrete" and ensure
demilitarization of the Palestinian state and especially prevention of
missile smuggling.

Based on Netanyahu’s firm stance on the matter, it appears that the task of
supervising the demilitarization of a Palestinian state would lie with
Israel and its security forces. As implied by Netanyahu’s remarks, Israel
cannot rely upon foreign forces in this context. Netanyahu made it clear
that this issue was discussed at length in his meeting with President Obama:
“Both of us,” he stressed, are committed “to try to find a realistic
concrete solution to this issue."

Netanyahu’s vision for the Israeli-Palestinian agreement questions the ideal
implied by the two-state principle. Netanyahu’s perception of the
Palestinian state is a country whose borders and airports must be supervised
by Israeli forces for years to come. Netanyahu clarified that the “time
factor,” i.e. the extent of the security framework needed to implement the
agreement, constitutes an essential part of the agreement itself. This
Palestinian state is not the sovereign state called for by the Palestinians
and by President Obama, and it is s hard to imagine that the Palestinian
Authority would accept it. Similarly, the other conditions Netanyahu
presented, notably the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and the
cessation of claims, have little likelihood of being accepted by the
Palestinian Authority anytime soon, certainly not in the manner presented by
Netanyahu.

Thus, any chance for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in the near future is
tenuous at best, as well as loaded with risks for both sides. Consequently,
the Netanyahu government seems to have come to the conclusion that the real
battle now and in the foreseeable future is over the administration’s
position and public opinion in the United States and Israel, namely, who is
responsible for the lack of an agreement. Netanyahu probably assumes, and
justifiably so, that the administration will have trouble completely
rejecting Israel's demands regarding the agreement, and will thus refrain
from imposing the entire blame for its failure upon Israel.

However, Netanyahu must take into account the possibility that the Obama
administration could demand that he agree to a "deposit formula," similar to
the one used before in regard to the Golan Heights issue, i.e., an
unequivocal clarification as to the extent of the withdrawal to which
Netanyahu would be willing to agree (that is, if and when the Palestinians
accept the conditions, in full or in part) “for the administration’s eyes
only.” If a deposit is indeed demanded of him, Netanyahu will find himself
in a tight spot, from which he will have difficulty emerging unscathed.