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Monday, August 16, 2010
MEMRI: Heading Towards a Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan

MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis|630| August 16. 2010
Urdu-Pashtu Media Project

Heading Towards a Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan
By: Tufail Ahmad and Y. Carmon*

Table of Contents
I. The U.S. Exit - An Emerging Chaos and Taliban Takeover
II. Karzai's Survival - Short Term Only Despite
a) Support of Afghan Allies
b) Support from U.S. and NATO Forces
c) Support from Evolving State Institutions
d) Support from Regional Allies
e) An Unexpected Factor
III. The ISI-Taliban Machine and the Threat to Karzai

IV. Pakistan's Grand Impact

V. As the U.S. Looks to Pakistan, India Turns to Iran

VI. The U.S.'s Options
a) To Let In the Incoming Chaos and the Taliban Takeover
b) To Either Postpone the Withdrawal or Opt for Partial Withdrawal
c) To Deploy U.S. Troops in the Pakistani Border Region
VII. Looking Ahead - Where Next for the Taliban?

I. The U.S. Exit - Emerging Chaos and Taliban Takeover

As U.S. troops begin to withdraw from Afghanistan in July 2011, an emerging
fragile Afghan state under Hamid Karzai appears to be headed for a likely
takeover by the Taliban.

Three major forces will impact the situation in Afghanistan: Pakistan, the
U.S., and to a lesser degree India and Iran. An internal and regional power
struggle will result. In fact, the regional powers have already begun to
assert themselves with a view to acquiring a foothold in the power structure
that will emerge after the U.S.'s exit. Recently, India has been turning to
Iran to forge a common position on Afghanistan. And while the U.S. is
seeking a return of the Russian presence to Afghanistan,[1] the Russian
ambassador to New Delhi opposes the U.S.'s ''hastened withdrawal'' from
Afghanistan because it could lead to ''hell.''[2]

The emerging situation in Afghanistan will be primarily characterized by
disorder: The federal government's ability to govern will be limited to
Kabul and some cities; vast regions will be controlled by the Taliban; and
various Afghan leaders will maneuver to fill in the power vacuum and will
position themselves as successor to Karzai, who cannot run for another term.
The instability will be similar to what it was after the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan.

II. Karzai's Survival - Short Term Only

Amid a power vacuum that will originate around the time of the U.S. forces'
exit, Hamid Karzai has a chance of surviving in power for the short term
only. He will be in a slightly better position to lead the fragile Afghan
state than Najibullah was when the Soviets left Afghanistan. Being in power
at the head of a fragile state, Karzai will become a target for the Taliban
and other opposition parties. The chances of Karzai's surviving this chaotic
phase, and his eventual exit from the scene will be determined largely by
the U.S.-supported secret peace talks between the Karzai government and the
Taliban. The militants are already in control of vast swathes of Afghanistan
and are backed by the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), the most powerful regional force.

The Obama administration's Afghanistan policy has been characterized by
three phases: a) during the initial months of U.S. President Barack Obama's
term, his officials favored peace talks with the Taliban; b) later, the
officials resisted Karzai's continuation in power and opposed any peace
talks until the Taliban were subdued through military operations; and c)
finally, they forced Karzai to embrace these inimical forces, especially
through engaging Pakistan, thereby weakening him and foreclosing a visible
path for the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. criticisms against
him over corruption, Karzai's chances of surviving through a transition
phase will be impacted to a large extent by the following:

a) Support of Afghan Allies
Karzai is backed by almost all former warlords and mujahideen leaders who
fought against the Soviets during the 1980s, including Burhanuddin Rabbani,
Abd Rab Al-Rasul Sayyaf and Abdul Rashid Dostum. A key mujahideen leader who
is not supporting him, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami, is nevertheless
engaged in peace talks.

b) Support from U.S. and NATO Forces
The Karzai regime will enjoy the strength derived from the presence of U.S.
troops who may remain in Afghanistan in some form. The U.S. and the NATO
countries have no option but - in adhering to the democratic process
underway in Afghanistan - to work with Karzai during a transition period.

c) Support from Evolving State Institutions
The evolving state institutions in Afghanistan such as the military, the
police, the bureaucracy and the justice system, though weak in their early
years, will strengthen Karzai's hand significantly. Over the past
half-century or so, elections have emerged as turning points, and in their
wake they leave irreversible imprints on a nation's life. Although the
August 20, 2009 Afghan presidential elections were tainted by corruption,
elections are currently the only UN-mandated democratic process in
Afghanistan that offer legitimacy to the government. The September 18
parliamentary polls will indirectly broaden the political basis on which
Karzai may survive the next few years.

d) Support from Regional Allies
Karzai will receive support from regional allies like India (because of its
opposition to the Taliban and Pakistan) and also from Iran (because of its
opposition to the anti-Shi'ite Taliban and the Sunni state of Pakistan).
Notwithstanding the reports of Iranian support to a section of the Taliban,
India and Iran have matching interests in the creation of an independent
Afghanistan; they will prefer Karzai for the time being, or a staunch
anti-Taliban Afghan leader like former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh,
over the Sunni jihadist force of the Taliban seizing power in Kabul. Pushed
into the corner by the Obama administration, Karzai too has recently been
courting Iran.

e) An Unexpected Factor
A totally unexpected factor may help the Karzai regime to stay in power. For
example, as a result of the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban will emerge as the
most powerful force in Afghanistan and some of the militant groups among
them may attempt to march toward Islamabad to capture power in Pakistan.
Such a possibility almost became reality in 2009, when the Taliban launched
the enforcement of Islamic Shari'a in Pakistan's Swat district and began
marching into neighboring districts on the way to Islamabad. An attempt by
the Taliban to move from Afghanistan into Pakistan may force the U.S. to
stay put in Afghanistan and support the Karzai government.

III. The ISI-Taliban Machine and the Threat to Karzai
Karzai has been pressured by the Obama administration to engage Pakistan for
a quick solution to the Afghan problem. Such pressure from the U.S. is a
direct result of the Pakistani establishment's diplomatic offensive in
convincing the Obama administration officials to accept the view that peace
is impossible in Afghanistan without Pakistan's cooperation. The Obama
administration has imbibed the Inter-Services Intelligence's (ISI) viewpoint
on Afghanistan, especially with regard to India's role in the country, but
has ignored the fact that the ISI's support to the militants is the root of
the problem in Afghanistan.
Under pressure from the Obama administration to engage Pakistan, Karzai
agreed to Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan during his May 2010 visit to
Washington, DC. However, at a discussion at the U.S. Institute of Peace,
Karzai pointed out that most of the Taliban leaders are in neighboring
Pakistan.[3] His point that the Taliban are controlled by ISI is known
internationally. Even when he is willing to engage Pakistan under U.S.
pressure, the problem Karzai is facing is the double-edged policy of the
ISI, which while mediating talks with the Taliban, is also encouraging the
Taliban to fight. The Taliban's influence is now consequential in all
provinces of Afghanistan.

Karzai has always favored reintegration of the low-ranking Taliban militants
into Afghan society, as opposed to the Pakistani view of reconciliation with
the core Taliban leaders. Under U.S. pressure, Karzai has been forced to
give a substantial role to the ISI. The premise of the ISI-sponsored
reconciliation process is that some Taliban leaders favored by the ISI will
be part of a power structure in Kabul that will replace Karzai. As long as
Mullah Omar, the Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, is around the
corner and has chances of returning to power, Karzai will not be able to
maintain his rule for long. The ISI's involvement with Karzai is transient
and tactical in nature. It should be kept in mind here that it is the ISI,
not the elected civilian government in Islamabad, which dictates Pakistan's
foreign policy.

IV. Pakistan's Grand Impact
As the U.S. troops leave, Pakistan will have the grand impact on
Afghanistan. During the 1980s, the ISI, working in cooperation with the CIA,
established a strong presence in Afghanistan which Pakistan regards as its
strategic backyard. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, various Afghan
warlords and the mujahideen leaders could not form a stable government in
Kabul. In the mid-1990s, the ISI propped up the Taliban to restore order and
establish Pakistan's control in Afghanistan. Even now, the Taliban are
controlled by the ISI. The current Pakistani policy is to bring back the
Taliban and to revive the policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan.
Pakistan had to rescind its diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime
after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, it kept hoping that
the Taliban will return to power in Kabul. Pakistan's worry has been that
when the U.S. leaves Afghanistan without a political settlement to its
liking, it might not be able to secure its interests there. It has worried
that an independent Afghanistan will raise the issue of Pakistan-Afghanistan
border demarcation, which Kabul does not recognize. It is concerned that
Afghanistan will also raise the issue of the continuing movement of the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants across the border. However, the Obama
administration has successfully forced Karzai to engage Pakistan. The
Pakistani foreign policy on Afghanistan and all engagements with Karzai are
being coordinated exclusively through the powerful duo of Pakistan Army
Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and Lt.-Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who
succeeded General Kayani as the chief of the ISI. Pakistan's long-held wish
to see the return of the Taliban in Kabul appears to be nearer than ever.

Even while the Afghan president is now building a relationship with the ISI,
it is unlikely that the Pakistani military will accept an independent
Afghanistan and forego Pakistan's entrenched perception which views
Afghanistan as strategic depth, in other words as a client state. In recent
years, Pakistani leaders have tried to counter international concerns over
the Pakistani military's idea of strategic depth in Afghanistan. Their
argument is that the Pakistani military no longer holds on to this theory.
However, contrary to this claim, Pakistan has been pursuing a policy of
neo-strategic depth, as per which the ISI thinks that Afghanistan should not
fall under Indian influence. The ISI will not accept a leader like Karzai in
the long run, especially in view of his strong associations with India and
also with Iran recently.

Therefore, it is expected that the ISI-Taliban machine will act against
Hamid Karzai as soon as pro-Pakistan Afghan leaders gain a say in the power
structure in Kabul. This will lead to the reversal of the ISI's current
tactical policy of engaging Karzai. It will also create a challenge for the
stability of the emerging Afghan state and put Karzai's life in imminent
danger. The Pakistani military's policy of neo-strategic depth and
successful revival of the Taliban is complete. With the U.S. forcing Karzai
to engage Pakistan, the path for the ISI-sponsored Taliban to take over
Kabul has been now paved. As the U.S. quits Afghanistan, it is Pakistan
that will have the grand impact in Kabul.

V. As the U.S. Looks to Pakistan, India Turns to Iran
In recent years, India had emerged as an important ally for the U.S. in
international relations. Both countries have shared goals on Afghanistan.
India has poured in hundreds of millions of dollars in reconstruction
projects in Afghanistan. In November 2009, India reversed its long-standing
policy of supporting Iran internationally and voted alongside the U.S. at
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in favor of referring Iran's
nuclear program to the UN Security Council.

However, with the Obama administration leaning on the Pakistani military to
broker peace in Afghanistan, India feels alienated from the U.S.,
particularly with the policy of undermining Karzai. Forced to engage with
Pakistan, Karzai too feels alienated from the U.S. and has extended his
overtures to Iran. India has also shown its disapproval of the ISI-mediated
peace talks between Karzai and the Taliban. India worries that with the
Taliban coming to power in Kabul, the Pakistani Taliban too will be
emboldened and pose a regional threat to India. The Indian government is
also concerned that the U.S. keeps going with Pakistan despite public
revelations that the ISI is supporting the anti-U.S. militant organizations,
thereby undermining the American policy in Afghanistan.

As a result of the Obama administration's policy of supporting a Pakistani
role in Afghanistan, India is now reversing its pro-U.S. stance on
international issues. During his trip to attend the Nuclear Security Summit
in Washington D.C. in April, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Obama
that the UN sanctions are not an answer to counter Iran's nuclear
program.[4] Later, Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna reiterated India's
disagreement with the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear program by publicly
welcoming an Iranian decision to send its low-enriched uranium stock to
Turkey.[5]

India has stated publicly that it will not walk away from its engagements in
Afghanistan when the U.S. troops withdraw. India now looks to Iran to forge
a common stance on Afghanistan. Indian and Iranian leaders have been
travelling frequently between Tehran and New Delhi. During a meeting in the
Indian capital in early August, top Iranian and Indian officials agreed in
principle to counter the threat of Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan.
Iran, courted by Karzai and India, has been gaining influence in
Afghanistan.

VI. The U.S.'s Options
What options does the U.S. have in Afghanistan?
a) To Let In the Incoming Chaos and the Taliban Takeover
The emerging chaos in Afghanistan results from the U.S. exit plan. The U.S.
can press ahead, as per the presidential pledge, to begin the drawdown of
U.S. troops from Afghanistan starting in July 2011. This stated goal has
already motivated the regional powers like Pakistan, India and Iran to
position themselves to shape the emerging power structure in Afghanistan.
Importantly, the Taliban attacks across Afghanistan have increased and their
influence in all provinces is now substantial. Depending on the pace of the
withdrawal, the Taliban are poised to claim power for the first time since
the U.S. troops dislodged them in 2001.
The moves to broker peace with the Taliban are unlikely to yield their
desired purpose. Any kind of peace agreement with the Taliban will embolden
them further as the militants are unlikely to accept the Afghan
constitution. A Shari'a-for-peace agreement reached between the Taliban and
the secular Pakistani government emboldened them so much that the militants
began enforcing Islamic Shari'a in the Pakistani district of Swat in early
2009. Indeed, this has been the fate of all peace agreements reached between
the Pakistani military and the Taliban in the Pakistani tribal region in
recent years. With or without an agreement with the Taliban, Afghanistan is
headed for a return of chaos with the U.S. troops no longer there.
b) To Either Postpone the Withdrawal or Opt for Partial Withdrawal
Another option could be to postpone the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and
support the Afghan forces fighting against the Taliban. Although this option
conflicts with the U.S. presidential pledge to begin transferring the U.S.
troops out of Afghanistan, at this point in time, only a symbolic withdrawal
seems realistic. The emerging terrorist threats in the U.S. emanating from
the Taliban may justify a delay in withdrawal.
Alternatively, the U.S. troops can withdraw not out of the country but to
barracks in and around Kabul and other key cities, depending on whether the
Karzai administration can shoulder some of the security responsibilities.
With the increasing strength of the Afghan troops, it will be possible for
the Karzai government to hold on to some cities. While partial withdrawal
could preserve the existing democratic process, such a move could also be an
ongoing inducement to the Taliban to mount attacks on Kabul until it falls.
Insofar as the strength of the Afghan security forces is concerned, it is
not sufficient to counter the ISI-Taliban machine. The Taliban appear to be
in a strong position to claim power when the U.S. troops leave.
c) To Deploy U.S. Troops in the Pakistani Tribal RegionInstead of
withdrawing totally back home, the U.S. troops could be redeployed to the
Pakistani tribal region. Unlike the U.S. drone attacks that have killed many
militant commanders, the Pakistani military operations have generally failed
to kill or capture top militant leaders of the Pakistani Taliban or the
Afghan Taliban leaders who reside in Pakistan. In fact, some Pakistani
militant commanders such as Maulana Fazlullah have been fighting in
Afghanistan recently.
The move to deploy U.S. troops in the Pakistani tribal region will be
justified by the Taliban's emerging strategy of fighting the U.S. on its
soil. The failed May 1, 2010 Times Square bombing by Faisal Shahzad and
Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud's video warning of attacks in North America
will justify the deployment of the U.S. troops inside Pakistan. Such a move
will be fiercely opposed by the Pakistani government and could materialize
only in the event of major attacks on the U.S. soil emanating from this
region.
Two elements are vital parts of all the three options: the preparation for
the continuity of leadership in Afghanistan, and the creation of a stability
fund.
First, there are no credible leaders at present who could replace Karzai,
but in the long run, the Karzai administration and the U.S. could work to
train new leaders, in case an attempt on Karzai's life succeeds or he
leaves. In the current circumstances, an attempt to eliminate Karzai in the
near term appears real. With the ISI-brokered peace talks becoming a
reality, some Afghan leaders are already sensing the arrival of a new regime
in Kabul and are now visiting Pakistan to seek ISI's blessings. Afghan
leaders - e.g. Ustad Mohammad Mohaqiq of Hizb-e-Vehdat party and Afghan Vice
President Karim Khalili recently visited Pakistan to position themselves as
Karzai's potential successors.[6] Some other acceptable leaders who enjoy
respect among Afghans could be Ali Ahmad Jalali (the former interior
minister), Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (the former finance minister and
presidential contender) and Zalmay Khalilzad (former U.S. ambassador to
Kabul). The role of the U.S. in preparing for such a possibility is vital.
Such an achievement can be ensured by working alongside Karzai, who cannot
run for a third term under the Afghan constitution.
Second, unlike the American withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of the
Cold War, the U.S. and its allies could set up a substantial stability fund
aimed at sustaining the Afghan security forces and local administrative
setups. Such a step will gradually build up the strength of the Afghan
security forces.

VII. Looking Ahead - Where Next for the Taliban?
In a stalemated power structure that will rise in Kabul as the U.S. troops
withdraw, a fragile Afghan state headed by Karzai will be opposed by a
strong opposition group led by the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami leader
Hekmatyar, who also enjoys consistent support from Pakistan's ISI. While the
Karzai administration will try to reach out to the militants, the
ideologically committed leadership of the Taliban movement is unlikely to
abandon its goal of establishing a jihadist emirate in Afghanistan. The
Taliban's efforts to establish such an emirate in Afghanistan will be
strengthened by the withdrawal of the U.S. troops which will be viewed as
victory by the jihadists.
With the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, the country's democratic
experience over the past few years will come to an end. The Karzai-led
regime will be taken over by the ISI-Taliban machine, a source of danger to
the U.S. and Arab regimes. Already, Pakistan's Afghanistan policy is being
arbitrated by the ISI chief. Afghanistan will again be a hotbed of the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The militants are already controlling vast regions of
Afghanistan.
After the Taliban's takeover, a question can be asked as to what will be the
next goal for the Taliban. Many of the militant organizations that are part
of the Taliban machine will be controlled by the ISI to engage against
India. From the experience in Pakistan, it is clear that some of the Taliban
groups are ideologically committed and they will continue the jihad machine
against the West. Many of them, especially the younger generations, are
aligned with Al-Qaeda and are also fighting against the Pakistani military
and the state of Pakistan. The new generations of the militant organizations
are devoted to the goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate.
The best course for the U.S. and its international allies in Afghanistan
could be to guarantee security to Karzai's life but simultaneously prepare
leaders to succeed him. A decision by the Bush administration to support the
government of Nouri Al-Maliki in Iraq not only stabilized Iraq but also
ensured that the jihadists did not expand their reach into neighboring
countries. A decision by the Obama administration to support the Karzai
government in Afghanistan may also save Pakistan from falling into the hands
of the Taliban.

* Tufail Ahmad is Director of MEMRI's Urdu-Pashtu Media Project; Y. Carmon
is President of MEMRI.

[1] Al-Hayat, London, May 22, 2010.
[2] www.timesofindia.com, India, May 10, 2010.
[3] www.state.gov, U.S., May 13, 2010.
[4] www.rediff.com, India, April 14, 2010.
[5] www.timesofindia.com, India, May 21, 2010.
[6] Roznama Mawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, August 10, 2010.

For assistance, please contact MEMRI at memri@memri.org.
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is an independent,
non-profit organization that translates and analyzes the media of the Middle
East. Copies of articles and documents cited, as well as background
information, are available on request.
MEMRI holds copyrights on all translations. Materials may only be used with
proper attribution.
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