Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of May 31, 2010
Session Number 4, on the date of 8.11.2010
Participants: Chairman, Justice (Ret.) Jacob Turkel:
Professor Miguel Deutch
General (Ret.) Amos Horev
Amb. Shabtai Rosenne
Amb. Reuven Merhav

Observers: Lord David Trimble
Brigadier General (ret.) Kenneth Watkin
Commission Secretary, Hoshea Gottlieb

Testifying: Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi
Commission Secretary, Hoshea Gottlieb: The Public Commission to Examine the
Maritime Incident of May 31, 2010, Session Number 4.
Chairman, Justice (Ret.) Jacob Turkel: Good morning. In the commission's
session today, we will hear the testimony of the Chief of General Staff. The
Chief of General Staff will respond to the questions directed at him, which
are within the mandate of the commission. For that which he cannot respond
to publicly, the Chief of General Staff will respond to in a closed-door
discussion. We, I, warn again at the start, it is possible that we will
decide to publicize portions of the closed discussion. The testimony of the
Chief of General Staff shall begin now and last until the afternoon hours,
as necessary. In the framework of the testimony, we shall leave for a
recess. As will be found proper, the commission will allow the Chief of
General Staff to complete his testimony verbally or in writing, and at this
point the photographers shall leave.
His honor, Chief of General Staff, according to the law you are cautioned
to speak the truth. In the testimony, I will request of you to relate first
and foremost to the first two topics in the commission's mandate, which are,
whether the closure that was put in place meets the requirements of
international law, and later, whether enforcement of the closure by the IDF
was in accordance with the requirements of international law. There is an
additional topic that I am not sure that his honor prepared for, and that is
the topic of the mechanism of IDF internal investigations, to what extent
this mechanism meets the principles of international law. If his honor could
enlighten us also in this matter, all the better. If not, we will do it at a
later stage. Please.
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: Good morning, thank you very much.
I, of course, would like to say several words of introduction, and after
this I will relate in a concrete way. At the start of the matter, I would
like to thank the commission and its head for allowing me to stand here and
testify before you as the commander of the IDF. I, as commander of the
military, bear responsibility for actions of the military, and I believe
that the decision to invite me and to refrain, as much as possible, from
inviting a series of commanders and soldiers, is an important and correct
decision. It is a decision that allows, in my mind, preservation of the
military's culture of inquiry, and especially our need to preserve the
confidentiality of the investigation, but in the main, to allow the soldiers
and commanders to deal with and prepare for the main occupations that we
have, both in the matter of the flotillas, as well as in these days, and I
will represent them here.
Chairman, Justice (Ret.) Jacob Turkel: Excuse me, I have here a technical
request. I have a feeling that something with the microphones is not
entirely right. The sound is somewhat faint. Something is not adjusted so
well, I think.
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: Is it on my end? Is it okay now? To
my perception and worldview, the IDF is a transparent organization, it is a
monitored organization, studying and committed at all times and in all our
fields of action to examine what is done, to investigate every action. In my
view, the strength of the military is hidden in the ability to investigate a
true investigation, revealing, critical, that will lead us to the correct
conclusions and lessons, to the location of errors, the failures, and
everything that will enable us to continue and improve. This is how we work
in our entire series of actions, as well as in this case, from out of a
granting of preference to our principal instrument, which is the instrument
of operational investigation. Perhaps at the end of the matter, I will
relate also to the third topic, of which you spoke and requested that I
relate to. This is our central and principal way on all levels, at all
ranks, in truth, to bring to light the flaws and to achieve an investigation
of the truth.
Immediately following the operation, and previous to decisions that stemmed
from the process that has brought us here, as we are accustomed to do, we
began a course of investigations from the level of the operational force, up
to the level of the General Staff, on all levels and in all branches. In
addition, in light of the complexity of the incident, I decided to appoint
an external team of experts, headed by Major General Giora Eiland, to
investigate the incident and present to me the findings, the conclusions,
and the lessons. The summary of all investigations of the generals, and the
summary of the work of Giora's team, were presented to me, presented to the
General Staff forum, and on their basis we prepared a work plan to implement
all of the lessons. We are already in the midst of this process, for the
purpose of the investigation is really to improve execution, for when you
come, as you recall, even after the flotilla that you are investigating, we
have already had at least two more flotillas, and we have still more
flotillas on the way.
On the basis of this matter, really, we prepared the work plan. I assigned
this to the Vice Chief of General Staff, and we are in the full swing of
implementation of the lessons. The findings of all the investigations,
including the investigation of the team of experts, were presented to the
General Staff forum, presented to the Defense Minister, presented to the
subcommittee of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In
addition, I decided to submit to you the full written report. I believe you
have studied it.
I, of course, will be happy to answer all questions, even concerning the
operation itself, and, according to need, also to clarify and update, if it
is necessary, information supplementary to all the investigations. You may,
of course, request also Major General Giora Eiland, we will assist as the
IDF, it is important for me to emphasize this, in all that is truly
necessary to present the complete facts and the complete findings required
by the commission in the framework of its duty.
But I already would like to say at the outset, a point that I think is very
important to highlight. I personally focused upon the investigation, upon
all the investigations, but personally on the investigation of the
functioning of the commando unit on the ship Marmara. This will perhaps be
surveyed more fully later on, we will present it, but I want to say from the
outset, that to me it is clear, that from the moment the operation started,
thus for me, at least, it was important to establish this, that in the
circumstances into which the fighters of the commando unit were thrown, as
well as anyone who operated around the ship Marmara, not only on this boat,
but by the nature of things it is our main occupation, acted in the
circumstances into which they were thrown, at risk of life, in a very
complicated life reality, acted in an exceptional fashion. It is absolutely
clear, that from the first moment they were thrown into life-threatening
danger. Today it is clear to us, even after the investigations, that it was
already after the first soldier descends and is in danger, the second
soldier is already shot, that the soldiers immediately employ their weapons.
I remember that immediately following the incident they spoke for some 45
minutes that we are dealing with fire from paintball guns. I want to
emphasize, that the soldiers opened fire, and to my mind it was justified.
The soldiers shot at whom they should have, and did not shoot at whom they
should not have. We even have cases of a soldier employing less lethal
weaponry, what we call "nafak" [Hebrew acronym for less lethal weaponry],
there is a passing to live fire when faced with life-threatening danger, and
then returning again to less lethal weaponry. I think that they displayed
throughout the entire course of this operation, facing a very complex
changing reality, split-second decisions, composure, bravery, morality, and
action that truly is in accordance with the IDF's values, and the purity of
arms. I think that we can certainly be proud of the way they acted. I think
that this operation certainly was commensurate and correct. I have a full
appreciation for them. I also said this to the soldiers themselves, and I am
personally proud, be your conclusion whatever it may be, for these are the
soldiers we actually have, and I am not thus excusing everything that
surrounds this, and that is not connected to the soldiers themselves.
Regarding the matters that I was requested in your letter to relate to, two
topics: the first, the imposition of the closure on the Gaza Strip, and the
second, the actions taken to enforce the closure on the date of 5.31. I will
relate to each of the topics separately, while presenting the full relevant
facts, to my mind, and, along the way, to everything that is to be related
to regarding the secondary questions that you posed in each of the questions
that appear in your letter. I, of course, invite the commission to ask, or
clarifications in the course of my words.
In the first part, regarding the first question, I was requested by the
commission to relate to the security circumstances, so is it noted, that
brought about the imposition of the maritime closure on the Gaza Strip, and
their examination in light of the question of the accordance of the maritime
closure with the principles of international law. At the outset of my words,
I would like to delineate the security background that led to the need for
the imposition of the maritime closure, and this, on the background of the
development of the terror threat and the military threat foreseen for Israel
from the Gaza Strip at that time. The Hamas movement that today rules the
strip has come a long way, from a cell of Muslim brothers and an opposition
group to Arafat, over the course of the previous decade has brought about
murderous attacks through suicide attacks in city centers.
After a number of years, it took control, essentially through a violent
military operation, to somewhat obvious brutal treatment, certainly some of
you have seen the pictures of the Authority men in Gaza, and essentially
took power by force and turned de facto into the ruling body in Gaza. After
the Disengagement, of course, in 2007. Since then, there has developed there
a multi-dimensional entity that combines both terror capabilities and varied
military capabilities, and at the same time represents a governmental
address. The ideology of Hamas is extremely radical, denying the existence
of the State of Israel and, in practice, working towards a state of Islamic
law on the territories of Palestine, from the sea to the river. Rapidly, the
Gaza Strip is turning into a hotbed of many additional terror elements,
including various Palestinian organizations, global jihad elements, and
more.
This development represents a threat to the State of Israel and rockets are
fired towards the State of Israel, tens of thousands of missiles that
essentially lead in the end to Operation Cast Lead. Even today, the relative
quiet that reigns in the Gaza Strip, stems essentially from strong military
deterrent, but the threat is not forgotten, and from time to time we even
see actions, whether of wayward organizations or from the direction of
Sinai, or what we call the "road of sin", meaning the way to Egypt. To us it
is clear that there is no doubt that Hamas has not abandoned the path of
terror and it still aims even today to carry out attacks against Israel.
Certainly the latest incidents, regarding Ashkelon and the firing on Eilat,
I think are a precursor to this. It is absolutely clear that they have not
abandoned this, the path of terror.
` Alongside this there is developing an additional threat, which is no less
significant, and it is perhaps less apparent to the eye, and that is the
process of reinforcement. Hamas is working under this relative quiet that
has been kept since Cast Lead, to broaden its capabilities in all areas. By
way of an immense project of smuggling by air, land, and sea, through the
tunnels and by sea. The purpose of this effort is to improve their military
capability within two central areas, the first: the area of rockets. Both to
increase the quantity, as well as to produce rockets that achieve a longer
range, larger explosive heads, and also capabilities for self-production.
One can look, and I will not survey this here, at the development of this
threat, and see how years ago they only had mortars, and after this, rockets
of the Kassam class for shorter ranges, etc., etc., and today we are
speaking of rockets for longer ranges. All of these things are happening or
taking place by way of the smuggling effort that is run by the Hamas
organization, and from within the Gaza Strip. In truth, it is a very
central effort that also involves funds, experts in relevant content, and
also self-production as far as it is possible within the Gaza Strip. They
also are improving their ground capabilities with the assumption that it is
possible there may be another ground confrontation, and for this purpose
there is a very great effort to acquire a wide variety of measures that will
improve their ground-handling capabilities, whether it is a system of
anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, night-vision devices, sabotage,
a system of fortifications, concrete-reinforced command posts, etc.
To our understanding, this process of reinforcement of Hamas would not be
possible without the aid of countries that support terror, most centrally,
of course, is the Iranian aid, that is truly attempting, also for Iranian
reasons, not only to strengthen their capabilities, but also to set up
against us deterrent by proxy. This is happening both with Hezbollah in the
north and with Hamas in the south.
In addition to all of this, Hamas is developing a maritime threat. I shall
not expand upon it. I will only say that Hamas is attempting to improve its
capabilities in connection with the ability to operate in deep water, from
the water and on the shores of the State of Israel, against navy ships that
operate opposite the Gaza Strip. We have things like this documented,
whether it's explosive boats, whoever remembers the incident not long ago,
of barrels of explosives that were sent from the coast of Gaza to the
southern coast of the State of Israel. And attacks from the sea against
civilians and military installations in abundance.
The smuggling effort is in the center of our occupations. I will not expand
here, but I will say that we are dealing with this even in nearby areas, the
navy and the naval commando units are really operating to disrupt, not just
them, this effort is of all the organizations, but regarding what is
relevant to the effort, we have seen outstanding and public examples, and
they are not the only ones. I mention the Karin-A, and I mention the Francop
that occurred for our purposes, for the purpose of the relevant discussion
here, in November 2009, just opposite the shores of the State of Israel. The
navy, the naval commando unit, the same soldiers that operated on the
Marmara based on intelligence information, took over the boat and brought it
to Ashdod. Our precise intelligence enables us to do this. I think that
anyone who viewed what was unloaded from that ship understood the great risk
hidden in maritime smuggling. Hundreds of tons of explosives, missiles. Just
to give the commission an idea: on the Francop alone, the quantity of
materiel, the quantity of munitions that was found, approaches 70 percent of
the ammunition fired upon the State of Israel over the course of the entire
Second Lebanon War. Rockets, missiles, and mortars. It is completely clear
that this matter is completely different from the smuggling efforts that you
do, let's say, by way of tunnels that were found in Gaza, on the Gaza-Egypt
border. Though we operate against the tunnels, occasionally attacking them,
and also in efforts together with Egypt in all kinds of ways that I will not
expand upon.
Regarding the maritime closure on the Gaza Strip: the importance of the
maritime closure is in my eyes first of all a security importance. I see for
this closure a number of central security goals, which are vital for
ensuring the security of the State of Israel, and the ability to defend its
citizens. The simple, central, basic, matter is, first of all, to prevent
the terror organizations, with the aid of Iran and Hezbollah, from smuggling
into the strip munitions in inestimably larger quantities than those that
are possible to do through other smuggling. I think that this maritime
smuggling is completely different, and in my opinion, it is our obligation
to prevent the arrival, and the possibility of arrival, of munitions by sea.
The things happen even very far from here, a portion of the smuggling routes
known to us, I will not, due to the nature of the matter, specify. But, in
the end, maritime smuggling is completely different smuggling, very
significant, both regarding the quantity that it is possible to bring, and
regarding the quality. I think that it would not be proper for us to allow
this smuggling.

The second matter, the central goal is to prevent, of course, attacks that
come out of Gaza against Israeli installations, off the coast of the State
of Israel, or penetration for the purpose of an attack in the State of
Israel itself.
An additional, third, goal is, of course, to prevent infiltration of
knowledge centers and military centers. I want to explain to the commission
that sometimes a knowledgeable man, with production capability, guidance, an
organization of weapons systems, his damage is no less than that from
munitions systems themselves. Whether this is an expert for producing
charges for rockets, or for anything else within the Gaza Strip. We have
evidence that when people like this succeed in reaching other locations, in
a process of relatively short time, he can train a cadre, and they succeed
in developing and producing and bestowing to the organization a capability
that it would not have, if not for this content expert, or this
knowledgeable man getting to there. Therefore, our interest is not just in
munitions, but also in terror activists of this type, and, of course, also
others.
An additional central, fourth, goal is also to prevent entry of money in an
unmonitored fashion into the strip. Attempts of this sort are carried out
from time to time through the underground passages, but it is also possible
with great ease to do this by sea. It is totally clear that the money is oil
upon the wheels of terror. The smuggling operation, the need to purchase, to
pay, to buy, to fund this entire process, requires large quantities of
money, and we see a close connection between the financial capabilities of
the organization and the ability to purchase and equip itself, and it is
also possible to do this by sea.
Bottom line, while I cannot say that we succeeded in completely preventing
the phenomenon of reinforcement by way of Hamas' smuggling to the strip,
along with this, to the best of our judgment, this is the information in our
possession, we disrupt not a little, and the maritime closure has a real
direct impact on the present ability, and if it wouldn't be, the future
ability of Hamas. Of course, with no maritime closure, I want to establish
this in an unequivocal fashion, an open sea route for ships to the Gaza
Strip would increase and intensify the threat to the State of Israel and to
broad portions of it.
I would like to move on to the decision-making process regarding the
imposition of the maritime closure, as a part of the questions that you
posed in the first section. I focused up to now on the security background
and on the development of the threat facing us from Gaza, by ground, rocket,
and sea, and, of course, on the phenomenon of smuggling and on the security
goals of the maritime closure. I want to relate now in a more concrete way
to the process of making the decision to impose the maritime closure on the
Gaza Strip, and, for this purpose, I want to first go over the phenomenon of
the flotillas, that occurred in 2008, if I am not mistaken, with their start
being something like August 2008, and they essentially represent the trigger
for the imposition of the maritime closure. It arises, essentially, with
respect to what were generally called protest flotillas, and over the course
of 2008 there were a number of these protest flotillas, led by the Free Gaza
organization, vessels of various sizes sailing from Cyprus, most of them
leaving Cyprus for the Gaza Strip.
On this background, we began dealing with the phenomenon, and seeking or
deciding to shape the political course of action, in our case, legal and
operational, regarding how to stop it. From an analysis of the connotations
stemming from the discussion of the flotillas, there formed for us, for me,
the position according to which sailing vessels must be prevented from
reaching the coast of Gaza. All of this, in light of the security
consequences that I just described, that can stem from the description of
the flotillas, and perhaps from a certain establishment of a sailing route,
a line of ships from the Gaza coast to Cyprus, or to somewhere else. And
essentially it would represent fertile ground for smuggling munitions,
people, money, and perhaps even under the guise of humanitarian activity.
Meanwhile, we began to lead staff work in the IDF together with the navy
regarding different alternatives for treatment of the phenomenon, and an
operational conception crystallized that included a number of courses of
action to prevent the entry of sailing vessels to Gaza. At that time, in the
beginning of August, 2008, the position of the political echelon was that we
need to prepare to prevent the entry of sailing vessels. And with reception
of the information regarding arrangement of this possibility, the directive
was actually to prohibit the ships' entry, as long as it would be achieved
with the minimum possible international and public relations damage that
could be caused by it.
Following the directive, I also found it proper to turn also to the Prime
Minister and Defense Minister at that time, in August, 2008, to note that we
are prepared for execution of the task, to prevent entry of the flotillas,
and in light of the expected consequences of this operational activity, I
think that it would be proper to take all efforts to prevent from the start,
if possible, the departure of these flotillas to sea. For dealing with it at
sea, by its nature, already then we thought, regarding the possibility of
frictions, the images, and the public relations aspect, is a less desirable
playing field.
We prepared, of course, to form an operational conception of how to deal
with the phenomenon of the flotillas at that time, and the operational
conception that crystallized based itself on graded confrontation, I will
detail this later, with commandeering truly being the last stage. This
graded conception was presented to the Defense Minister as a central idea
already in the first stages of its formation, in the framework of the
general authorization of preparations for stoppage of those flotillas. This
matter, of course, was also authorized. Following the directive and
preparations, we involved, of course, the Military Advocate General, as part
of our usual work method, and we sought the legal and convenient tools and
alternatives of how to actualize the ability to stop the vessels at sea, in
a fashion that would enable us to prevent their entry to the waters of the
Gaza Strip. I will not describe the entire process. I think that Military
Advocate General gave you his document, in which he surveys all of the
alternatives. But what arose in a clear way, and so I also understood from
the conversation and from reading the assessment and from the discussion, is
that the royal road, as it is called, to prevent the passage of all vessels,
and the powers required to prevent entry of sailing vessels, is by means of,
at the end of the day, is by means of a declaration of a maritime closure.
There were other alternatives. Other legal sources that could have given us
the ability to search, seize, divert from its route a sailing vessel that
wants to reach the coast of Gaza. But the conclusion was quite clear that
without a declaration of a maritime closure, there were regarding this
doubts, limitations, and questions regarding the likelihood of implementing
it.
The Military Advocate General who put together this legal assessment, and
myself as well, saw a need to turn also to the Attorney General to receive
his approval and his assessment. This we indeed did, and as far as I know,
the Attorney General indeed approved this assessment, and indeed,
recommended taking it also to the political echelon. Alongside the formation
of this legal position regarding the justification of imposing a closure, a
decision had not yet been taken regarding the declaration of a maritime
closure. Within this reality, navy elements acted to pass along a message in
the accepted channels that called for foreign sailing vessels to refrain
from entering the region adjacent the Gaza Strip, the declaration of a
combat zone, and we considered it in the usual way, and the sailing vessels
were called upon to refrain from entering it. This message was, of course,
in accordance with the Attorney General, and according to it, without a
maritime closure, the announcement of security activity in the region would
aid in limiting entry to Gaza.
We also announced, it is important to make known, also already at this
stage, that the transfer of humanitarian supplies to the Gaza Strip would be
made possible through the land crossings between the State of Israel and the
Gaza Strip, with the requirement, of course, of examination by the Israeli
authorities.
Of course, as I noted, the initial decision was to allow, but while we were
putting together the ways of dealing with this in an operational fashion,
and forming the assessment and recommendation regarding the closure, the
political echelon decided to allow, at the end of August, entry of the ships
to Gaza. And, indeed, we see the entry of a number of yachts and other
ships, on various dates, more or less until the end of the year, with them
appearing separately from Larnaca toward the Gaza Strip on various dates,
and they were allowed to enter Gaza in light of the decision I just
detailed.
A further incident must be noted, of another ship, which flew the Libyan
flag, and attempted to reach the strip during that time, in November of
2008, and reversed course after messages were relayed to it not to continue
on its way to a region in which security activity was being carried out,
and, indeed, it reversed its course.
I would like to note that in light of the intensification of the flotilla
phenomenon, and the policy that allowed their entry, I thought that it was
not correct to allow them to enter, and this has been my consistent opinion.
I appealed in writing both to the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister,
and recommended changing the existing policy and prohibiting the entry of
the flotillas, once again, out of security concerns, in order not to open
that sailing route between Gaza and Cyprus, or other places for that matter,
while I detailed the recommended grades of action for the IDF for activities
to stop the ships at sea.
The next stage that is important for the development of the process is the
stage of Cast Lead. As mentioned, after the entry of the flotillas and the
government's decision not to establish a maritime closure, the government,
in light of the events of the end of 2008, Hamas' intensifying shelling,
ordered the IDF to initiate Operation Cast Lead, out of its obligation, of
course, to protect the State of Israel, which was then subject to
intolerable attacks, I believe. If I recall, there were weeks of dozens of
rockets, and even more. In our frame of interest, in the framework of
assessments of the situation, in the framework of Operation Cast Lead, there
arose among us once again the topic of dealing with foreign civilian sailing
vessels that would try, or were trying, to reach the coast of the Gaza strip
during the operation.
Thus, for example, one of the ships that had already been there, Dignity,
sailed from Cyprus and made its way toward the Gaza Strip. The vessel
reversed its course after we diverted it from its course with naval forces,
and after it was warned that it was entering a region in which there is a
combat event, in light of the events that were occurring then in Gaza. In
its attempt, there was even a bow-to-bow confrontation between the Dignity
and our ship. In the end, it turned around and returned to its port of
berth.
Professor Miguel Deutch: At what distance from Gaza did you then stop the
ship, and how many participants were there on it?
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: The Dignity at that time, I think
that it was something like several dozen miles from the coast of Gaza. Then,
there hadn't been a declaration of a closure, as I tried describing just
now, and we acted on the fact that there was combat there, an armed region,
and that therefore they were interfering with activity, and were cautioned
not to approach and required to move away.
Professor Miguel Deutch: And the amount of participants on it?
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: There were a few dozen on those
flotillas, a few dozen activists. I do not recall the precise number. But we
are not discussing something similar to the Marmara with several hundred.
There were a few dozen, some of them known to us, some of them less so. It
was typical mainly of those flotillas that occurred even beforehand. But we
did not know who all the people were.
This incident sharpened once again the legal difficulty we had in
confronting sailing vessels trying to reach the Gaza coast. In a case where
there is no concrete information, providing basis for a suspicion of
involvement in hostile terror activity and anything related to the topic of
contraband. In other words, bandages, munitions, terror activists, and
similar things, things that can aid an enemy organization. This matter
really raised once again the need to impose a maritime closure as the royal
road. The Military Advocate General directed at me another letter, for the
purpose of raising this topic of the maritime closure once again as a
legitimate means, and accepted within the framework of laws of combat, and
he accordingly recommended to raise it again. All of this for the reason
that the legal and optimal ability to deal with the flotilla phenomenon
should stand available to us, and to do this also from an operational
perspective, to prevent the establishment of this norm, this phenomenon of
an open and unmonitored line to the Gaza Strip. The Military Advocate
General emphasized in his assessment that this maritime closure could
continue even after Operation Cast Lead, in order to deal with the flotilla
phenomenon.
In this assessment, which I studied, naturally are defined the conditions
for the initiation of a closure, which I believe were rather detailed, at
their center of course being a public declaration, effective enforcement,
non-discrimination, commensurateness, prevention of a humanitarian crisis,
granting to other vessels the allowance of access to neutral countries, and
things of that nature. I originally thought it proper to prevent this
phenomenon, and I of course accepted the recommendation, as I already
thought previously, and as I already described earlier, I believe it was
proper to prevent this from the beginning. Naturally, I brought it up, I
received the recommendation and I brought up my recommendation together with
the recommendation of the Military Advocate General to the Defense Minister.
The Defense Minister accepted the recommendation, and authorized it, and
directed us to impose a maritime closure on the Gaza Strip until further
notice. We formulated the letter, the Defense Minister signed it, we
appended to it the map and the tools demanded according to international law
regarding how to publicize it. There arose the question of how we publicized
it. We publicized it in accordance with accepted practice and according to
the law, in the mechanism for announcement to sailors. It is called "Notices
to Marines." We passed on this message to the Ministry of Transportation for
publicizing in additional channels. The declaration was also publicized in
all the accepted channels for transmitting announcements to sailors. And we
informed the coordinating war room of this. There is such a thing in the
Mediterranean Sea called the Naval Center, with regional coordination in
Cadiz, Spain, for ship agents, shipping companies, and in addition we
broadcast this announcement, since then and today, twice daily, over a
system called "Navatex," which is a system serving mariners that is received
hundreds of kilometers from the coast of the State of Israel.
Professor Miguel Deutch: With his honor's permission. I request for a moment
to return to the Dignity. Was there then a plan drawn up for commandeering
the ship?
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: We prepared a plan to commandeer the
ship, more or less in the steps that we formulated then, which are quite
similar to what I will describe later concerning the flotilla. But as long
as the question was raised, our basic approach, as a conception more or less
from the start of dealing with the flotilla phenomenon, and largely also
until today, was to look at the entire range of possibilities, in order to
actualize, if there would be recognition of a maritime closure, or we would
need to confront, of course in a legal way, to actualize all the
alternatives that were possible to do, in order to stop it.
Our outlook was that commandeering is a type of last resort. Therefore we
attributed very great importance to attempting in all possible ways,
diplomatic and otherwise, and perhaps we will detail this less here,
intelligence-wise and otherwise, to attempt first of all to deal with this
matter at its formative and organizational stage in the ports of berth. By
way of a long line of steps, taken towards the nations responsible. It is
indeed known that a country has responsibility over vessels that sail from
its ports, just as it has responsibility over aircraft that take off from
its airports. The owners have responsibility, the country whose flag it
flies, the captain has responsibility, the insurance companies have
responsibility, and things like this. It is a way of operation that in
certain cases even brought about a prevention of the departure of the
flotillas. I will relate to this later.
For example, in the flotilla Sky Winds 7 it lowered the number of ships.
This activity. We expected more ships. The president of Cyprus, for example,
decided that he would not allow it to depart. There also other cases and
examples in which this helped. But first of all attempt to deal with the
actual departure of the flotilla. The other way to deal with the actual
departure of the flotilla, this was true even then, is by publicizing an
announcement that Israel will not prevent, and Israel has publicized the
announcement, Israel will not prevent supplies, certainly humanitarian, to
enter Gaza in the accepted way. I coined then the statement that the rule of
a container to Gaza is the rule of a container to Ramallah. Let's assume you
want to order equipment, or you need equipment for Gaza. Since there is also
no seaport in Gaza since there is no capability of inspection, the container
will come to Ashdod or to another seaport, be inspected, and will travel
after a sweep-through by way of the Erez checkpoint to Gaza. And this is
exactly what we do. This suggestion was available already then, later on,
and is available still today. This method, too, we proposed.
The next step, if you wish, or the next alternative, is one where if the
flotilla sets sail, we are to warn it that it is approaching a region, in
the case of the Dignity it was a combat region, in the case of a maritime
closure, a region of a maritime closure, and in an aggressive fashion to
request it to turn back, captain to captain, to speak with him and also to
warn him that he is entering a region that it is forbidden to him to enter,
and that there may be consequences to this. There is a precise formulation
that we also later formulated and made known. If you wish, we can submit it.
And we always read it out and also documented this.
Professor Miguel Deutch: And the plan for commandeering, in a case where it
would come to this, in the case of the Dignity, was it similar, was the plan
similar to the plan of the Marmara later on?
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: I will relate to this presently.
Before the step of commandeering, there was an additional step. Even after
they set sail, and even after they were warned, there was another step from
the perspective of the basic idea, which was to offer them to be escorted to
Ashdod, to unload the cargo, which would be taken to Gaza. They would be
able to travel back on their way. There were cases, later on there were
other ships, after the imposition of the closure, where that is actually
what happened with them. They actually accepted and were escorted to Ashdod.
We had such a case after the flotilla, of the Rachel Corrie. That's
precisely what happened with it. After we appealed to them and offered them
to be escorted to Ashdod, they actually came to Ashdod, and that's what
happened.
Professor Miguel Deutch: And if it would have then come to commandeering,
the plan would have been similar to that which we saw now, in the case of
the Marmara?
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: In the case of the Dignity? Then we
did not yet have a maritime closure. The tools we had then, it was just to
divert it from its course. Only after the imposition of the maritime closure
we operated like this.
Professor Miguel Deutch: I understand, but if it would have come to
commandeering, the plan then would have been similar?
Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi: If there was a directive to stop it
and to prevent its entry, then the only way after we would try all of these
things, I assume probably that we would suggest boarding the ship and
commandeering it.