Iran's Late-Summer Display
INSS Insight No. 205, September 5, 2010
Shapir, Yiftah
www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=4402

Every day for a full week beginning August 20, as part of the Government
Achievement Week festivities, the Iranian media reported the unveiling of
new weapon systems. That week Iran also celebrated the insertion of fuel
rods into the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. In all probability, the events
were reported at the same time to impress the world with Iran's ability to
progress and grow stronger in the fields it considers important despite the
sanctions against it.

The weapon systems unveiled included two new or improved tactical
surface-to-surface missiles, an improved version - according to the
Iranians - of the familiar Fatah 110 missile, a new missile by the name of
Qiam-1, two types of fast-moving patrol ships - Serag and Zulfikar, and an
armed, stealth unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) called Karrar.

The Fatah 110 has been a fixture of Iran's weapons arsenal for some time. It
is operational and many such missiles have almost certainly already made
their way to Hizbollah. It is in essence a guided version of the Zelzal-3
rocket. The missile uses a solid fuel propulsion system, is launched from a
launch vehicle, and (according to various reports) has a range of 150-250
km. Since the original missile was thought to have a low accuracy, it is
probable that the improvement claimed for this version lies in the missile's
guidance system, though it is hard to assess its accuracy at this point.

The Qiam-1 uses a liquid fuel propulsion system and seems to be of similar
(or even smaller) dimensions as the Shehab-2 / Scud-C, which Iran has had
for a long time. It differs from the Shehab-2 in two ways: its nose-section
is tri-conic (resembling a baby bottle) like those of the heavier Ghadr-1
and Sejil-2 missiles (and unlike that of the Shehab-2's simple conical
nose); and the tail stabilizers have been removed.

At this stage, it is hard to assess the significance of Iran's possession of
the new missile. Its dimensions indicate a range of between 300 and 450 km
at most. The warhead segment is smaller than that of the Shehab-3, but its
shape may indicate that is it capable of separating from the body of the
missile at the point of reentry into the atmosphere and it may even be
equipped with a terminal guidance system. The lack of tail fins indicates
that the missile has an entirely new steering system capable of overcoming
the loss of aerodynamic stability given by the fins during the missile's
acceleration phase. Moreover, the absence of the fins may indicate that the
Iranians intend to be able to launch the missile from a canister or a
permanent silo. Indeed, some assessments suggest that the Qiam-1 missile is
nothing but a cheap, available means for developing such a capability, which
in the future would be installed on heavier missiles such as the Sejil-2.

Among the ships displayed, the Zulfikar looks like a fast moving patrol
vessel and may carry two small sea-to-sea missiles such as the C-802. The
Serag is an even smaller boat. From the photographs shown on Iranian
television, it appears to carry a small multiple rocket launcher for 107 mm
rockets. Both are apparently meant for hit-and-run operations against large
navies, e.g. the American fleet in the Gulf. If produced in large numbers,
they would be capable of swarming attacks (i.e., hit-and-run operations by a
swarm of small, fast moving boats), a strategy developed by the Iranians in
order to fight large, well equipped ships.

The Karrar attack drone is a jet powered drone launched from a track using a
rocket booster. In photographs, the drone seems to be carrying one bomb
under its belly. Its range, according to Iranian reports, is 1,000 km. There
is no information about its guidance or steering systems. In photographs,
the drone resembles (though it is not identical to) the Soviet Tu-143 Reis
drone (also known as the DR-3). It was developed during the 1970s and used
for intelligence gathering operations (in our region as well). The Soviet
drone had a pre-programmed track and its operators had no control over it
after the launch.

The Iranian drone will likely be equipped with a GPS-based guidance system
and will therefore be able to hit its target with a relatively high degree
of accuracy. By contrast, it is unlikely that it is a stealth drone as the
Iranians have claimed; likewise, it is unlikely that it can fly at low
altitudes or avoid obstacles on the ground. Therefore, even if it does reach
the stage of production and operational deployment, it will be a relatively
easy target for the aerial defenses of the side being attacked.
Conclusion

Reports of innovative weapon systems in development are not a new
phenomenon, and often appear in conjunction with extensive military training
maneuvers or Islamic Republic holidays. This time the reports were linked
both to the sanctions and to the fueling of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. As
usual, however, it is difficult to conclude which if any system represents a
new threat or whether it is all empty bravado.

As in previous cases, the truth apparently lies somewhere in the middle. The
Iranian reports suffer from a great deal of hyperbole, but real advances
have also been made. On the one hand, the declarations should not be
dismissed out of hand, and increased quantity is often seen as increased
quality. Years of repeated announcements about varied and versatile weapons
systems - with no opportunity to date either to prove or deny their
capabilities - have created the image of Iran as a menace to the world
around it. At the same time, these declarations contribute to the
glorification of the regime in the eyes of the Iranian people.

On the other hand, is a mistake to dismiss the announcements because there
have also been real advances. As in the past, the progress that seems the
most concrete and real is in the field of ballistic missiles. More accurate
Fatah 110 missiles would represent an addition to the current threat, and
should they be provided to Hizbollah they would certainly represent a threat
close to the State of Israel.

Israel is almost certainly out of range of the Qiam-1 missile. It seems to
be in its early stages of development. However, its real threat is in the
fact that it is a tool for developing canister or silo launching technology,
something that could significantly improve the accuracy and survivability of
the Sejil-2 missiles once they become operational.

Increasing missile accuracy - both of long range missiles such as the Sejil
and of short range missiles such as the Fatah 110 - means that the missiles,
from being a terrorist threat against civilian populations (like the
al-Hussein missiles in 1991), have turned into a more concrete threat
against small strategic targets such as military bases, airfields, and
civilian infrastructures. Increased survivability of missiles means greater
difficulties in responding to them and in damaging them at their launching
sites.