[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:

Hats off to David Horovitz for this tremendous interview.

It is hard to know if Ms. Livni realizes what she said here.

But here it is:

#1. She says she was responsible for the talks with the Palestinians and
that they never reached the point that Jerusalem was discussed.

#2. On the other hand, she recognizes that while she was talking with the
Palestinians as FM, that PM Olmert not only discussed Jerusalem - he made a
tremendously generous offer to Mahmoud Abbas.

#3. She recognizes that Mahmoud Abbas rejected Olmert's very generous offer.

But Kadima head Livni refuses to do the math.

#4. Livni adamantly insists that it doesn't matter that Abbas rejected
Olmert's very generous offer.

Why? Because Livni was in charge of the official negotiations and she
didn't make the offer. The prime minister of Israel made the offer.

Question: Does Ms. Livni think we are idiots? Or is her ego so huge that
she genuinely thinks that the only thing that matters is what took place
between her and the Palestinians in the formal window dressing talks?]

Full Livni interview: Editor's Notes
By DAVID HOROVITZ The Jerusalem Post 12/31/2010 16:19
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=201629

"I didn’t go into politics out of concern for the Palestinians but out of
concern for Israel," Kadima leader Tzipi Livni says in this extensive
interview.

For an opposition leader who believes Israel has a dreadful government under
whose watch our very legitimacy is being increasingly questioned, Tzipi
Livni is a reluctant interviewee. The conversation below took many months to
arrange.

Once face-to-face across her desk high in a Tel Aviv skyscraper, however,
and even though she claims credibly to be exhausted, Livni, 52, is energized
and forthcoming. The Kadima leader may be commendably discreet on some of
the specific positions she adopted during her aborted nine months of
negotiations under prime minister Ehud Olmert with the Palestinians, but she
readily sets out the principles that guided those talks. She fiercely
defends her contention that Israel has a viable partner in Mahmoud Abbas’s
Palestinian Authority. And she returns time and again to stress her sense of
Israeli Jewish imperative in reviving those negotiations and trying to bring
them to a successful conclusion.

“I know this is an ordeal for you,” I say to her about an hour into the
interview, which at this point has focused entirely on the Palestinian
process. “No,” she says. “These are actually the issues I like to talk
about.”

Her candor extends to the detailing of her repeated conversations with Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu about the possibilities of a Likud-Kadima
coalition. She not only sets out the arguments she put to him in favor of an
equal partnership, complete with prime ministerial rotation, immediately
after the elections in February 2009 – arguments he firmly rejected – but
also talks through several subsequent meetings, including in recent months,
on the subject. These were meetings she initiated, in which she again urged
Netanyahu to ditch one or more of his “natural” partners, and bring in
Kadima, this time without rotation, to push the diplomatic process.

Those overtures repeatedly rebuffed, Livni has now evidently concluded that,
whatever his rhetoric, the prime minister is disinclined to advance any
process of substance with the Palestinians – an assessment that will
doubtless make for unhappy reading in Washington and many places beyond.

“An agreement will always constitute a position that is not the classical
right-wing position,” she says. “I see his lack of willingness to advance,
and I understand where he stands.”

The key question, she says, is whether the prime minister is prepared to pay
the realistic price of an accord that protects our fundamental interests.

Well, I ask, is he? “I’m head of the opposition,” she shoots back. “That’s
your answer.”

Our interview does range beyond the Palestinian issue. Livni speaks at some
length about her conception of Israel’s Jewish character, though she says
she’s still in the process of thinking through some of her positions. The
synagogue she doesn’t go to very often is an Orthodox one, but the recent
conversion controversies have brought her into deeper contact with the
non-Orthodox streams of Judaism and, as she puts it, her eyes are being
opened.

“The more the haredim use their monopoly and impose their worldview on the
national, liberal movement,” she says at one point – not as a threat, but as
an assessment – “the more this will lead to a revolution.”

Excerpts:

From your experience leading the substantive, direct negotiations with the
Palestinians in the last government, are they prepared to make a viable,
permanent peace agreement with Israel? Despite things like Fatah’s
rejectionist stance on Israel, the Palestinian leadership’s endorsement of a
“study” that denies Jewish ties to the Western Wall, and that leadership’s
efforts to secure international support for the unilateral establishment of
statehood?

I believe that it is possible to reach an agreement between Israel and the
Palestinian national movement that puts an end to the conflict. I have no
illusions about a “new Middle East.” I don’t believe that, the moment an
agreement is signed, we’ll live in a fairy tale world of prosperity and
happiness This is a harsh neighborhood. This is a highly complex conflict.
There are religious factors involved here as well as the nationalist
factors.

The capacity to reach an accord is dependent on the behavior of both sides.
It would have been very easy for me to declare after each and every meeting
with the Palestinians that “there is no partner.” Perhaps they could have
said the same about me. I was tough, too, in the negotiations. But we
managed in nine months to understand the mutual sensitivities, see what
needed to be overcome, and to reach a mutual conclusion that an accord was
possible. It wasn’t around the corner. Not a matter of 20 seconds. It would
be very fragile. It might be accompanied by terrorism. We did not exhaust
that process.

There are all the reasons in the world to give up, to despair – when you see
their textbooks, when you hear some of the things they say, when you read
some of the articles. And by the way, they could say the same about us.

I simply think that given the choice of options – and the Middle East
generally creates bad options for us – giving up now on the effort to reach
an accord would be bad for the Jewish state, physically and in every other
way. Whoever doesn’t fully internalize the threat that is being posed to the
existence of the State of Israel as the national home of the Jewish people
in the absence of an accord, will find all the reasons [not to reach one].
And whoever believes that the option of two national states represents the
Israeli interest, will find the ways to overcome the problems.

This “threat to our existence”: Are you talking demographics, international
legitimacy...?

It’s everything. First of all, on the ideological level, we have to choose
between two different visions. One vision speaks of Jewish sovereignty, or
Jewish existence, on the entire Land of Israel, or let’s say between the
river and the sea: the physical realization of the national historic right –
a right in which I believe – on all those areas. For those who hold to this
vision, every day that passes is a new victory. Another house. Another day
that we’re here. New facts on the ground.

And in their vision, set against the delegitimization of Israel is the
conviction that they have justice on their side, and that things will work
out. This is generally a group of believers [in God] – who believe that
things work out not only as a consequence of decisions we make. I respect
this vision, but I disagree with it.

I myself come from a place where all of us shared this vision. This was the
thinking after 1967 – the sense that we have returned to the places of our
ancestors. The problem is that those who still share this vision never took
a decision. The Right. They never passed, or tried to pass, a decision that
annexed those territories to Israel. So we have remained in a sort of
twilight zone since 1967, in a kind of limbo in which no decision has been
taken. It’s time to make up our minds.

My vision, shared by most of the Israeli public, speaks of the existence of
Israel as a Jewish, democratic, secure state, a state living in peace, in
the Land of Israel. If I want all of the Land of Israel, I have to give up
on either the Jewish or the democratic aspect. I don’t want to give up on
either, and by the way, I think that Jewish values are democratic values.
The only way to maintain those values is to relinquish part of the Land of
Israel...

Presumably Olmert internalized these arguments, and yet, together with you,
he couldn’t reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Well it wasn’t together with me. I was authorized by Olmert to conduct
negotiations with the Palestinians. The principles on which I ran those
talks for nine months, in accordance with the Annapolis framework, were to
negotiate with the Palestinian national movement [represented by Ahmed
Qurei/Abu Ala] to reach an agreement on all the core issues – a detailed
agreement, an agreement that could be implemented, with a stated commitment
that this marked the end of the conflict via two national states, in which
each state constitutes a solution for its people.

In November 2008, we gathered – Abu Mazen [Abbas], myself, representatives
of the Quartet, the Arab League – in Sharm e- Sheikh. And we agreed that we
hadn’t exhausted the process and that we wanted to continue. We hadn’t
talked about Jerusalem and we hadn’t yet reached final decisions on all the
issues. The negotiations weren’t finished. They hadn’t reached a dead end.
We hadn’t yet put everything on the table.

Olmert, outside of that framework, decided at some stage toward the end of
his time in office to place a certain proposal on the table. To the best of
my knowledge, Abu Mazen did not even respond to it – for various reasons
connected to the situation at the time: Operation Cast Lead, the end of the
prime minister’s term, and other factors.

You know, Ehud Barak returned from Camp David [in 2000] and declared happily
that we had “removed the mask” [from Yasser Arafat and exposed him as not
genuinely seeking peace]. Removing the mask was not the aim here. It may be
that we will reach a point at which we will not be able to reach an accord.

But Abu Mazen’s response, or lack of one, is not a barometer?

Absolutely not. I have no doubt. And I think Olmert feels the same.

Olmert has said that Israel should again present those same terms to Abbas –
some of which, by the way, you wouldn’t offer...

I disagreed with him on some of the terms. I also think this idea, which
also played out at Camp David, of saying “we’re issuing a proposal, take it
or leave it,” is less good than proceeding through negotiations.

Nonetheless, Olmert’s was a very, very generous proposal. And it can be
argued that had Abbas truly wanted an accord, he would have jumped on those
terms, and signed as quickly as possible.

I hear that the Palestinians [recently] gave the Americans, and tried to
give to Netanyahu, their own proposal for an accord. I assume this was some
kind of opening position. I’d really like all the skeptics to look at this
proposal, and see how far it is from a genuine accord. It may be that this
will produce the understanding that a deal is possible, after all. Now, even
when it seems the gaps are narrow, sometimes it can be like a pair of [polar
opposite] magnets, where at the end they can’t be bridged; where the gaps
are deal breakers.

But I think it is inaccurate to invoke Olmert [and his proposal], and say
there is no partner because the Palestinians didn’t accept it.

The Palestinians “tried to give’ the current government a proposal, maps?
Can you elaborate. If they tried to give Netanyahu something, why weren’t
they able to?

Let me put it this way: They certainly gave the Americans a proposal of this
kind, a map...

But you don’t know the details?

I do know. But I’m being discreet.

What specifics can you tell us about your positions in the negotiations?

It’s tactically wrong for Israel to go into the details, but I’ll tell you
the principles. First, we’re talking about two national states. That means
each state constitutes the solution for its people. The establishment of the
state of Palestine ends the conflict. And just as the State of Israel gave
refuge to those Jews who came after the Holocaust from Europe and from Arab
states, just as the State of Israel is today a national home with a minister
of absorption and the Law of Return, so with the state of Palestine: Its
establishment should constitute the complete, full national answer for the
Palestinians wherever they are. Therefore there will not be a return of
refugees to Israel.

So the number is zero.

Of course. And the Palestinians know my position on this and so does the
entire Arab world.

This national solution is also the solution for the Arabs of Israel, who are
citizens with equal rights because of our values as a Jewish state and as a
democratic state. Their national demands from Israel will cease. They are
individuals with equal rights in a state that is the national home of the
Jewish people.

The next principle relates to security. This is not about ideology, but
about the obligation of every government to provide security. This too is an
American and international interest. After all, another terrorist state,
another failed state, another fundamentalist Islamic state – there are
enough of those already.

The Palestinians have already said they agree to a demilitarized state. It
is clear to them that Israeli security represents even their interests. The
Palestinian national movement is not an Islamic religious movement.

And therefore the Hamas takeover of Gaza hurts them, just as a future Hamas
takeover [in the West Bank] obviously would not represent their interests.

I don’t want to go into other security parameters. Israel has set out for
itself its requirements.

Finally, demarcating the border, I’m not going to sketch it out. But I want
to say something about the settlements. After 1967 I regarded the settlement
enterprise as a part of the Israeli people’s return to its homeland. It
seemed only natural to me, from a historic and national perspective. Others
saw it as colonialism, contrary to international law. It really doesn’t
matter anymore.

On the assumption that we are proceeding along the principle of two states,
every prime minister will have to demarcate the border in such a way as to
deal with the reality on the ground. After 40 years, hundreds of thousands
of Israelis live today in areas that are a part of the negotiation process.
The good news is most of them live in what we call the blocs. The settlement
enterprise does indeed determine where the borderline runs. It determines
this, because the aim is to leave as many Israelis as possible in their
homes, which today are inside the settlement blocs. Otherwise, it will be
impossible. The world understands this.

As for Jerusalem, it has been on the negotiating table since the Oslo
accords. I didn’t discuss Jerusalem [in the negotiations with Abu Ala]. So I
won’t go any further. But it’s obviously not just Jerusalem that will have
to be negotiated. Every representative of every government that represents
the Israeli national home will have to manage and to preserve those places
that from a historic, national and religious perspective are so critical to
us. I may have been born in Tel Aviv, but my umbilical cord emerges from the
Temple Mount.

And on the basis of those principles, you say that it is possible to reach
an accord?

Yes.

I came from the Right and I’m still on the Right in the national context. I
didn’t go into politics out of concern for the Palestinians but out of
concern for Israel.

What most troubles me about the prime minister’s actions, about this
coalition, is that Netanyahu, via megaphone diplomacy, in order to preserve
his base, is harming the national interests...

Netanyahu starts with the “no.” He always says what the deal breakers are,
not the deal makers.

The prime minister, who sounds tough on the national issues and the security
issues, is hurting us on those issues. After two years of this government,
there are more question marks than there were before about the Jewish state,
more question marks about the legitimacy of Israel, about the legitimacy of
Israel’s security requirements. Things that were taken for granted in the
past are no longer taken for granted because of all the rhetoric that sounds
so tough domestically. Netanyahu won’t protect Israel’s interests in the
negotiating room any better than me, if he ever gets there. He’s just
eroding our positions.

Are you worried by the Abbas trend toward unilateralism?

Very. I conducted direct negotiations, the world didn’t intervene, we
negotiated in a closed room and everyone supported this. That is the optimal
situation. That kind of negotiation best serves Israel’s interests. You’re
in control. You initiate. You act tactically correctly in the room.

Now we’re in the worst possible place. There are no talks, and as time
passes, other proposals are being presented. The absence of negotiations,
the delays in the process, are likely to place Israel in a worse position in
terms of the capacity to end the conflict, in terms of Israel’s legitimacy,
and so on.

I hope, by the way, that what is unfolding will prompt the Israeli Right to
understand that there is no comfortable status quo. I’m sorry to have to say
that. And I do see that happening.

Where do you see that?

This government has served for almost two years. A government comprising a
prime minister who had refused to say “two national states.” A foreign
minister [Avigdor Lieberman] who had left the Olmert government, by his
account, because of Annapolis. And an interior minister [Eli Yishai] from
Shas, the party that had refused to be in a government with me [after Olmert
resigned and I tried to form a coalition] if we talked about Jerusalem.
Talked about – not divided. And [Yishai] knew that I hadn’t talked about it.

The three of them, today, are calling on the Palestinians to enter the
negotiating room, when it’s clear that the dialogue today is on terms much
worse for Israel. When it’s clear that the talks will cover all the core
issues, including Jerusalem.

It’s true that Lieberman takes care to add that there’s no chance for an
accord anyway because the Palestinians are to blame, because we offered them
everything. It amazes me that all of these people utilize the things that
were offered in order to say there is no partner on the other side, without
asking themselves whether they themselves are partners to those offers.

Netanyahu, who tried to market economic peace and security peace without
diplomatic peace, nowadays talks of diplomatic peace. The gulf between those
words and an agreement is vast. That’s why I’m not in this government. But
as someone who was accused by that group, told that it was unthinkable to
seek this, and wrong, and not representative of the Israeli interest... I’m
not saying “I told you so.” I’m saying that this is a very important
process. Any agreement will be very problematic. It will rend the people. It
will be terrible. But at least there should be the recognition that there is
no better option for Israel.

If we don’t get back to direct talks, where will the unilateral effort lead?
Will the Americans stand against the world and veto...?

It’s absurd, what’s happening in the world today. What are [those countries
that are recognizing “Palestine”] saying? They’re saying, “We’re not against
Israel.” They’re saying, “The Israeli government also supports two states,
also speaks of a Palestinian state. So we’re going a little faster.”

The absence of negotiations creates unilateral and international steps that
this government evidently can’t handle. So long as there were direct talks,
the world didn’t try to intervene.

I remember making a visit to Paris [as foreign minister], when France held
the EU presidency, and they were about to issue a decision endorsing a
Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. Jerusalem as the capital. Everything.
I had a very frank discussion with the French foreign minister. I said to
him, “Look, we’re negotiating. The Palestinians say it’s serious. We want to
reach a successful conclusion. We’re not trying to waste time. This
announcement now won’t help.” It came off the agenda.

Now what’s happening? On the one hand, this government has recognized that
there will be a Palestinian state. On the other hand, it is doing nothing to
advance this. The prime minister is not prepared to take even a quarter of a
political risk – even though he has a majority for every decision. Nothing
would have happened to his coalition if he had approved a second settlement
freeze.

Really?

No party would have bolted his government. Not Lieberman and not Shas. And
he knew that. He tried to bargain, to get a better deal [from the US].

But would a second settlement freeze have produced anything substantive?

This is the real question: Does the current prime minister want to reach an
accord? Plainly he wants to negotiate. But does he want to reach an accord?
That’s the real test. There is a giant question mark over Israel.

Obviously he wants an accord. The question is what price he is prepared to
pay.

Yes. Is he prepared to pay the realistic price of an accord that protects
our fundamental interests?

And what’s your answer to that question?

I’m head of the opposition today. That’s your answer.

Head of the opposition, despite being asked to join the coalition?

I’ll give you the facts. From the time this government was established, on
almost a daily basis, I asked myself, is there no substantive process
because the prime minister doesn’t want to pay the price involved in an
agreement or because he can’t move ahead for political reasons?

Immediately after the elections, I suggested a different coalition to him in
a meeting we had. He said he already had commitments to what he called his
natural partners, the haredim and Lieberman. His offer to me was to join
that coalition. He said the right wing had won.

Everybody wants to live in peace. Netanyahu wants to live in peace. That’s
clear. But I understood that there was a gulf between my and his
internalization of the imperative for an agreement. He didn’t have the drive
for it.

I said: You can interpret the election results [as a victory for the Right]
or you can say that two parties won – Kadima and the Likud, putting aside
the fact that we got one more seat. I suggested: Let’s agree between us that
we’re going for an agreement [with the Palestinians] on the basis of
principles we can agree on, two states. And let’s create partnerships.
Kadima with, say, Labor, and the Likud with one partner that it would
choose. A different translation of the election results. He didn’t want
this.

With rotation of the prime ministership?

Absolutely. I thought that the way to create the partnership was by
[governing] together, including with rotation. But we didn’t reach
agreements, in any case, on content.

[Later] I saw him start to say those words “two states.” But without real
intent, without the drive, without the [sense of imperative] that we have to
reach an agreement and to pay those prices, because otherwise the option for
the Jewish state will be worse. Rather, he saw and analyzed the processes,
the American pressure for negotiations, the need to start speaking in those
terms.

Still, I asked myself, is there some kind of opportunity whereby he does
want to pay the price? So – and this was before the flotilla [in May] – I
initiated another discussion with him on the issue.

I said to him, in order to stop the international trend against Israel, you
have to decide for yourself first if you’re prepared to pay the price of an
accord. If not, there’s no point in continuing this discussion. If yes,
there has to be an accompanying political drama, whereby you exchange your
coalition for a coalition in which there is a majority for an agreement. You’ll
have to bid farewell to one of your partners, because I can’t [enter your
coalition and] face an automatic majority of 61 against. I’ll be taking all
the hope for peace, all the international credibility I have, and jumping
into the pool with two weights around my ankles – Shas on one ankle and
Lieberman on the other and no chance of making progress.

I initiated [these conversations] on more than one occasion – every time I
thought there was a chance, maybe, but that he felt himself constrained
politically. He didn’t want it.

And since then, I’ve come to understand that out of his lack of willingness
to make a change politically, and the relentless preoccupation with the next
elections – concern for his base, concern over whether Lieberman will
outflank him from the right... If he fears that Lieberman will outflank him
from the right before the next elections, he won’t advance any process [of
substance with the Palestinians]. An agreement [with the Palestinians] will
always constitute a position that is not the classical right-wing position.
I see his lack of willingness to advance, and I understand where he stands.

Your later proposals also included a demand for rotation?

No.

But to be given authority to run the negotiations independently?

Agreements on content, on managing the negotiations and on a dependable
majority in the government in order to move this forward. After the
elections I did include rotation, subsequently no. I thought, if there is an
opportunity and the world is pressing... But it’s not there.

I said something else to him. The Likud and Kadima are two national, liberal
parties, or supposed to be. Yet the Likud gives the haredim a monopoly on
the Jewishness of the state. In my view, the issue of a Jewish state has a
national connotation, not a haredi connotation. I thought that together we
could have written the first chapter in the constitution of Israel. We could
have introduced national content, core curricula for all, an equalizing of
the [military and social] burden, all of those things.

All the mistakes were Netanyahu’s, or did the Americans contribute with an
exaggerated focus on settlements and the freeze as a precondition?

I don’t have an ideological attachment to the freeze. It’s no secret that
when we were negotiating, we built a little. It was in the settlement blocs
and we didn’t make a provocative issue of it. If Netanyahu hadn’t been able
to freeze completely, I wouldn’t have attacked him.

Before Netanyahu had decided whether or not to extend the freeze, I didn’t
publicly demand that he extend it, until I realized that he was going to say
no to the United States. No to a request for another two months, which
seemed to me to be a mistaken decision from every point of view. Two months
or three months at the request of the president of the United States,
honestly! I thought it was a mistake of the first order for Netanyahu not to
agree, and never mind whether or not it was important to seek that freeze or
not.

Additional building in the settlements, certainly beyond the security
barrier, does not serve the vision of a Jewish, democratic, secure Israel in
the Land of Israel. I’ve asked Netanyahu from the Knesset podium, how can
you send a young couple to start to build their lives in a settlement when
you know deep inside, assuming you are honest when you say “two states,”
that you are apparently going to have to evict them in a year, two years,
five?

When I meet with Council of Jewish Settlements members, as I do sometimes,
some of them say, “We need interim arrangements, some kind of modus
vivendi.” I ask them, “When you talk about those kinds of agreements, are
you saying, ‘Ok, we won’t build anymore, we’re trying to stabilize the
existing situation?’ Or are you intending to carry on building in order to
realize your vision [of a Jewish presence throughout Judea and Samaria],
which conflicts with our vision?’” And they say, “The latter.”

Knowing exactly where I want to get to in the end, the decisions are so
clear. But we’re living in an illusory world. People are speaking with a
mishmash of words, without taking decisions on the real matters. For our own
sakes, we have to make up our minds. Then we’ll interact with the Americans
and the Palestinians and the rest of the world.

If Netanyahu had truly embraced this vision, he’d have separated the wheat
from the chaff. The way he’s operating, a man who can’t distinguish between
the settlement blocs and isolated settlements, he gives the settlement blocs
the exact same status as other settlements instead of strengthening them.

I want to ask you some questions about the Jewish nature of our Jewish
state. Do you, for instance, believe that Reform rabbis should be allowed to
perform authorized wedding ceremonies here? Do you support gay marriage? Do
you consider a child of a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother to be Jewish?

I’ll answer you more on the level of principles than specifics. I see myself
as a Jewish Israeli – as a Jew who lives in Israel, not as an Israeli who is
Jewish. In my eyes, the issue of Jewishness is a deep national feeling. I
certainly don’t keep the 613 commandments. I keep some. I don’t often go to
synagogue, but when I do I go to an Orthodox synagogue and I sit in the
women’s section.

I see the Jewish issue as something I choose out of a sense of connection to
the history, the culture, the heritage, the tradition, something very
emotional that links me to the Jewish melody. Everyone can make their
choice. There was a period when you could not light a fire but you could
watch television; not cook but smoke; drive, but not near the synagogue.
Those were very Israeli kinds of choices and very Jewish in the national
sense. I certainly didn’t want a separation between religion and state
because then we become Jews who live in the State of Israel just like Jews
who live in any other country.

But as minister of immigrant absorption, I understood that 300,000 people
[who were not halachically Jewish] had come here under the Law of Return,
which enables entrance to Israel for anyone from a Jewish family, and which
to me emblemizes the fact of Israel as a Jewish state. Yet in practice, we
don’t connect them to that Jewish aspect. That brought me up against all the
issues of conversion procedures.

I came from a place where it was entirely natural that the Orthodox
rabbinate be fully responsible for conversions, but suddenly I found, when I
wanted to enable those processes, that people were saying to me, “What do
you care if they’re Jewish? They’ll learn Hebrew, they’ll serve in the army.
They’re combat soldiers, wonderful soldiers.”

I said being Jewish is deeper than serving in the army. And those are two
elements – serving in the army and speaking Hebrew – that we do not have in
common with the Jews in the Diaspora. If being Jewish is comprised of those
two components, it’s very Israeli, and a very particular kind of
Israeli-ness, at that. It certainly doesn’t connect them with the haredim.

I started looking still deeper into this and I’m no expert on Halacha, but
there are places where the rabbinical establishment can be lenient and isn’t.
For example, children under 13, who in any case aren’t obligated to fulfill
all the commandments, why must they go to Orthodox schools? That makes life
harder for the parents. And why do those who want to go through conversion
have to prove that they’ll fulfill the commandments after their conversion?
Arik Sharon said once that he wouldn’t be approved for conversion, and nor
would I.

So since then I’ve been looking for areas where one can be lenient, if
possible without confrontations but certainly with respect to the other
streams of Judaism.

Within the contours of Halacha?

When they proposed the conversion law with the idea of concretizing the
rabbinic, halachic monopoly in law, [Diaspora] representatives of all the
streams of Judaism came to Israel. They opened my eyes to a certain extent
to the fact that we’re outlawing a great proportion of the Jewish people.
The rabbinate is so strict. The halachic Orthodox establishment has regarded
joining the Jewish people as something to prevent.

I come from a Jabotinsky world. He felt that the stringent approach to
Judaism had preserved the Jewish people in exile. But the idea was that when
you come to the Land of Israel, and create Jewish sovereignty here, we can
lighten up a little and create a renewed national Judaism in the birthplace
of the Jewish people, without the need for this hard skin that safeguarded
the people in exile.

I’m not talking about destroying something, I’m talking about finding common
ground. I’m grappling with some of these issues now. I work with the [modern
Orthodox, Zionist] Tzohar rabbis and others.

You asked me about the son of a Jewish father. Look, I sit with Haim Amsalem
[the maverick Shas Knesset member and rabbi, who encourages a lenient
halachic approach to conversions in Israel]. I believe there is the
possibility to ease up more.

I’m in the process of thinking, beyond respecting the various streams and
recognizing their conversions. I’m also in touch with Conservatives and
Reform in Israel. I don’t yet have a practical platform for how this should
be reflected in the constitution on the matter of marriages. Thus far we [in
Kadima] have supported the civil marriage bill. It’ll come up for a vote
again. Thus far we have found solutions within the halachic framework. But
the more the haredim use their monopoly and impose their worldview on the
national, liberal movement, the more this will lead to a revolution.

I should add that Kadima invites representatives of all streams of Judaism
to its conferences and activities.

It seemed unfair of you to demand the prime minister’s resignation after the
Carmel fire. You didn’t resign after the Second Lebanon War.

I didn’t have to. First of all, in my opinion, Netanyahu shouldn’t be prime
minister for a thousand and one reasons. The Carmel fire is just one of
them. He turned a disaster into some kind of big show. He took one correct
decision, to call for international assistance, but now what? Now what?
While we sit here talking, nothing has been sorted out. The fire services
haven’t been sorted out.

The Lebanon War was a result partly of failures that had been there before,
landing upon a serving prime minister, and I called on him to resign too.

You don’t feel responsible for the failure of [Security Council] Resolution
1701, after which Hizbullah rearmed?

Absolutely not. Let’s talk about Resolution 1701. 1701 was the most
appropriate and best option to end that war. I’m pretty sick of the
superficiality with which this is treated, including by Netanyahu. There are
three options when you face a threat from a certain area. One is to hold on
to it, and we held onto south Lebanon for many years and that did not bring
the desired result. The second is to get out of there under cover of
darkness, as Ehud Barak did [in 2000, dismantling the security zone], which
didn’t bring the desired result. And the third is to get out with some kind
of agreement – with commitments and some kind of international recognition.

Given the choice of remaining in Lebanon in a situation where the missiles
were not only coming from south Lebanon, but from further north, was Israel
supposed to conquer all of Lebanon? This was not war between states where
there would be a defining result. Israel was fighting Hizbullah in a Lebanon
that had a legitimate government. In the UN we could work on the basis of
Israel and the state of Lebanon, and create a lack of legitimacy for
Hizbullah.

By contrast, when we were fighting Hamas [in Gaza two years ago], I didn’t
want to reach an agreement with Hamas, because Hamas is not legitimate and I
think that any dialogue with them, except regarding Gilad Schalit, is a
terrible mistake. Ehud Barak wanted to reach an agreement with them in
Operation Cast Lead. Sometimes people fight the previous war. They say in
Lebanon we wanted to reach an agreement. Absolutely, because there was a
legitimate government.

Under 1701, the Lebanese Army deployed in the south. International forces
arrived. There’s no 100 percent. Yes, there has been rearming by Hizbullah.
There would have been rearming under any other option as well. But we for
the first time created a situation in which that rearmament was not
legitimate, with the natural consequent options if we need to use them.

According to the surveys, Kadima leads the Likud, but does not seem to have
the chance of building a coalition. How are you going to improve that?

I don’t deal too much with surveys because they change. But in all the
surveys, Kadima is strong today. Partly that is because this is a lousy
government, and partly because we have maintained Kadima as an alternative
to this government – by staying in opposition, and being a responsible
opposition. Just as I think it was foolish to manage Operation Cast Lead
according to the conclusions of the Second Lebanon War, so I advise people
not to interpret the results of the next election according to the results
of the last election. We don’t know yet who all the players will be. They
can completely change the political blocs.

Certainly if I am given the mandate to form a government, I would invite the
Likud to be my partner, but on a path that I would set out – both as regards
an accord with the Palestinians and as regards national content. Today’s
Likud understands the political price it is paying for the historic
partnership with the haredim.

I don’t know what Lieberman’s considerations will be. I don’t know what the
other players’ considerations will be. In opposition, you have to find the
balance, the appropriate ways to advance your agenda. I intend to submit
bills on issues of conversion, legislation on sharing the burden, on
national service and other issues. I don’t want to be a constant voice of
criticism. But when it’s needed, the criticism is harsh. They’re not giving
me the opportunity, but if this government follows correct processes, I’ll
voice my support.

I think the public is looking at us less as a ferocious opposition and more
as a potential alternative government. It’s asking how I would be as prime
minister. Kadima’s lead over the Likud is substantial and in the last month
or two, people are switching from the Likud to us. We’re not strengthening
just because Labor is collapsing. There’s a soft right which is not happy
with the current situation.

Two final questions. Going back to the talks, you said you were authorized
by Olmert to conduct negotiations for an accord that could be implemented.
How could anything be implemented with Hamas in Gaza?

We negotiated with the Palestinian national movement on the assumption that
there is no chance for peace with Hamas and that no agreement can be reached
with them. We managed to bring the entire international community on board
not to give legitimacy to Hamas until they announce that the State of Israel
has the right to exist and renounce violence and terrorism. We agreed with
the Palestinians that an accord would be implemented only after there were
changes on the ground and a legitimate Palestinian government throughout the
territory That was the solution.

To my sorrow, while this government speaks out very strongly against
terrorism, in practice Hamas is becoming more and more legitimate because
one element of the equation we had is missing. We managed to get everyone on
board against Hamas because it was clear that Israel was serious in its
intentions with respect to the moderate Palestinian players.

And now you see a fracturing of the international consensus against Hamas?

Israel has already been forced to lift the closure on Gaza.

Exports from Gaza are permitted now. This government is taking decisions
that strengthen the process [of Hamas legitimacy]. Bibi, who spoke a lot
about the state of Hamastan, in practice is becoming a partner in its
establishment, to my sorrow. The flotillas are also part of this. It’s all
beginning to create legitimacy for Hamas.

And finally, your thoughts on the rabbis’ letter, outlawing home sales or
rentals to Arabs?

There is a struggle not only over the vision of a secure, Jewish, democratic
state in the Land of Israel, but also over the nature of a Jewish state. Is
the source of authority the law or the Torah? Is the interpreter the judge
or the rabbi? The sense of threat maybe, or of fear, in parts of the Israeli
society is being turned against the minorities or the foreigners.

The task of leadership today is to prevent this ill wind. In my opinion it
does not represent the Jewish values of the State of Israel. This is not the
Judaism I know.

And if we’re talking about Israel and the Diaspora, it certainly makes it
harder for those who want to represent Israel and its values outward.