Sunni vs. Shiite in Saudi Arabia

Joshua Teitelbaum Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 10, No. 23 16 January
2011
http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=5719&TTL=Sunni_vs._Shiite_in_Saudi_Arabia

* On December 16, the Saudi city of Medina witnessed severe clashes
between Sunnis and Shiites at the time of the annual Ashura gathering, when
Shiites commemorate the martyrdom of Husayn, grandson of the Prophet
Muhammad.

* Wahhabism, the leading stream of Islam in Sunni Saudi Arabia, is
extremely anti-Shiite, since certain Shiite practices conflict with Wahhabi
Islamic practice. Shiites, who constitute 10-15 percent of the Saudi
population, have suffered greatly under Saudi rule. Depredations have
included killings, arbitrary arrests, job discrimination, and forbidding of
their religious ceremonies.

* With Shiite Iran on the cusp of nuclear arms, and with demonstrated
victories by Iran's proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip, the Saudi
rulers cannot afford to be seen coddling local Shiites. Saudi Sunnis expect
their leaders to defend the honor and position of the Sunni majority within
and without Saudi Arabia, lest Shiite victories generate a sea change and
reverse the age-old dominance of the Sunni sect of Islam.

* The Shiites are not numerous enough to constitute a threat to the
regime, but they do constitute an actual and potential arm of Iranian
influence.

* The sense is that if King Abdullah had his way, he would end
discrimination and fully integrate the Saudi Shiites. But the king faces an
ongoing dilemma: if he appeases the Shiites, he risks the wrath of Wahhabi
extremists and the religious establishment; if he doesn't, the Shiites will
remain a thorn in his side.

On December 16, the Saudi city of Medina witnessed severe clashes between
Sunnis and Shiites. The clashes occurred at the time of the annual Ashura
gathering, when Shiites commemorate the martyrdom of Husayn, grandson of the
Prophet Muhammad. Although the local press referred only to anonymous mobs,
it was clear from international reporting and Saudi Shiite websites that
this was a sectarian riot.

Sunni Wahhabism and Shiism in Saudi Arabia

Wahhabism, the leading stream of Islam in Sunni Saudi Arabia, is extremely
anti-Shiite, since certain Shiite practices conflict with Wahhabi Islamic
practice. These include grave visitation and inordinate reverence for the
Prophet and his family. Shiites constitute the ultimate "other" for
Wahhabis, whose strict idea of the unity of God, a doctrine known as tawhid,
is diametrically opposed to Shiite practices that include pleading for the
intercession of saint-like mortals on behalf of humans. For this reason,
Wahhabis call Shiites mushrikin, often translated as "polytheists." Shiites
constitute 10-15 percent of the Saudi population and are concentrated in the
oil-rich Eastern Province along the Persian Gulf littoral. There is also a
small population in Medina.

Shiites have suffered greatly under Saudi rule. Depredations have included
killings, arbitrary arrests, job discrimination, and forbidding of their
religious ceremonies. According to the latest State Department human rights
report on Saudi Arabia, testimony by Shiites is not valid in courts, Shiite
prayer services are regularly disrupted, and Shiite social forums in the
Eastern Province have been banned.1

That said, matters have improved somewhat in the past several years under
the leadership of Crown Prince and now King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz. But
the Shiites want matters to change at a much faster pace. Although there
have been gains, in Shiite eyes there is still a very long way to go.

As in other fields, Abdullah has moved slowly toward reforming the Wahhabi
view of Shiites. He has met publicly with Shiite figures and in 2003
presided over a high-profile national dialogue between Sunnis and Shiites.
But the pace of this reform is hampered by the need to appease the religious
establishment, upon which the Saudi family relies for legitimacy. Moreover,
with Shiite Iran on the cusp of nuclear arms, and with demonstrated
victories by Iran's proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip, the Saudi
rulers cannot afford to be seen coddling local Shiites. Saudi Sunnis expect
their leaders to defend the honor and position of the Sunni majority within
and without Saudi Arabia, lest Shiite victories generate a sea change and
reverse the age-old dominance of the Sunni sect of Islam.2

Over the years, the country's Shiites have been divided between those
seeking recognition and integration and those who support the idea of "the
rule of the jurisconsult" (wilayat al-faqih), following the religious
guidance of Ayatollah Khamene'i, the Supreme Leader of Iran. Members of the
second trend have been widely blamed for the Khobar Towers bombing of June
1996, which killed 19 American servicemen.3

The Medina Clashes

Shiites revere the Prophet, his family, and his companions to a greater
extent than mainstream Sunnis and most certainly Wahhabis. Medina is host to
the Prophet's Mosque and Tomb. Many Shiite-revered imams (descendants of the
Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali), as well as his two wives,
are buried in Medina's al-Baqi cemetery, which is often off-limits to
pilgrimage since Wahhabism frowns on grave visitation.

The December 16 confrontation is best viewed within the context of
increasing disappointment with the Saudi royal family's treatment of the
Shiites. Change is not coming fast enough, according to Shiite leaders.

This is not the first time in recent history that Sunnis and Shiites have
clashed in Medina. In February 2009 Shiites attempting to perform visitation
rites at the al-Baqi cemetery on the anniversary of the Prophet's death were
set upon by members of the Wahhabi Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and
the Prevention of Vice, often termed the "religious police" in the West. A
Saudi official put the blame on the Shiite pilgrims, saying they triggered
the dispute by practicing rituals deemed to be "religious infractions," such
as the practice of Shiites to grab a handful of dust as a blessing and pray
at the graves of the imams.4Apparently, the authorities were disturbed at
the gathering, which was made up of over 1,500 people. The religious police
fired in the air to disperse the crowd, which led to a stampede and the
death of three pilgrims. Many others were injured and several arrests were
made. In late February and early March, security officers arrested more than
50 Shiite citizens, including children, in the Eastern Province for engaging
in a peaceful demonstration in solidarity with Shiites arrested in the
Medina clashes. Authorities held more than 24 individuals until July 1, when
the king granted a pardon.5

In the lead-up to the December events, Shiites endured increasing
harassment. In July, the Shiite website Rasid reported, the religious police
attacked a ceremony in Medina celebrating the birth of the Imam Mahdi, the
last of the Twelve Imams.6 Several Shiite activists received threatening
visits from the authorities, and others were arrested.7 Human Rights Watch
published an appeal in March for the release of Munir Jassas, who had been
arrested for his online protests of the 2009 attack on Shiite pilgrims in
Medina.8

Just a few days before the December 2010 clashes, Sunni extremists had
bombed several processions in Iraq in the lead-up to Ashura.9 This must
surely have been on the minds of Medina's Shiites. The December riots
occurred near the al-Quba mosque in Medina, which is said to be the world's
first mosque. According to Rasid, Sunni extremists attacked the Shiite
gathering with poles and stones.10 The police deployed ten teams of special
task force units, 40 security patrols, and several water trucks. The crowd
was dispersed by security forces who fired in the air.11 The Saudi daily
al-Madina wrote that 38 people were arrested, 3 people injured, and 36 cars
damaged.12

Greater detail is hard to come by. It was not clear if the Shiites were
actually carrying out an Ashura procession or just gathering and
"threatening," in the eyes of the Sunnis, to do so. It is likely, though,
that any Shiite crowd on that day would have drawn the ire of Wahhabi
zealots. It also appears from various reports that the clashes were much
like a "rumble" between young toughs from Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods.

Looking toward the Future

With King Abdullah indisposed while recovering from an operation in New
York, reconciliatory meetings were held on the local level in Medina. On
December 22, the governor of Medina Province, Prince Abd al-Aziz bin Majid,
called Sunni and Shiite leaders to a meeting at his palace. According to a
report, Prince Abd al-Aziz stressed in his remarks that Islam was a religion
that did not foster discord between its sects. He suggested that the leaders
hold a seminar and further meetings to ease tensions.13 At a meeting on
December 25, Shiite and Sunni leaders signed a document promising "to live
as one family." Apparently the first document of its kind, it was signed by
four leaders from each side.14

In general, over the years there has been some improvement in the lot of the
Shiites of Saudi Arabia. They are allowed to hold Ashura commemorations in
some locations, publish Shiite works, and open Shiite mosques and Shiite
schools, albeit all in a very slow and highly scrutinized manner.15 Even so,
Saudi Shiites never stop worrying that their hard-won gains may evaporate
one day, and they do not have faith in the government. Paradoxically, the
gains of their Iraqi brethren might cause them to lose what they have
achieved in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Sunnis accuse Saudi Shiites of funding
terrorism against Sunnis in Iraq,16 while Saudi Shiites accuse Saudi Sunnis
of funneling funds to Sunni terrorists in Iraq. Saudi Shiites are also
worried about extremists in their midst. In the village of Awwamiya, some
residents were reported to be carrying automatic weapons and wearing
necklaces with a picture of Hizbullah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah.17

Saudi Shiites continue to be divided between those who favor continued
dialogue and those who want a more confrontational approach, while all
Shiites perceive a lack of momentum regarding reform. Leaders such as
Ja'afar al-Shayib, Muhammad Mahfuz, and Hasan al-Saffar support continued
engagement with the regime and the conservative Sunni elements of Saudi
society, while others, such as the cleric Nimr al-Nimr, pursue a more
militant line. Some leaders have even proposed the establishment of a Saudi
Shiite marja' al-taqlid (source of religious emulation) in order to allay
Sunni fears that the Saudi Shiites were influence by Shiite clerics in Iran
and Iraq.18

In order to preserve their gains, the Shiites seem to believe that it is
necessary for King Abdullah to speak out against anti-Shiite fatwas
(religious rulings), which are quite common; indeed, they argue that such
fatwas should be criminalized.19 But it is likely they will be disappointed.
Relations between the regime and the Shiite population are fraught with
difficulty. Given the reliance of the regime on the Sunni Wahhabi clerics,
it is unlikely that the Al Saud will rein them in. The situation in Iraq has
made it much harder to do so. The royal family feels keenly its role as a
leader of the Sunni world, and local Sunnis are pressuring the regime to
support the Sunnis in Iraq. In the face of the regional Shiite ascendancy
marked by Hizbullah's performance against Israel, a possible Shiite state in
Iraq, and a powerful Iran, it is likely that Saudi Shiites will continue to
pay the price of being the ultimate "other," sacrificed on the altar of the
Wahhabi legitimacy on which the regime is so dependent.

The Shiites are not numerous enough to constitute a threat to the regime,
but they do constitute an actual and potential arm of Iranian influence. The
sense is that if King Abdullah had his way, he would end discrimination and
fully integrate the Saudi Shiites. But the king faces an ongoing dilemma
that presents no immediate solution: if he appeases the Shiites, he risks
the wrath of Wahhabi extremists and the religious establishment; if he
doesn't, the Shiites will remain a thorn in his side.

The exponential growth in Iranian influence in the region makes Abdullah's
task that much harder. Beyond the struggle for regional hegemony between
Tehran and Riyadh, Abdullah's Shiite problem has grown because Iran is
contesting the leadership of world Islam. And within the kingdom, Iran
pushes Saudi Shiites toward confrontation. No wonder Abdullah urged the U.S.
to "cut off the head of the snake."20

* * *
Notes

1. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136079.htm.

2. See Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Shiites of Saudi Arabia," Current Trends in
Islamist Ideology, Vol. 10 (2010), online at
http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-shiites-of-saudi-arabia.

3. While some have argued that al-Qaeda was responsible for Khobar Towers,
most evidence points to extremist Shiite groups supported by Iran. See
Thomas Hegghammer, "Deconstructing the Myth about al-Qa'ida and Khobar," CTC
Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 3 (February 2008), online at
http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer_-_AQ_and_Khobar_-_Sentinel.pdf.

4. AP, February 24, 2009.

5. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136079.htm.

6. http://rasid.com/english/?act=artc&id=282.

7. See, for example, http://rasid.com/english/?act=artc&id=288.

8.
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/23/saudi-arabia-free-advocate-shia-rights.

9.
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/906631--roadside-bombs-target-shiite-pilgrims-in-iraq.

10. http://rasid.com/artc.php?id=41881; AP, December 18, 2010.

11. Arab News, December 18, 2010.

12. AP, December 18, 2010.

13. http://rasid.com/artc.php?id=41973.

14. http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=218486; see
http://rasid.com/artc.php?id=42011 for more details and pictures of the
gathering.

15. AP, January 30, 2007; Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2006; New York Times,
February 5, 2007. Department of State, Saudi Arabia: Country Report on Human
Rights Practices 2006, March 6, 2007.

16. FBIS OSC Report on terrorist websites, February 12, 2007.

17. AP, February 3, 2007.

18. Fred Wehrey, "Shi'a Pessimistic About Reform, But Seek Reconciliation,"
Arab Reform Bulletin, August 19, 2008.

19. Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 2007.

20. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/150519.

* * *

Joshua Teitelbaum, Ph.D., is Principal Research Fellow at the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs. He is a researcher at the GLORIA Center,
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and holds visiting positions at the
Hoover Institution and the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of
Law, both at Stanford University.