"It appears that in the short term the two regimes are stable, but what can
be expected in the longer term is of serious concern."

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: For years Shlomo Brom has been part of the group
recommending that Israel can trade security based on physical conditions in
the field for pieces of paper.

Yet now we have this proponent of "land for piece"(of paper) concluding
that there are grounds for serious concern for the long term stability of
Jordan and Egypt - where the sources of instability have nothing to do with
what the Jewish State does or doesn't do.

Oops.]

The Toppling of the Tunisian Regime: Ramifications for the Arab World
INSS Insight No. 238, January 20, 2011
Brom, Shlomo
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=4765

The overthrow of the Tunisian regime, which prompted authoritarian President
Zine El Abidine Bin Ali to flee the country on Friday, January 14, 2011, is
an unprecedented event among Arab countries. In its short history, the Arab
world – which abounds with autocratic regimes – has experienced many
military coups that toppled the existing ruler and replaced him with another
strongman. However, in recent decades, military coups have nearly
disappeared as a result of stronger internal security apparatuses; growth in
the size of armies, which has made organizing military coups more difficult;
and pervasive mass media. A battalion commander can no longer carry out a
coup by taking over a radio station. In the Tunisian case, and for the first
time, an autocratic regime was toppled as a result of a popular uprising.

The Tunisian regime fell because it lost control over mass demonstrations
that began when an unemployed university graduate working as a peddler set
himself on fire after police confiscated his cart. Throughout the
demonstrations, the abundance of media channels and the subversive use of
the internet played an important role, as in the demonstrations in Iran more
than a year ago. Regimes in the Middle East no longer have a monopoly on the
mass media, which makes it difficult for them to withhold information and
maintain their rule. The internet was also an important conduit for the
waves of responses from other Arab countries.

Indeed, the fall of the regime in Tunisia fomented discontent among the
public elsewhere in the Arab world, where those at the helm are generally
alienated from the masses. In various Arab countries, protestors have
rallied in support of change in Tunisia, spouting defiant rhetoric against
the regimes of their own countries. This phenomenon was particularly blatant
in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Libya.

The fall of the regime in Tunisia also departed from the familiar scripts of
Arab regimes falling in a popular uprising. These scenarios generally
predicted a popular uprising led by Islamist elements against the backdrop
of strengthened Islamic movements in the Arab world. From this point of view
Tunisia is an exception, since under the Bin Ali regime it has undergone a
process of modernization and fast economic development. In addition, the
regime confronted the local Islamic movement with an iron fist, and Islamic
leaders that survived fled abroad. The popular uprising was waged mainly by
Western-educated young people who were led by activists from the democratic
opposition. In fact, this was an uprising by the social class that was
essential to the regime in its struggle against the Islamic movement. In
contrast, in other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, the democratic
opposition does not have a great deal of influence in the local society,
while the Islamic movements have a wide circle of supporters and wield much
influence.

Nonetheless, it is hard to foresee the outcome of democratic elections in
Tunisia after such a long period of autocratic rule, which has prevented the
populace from expressing its genuine inclinations. True, the exiled Islamic
movement leader declared that his movement would not run its own
presidential candidate in forthcoming elections, apparently aware of the
difficulty in building a political infrastructure for elections in such a
short time. However, the parliamentary elections could reveal Islamic
leanings that were concealed during the previous regime, especially in rural
areas outside the large cities. This means that free elections, if they are
in fact held, could produce a model of a functioning democratic regime or,
alternatively, demonstrate the success of the Islamic movement in taking
over an Arab state through democratic elections.

Possible reactions in the Arab world to the Tunisian events should be
examined in two time frames. In the short term, the demonstrations and
protests in some Arab countries could escalate to the point that the regimes
would be hard pressed to control them. This scenario pertains primarily to
situations in which the regimes use too much force, causing bloodshed and a
chain reaction. At this point, it seems that the regimes in most Arab
countries have a great deal of experience in controlling situations where
the crowd is whipped into a frenzy, and therefore they could manage these
events and quell unrest.

Indeed, against the successful example, at least in the short term, of
Tunisia is the failure of the mass demonstrations in Iran in 2009, which
were firmly suppressed by the Iranian Islamic regime. In any case any regime
that wants to suppress a popular uprising at the outset will face a dilemma
about how much force to use. Too much force at the start of a demonstration
is liable to spark a counter-response that will bring about a more wide
scale uprising. However, a response that is seen as sluggish is liable to
project a lack of firmness on the part of the regime and encourage those
involved in the uprising.

The more difficult question, however, how this uprising will influence Arab
countries in the longer term, depends on the developments in Tunisia. If the
elections in Tunisia take place in an orderly fashion and seat a
Western-oriented government that succeeds in establishing and maintaining a
democratic regime, they will produce a model that can influence other Arab
publics and enhance domestic democratic oppositions. Two other scenarios –
chaos and the democratic opposition’s inability to form a stable government,
and the rise of the Islamic movement to power through democratic means –
will provide tremendous encouragement to a rising Islamist wave in the Arab
world, strengthen the Islamic movements, and even encourage them to take
concrete steps towards the overthrow of their host regimes.

The model of revolution through popular uprising will be studied by various
opposition movements, which will likely aspire to imitate it. However, there
are important differences between the respective Arab societies. Tunisia,
for example, with a relatively small but largely Western-educated
population, is different from Egypt or Algeria, which have enormous
populations. Future uprisings will also to a large extent depend on the
particular regime’s determination to maintain its rule and its ability to
maintain strong security apparatuses and build broad strata in the
population that have a vested interest in maintaining the regime.

Israel should be concerned mainly by the developments in its immediate
vicinity, i.e., Egypt and Jordan. For some time now there has been a
twilight atmosphere in Egypt because of President Mubarak’s age and his
health, and the uncertainty concerning his successor. Although Mubarak is
attempting to groom his son Gamal as his successor, there is much opposition
in Egypt to this idea. However, the regime in Egypt has succeeded in
building effective security organs and a solid elite that has an interest in
the continuity of the regime, and this elite includes all the security
organizations, including the military. In Jordan, which is suffering a
prolonged economic crisis, there is also unrest because of the tension
between residents of Transjordanian origin and those of Palestinian origin;
the not-insignificant support for the Muslim Brotherhood; and the
dissatisfaction of elements in the Transjordanian tribes, who feel that they
have been pushed to the sidelines. It appears that in the short term the two
regimes are stable, but what can be expected in the longer term is of
serious concern.

The Institute for National Security Studies • 40 Haim Levanon St. • Tel
Aviv 61398 • Israel • 03-640-0400 • e-mail: info@inss.org.il