Could the Kingdom of Bahrain Become an Iranian Pearl Harbor?

February 20, 2011 by jerusalemcenter
http://jerusalemcenter.wordpress.com/2011/02/20/could-the-kingdom-of-bahrain-become-an-iranian-pearl-harbor/

Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah

The Islamic Republic of Iran has reiterated in the past that its military
strategy is based on “asymmetric warfare“ – Tehran will not confront the
U.S. and its allies directly, given the superior military technology of the
West, but rather through subversion and terrorism. Bahrain is, in fact, the
ideal target for such an Iranian strategy. The actual stakes in the struggle
for Bahrain are far greater than one would think, given its small physical
size (760 sq. km.) and its tiny population (738,000).

When the U.S. entered the Second World War, Imperial Japan launched a
sea-borne airstrike against the headquarters and ships of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Today, as is well known, the headquarters of
the U.S. Fifth Fleet is in Bahrain. Iran does not need to employ its air
force against the U.S. naval facility, but only to topple the pro-American
regime of the al-Khalifa family and replace it with a new Bahraini regime
backed by the Shi’a majority which seeks the immediate withdrawal of the
fleet. In 2005, Shi’a demonstrators marched in Manama, Bahrain’s capital,
showing their support for Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Three years later in 2008, Shi’a demonstrators waved Hizbullah flags in
Manama and called for closing U.S. bases in Bahrain.

The recent events in Bahrain have underlined the very volatile situation in
which the small kingdom has been managing its affairs for the last two
decades.

Nothing could be as descriptive of its unique situation as the narrative of
the American analyst whose paper was leaked to the public through WikiLeaks:
“The Sunni ruling family of tiny, Shi’a-majority Bahrain have long
recognized that they needed outsiders – first the British, then the United
States – to protect them from predatory neighbors, Iran foremost among them.
Both Shahs and Ayatollahs have asserted claims to sovereignty over Bahrain
from time to time. While keeping close to their American protectors, Bahrain’s
rulers seek to avoid provoking Iran unnecessarily, and keep lines of
communication with Iranian leaders open.”

The Sunni al-Khalifa family took Bahrain in 1783 from another Arab clan that
acknowledged Persian overlordship. In 1971 the British colonizers left
Bahrain at a time when the last Shah of Iran asserted and then withdrew a
claim of sovereignty over the tiny island. After the Islamic revolution, the
Iranian regime claimed sovereignty over Bahrain from time to time. Tensions
between Bahrain and Iran developed again in February 2009 when Ali Akbar
Nateq-Nouri, an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
said Iran had sovereignty over Bahrain. He called Bahrain Iran’s 14th
province (Saddam Hussein called Kuwait Iraq’s 19th province during the 1991
Gulf War). Bahrain halted natural gas negotiations with Iran in protest of
the comments and demanded an official apology. Former Iranian Foreign
Minister Manoucher Mottaki visited Bahrain at the time and presented an
official apology.

It should come as no surprise that Bahraini rulers view Iran with deep
suspicion and support fully the U.S. efforts to pressure and contain Iran.
According to another leaked WikiLeaks document of April 2008, on the eve of
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Bahrain in 2008, the king
reiterated that his number-one security concern was Iran. The king told the
American who prepared Rice’s visit that the purpose of the meeting was to
demonstrate that “we have an alliance that will not stand by and watch
countries fall to Iran one by one.”

Bahraini officials often tell their American counterparts that some Shi’a
oppositionists are backed by Iran. The king himself has claimed that members
of the opposition have received training in Lebanon with Hizbullah officers
(even though the Americans were unable to confirm this report). The last
known and proved Iranian involvement in Bahrain occurred in the mid-1990s
when followers of Ayatollah Shirazi, who had received money and weapons from
Iran, were rounded up and convicted of sedition (and later pardoned, while
some engage today in legal politics). The Bahraini government presented
evidence in Washington that the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards was
involved in a 1995 Shiite uprising.

Nevertheless, as neighbors, Iran and Bahrain have had a long relationship
centered largely around bilateral trade, though basic tourism and necessary
regional cooperation also play a part. Since the international community and
the United States in particular began to condemn Iran for its nuclear
program, Bahrain’s relations with the Islamic Republic have become
increasingly strained. Bahraini officials have publicly stated that Iran is
pursuing a nuclear weapons program in violation of its Non-Proliferation
Agreement obligation. Moreover, according to the WikiLeaks document
referring to Bahrain, dated August 2008, roughly 30% of the Bahraini Shi’a
follow clerics who look to more senior clerics in Iran for guidance. The
majority look to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq and a few to the late Muhammad
Fadlallah and others in Lebanon. Bahrain’s most popular cleric is Sheikh Isa
Qassim, who has occasionally endorsed the Iranian regime’s doctrine of
“velayat-e-faqih” (guardianship of the jurist – the Supreme Leader).
According to the same WikiLeaks report, a number of Bahrain’s middle-aged
clerics studied in Qom during the years when Saddam Hussein obstructed study
in Iraq.

In other words, Bahrain rulers are practically sitting on a barrel of
explosives whose detonator lies in the hands of the leaders of Iran. Bahrain’s
precarious regime lies on a very unstable social fabric:

a. 60-70% of Bahrain’s 500,000 citizens are Shi’a, while the other
half-million residents are guest workers.

b. Shi’a are poorer than Sunni Bahrainis.

c. About 15% of Bahrainis are Persian and speak Persian at home and tend to
belong to the professional classes.

The protests of mid-February and the subsequent violent repression by the
authorities have underlined once more the deep grievances of the Shi’a
majority. The protesters’ demands have two main objectives: to force the
ruling Sunni monarchy to give up its control over top governmental posts and
all critical decisions, and address the claims that the Shi’a face
systematic discrimination and are effectively blocked from key roles in
public service and the military. Specifically, the protesters called for the
government to provide more jobs and better housing, free all political
detainees, and abolish the system that offers Bahraini citizenship to Sunnis
from around the Middle East.

As a measure of appeasement, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has ordered an
increase in food subsidies and social welfare payments, and a grant of 1,000
dinars ($2,653) to each Bahraini family. According to Bahraini newspapers,
more than 71% of the families entitled to this grant have utilized it. The
ruling family entrusted the management of the crisis to Crown Prince Salman,
who called for a dialogue with an opposition inspired by the Tunisian and
Egyptian models, which is not ready at this point to compromise before
satisfying its main demands.

No doubt this dire situation is not pleasant for the U.S. Due to their deep
interests in Bahrain and the Persian Gulf, the Americans have been
monitoring the domestic situation there for quite some time. Nevertheless,
the analysts seem to have been very condescending towards the Bahraini
monarchy to which it attributed a closer grip and control of the country,
together with a proclaimed policy of liberalization. On the one hand, the
Americans were very much aware of Bahrain’s deep social, political, ethnic,
and religious problems, but on the other hand, this did not trigger warnings
regarding the capabilities of the regime to deal with such dire crises as
the actual one. On the contrary, the Americans painted the rulers in a very
positive way and stressed their commitment to political reform and
reconciliation.

The December 2009 WikiLeaks document states as follows: “King Hamid
understands that Bahrain cannot prosper by repression….There is more
religious freedom in Bahrain than in most neighboring countries…two election
cycles have seen the integration of the Shi’a opposition into the political
process. While a Shi’a rejectionist fringe continues to boycott the process,
their influence remains limited as the mainstream Wifaq Party has shown an
ability to work with the government to achieve results for its constituents.
Discrimination against Shi’a persists, however, and the government has
sought to deflect criticism by engaging with Wifaq and focusing more public
spending on housing and social welfare projects. So long as Wifaq remains
convinced of the benefits of political participation, the long-term outlook
for Bahrain’s stability is good.” (!)

The protests in Bahrain, home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, have created a
serious situation for the U.S. national security and for its economic
interests. According to a late 2009 WikiLeaks document, U.S. companies have
won major contracts between 2007-2009 that include Gulf Air’s purchase of 24
Boeing 787 Dreamliners, a $5 billion joint venture with Occidental Petroleum
to revitalize the Awali field, and well over $300 million in foreign
military sales.

Bahrain has been a faithful ally to the U.S., has developed very close
intelligence cooperation with the U.S., especially on issues of
counter-terrorism, cooperates in the military and naval fields, as well as
in the organization of an anti-Iranian Arab alliance. Under American aegis,
Bahrain has improved its stance on human rights and political freedoms,
although it seems not enough to prevent the outburst of protest that
occurred in mid-February 2011.

The U.S. has every reason to be worried if Bahrain tumbles under Iranian
hegemony. Indeed, all the ingredients are present for a potential change in
Bahrain. It is also obvious that only through the use of force can the
Bahraini regime survive. For how long? Certainly for as long as the U.S. is
willing to support the regime and ignore its actions against human rights,
and as long as there is no overt confrontation with Iran. Even more
worrisome for the U.S. is the fact that this Shi’a protest could very easily
expand to the neighboring eastern Saudi shore of Al-Ahsaa where most of the
population is also Shi’a. Such a situation and potential continued unrest
could create a serious challenge to the military presence of the U.S. in the
Gulf area, especially if it is exploited by Iranian agents interested in
provoking havoc in an “American preserve” at a time when Tehran itself is
feeling the weight of popular protest, encouraged openly by the Obama
Administration.

In view of the above, there is a clear possibility that the American naval
presence in Bahrain will become a target for potential Iranian terrorist
acts.

It should be stressed that Iran has already identified a situation of
American weakness in protecting its allies in the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf. Iran therefore is increasing its support to subversive
elements throughout the Persian Gulf and especially in Bahrain.

Finally, it seems that if Iran perceives a situation where the U.S. would
treat the king as it treated Mubarak earlier, this would definitely
encourage Iran to increase its offensive subversion in Bahrain and possibly
in eastern Saudi Arabia.

Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, a special analyst for the Middle East at the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, was formerly Foreign Policy Advisor to
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Deputy Head for Assessment of Israeli
Military Intelligence.