As long as the regime has military and police forces at its disposal, it
will not attempt to drag Israel into battle because Israel is liable to
strike hard, in particular disabling its helicopters and preventing it from
operating against the masses. Nevertheless, in the event of a total
collapse of the governmental apparatus, someone in the Syrian regime might
think along the lines of “Let me die with the Israelis” and launch nasty
weapons in Israel's direction. In such a case, it will be difficult for
Israel to respond effectively for there will be no one to deter and punish.
Israel must be prepared for such a scenario, and especially keep its eyes
and ears open in light of the weapons of mass destruction in Syrian hands.
Center for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation)
Bar-Ilan University
Middle Eastern Insights
No. 7, 29 April, 2011
To the Last Syrian
Mordechai Kedar
The sights and sounds emanating from Syria indicate that the sides, both the
regime and its opponents, have reached a stage in which they feel desperate
and will not waive their demands, regardless of the price to be paid. From
the public’s perspective, the threshold of demands rises as more time passes
and casualties grow: if, when the protests began, they called for repeal of
the emergency law, they now see the regime as the enemy of the people and
insist upon its downfall. Knocking down statues of Assad – father and son –
and tearing down their portraits has become routine, and the masses do this
with obvious enthusiasm.
The turbulent bloodbath is becoming more complex: the one hundred murdered
today are the one hundred funerals of tomorrow, each a protest in which more
will be killed, and similarly thereafter, with emotions becoming
increasingly heated as regime violence intensifies.
Fear is dissipating on both sides: the people are no longer afraid to mass
in the streets and – in contrast – the authorities are no longer reluctant
to concentrate massive fire at the crowds. The breaches in the ranks of the
regime are becoming more widespread: The Mufti of Syria resigned three
weeks ago; members of Parliament quit during a live broadcast on Al-Jazeera
last week; the editor of a major newspaper was sacked after sharply
criticizing the government; senior officers are shedding their uniforms in a
sign of protest; soldiers are deserting the army and taking their personal
weapons with them; prominent public personalities are openly expressing
disapproval of the conduct of the security forces, which received a green
light to open fire at demonstrators.
As the circle of Bashar’s supporters becomes smaller, their siege mentality
and cruelty will increase. They no longer fight for the regime but to keep
their heads from rolling. The blood of the protesters will be washed away
by that of the regime’s fighters, if they are caught in uniform. The
loyalists are prepared to fight to the last Syrian.
The city of Hama is the symbol of the 1982 uprising of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which was crushed with much cruelty and the murder of
thousands. The dispatch of troops to Dar’a at the beginning of last week
points to the possibility that it will serve as the symbol of the 2011
uprising. The question is how many more thousands have to be killed in
Syria before the world begins to take action as in Libya.
To the government of Israel I would propose parachuting medicines into
Syrian cities using unmanned drones. This would be an excellent investment
for the future.
Possible Scenarios for Syria’s Future
A. Preservation of the Syrian State Under New Leadership
It is possible that at some point a responsible adult high in the ranks of
the Syrian army or the head of an intelligence agency will understand that
it is worth throwing the public a bone in order to salvage as much as
possible. With the assistance of several armed bodyguards, he will arrest
Bashar Assad along with his brother Maher and other relatives, primarily
from the Makhlouf family, that of the president’s mother. He will conduct a
hasty trial and treat them as the public expects them to be treated, in
order to attain calm. He will announce constitutional changes and economic
reforms and schedule elections for several months later. This scenario is
somewhat similar to the current situation in Egypt.
If this responsible adult is an ’Alawi, it is safe to assume that the public
will not accept him and will continue its protests. If he is a Sunni, there
is a greater chance that some people will wait and see how things develop,
especially if he will not be identified with economic corruption and the
bloodshed that took place during the crackdown on the protests. The
important point in this scenario is that the government machinery survives
and continues to function and administer the state; in the coming years,
this machinery will undergo change and those who were part of the previous
regime will gradually be replaced.
If the pace of reforms does not satisfy the masses, they will return to the
streets, oppose the authorities and prevent the ruler from establishing
himself while he pushes the public and its wishes to the sidelines. The
masses sense their power and will not cede their accomplishments,
particularly after sacrificing so many on the altar of freedom.
B. Regime Split
The government will split if and when conflicts erupt within the security
forces – the army and the intelligence – with some switching their loyalty
from the regime to the street, similar to what transpired in Libya and
Yemen. If things develop as they did in Libya, an all out, no-holds-barred
war will commence between those in the army who support the rebels and those
who support the regime. If developments follow the Yemenite pattern, the
army will be paralyzed by its divided loyalties. A potential Syrian
parallel could divide the state into two parts reflecting the geographic
division of the forces which develop, with a possible war between the two
sides similar to that in Libya. This scenario will create an unstable
situation since each side will continue to be ruled by a military elite and
Syria’s fundamental problems will remain unsolved and will, indeed, worsen.
The regime will be supported by Iran and the western world will back the
rebels.
C. The Collapse of the State
If the ’Alawis lose the battle for the Syrian street and their control of
the government, the worst will transpire for them; frenzied Sunni masses
will descend on ’Alawi neighborhoods in Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo,
armed with knives, ready to detach ’Alawi heads from their necks. All
Muslims in Syria know that ’Alawis are infidels and idol-worshippers and, as
such, are condemned to death. The ’Alawis will flee to the Ansayriyyah
Mountains, their ancestral homeland in western Syria, and, entrenched there,
will defend their lives.
The Kurds in the North will declare independence as did their brethren in
Iraq; the Druze in Jabal al-Druze in the South will restore the autonomy
stolen from them by France in 1925; the Bedouins in the East will establish
a state with Dir a-Zur as its capital; the Aleppans will exploit the
opportunity to throw off the yoke of the hated Damascenes. Thus, six states
will rise from the ruins of Syria, each much more homogeneous than the
former united Syria and, therefore, more legitimate in the eyes of most of
its inhabitants. This is similar to what transpired in Yugoslavia.
These six states will not require an outside enemy in the form of Israel,
whose permanent role had been to unite the people under the president's
banner; there is, therefore, a greater possibility than ever before that
peace will reign between the state that is founded on the other side of the
Golan (the State of Damascus?) and Israel. As these states are unlikely to
maintain warm relations with Iran, the world can bless this development,
which will break the axis of evil and further isolate Iran. Hezbollah in
Lebanon will also feel less secure without the permanent Syrian backing it
has enjoyed to date.
Heating Up the Border with Israel
Until the 1970s, whenever the Syrian regime faced internal problems, it
heated up the border with Israel in order to create the opportunity to tell
the enraged masses: “The Zionist Huns are poised to destroy us and, you,
therefore, must put aside all conflicts and unite under the aegis of the
savior, the president”. This practice has been neglected for thirty-seven
years and it is hard to believe that it will be resumed because the public
no longer “buys” the story.
As long as the regime has military and police forces at its disposal, it
will not attempt to drag Israel into battle because Israel is liable to
strike hard, in particular disabling its helicopters and preventing it from
operating against the masses. Nevertheless, in the event of a total
collapse of the governmental apparatus, someone in the Syrian regime might
think along the lines of “Let me die with the Israelis” and launch nasty
weapons in Israel's direction. In such a case, it will be difficult for
Israel to respond effectively for there will be no one to deter and punish.
Israel must be prepared for such a scenario, and especially keep its eyes
and ears open in light of the weapons of mass destruction in Syrian hands.
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