Hamas and Fatah: A Temporary Marriage of Convenience
by Dr. Mordechai Kedar

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 138, May 12, 2011
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/perspectives138.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Hamas-Fatah agreement creates a Janus-faced
government in the West Bank and Gaza, which is more smoke and mirrors than
reality. When the time comes to divide up the bearskin – perhaps after
international recognition (if this takes place) of a Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza – the deep-seated divisions between Hamas and Fatah
will again come to the fore.

Both parties to the Hamas-Fatah “unity” agreement are acting on the basis of
expediency. In fact, the appearance of unity and the accolades for achieving
it are of more significance than unity itself.

Mahmoud Abbas is racing forward in preparation for the unilateral
declaration of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, a move
strongly backed by Europe, by some defeatist Israelis, and perhaps even by
the White House. At this rate, in September 2011 he will become the
president of a Palestinian state.

However, this in fact would be domestically disastrous for him. In
Palestinian and Arab eyes, Abbas would be viewed as a traitor for
relinquishing Haifa and Jaffa (i.e. Israel of 1948), for forsaking the
refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, and for building a state on
“only” 22 percent of Palestine. This situation would be intolerable for
Abbas as it would create too wide a disparity between his favorable
international status and his domestic status as a “traitor.” He requires
backup in order to silence his worst critics, i.e., Hamas. Even if such an
agreement enables the Islamist Hamas to win the majority of seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council, as occurred in January 2006, and even if
Hamas achieves the sought-after position of president in the elections that
must be held within a year according to the agreement – Abbas prefers this
to being branded a traitor. He must prepare for September by establishing a
temporary state of calm in his backyard – this is what he aims to achieve
through the agreement with Hamas.

Hamas, for its part, is amazed by the way the world ignores its de facto
state in Gaza, with an army, a missile industry, a legislative system, law
and order. Everyone is speaking only with Abbas, preparing a state for him,
and filling his coffers, while they – the authentic and legitimate
representatives of the Palestinian people, as Hamas views it – are left out
of the discussion entirely. Hamas is concerned that the PLO will be
recognized as the official ruling body in the new state, which is
unacceptable to it. Can Hamas, who suffered years of blockade, siege and
hunger, who firmly withstood bombings and assassinations, and who undermined
Israel's international standing through Goldstone and peace flotillas, now
hand the controls over to Mahmoud Abbas, who actually encouraged Olmert to
embark on Operation Cast Lead? The recent agreement, therefore, is favorable
to Hamas as it enables both groups to share the steering wheel: Abbas with
his foot on the gas and Hamas riding the breaks.

The agreement stipulates a "non-partisan 'experts' government," which
essentially means they have decided not to decide. The designation of
executive positions, those which enable ministers to appoint their own
people to positions of control, power and money, will be delayed until the
next stage, if only to postpone the tussle over "dividing up the cake." The
critical issue at present is deciding who will control the security
mechanisms, as these constitute the true source of power. Initially, Hamas
will retain control over the Gaza strip. Abbas will pay a courtesy call
after Hamas places behind bars all members of radical groups to guarantee
his security. In the West Bank, Abbas will take measures to ensure that
Hamas does not become too prominent, and that its leaders, who will be
released from prison as part of the agreement, are well aware of the
surveillance placed upon them.

While the PLO and Hamas differ ideologically, the main difference is in the
sociological composition of the two organizations. The average age of Hamas
activists and leaders is 30-40 while the average age of PLO activists is
60-70. The PLO represents the Naqba generation, an oppressed, exiled
generation who would be satisfied with partial achievements before moving on
to the next world. Among the PLO, many were born in the land on which the
State of Israel was established in 1948, like Abbas, who was born in Safed.
They are not perceived as "sons of the town" (Abnaa' al-Balad) either in
Ramallah or in Gaza, but as foreigners. They have no local family clan
(hamula) to stand up in their support. The middle generation of PLO has a
stronger connection to the area (Sa'eb 'Arekat is from Jericho), but they
are still an echelon above the common people, with suits, ties and gold
cufflinks; they smoke cigars and travel in luxury vehicles with tinted
windows.

In contrast, Hamas' members are closer to the indigenous population,
particularly to those in refugee camps who, for 63 years, remained
marginalized socially, economically and politically, and who served as
menial laborers of the effendis in Nablus, Ramallah and Gaza. These are the
people who spent many years in Israeli prisons and are proud of the scars on
their bodies rather than of suits they do not wear.

Another difference between the two groups, somewhat of a skeleton in the
closet, is that Hamas is an authentic representation of the Gaza population,
90 percent of which is of Bedouin origin, while the PLO represents the
urban, educated elite of the West Bank. Many of the women in the West Bank
dress in flattering, modern fashion and reveal their hair, while the women
of Gaza cover their bodies with loose-fitting jilbabs to hide their shape.
They also conceal their hair with khimars and many even wear a heavy face
covering. The West Bank residents look down on the Gaza residents. The two
regions differ in culture, worldview and even in dialect. In the Middle
East, a marriage between a Bedouin family and an urban family is never
considered to have good prospects.

Despite the agreement, PLO-Hamas relations will continue to be ridden with
suspicions from both sides. Hamas will constantly suspect Abbas of flirting
with the United States, Europe and Israel, while Abbas will always be on the
lookout for Hamas attempts to recruit members of his own camp.

The world has ceased to count the number of accords that the PLO and Hamas
have signed. The best example is the signing of the Mecca agreement in
February 2007, in front of the holy Kaaba shrine, following unrestrained
physical force by Saudi King Abdallah. The aim of this agreement was to mend
PLO-Hamas relations after the fallout that occurred when Hamas won the
majority of parliamentary seats in the previous year's elections. For an
entire year, the PLO had refused to transfer any authority or governing
positions to Hamas. Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, a Hamas
member, had his hands tied due to the rift with Israel, the Quartet's
hostility, the refusal of the US to recognize Hamas as a legitimate entity,
and Europe's aversion to funding an entity ruled – at least by name – by a
terror organization.

The Mecca agreement should have directed both parties' efforts toward common
objectives – for instance, overcoming the Zionist occupation, freeing
Jerusalem, promoting the return of the refugees, and releasing the
imprisoned. The two sides agreed at the time to implement "political
pluralism," an expression used to avoid decision making on the political and
operative guidelines. They also consented on the principle of political
collaboration, which outwardly meant joint decision making, but in practice
meant a mutual freeze of both parties to the agreement. The agreement
eventually led to the establishment of a unity government in March 2007.
However, disagreements along the way, over the identity of the decision
makers, resulted in its collapse and in the Hamas takeover of Gaza that
year.

Disagreements between the PLO and Hamas over objectives and methodology
still exist today. Their differing worldviews have not diminished over the
years of severance, accusations and defamations. While Hamas does not
believe in the slogans propagated by Abbas about not relenting on the
Palestinians' rights, they are prepared, once again, to enter into a
non-binding agreement with the PLO. This willingness has been spurred by the
public demand in Gaza and Ramallah to solve the dispute and bridge the gaps,
as a high political cost has been incurred by both sides due to the
divisiveness.

Nevertheless, Hamas' security apparatus, led by the 'Izz-addin al-Qassam
brigades, will never give in to the PLO agenda. The armed wing of the PLO,
as well, will not consider, even for a moment, abiding by demands dictated
by anyone from the Hamas camp. The contradictions within this Janus-faced
emerging entity will continue to divide the Palestinian Authority, despite
attempts to mitigate the discord. When the time comes to divide up the
bearskin – perhaps after international recognition (if this takes place) of
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza – the deep-seated divisions
between Hamas and Fatah will again come to the fore.

Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a 25-year veteran of Israeli military
intelligence, teaches Middle Eastern history at Bar-Ilan University, and is
a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family