[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:
The biggest mistake someone could make today is to assume that a snapshot of
the situation reflects what will transpire in a few months - let alone a few
years.
Oded Eran's own piece conveniently avoids addressing the possibility that
the Moslem Brotherhood ends up playing a key role in the ruling government
after the elections.
And while the Egyptian Army has acted more or less responsibility in
controlling the protests Israeli intelligence reports that they are doing a
lousy job stopping the flood of weapons to the Gaza Strip.
Oded Eran declines to note that the Egyptian Army has been acting first and
foremost to remain popular to the Egyptian street/mob. Their treatment of
various former senior Egyptian officials speaks volumes.
Oded Eran - nor anyone else in Israel - or for that matter at this stage in
Egypt - knows just how far the Egyptian Army, and in turn the Egyptian
Government that will be formed after elections, will ultimately feel
compelled to go as part of its effort to maintain the support of the
street. ]
Egypt–Israel–United States: Problems on the Horizon?
INSS Insight No. 255, May 15, 2011 Eran, Oded
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=5159
From Egypt's signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 to the recent
mass demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, there has never been a
question as to Egypt’s commitment to the agreement. In spite of difficult
tests over the years, including Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear
reactor in Baghdad (1981); the invasion of Lebanon and the IDF’s continued
presence there (1982-2000); two intifadas; and various operations in
Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza, Egypt observed most of the articles in the
military part of the treaty and helped lower the heat in the Arab discourse
on subjects related to Israel, especially the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The
exception to this general rule was Egypt’s position on the Israeli nuclear
issue.
Public opinion polls conducted in Egypt since the start of the recent
demonstrations have addressed the question of Egypt’s continued commitment
to the peace treaty with Israel. In a telephone poll conducted among 615
respondents for the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York, 46
percent of respondents stated that they would be "much more likely" to vote
for a party that supports keeping the treaty with Israel, the Arab peace
initiative, and the two-state solution. Another 17 percent said they would
be "somewhat more likely" to prefer such a party. That is, 63 percent
expressed willingness to support Egypt’s continued commitment to the treaty
(even though it is impossible to tell from the poll whether the support is
conditional, for example, on achieving a solution on the basis of two states
for two peoples).[1]
Another poll conducted for the Pew Research Center in March-April 2011 among
one thousand respondents presented more disturbing results.[2] Fifty-four
percent of those polled stated that Egypt should cancel the agreement, while
36 percent replied that it should maintain it. Support for maintaining the
treaty was greater among those with higher incomes and higher levels of
education. (Since the IPI poll was conducted by telephone, the positive
result is presumably misleading because of the greater weight given to those
in possession of a telephone and capable of answering the questions without
a face-to-face connection).
Along with other surveys, these two polls have pointed to former Foreign
Minister and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa as the leading
candidate in the Egyptian presidential elections. Moussa’s views on
relations with Israel are important, as are the opinions of the current
foreign minister, Nabil el-Araby. In a comprehensive interview with the
German newspaper Der Spiegel on March 16, Moussa, responding to a question
about his critical position towards Israel, stated, “Egypt fully supports
the joint Arab position toward Israel. The Palestinians need their own,
viable state, and Israel has to withdraw from the occupied territories. And
as a very first step, the blockade of the Gaza Strip has to be lifted,
immediately and in full.” As to whether he could have a discussion with
Netanyahu, Moussa stated, “First of all, Netanyahu would have to show that
he is interested in a just peace. That would reduce the tensions in the
region.”[3]
In response to a question by Lally Weymouth of the Washington Post whether,
if he became president of Egypt, he would keep the treaty with Israel, Amr
Moussa replied: “The treaty is a treaty. For us, the treaty has been signed
and it is for peace, but it depends also on the other side. If you asked me
what kind of relations between the Arab world and Israel I would like, I
would say that the Arab position – of which Egypt is a party – rests on the
Arab initiative of 2002.”[4]
Current Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabli el-Araby, a seasoned diplomat who
has a reasonable chance of keeping his position in a future Egyptian
government, stated unequivocally (also in an interview to Lally Weymouth),
“Egypt is going to comply with every agreement and abide by every treaty it
has entered into. That is the goal of treaties…Once it is done and
everything is signed, both sides abide and comply faithfully.”[5]
The responses from el-Araby, a professional lawyer who worked as a lawyer
during most of his years in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and the
statements by Amr Moussa show that in spite of the results of the PEW poll,
a sweeping Egyptian decision to cancel the peace treaty with Israel is not
expected. It is clear to both Egypt and to its future leaders that this
would cause severe damage to Egypt and to its economy. However, on at least
two subjects, deterioration is likely if Moussa and el-Araby continue to
play a central role in Egypt’s foreign policy after September 2011. These
two subjects are the Palestinian issue and the nuclear issue.
It comes as no surprise that Amr Moussa, who until recently was the Arab
League secretary general, speaks about the Arab initiative of 2002. For his
part, El-Araby has made no secret of the fact that Egypt wholeheartedly
supports a UN General Assembly decision to recognize a Palestinian state
within the 1967 borders with territorial exchanges, according to the Clinton
parameters of December 2000, and that Egypt is pressuring Europe to support
such a decision.
The convergence in September 2011 of elections in Egypt and the General
Assembly discussion is likely to give rise to fiery statements from Egyptian
presidential candidates. Israel has an interest in preserving the treaty
with Egypt and therefore should refrain from hasty responses to the comments
by the presidential candidates. These events may also become entangled in
the issue of American aid to Egypt, and in this discussion too, Israel and
its friends in Congress are liable to deliver hasty responses. The
discussions in Congress about the 2012 budget will be most heated in
September (the American fiscal year starts on 1 October). The administration’s
desire to aid Egypt was clear already at the start of the uprising in Cairo.
Secretary of State Clinton raised the issue in her meeting with the
Republican Speaker of the House on February 14,[6] and four days later,
Clinton announced aid totaling $150 million to address the economic problems
that resulted from the demonstrations in Egypt.[7] In talks with President
Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu will likely and justifiably raise Israel's
concern over changes in the Egyptian position, but it is important that his
comments do not send any signals on the subject of American aid to Egypt.
Against the backdrop of expected cuts in the overall American aid budget,
there are a number of American legislators who would be happy to identify
such signals, and therefore it is critical that Israel not involve itself in
this discussion.
Indeed, Israel’s hasty decision in the wake of the agreement between Fatah
and Hamas to stop the transfer of tax money collected for the Palestinian
Authority provides a negative example of potential fallout. The European
Union responded immediately with a decision to transfer monies to the
Palestinian Authority, which as such damaged Israel's position.
Relations between Egypt and Hamas will presumably thaw, even if the Muslim
Brotherhood does not play a role in the Egyptian government after September
2011. If the hopes expressed by the Washington Post editorial[8] – that
Egypt will moderate Hamas positions – are realized, tension in the United
States-Israeli-Egyptian triangle is likely to arise over disagreements
regarding the extent to which Hamas has actually moderated its positions.
Prime Minister Netanyahu should anchor this issue in the framework of the
three Quartet conditions – recognition of Israel, acceptance of the
agreements between Israel and the PLO, and renunciation of terrorism – and
avoid reactions and chain reactions that will damage Israel's relations with
Egypt in the post-Mubarak period.
This suggestion also applies to the Egyptian attempt to convene a
conference on a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East in 2012, as was
decided in the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. It was Amr Moussa who turned
the struggle against Israeli nuclearization into the flagship of Egyptian
diplomacy. In the interview with Lally Weymouth, Amr Moussa says that “the
nuclear issue in the Middle East means Israel and then Iran.” Nabil Fahmy,
who served as Egypt’s ambassador to the United States between 1999 and 2008,
reiterated his call to establish a nuclear free zone in the Middle East that
will include Iran and Israel, with practical steps by Israel in this
direction and a clear and defined timetable.[9] The United States indeed
supported the decision last year, but it is doubtful that President Obama,
whose high ranking officials – in spite of the American vote – repudiated
the decision even then, will lend a hand, at the height of the US
presidential election campaign and against the background of the
developments in the Middle East, to a conference that will only add fuel to
the regional fire. Thus it is preferable that Israel tackle this issue as
well behind the scenes, and not be dragged into threats and drastic actions
that will damage the delicate relations in the Israeli-Egyptian-United
States triangle.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] http://www.ipacademy.org/images/pdfs/egypt-poll-results-april2011.pdf;
Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703992704576305423166596598.html?KEYWORDS=poll+egypt.
[2] www.pewglobal.org.
[3] http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,750969-2,00.html.
[4]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/amr-moussas-vision-for-egypt/2011/05/09/AF36AxbG_story.html.
[5]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-foreign-minister-on-the-way-forward-after-mubarak/2011/05/05/AFRI3BCG_story.html.
[6] U.S. State Department announcement, February 14, 2011.
[7] See also Clinton’s comments at the Brookings Institution on April 12,
2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/04/160642.htm.
[8] Washington Post, May 11, 2011.
[9] Spring issue of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs,
http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=26.
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