Center for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation) Bar-Ilan
University
Middle Eastern Insights
No. 10, 22 July, 2011

Egypt – Bound to Explode?

Mordechai Kedar

Six months ago, on January 25th, thousands of Egyptians started to pour into
al-Tahrir (Liberation, from the British occupation) Square in central Cairo.
They demanded the downfall of Mubarak, who had occupied the presidential
seat for almost thirty years, since October 1981. What the masses actually
called for was the removal of the corrupt, fossilized regime of The Free
Officers that took control of Egypt in July 1952, i.e. fifty-nine years ago;
Mubarak was its last member. This government, which never stood for
elections worthy of the name, was based on a large group of “fat cats” who
ruthlessly controlled all areas of life and exploited every resource for
their own gain. The people remained poor and neglected, and forty million
Egyptians live in unplanned neighborhoods with no infrastructure for running
water, sewage, electricity, communications, education and health.

The protests against Mubarak, which intensified daily, were exemplified by
signs, carried by demonstrators, focusing on one word: Irhal (Go Away),
directed at Mubarak, his wife and sons – including Gamal, his designated
successor – and the ministers who served him for many long years. Mubarak
always counted on the army to help him in such a situation, by shooting at
protestors; indeed, every unit in the Egyptian army was tasked with
restoring order in a given city or neighborhood (i.e. to diffuse any
anti-government activity). However, the army did not meet Mubarak’s
expectations and did not shoot at demonstrators as long as they did not
endanger its forces and its installations. Nevertheless, hundreds of
protestors were killed by the police and by gunmen of State Security and
General Intelligence, some when they attacked police stations in order to
steal weapons.

When the demonstrations intensified, it was Minister of Defense, Tantawi,
who demanded in no uncertain terms that Mubarak step down from office; the
military became “the people’s army” and not “the president’s army”, and
gained the protesters’ trust. After Mubarak’s removal, the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces took power, suspended the constitution for half a year
and appointed a temporary government headed by Essam Sharaf. The people’s
success in ousting the Sphinx (Mubarak) brought high spirits to the country:
people began cleaning the public areas near their homes, sensing that the
country was theirs again, and the land was their land after it had been
liberated from the dictator. Neighbors started to take an interest in each
other’s lives because they felt united by their enormous success in getting
rid of the tyrant. Initially, there were many reports that girls in the
street, particularly at demonstrations in al-Tahrir Square, experienced much
less sexual harassment, a daily occurrence prior to the revolution; the
atmosphere during the uprising had become one of camaraderie, cooperation
and responsibility. The dawn of a new era broke over Egypt in February and
inspired the banks of the Nile with hopes – great hopes – of a flourishing
spring, of success and prosperity.

Time has, however, passed and after six months, the situation in Egypt has
only worsened, not improved. Unemployment, which stood at 25% during Mubarak’s
rule, has risen dramatically. It is now estimated at 50% or higher, i.e. one
of every two wage earners does not have a steady job. The rise in
unemployment stems primarily from the disappearance of the tourism industry.
Millions of tourists had arrived each year and provided good income for
hotel, restaurant and nightclub workers; for taxi and bus drivers; for
souvenir and clothing manufacturers; for operators of Nile cruises; for
policemen who helped them cross busy streets; for show girls; for farmers
who marketed their produce to hotels and restaurants where tourists ate to
their hearts’ content. Since the outbreak of the revolution, there are
hardly any tourists and those millions of Egyptians who directly and
indirectly benefited from such visitors have been without income for six
months. Since the unemployed consume less food, clothing and services, many
other branches of the economy have suffered from the domino effect of the
downturn in tourism. Only a very few of the tens of thousands of Egyptians
who are now completing their academic studies will find work, whether in the
private or government sectors, commensurate with their education. In this
respect, favoritism was, and still is, the name of the game.

Hopes that the new government would clean up the corruption in the public
sector have been dashed. Police officers suspected of fatally shooting
protestors in January and February have not been suspended, interrogated or
put on trial for their crimes. Even Mubarak, allegedly responsible for the
shooting of demonstrators, is spending the last few months awaiting trial in
a Sharm al-Sheikh hotel rather than in prison. Ministers and officials
currently serving in the temporary government were part of Mubarak’s corrupt
ruling apparatus for many long years. Military courts continue to try
civilians for harming state security, defying the explicit demand of
protestors, who feel that the chances of a civilian receiving a just trial
in a military court are nil.

The question that has occupied Egyptians this past month is what should come
first: should constitutional change precede elections, or should such change
be the responsibility of the parliament to be chosen in the next elections.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces resolved the question by deciding to
hold elections first; however, they continue to be postponed and are now
tentatively scheduled for November. The dozens of new parties will not have
sufficient time to organize, giving an advantage to the established parties
including the Muslim Brotherhood; the split in that movement, however, has
already given birth to five parties and it is unclear if all of them will
ultimately run separately. There are constant media reports about American
pressure on the government to hold only partially democratic elections in
order to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood parties from having too much
influence. This is enough to remind the public of the Mubarak period and to
wonder what has changed.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is playing a critically important
role. On the one hand, the army took a sympathetic approach towards the
revolutionary youth and ousted Mubarak from power. On the other hand, the
military undertook the difficult task of running the country during the
transition; of restoring the public’s faith in the government corrupt
bureaucracy, which has remained largely intact; of stabilizing the economy
and of conducting democratic elections in which a president and two
parliamentary houses – the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council – would
be chosen to jointly establish a government. The public, primarily the young
people of the revolution, have well understood this difficult task and have
generally accepted the decisions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
over the last few months.

However, this past month has seen a turning point: the army increasingly
operates as a ruling body and less as an organization assisting the people
in achieving their goals. The public is growing less and less enamored of
the Council of Armed Forces and is already waving signs in al-Tahrir Square
along the lines of: “Down With the Council of the Armed Forces”; “Council of
Armed Forces – Your Credit Has Run Out; “The Revolution Continues”; “Stop
Military Trials for Civilians Now”. The names assigned to recent Fridays
express the public’s rage at the situation – “Friday of Rage” and “Friday of
Warning” – with everyone understanding at whom the rage and warnings are
directed.

The above developments have been clearly reflected in the behavior of one of
the members of the Council of Armed Forces, General Mohsen Fangary. From the
beginning of the revolution on January 25th, he supported the rights of
citizens to express their opinions peacefully, and has been very popular
among the masses. Two weeks ago, on July 12th, he appeared on local and
international media and, in a frightening and intimidating tone, read a
statement issued by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces while waving his
finger threateningly: “. . . The council will not relinquish its role
during this critical period in Egypt’s history . . . Freedom of expression
is guaranteed to all, but only within the boundaries of the law. Elections
will be the first step, after which the constitution will be drafted. The
special courts (i.e. military courts) will not be abolished. The army will
not allow violent protests or the obstruction of economic activity; it will
not permit the spreading of rumors and misinformation which could lead to
disunity, disobedience and the dismantling of the homeland; it will give
precedence to the interests of the public over those of individuals. The
council will not allow anyone to seize power and will take the necessary
measures against threats to the homeland.”

Millions of Egyptians listened with great concern to this threatening
announcement, which made it clear to them – from no less than the thundering
voice of the popular General Fangary – that the period of hugs and flowers
had ended, that the army intends to stay in power for more than half a year,
and perhaps for a much longer period. General Fangary, with his menacing
finger and booming voice, let the audience know that what had been will no
longer be and that he would not permit the Woodstock atmosphere in al-Tahrir
Square to evolve into anti-army protests.

Egypt is now at the height of a hot summer; the overall atmosphere, as well
as the air temperature have risen. In less than two weeks, at the beginning
of August, the month of Ramadan, during which Muslims grow close to Allah,
will commence. During the course of the day, the stomach is empty of food,
but the soul is filled with thoughts; given the disappointment at the bitter
reality in which the country finds itself, it won’t take more than a tiny
clash between the military and protesters to inflame the atmosphere and
ignite the fumes gathering in the Egyptian street. When there is not enough
money to buy food for all thirty evenings of Ramadan or to buy presents for
the women and children, the Egyptian points an accusing finger at the
regime, currently headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

In the next few weeks or months, the Arab Spring is liable to turn into the
Egyptian Summer – hot, steamy, violent and repulsive – in which the cat will
be let out of the bag and the youth of Al Tahrir Square will realize that
they have replaced one group of officers with another, that instead of
Mubarak, they have Tantawi or Fangary, all cut from the same cloth. If
conflict erupts, Heaven forefend, it will take place between the
revolutionary youth and the army, which, this time, might fire massively at
them.

The army may in the interim throw protesters some bones, such as a show
trial for Mubarak (if he lives), his wife and sons, and the public might
even get to see them swinging from a rope in al-Tahrir Square; aside from
momentary joy, however, this will not calm the street. The standing of the
Israeli embassy and the peace agreement with Israel might also be impacted,
because the army may employ such a stratagem to douse the flames.

In the event of major clashes between the army and the population, many
Egyptians are liable to try and reach Israel via Sinai and the open border.
Israel must prepare for such a scenario so that it is not caught by surprise
when thousands of Egyptians arrive daily, fleeing the cruelty of their army.
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Mordechai.Kedar@biu.ac.il
The article is published in the framework of the Center for the Study of the
Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan University, Israel.
Translated by Nachama Kanner