The Peace Index: October 2011
Date Published: 08/11/2011
Survey dates: 31/10/2011 - 01/11/2011
The Peace Index is a project of the Evens Program for Conflict Resolution
at Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute
www.peaceindex.org EMail: info@peaceindex.org

1. What is your position on holding peace negotiations between Israel and
the
Palestinian Authority?
Jews
1. Strongly in favor 30.5
2. Moderately in favor 39.8
3. Moderately opposed 15.5
4. Strongly opposed 9.5
5. I don't know\ refuse to
answer 4.7

2. Do you believe or not believe that negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority will lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians
in the coming years?
Jews
1. Strongly believe 4.8
2. Moderately believe 26.6
3. Moderately don’t believe 33.2
4. Don’t believe at all 33.0
5. I don't know\ refuse to answer 2.4

6. Some say Israel must now respond with great force to any aggressions by
the Palestinian side, including launching a wide-scale military operation in
Gaza in response to the firing from there. Do you support or do you not
support a wide-scale military operation in Gaza?
Jews
1. Don’t support it at all 11.4
2. Moderately don’t support it 20.0
3. Moderately support it 29.1
4. Strongly support it 35.9
5. I don't know\ refuse to answer 3.7

7. Some claim Israel is being restrained in its response to the firing
from Gaza so as not to endanger the fragile relationship with the Egyptian
regime. Assuming this claim is correct, do you approve or not approve of the
government’s policy on this issue?
Jews
1. Strongly approve of it 13.9
2. Moderately approve of it 39.8
3. Moderately don’t approve of it 22.8
4. Don’t approve of it at all 16.6
5. I don't know\ Refuse to answer\Other 6.9

Summary of the Findings

The Shalit deal—a smart move? Even after the Shalit swap was carried out and
after the attendant public debate, an overwhelming majority of the Jewish
and Arab public (78%) thinks the exchange was the right thing to do. And
despite the assessments of various experts, 60% of the Jews and half of the
Arabs think the deal has not weakened Israel’s deterrence. In the same
spirit, a majority (70% of the Jews and 54% of the Arabs) sees no connection
between the increased fire from Gaza and the Shalit deal. Even among those
who do think the deal weakened Israel, a majority supports the deal; not
surprisingly, however, this majority is smaller than the majority among
those who do not believe the deal weakened Israel (57% compared to 91% of
the Jewish public). A similar pattern was found in response to a question on
the link between the deal and increased fire from Gaza.

Should Israel respond to the stepped-up fire from Gaza? About two-thirds of
the Jewish public favors a very strong response, including a wide-scale
military operation. A segmentation of respondents by self-definition in
terms of right-left political affiliation shows that 79% of respondents on
the right support a military response, 62% in the center, and only 26% on
the left. Yet, at the same time, a majority (54%) says Israel’s restraint is
justified so as not to endanger the fragile relationship with Egypt. Of
those justifying restraint for this reason, 43% are on the right, 65% are in
the center, and 73% are on the left. In the Arab public, the large majority
(73%) opposes a harsh military response, with 54% basing this position on
the desire to avoid damage to relations with Egypt.

Price tag? A very large majority of the Jewish public (88%), which crosses
political camps, opposes retaliatory "price tag" actions against
Palestinians. As expected, the opposition to price tag actions against the
IDF is even greater (93.5%). Still, it should be noted that 9% of
respondents openly express support for such actions against the Palestinians
and 3% even express support for such actions against the Israeli army. The
Jewish public is, however, divided on how the security forces and
enforcement authorities have responded to such actions: the highest rate
(38%) sees the response as appropriate, 35% as too mild, and 13% as too
harsh. A segmentation by the degree of religiosity of the respondents,
however, reveals significant disparities: among those defining themselves as
haredi, the highest rate (49%) thinks the response is too harsh; among the
religious and the traditional, the highest rate (46% and 41%, respectively)
views the response as appropriate, while the most common answer among
secular respondents (46%) is that the response of the authorities is too
mild.

Should female and male soldiers in the IDF be segregated? Two-thirds of the
Jewish public opposes holding separate events for female and male soldiers
in the IDF. Not surprisingly, there is a strong connection between such
opposition and degree of religiosity: among the ultra-Orthodox—0% oppose
this proposal, among religious—47.5% oppose, among traditional—67% oppose,
and among secular—81% oppose. At the same time, the public as a whole is
evenly split (45%-45%) on whether female soldiers should be kept out of
units of haredi soldiers so as to enable ultra-Orthodox soldiers to serve in
the IDF. This indicates that positions on the issue of gender segregation
depend on its purpose; opposition to gender separation declines if the
separation is intended to encourage haredi enlistment.

And what about the social protest? A large majority (75% of the Jewish
public and 82% of the Arab public) favors continuing the social protest. A
small majority of the Jewish public (54%) and a large minority of the Arab
public (40%) think that the social protest has not scored any significant
achievements so far. But even among those who hold this view, the large
majority wants the protest to continue.

The Findings in Detail

In recent years, an almost constant majority of over three-quarters
supported a deal for Gilad Shalit even if it meant freeing a large number of
Palestinian prisoners. The voices against such a deal were few and the media
gave them little space. In a certain sense, the situation changed once the
deal had been carried out; at that point, the various media gave experts and
other opponents a chance to speak their minds, and the pro-and-con debate
heated up after the fact. Yet, on the level of public opinion, even after
the deal, and despite the recent rocket attacks, an overwhelming majority of
the Jewish and Arab public (78%) still thinks it was the right move.
Interestingly, the rate of support for the deal is lowest among the haredi
public, though here too the majority is in favor of the deal: among haredi
respondents—64% favor the exchange, among religious and traditional
Jews—80%, and among secular—78%. A segmentation of respondents by their
self-definition on the right-left political spectrum revealed a considerable
majority supporting the deal in all the camps, though with disparities: on
the right—71% support the deal, in the center—83%, and on the left—89%.

Again, in contrast to the assessments of various experts, 60% of the Jews
and half of the Arabs believe that the deal did not weaken Israel’s
deterrence. In the same spirit, a majority (70% of the Jews and 54% of the
Arabs) sees no connection between the increased fire from Gaza and the
Shalit deal. Even among those who do think the deal weakened Israel, a
majority supports it; however, not surprisingly, this majority is smaller
than the majority among those who do not believe the deal weakened Israel
(57% compared to 91% of the Jewish public). A similar pattern was found on
the question of the link between the deal and the increased fire from Gaza.
As for how the Shalit deal affected Israel’s deterrence, a segmentation by
political camps shows a very large group on the right—47%—who say the deal
weakened Israel, compared to 33% in the center and 20% on the left. As for
whether the deal encouraged the increased fire from Gaza, here too there
were political gaps: while the majority in all the camps does not think the
deal led to increased fire from Gaza, the rates differ. One-third of the
right thinks the deal encouraged the increased fire and one-quarter of the
center, while on the left only 13% see such an effect.

The intensified fire from Gaza again raised the issue of the appropriate
Israeli response. On this issue, the Israeli Jewish public turns out to be
very hawkish: about two-thirds favor responding with great severity,
including a wide-scale military operation. A segmentation by self-definition
on the right-left political spectrum shows a majority for such a move on the
right (79%) and in the center (62%), but not on the left, where only 26%
support a major military campaign. Yet, at the same time, a majority (54%)
says Israel’s restraint is justified so as not to endanger the fragile
relationship with Egypt. The rates of those justifying restraint for this
reason are 43% on the right, 65% in the center, and 73% on the left. In the
Arab public, the large majority (73%) opposes a harsh military response,
with 54% basing this desire on not wanting to damage relations with Egypt.

Lately there has been a spike in retaliatory “price-tag” actions by settler
groups against Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and even against IDF soldiers
and military property. This month’s survey reveals that a very large
majority of the Jewish public (88%)—across political camps—opposes price-tag
actions against Palestinians. Not surprisingly, the opposition to price-tag
actions against the IDF is even greater (93.5%). Still, it should not be
ignored that 9% of respondents openly expressed support for actions against
Palestinians and 3% even for actions against the Israeli army. The highest
rate of support for price-tag actions (9.5%) was found among haredi
respondents.

The Jewish public is, however, divided on how the security forces and
enforcement authorities have responded to such actions: the highest rate
(38%) sees the response as appropriate, 35% as too mild, and 13% as too
harsh. A segmentation by the degree of religiosity of respondents, however,
turns up significant disparities: among those defining themselves as haredi,
the highest rate (49%) thinks the response is too harsh; among the religious
and the traditional, the highest rate (46% and 41%, respectively) views the
response as appropriate, while the most common answer among secular
respondents (46%) is that the response of the authorities is too mild. A
segmentation by political position shows that, on the right, 18% see the
response as too harsh, in the center—8.5%, and on the left—5%. The response
of the authorities is considered too mild by 23% on the right, 45% in the
center, and 66% on the left.

Recently the issue of gender separation in the army has been in the
headlines. Male and female soldiers were separated for Simchat Torah
celebrations, and religious soldiers walked out of events in which women’s
singing could be heard. It turns out that such separations do not reflect a
taboo among the Jewish public: two-thirds oppose holding separate events for
female and male soldiers, though one-third justify it. Not surprisingly,
there is a strong correlation between the degree of religiosity of
respondents and opposition or support for segregation: among the
ultra-Orthodox—0% oppose separation, among the religious—47.5%, among
traditional Jews—67%, and among secular respondents—81%. At the same time,
however, the public as a whole is evenly split (45%-45%) on whether female
soldiers should be kept out of units of haredi soldiers so as to enable
ultra-Orthodox Jews to serve in the IDF. One hundred percent of the haredim
favor separation under such circumstances, 47.5% of religious respondents,
and 30% of the traditional and secular. This indicates that positions on the
issue of separation depend on the purpose of the separation; opposition to
gender segregation declines if it is done to encourage haredi enlistment.

And what about the social protest? A large majority (75% of the Jewish
public and 82% of the Arab public) favors continuing the social protest. A
small majority of the Jewish public (54%) and a large minority of the Arab
public (40%) think that the protest has not scored any significant
achievements so far. But even among those who hold that view, the large
majority wants the protest to continue.

The Negotiations Index for October, 2011
The Peace Index project includes ongoing monitoring of the Israeli public's
attitudes towards peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority. The monthly
Negotiation Index is comprised of two questions, one focusing on public
support for peace negotiations and the other on the degree to which the
public believes that such talks will actually lead to peace. The aggregated
replies to these two questions are calculated, combined, and standardized on
a scale of 0-100, in which 0 represents total lack of support for
negotiations and lack of belief in their potential to bear fruit, and 100
represents total support for the process and belief in its potential. Each
month, the Negotiations Index presents two distinct findings, one for the
general Israeli population and the other for Jewish Israelis.

Negotiations Index: General sample: 50.0%; Jewish sample: 49.8%

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The Peace Index is a project of the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict
Resolutionat Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute. This
month's survey was conducted by telephone on on October 31 and November 1 by
the Dahaf Institute. The survey included 606 respondents, who constitute a
representative sample of the adult Jewish population of Israel. The
measurement error for a sample of this size is 4.5%; statistical processing
was done by Ms. Yasmin Alkalay.