The Peace Index: November 2011
Date Published: 14/12/2011

Survey dates: 05/12/2011 - 06/12/2011
The Peace Index is a project of the Evens Program for Conflict Resolution
at Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute
www.peaceindex.org Email: info@peaceindex.org

Summary of the Findings

The Findings in Detail

Summary of the Findings

What will happen in the wake of the Egyptian elections? Only a small
minority of the Jewish public (10%) thinks that the rise to power of the
Islamist forces will leave the peace treaty with Israel as it is. The
majority (51%) believes that the treaty will not be officially canceled but
relations will suffer; the rest are divided between those who think the
treaty will be officially canceled, creating a situation of “no peace” and
“no war” (19%), and those who think the treaty will be canceled and Egypt
will return to a state of war with Israel (15%).

How will the changes in the Arab world affect Israel in general? The
majority (68.5%) thinks that Israel's national security situation is worse
than it was before the process of change started.

And what about Iran? On the Iranian issue, too, it appears that most of the
Jewish public has negative expectations. Slightly over half (52%) say that
the proclaimed efforts of the Western states to prevent Iran from attaining
nuclear capability are not real and genuine; a sizable majority (61%)
believes Israel should come to terms with the fact that Iran will ultimately
have nuclear weapons, and should develop a security strategy based on the
assumption that Israel will not be the only nuclear state in the region.

And will a peace treaty be signed with the Palestinians? Only about a third
think such a treaty would improve the Arab world’s attitudes toward Israel,
with 63% saying the Arab world would remain hostile toward Israel even if a
treaty were to be signed.

If so, what should Israel do? Despite this pessimistic assessment, 61% think
that in the present state of affairs Israel should make special efforts to
renew the negotiations with the Palestinians.

And how should Israel go about that? Fifty-four percent assess that the
Netanyahu government is functioning moderately well (40%) or very well (14%)
regarding the conduct of to negotiations with the Palestinians. It makes
sense, then, that the majority (58%) says opposition leader Tzipi Livni did
not act properly when she recently met with Abu Mazen.

Do religion and democracy go together? The prevailing view (59%) is that, in
principle, a government with a majority of religious parties is not capable
of ruling democratically and safeguarding minority rights, freedom of
expression, and equality between all religions, beliefs and the sexes.

And what about religious radicalization in Israel? A substantial majority of
the public (64.5%) is worried about this trend. In the same vein, close to
half (49%) see the role of religion in running the state of Israel as too
strong, 17% as too weak, and 28% view it as appropriate.

The Findings in Detail

Only a small minority of the Jewish public (10%) thinks that the rise to
power of the Islamist forces in Egypt will leave the peace treaty with
Israel as it is. The majority (51%) believes that the treaty will not be
officially canceled, but relations between the two countries will suffer;
the rest are divided between those who think the treaty will be officially
canceled, creating a situation of “no peace, no war” (19%), and those who
think that the treaty will be officially canceled and Egypt will return to a
state of war with Israel (15%). A segmentation by support for Israel's
political parties revealed that the highest rate of respondents who envision
the official cancellation of the treaty and Egypt returning to a war footing
against Israel are voters for the National Union party (36%). Far more of
this party's voters have this expectation than voters for any of the other
parties.
Nonetheless, the majority of the Jewish public perceives danger in the major
political changes occurring in the Arab world, as rulers fall and new
forces, including Islamist ones, rise. Sixty-eight percent regard these
developments as having worsened Israel’s national security. Here, it should
be noted, opinions are very similar among respondents defining themselves as
right, center, and left.

On the Iranian issue, too, most of the Jewish public appears to have
negative expectations. Slightly more than half (52%) think the proclaimed
efforts of Western countries to prevent Iran from reaching nuclear
capability are not real and not sincere. In this context, a sizable majority
(61%) apparently now thinks—clearly contradicting the government’s
position—that Israel should come to terms with the fact that Iran will
ultimately have nuclear weapons and therefore should devise a security
strategy based on the assumption that Israel will not be the only nuclear
state in the region. This opinion is dominant among voters for all parties,
with the exceptions of National Union voters, who are evenly split between
those who agree that Israel should adopt such a strategy and those who
disagree, and Torah Judaism voters, a majority of whom (50%) do not agree
that Israel should adopt such a strategy (vs. 38% who do agree).

A perception of threat emerged in responses to other questions as well. Only
about one-third of respondents believe that a peace treaty between Israel
and the Palestinians, if one were to be signed, would improve the Arab world’s
attitudes toward Israel; 63% say the Arab world would remain hostile even if
such a treaty were signed. On this question, we found a wide gap between
voters for left-wing and centrist parties, on the one hand, and voters for
right-wing and religious and haredi parties on the other. Whereas the
majority of voters for Labor, Meretz, and Kadima (81%, 67%, and 58%
respectively) think that signing such an agreement would improve the Arab
world’s attitudes toward Israel, the opposite view is held by all voters for
the National Union, 90% of voters for the National Home, 89.5% of Torah
Judaism voters, 87.5% of Shas voters, 86% of Yisrael Beiteinu voters, and
71% of Likud voters.

Despite that pessimistic assessment, a substantial majority (61%) affirms
that, in the current state of affairs, Israel should make special efforts to
renew the negotiations with the Palestinians. As expected, here too there
are pronounced disparities according to Knesset voting in the latest
elections. We found majority support for such efforts among voters for Labor
and Meretz (92% each), Kadima (83%), Yisrael Beiteinu (69%), and the Likud
(54%), while only a minority of voters for the Jewish Home (40%), the
National Union and Shas (25% each), and Torah Judaism (21%) think Israel
should make such efforts.

Given the above, it is especially interesting to find that today, as in the
past, a majority (54%) of the Jewish public views the Netanyahu government
as functioning moderately well (40%) or very well (14%) on the matter of
negotiations with the Palestinians. It therefore makes sense that the
majority (58%) says opposition leader Tzipi Livni did not act properly when
she recently met with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. A segmentation of
the responses to these questions by voting in the last elections shows Prime
Minister Netanyahu receiving a positive evaluation from voters for Torah
Judaism (84%), Likud (79%), Shas (75%), Jewish Home (60%), and Yisrael
Beiteinu (57%). Not surprisingly, he gets a negative rating from voters for
Labor, Kadima, and Meretz. In addition, it was only among voters for these
parties that a majority of respondents (55%, 63%, and 92% respectively)
approve of Livni’s meeting with Abbas.

In light of recent developments on the domestic front, this month we also
looked into whether the Jewish public views religiosity and democracy as
compatible. The prevailing opinion (59%) is that, in principle, a government
with a majority of religious parties is not capable of ruling democratically
and of safeguarding minority rights, freedom of expression, and equality
between all religions and beliefs and between the sexes. Naturally, a
segmentation by the respondent's self-definition of degree of religiosity
revealed sharp differences between the different categories. A large
majority of those defining themselves as haredi or religious (81%) saw this
combination as possible. Respondents who defined themselves as
traditional-religious were divided between those who think like the haredi
and religious respondents (48%) and those who do not think a government with
a majority of religious parties would be able to rule democratically (44%).
Among the traditional-secular and the secular, however, a large majority
views a predominantly religious government as incapable in principle of
being democratic (67% and 79% respectively).

And what about religious radicalization in Israel? A considerable majority
of the public (64.5%) is worried about this trend. In the same vein, close
to half (49%) see the present role of religion in running the state of
Israel as too strong, 17% as too weak, while 28% view it as appropriate.
However, a segmentation by self-definition of degree of religiosity again
reveals large gaps between haredi and religious respondents, on the one
hand, and traditional and secular respondents on the other. Only 16% of
haredi and 43% of religious respondents are worried about religious
radicalization—compared to 68% of the traditional and 79% of the secular.

The Negotiations Index for November, 2011
The Peace Index project includes ongoing monitoring of the Israeli public's
attitudes towards peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority. The monthly
Negotiation Index is comprised of two questions, one focusing on public
support for peace negotiations and the other on the degree to which the
public believes that such talks will actually lead to peace. The aggregated
replies to these two questions are calculated, combined, and standardized on
a scale of 0-100, in which 0 represents total lack of support for
negotiations and lack of belief in their potential to bear fruit, and 100
represents total support for the process and belief in its potential. Each
month, the Negotiations Index presents two distinct findings, one for the
general Israeli population and the other for Jewish Israelis.

Negotiations Index: General sample: 47.0%; Jewish sample: 47.5%

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The Peace Index is a project of the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict
Resolution at Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute. This
month's survey was conducted by telephone on December 5-6 by the Dahaf
Institute. The survey included 606 respondents, who constitute a
representative sample of the adult Jewish population of Israel. The
measurement error for a sample of this size is 4.5%; statistical processing
was done by Ms. Yasmin Alkalay.