The “Revolutionary Parliament” and the New Governmental Order in Egypt
INSS Insight No. 311, February 2, 2012
Meital, Yoram
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=6041

On the eve of the first anniversary of Egypt’s January 25 revolution, the
country’s first parliament in the post-Mubarak era convened its opening
session. The disputes among the freshly minted representatives as to how the
session should be conducted, the choice of a speaker, and the oath of
allegiance testified to the dramatic change underway in Egypt. For the first
time in dozens of years, representatives elected in free and fair elections
occupy the seats in parliament. Dr. Saad al-Katatni, a senior Muslim
Brotherhood official, was chosen as speaker of the parliament.

After drawn out and procedurally complicated elections, 498 representatives
were elected to the parliament of 2012. They were joined by ten
representatives, including three women and five Copts appointed by the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which manages affairs of state
during the interim period. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which ran on
behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood, earned 216 seats: overnight the movement
that for decades symbolized opposition to the regime became Egypt's largest
party. The Salafist al-Nour ("Light") Party provided the biggest surprise,
in sending 109 delegates to the parliament. The Liberal Party (al-Wafd)
holds 41 seats, and the Egyptian Bloc, which represents left wing parties
and is identified with the “secular” camp, is represented by 34 delegates.
The remaining seats in the parliament are divided between approximately a
dozen parties and independent delegates.

The current parliament faithfully reflects the new political balance of
power in Egypt, and compared to previous parliaments, it more fully
represents the society. However, the “revolutionary parliament,” as it is
called in Egypt, has only twelve women. Moreover, it does not include
significant representation of the youth who ignited and led the civil
uprising and who, since the fall of the Mubarak regime, have campaigned for
the immediate transfer of power and authority from the military to the
parliament. During the opening session, many delegates praised the
contribution of the “youths of the revolution” – at the same time that these
activists were demonstrating in Tahrir Square. A letter sent by the April 6
Movement to the elected representatives stated: “The people chose you to
represent them in the parliament, and therefore it is incumbent upon you to
fulfill their demands and the demands of the revolution.” The delegates were
called upon to demand that the Military Council immediately transfer their
state management powers to the parliament until a civilian president is
elected. Other groups are demanding that the parliament reexamine the laws
published by the Military Council and immediately establish a commission of
inquiry to examine the army’s responsibility for the death of protesters.
Clearly, forces in civil society have marked the revolutionary parliament as
the main institutional address for their demands. In Tahrir Square, some
place responsibility for the failure to achieve the revolution’s goals not
only on the Military Council, but also on the parties, and in particular,
the Freedom and Justice Party.

The public discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood and the government, underway
In Egypt for some eighty years, accelerated in the wake of the Brotherhood’s
unprecedented gains in the parliamentary elections of 2005. In the first
round of these elections, the Brotherhood won 88 seats, but the regime
subsequently disrupted the elections process and prevented the Brotherhood
from achieving much larger gains. The government’s tough policy toward the
movement saw the arrest of dozens of senior officials who were tried in
military courts and severely punished. In the public sphere, both supporters
of the regime and many liberals waged a campaign to blacken the name of the
Muslim Brotherhood. In turn, the latter sought to fend off criticism by
means of parliamentary activity that seldom dealt with religious issues and
by issuing declarations and documents that presented pragmatic positions on
civilian, economic, and political topics. Dr. Mohammad al-Sayed Habib,
deputy general guide of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, published a fascinating
article, “What if the Brothers Come to Power?” Early on he stressed “that
the Brotherhood’s coming to power is not realistic, at least in the near
future. However, if it does happen, how would we view such a government?”
First, the movement will support establishment of a government based on free
elections. The elected parliament will promote “a new constitution that
defines the governmental order (democratic parliamentary republic) and the
relations between governmental authorities and the people, including
limitation of the president’s term and his authorities.” The first topic the
government will address is “permitting general freedoms.” Economic policy
will be based on principles of a market economy, but will support weak
sectors in society. At the top of the list of national priorities will be
the battle against poverty and unemployment, unchecked inflation, and a
solution to problems of housing, transportation, and health. The education
system is a priority when resources are allocated.

Today the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is called on not only to
update its positions on these and many other issues, but most of all to
realize in deed the organization’s historic slogan, “Islam is the solution.”
The FJP is required to launch practical programs to cope with a variety of
urgent problems, mainly restoring law and order, rehabilitating the economy,
and waging a comprehensive war against the corruption that is rampant in
both the public and private sectors. As a reform movement based on pragmatic
religious interpretation, the Muslim Brotherhood advocates conducting
affairs of state in cooperation with the existing bureaucracy and security
establishment. The group’s leaders declare that their policy will be based
on the religious principle of ensuring the public good, which will guarantee
the rights of all Egyptian citizens and a policy that takes into account all
national interests.

In this context, the FJP seeks to form a parliamentary coalition based on
“national consent,” and not necessarily religious consent. This is not a
simple task. FJP leaders are seeking to include in this coalition as many
representatives as possible from the liberals and the youth, but the gaps in
positions are quite wide. Many in the liberal Wafd Party, for example, claim
that differences of opinion on the issue of religion and state should not be
swept under the rug, and that it is better to lead the opposition in
parliament and expose their Islamist rivals’ inability to govern. Other
delegates believe that joining a coalition will aid them in promoting goals
they will have difficulty in achieving from the opposition.

Elections to the revolutionary parliament have also opened a new chapter in
relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups. While all
advocate implementing Islamic law in every area of life, they have different
religious interpretations regarding the means to advance this goal. Until
recently, the Salafists objected to political participation and their public
activity was rather limited. Their entry into the arena of political parties
indicates a dramatic change in approach, which is no less significant than
their achievements at the polls. This change reshuffles the cards in the
Egyptian political arena, particularly in relations between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Salafists. In the wake of their impressive achievement
in the parliamentary elections, the Salafists will seek to expand their
public activity and compete against the Muslim Brotherhood for the
conservative religious vote. In this context, efforts by the Freedom and
Justice Party to form a coalition without the al-Nour Party are noteworthy.
At the same time, these political moves will not prevent ad hoc cooperation
on parliamentary issues between the two Islamist parties that constitute
some 70 percent of the parliament.

The revolutionary parliament is a critical link in the attempt to
institutionalize a new post-Mubarak governmental order. The coming months
will see other critical links: ratification of a new constitution, election
of the president of the republic, transfer of all governmental powers to an
elected civilian leadership, dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces, and the army’s return to its camps. Completion of this process will
lead to creation of a new governmental and political order whose orientation
will be determined only in the course of a fierce struggle among the forces
mentioned above. Thus while it is still too early to assess what form the
"new" order will assume, it will likely be characterized by long term power
struggles. Egypt is in the midst of a revolutionary experience, and its long
history indicates that the dramatic changes will affect processes throughout
the Middle East.

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Prof. Yoram Meital is Chairman of the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East
Studies and Diplomacy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.