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Monday, February 6, 2012
Tactical Vs. Strategic Raid - going for strategic change by attacking enemy leadership

The lesson to be learned is that while the majority of the IDF's air, land,
and sea forces deal with the enemy's defense layout, destroy rocket
launchers and their operators, and target civilian infrastructures, the
potential for a strategic change during war lies in operations directed
against the enemy's leadership, and in the case of Lebanon, indirectly
against the Lebanese government....Today, the IDF is able to execute a
difficult, large-scale raid deep into enemy territory.

Tactical Vs. Strategic Raid
The IDF is establishing a Depth Corps, but the difference between a tactical
raid and a strategic raid remains unclear even after the Second Lebanon War
and Operation Cast Lead
IsraelDefense 6/2/2012
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=894

The IDF is establishing a Depth Corps. The command will unite the IDF's
special forces units – Sayeret Matkal (special ops), Shaldag (air force
commandos), Shayetet 13 (naval commandos), and 669 (airborne SAR) – into a
unified command for special ops far from Israel's borders. The report raises
the debate as to the status of the raid in the IDF.

In general, the raid has been an aspect of combat operations since the
beginning of armed conflict. It is mostly applied in offensive battles
because its execution requires a concerted effort and many resources at the
expense of defensive preparations.

Decades ago, Liddell Hart wrote in "Thoughts on War:" "Decisive success in
war is possible only through surprise, and surprise has to be a combination
of several complex factors...by delivering a blow at an unexpected moment,
from an unexpected direction, or concentrating unexpected strength in the
blow." These words still ring true.

A raid deep in the enemy's defense layout is an exceedingly intricate and
challenging operation that demands special weapons and transportation. It
must be comprised of soldiers and commanders with proven courage, tenacity,
creative thinking, survivability, and especially, the capacity to exploit
sudden opportunities.

When is a raid considered strategic? It is strategic when its purpose is to
exploit a major weakness in the enemy that can change the course of the war.
In other words, it is strategic when it has the effect of shuffling the
cards and creating a new reality.

One of the most complex challenges facing commanders and staff officers is
to identify an opening that can alter the direction of a campaign, or the
opposite—to invite grave danger. In combat, the name of the game is spotting
opportunities and threats.

What the rear-based headquarters often see as an opportunity or immediate
danger is not the reality on the battlefield. In many instances, the enemy
creates deceptions designed to look like death traps.

Throughout history, the defending side, especially when defending a narrow
and crowded combat zone, would concentrate its forces on the front, build a
massive array of fortifications and obstacles, and create a network of
defensive lines from the front to areas deemed vital for regional defense.
In Israel, there are two fighting theaters: in the north, a narrow front
facing Syria and Lebanon, bristling with enemy forces and a wide range of
weapons; and in the center and south, broad fronts facing Jordan and Egypt
with a concentrated defense layout around roads leading from the front lines
to the depth of the territory.

On the modern battlefield, defenses usually consist of a highly effective
arrangement of fortifications and obstacles based on the massive use of land
mines, anti-tank missiles, and mobile fighting units. The attacking side,
realizes the exorbitant price a direct assault will incur, along with the
need to outflank the defensive fortifications and strike in the enemy's
depth in order to reduce the fighting time, save lives, and create
situations for battlefield decisions.

Military history is filled with examples where outflanking the enemy lines
and penetrating deep into its territory, have decisively changed the face of
an entire campaign. Such moves can be traced back to infantry troops and
cavalry in the distant past, and to mechanized armor maneuvers in the
present.

The modern battlefield demands various landing capabilities: naval vessels,
air transports, helicopters, and all-terrain vehicles in order to bring a
critical mass of forces and weapons deep inside enemy territory. All these
are necessary to ensure the force's survival and sustained presence in the
field so that it can have an effect on the enemy.

In IDF history there were cases when a force penetrated deep behind enemy
lines as an outflanking maneuver. Two examples of such tactical raids are
the paradrop at the Mitle Pass in the Sinai Campaign (1956) and the landing
of forces near Sidon in the First Lebanon War (1982).

An example of a strategic raid is the crossing of the Suez Canal by Ariel
Sharon's division in the Yom Kippur War, which brought the IDF to within one
hundred kilometers of Cairo, and surrounded and cut off the Egyptian Second
and Third Armies (Egypt's main fighting forces) in the rear. The Egyptians
had no choice but to ask for a ceasefire.

Interestingly, the Suez Canal crossing is not referred to as a raid, but as
the "shift to the offense" or the "battle of the canal crossing." However,
according to a strict doctrinal analysis, the many elements in Sharon's
crossing describe the combat term: raid. It is without a doubt, that this
raid had strategic value.

A Tactical or Strategic Raid

Confusion still abounds in the military on the difference between the
concept of a strategic raid and the application of special forces deep in
the battlefield.

Tactical raids, daring and surprising, create conditions that only affect
the immediate combat zone, whereas strategic raids change the course of the
military campaign by creating conditions for winning the war and influencing
decisions at the political level.

An in-depth strategic raid is generally performed by special forces.
However, this alone would not have a strategic effect on the campaign,
unless it is specifically intended to do so. On the other hand, special
forces can perform a series of tactical raids that make a significant impact
on the various battlefields.

While high intensity warfare, which characterized Israel's conflicts from
the War of Independence (1948) to the Yom Kippur War (1973), naturally
created opportunities for deciding the campaign, especially in light of the
enemy's massive and well-arranged deployment, by enabling strikes against
his weak points and throwing him off balance. Now, in the age of low
intensity (asymmetric) warfare, spotting opportunities that can change the
face of a campaign is a more challenging task.

The IDF and the political-defense echelon were both bitterly criticized for
their lack of preparedness and management in the fighting of the Second
Lebanon War (July 2006). This gave birth to the Winograd Commission that
investigated the war's shortcomings, even though special operations were
carried out on an unprecedented scale in the enemy's backyard. During the
fighting, a special team was established in the Operations Branch of the
General Staff to plan raids in the enemy's rear. Two of the more famous
missions were Sayeret Matkal and Shaldag’s operations in Baalbek in Northern
Lebanon, and the naval commando raid in the residential area of Tyre where
senior Hezbollah figures lived. Only during the last two days of the war
were large infantry units airlifted behind Hezbollah's forward defense
lines.

During Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip (January 2009), special forces
also carried out deep penetration raids, even though the fighting was less
intense than during the Second Lebanon War.

In both wars (Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2009), the IDF used massive air
power unremittingly, ground forces sparingly, while avoiding the enemy's
defensive positions in urban areas (especially during Cast Lead). In both
cases, the primary goal was not to defeat the enemy, but to punish him
severely, restore quiet to the front, and strengthen Israel's deterrence.

An analysis of Hezbollah and Hamas's fighting patterns shows that both
organizations employed a comprehensive layered defense from the border to
the heart of their urban areas. Both fired volleys of rockets into Israel's
depth up until the last day of the fighting, and both emphasized the
leadership's survival and retention of strategic bargaining chips (the
captured soldiers Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser in Lebanon, and Gilad
Shalit in the Gaza Strip).

The lesson to be learned is that while the majority of the IDF's air, land,
and sea forces deal with the enemy's defense layout, destroy rocket
launchers and their operators, and target civilian infrastructures, the
potential for a strategic change during war lies in operations directed
against the enemy's leadership, and in the case of Lebanon, indirectly
against the Lebanese government.

The question is whether such opportunities existed during these two wars.
The books and articles published after the events seem to shed light on the
answer. The literature mentions the idea of a raid on Beirut International
Airport for the purpose of controlling it for a certain period and using it
as a staging area for missions in Beirut. This could have had a decisive
impact on Hezbollah's nerve center and had its leadership fight the IDF in
the south or in Beirut. This would also have placed the population and the
Lebanese government under duress, not to mention the regional and
international implications of such a move, while Hezbollah made a concerted
effort to counter the incursion of the hesitantly managed IDF forces in
Southern Lebanon. Had it happened, such a raid might have reversed the
negative trend in the fighting and shifted the weight of the battle to the
enemy. It also might have shortened the war (although the operating forces
would have been at risk and their retreat threatened, even though Israel
controlled both the sea and air).

There was also uncertainty whether Hezbollah was hiding Regev and Goldwasser
in the Dar el Hikmeh Hospital in Baalbek. Naturally, a raid designed to
rescue them, whether they were alive or not, could have changed the course
of the war and swiped Hezbollah's bargaining chip out of its hands,
especially since the Israeli Security Cabinet had defined the return of the
two soldiers as a goal of the war.

After Cast Lead, declassified reports stated that during the operation,
senior Hamas leaders went into hiding in the Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. It
also said the security forces had a short lead regarding Gilad Shalit's
whereabouts. In Gaza, as in Lebanon, a raid on Hamas's leadership and the
rescue of Shalit would have made a strategic impact on the course of the
campaign and its long-term ramifications.

Structural Failure

Now to the political echelon: how, if at all, did the senior state and
defense decision-makers interact with the IDF as executor, when considering
the implementation of a strategic raid while managing war?

To answer this question, we must first consider if the military, state, and
defense apparatus has mastered the skills, knowledge, and professionalism
required for identifying an opportunity when (and whether) a strategic
advantage can be gained. In addition, in order to take advantage of the
opportunity, a deep understanding of the opponent is needed within the
context of timing and our own force's capabilities.

The Winograd Commission called attention to the absence of professional
discussion among the senior defense figures who were involved in the
decision-making process both before and during the war. The lack of deep
knowledge on Lebanon and Hezbollah may have stunted their ability to
recognize strategic opportunities.

In addition to military proficiency and knowledge of the enemy, there should
also be some form of experience in commanding raids and special operations
deep behind enemy lines. As for the senior level of decision-makers—the
prime minister, defense minister, chief of staff, director of intelligence,
and head of the operations branch (who should all have a profound knowledge
of and familiarity with the enemy and the ground forces' capabilities)—only
the head of the operations branch measured up to this criterion. The others
went from a partial understanding to no understanding at all. This lack of
knowledge and familiarity with the professional aspects had a direct
influence on the courage and resolution needed by the senior decision makers
to decide in favor of a strategic raid that entailed a great amount of risk.

Another factor is the IDF's force buildup and ability to carry out a complex
raid. Today, the IDF is able to execute a difficult, large-scale raid deep
into enemy territory. Naturally, Israel's air and naval superiority in
Lebanon strengthens the assumption that the forces can remain in enemy
territory for as long as necessary.

Only two of the key figures in the Second Lebanon War remained in their
position three years later when Operation Cast Lead was launched – the prime
minister and head of intelligence. The chief of staff, minister of defense,
and head of operations have all been replaced.

The ability to seize a strategic opportunity improved significantly between
2006 and 2009. The IDF applied the lessons of the Second Lebanon War and
reorganized force building through training, exercises, and professional
learning. Senior officers have become far more knowledgeable on the enemy
and other regional players, the capabilities of the ground army and special
forces, and the requirements for deep penetration raids. This improvement
was supposed to project boldness and determination, but in Operation Cast
Lead, as in the Second Lebanon War, opportunities were not exploited and no
major ground action took place. However, the reason may have come from an
awareness that opportunities did not have to be fulfilled during the
campaign, since winning at all costs was perhaps more important than the
desire to create fundamental changes in reality. In this case, the
operational objectives drawn were limited and modest, so as not to aim for
strategic gains like the ousting of Hamas or the return of Gilad Shalit.

The IDF and senior figures in the defense establishment can expect to face
more challenges. In order to seize strategic opportunities in the future,
operative ideas should be envisioned beforehand, tested in training
exercises and routine security duties, and materialized into plans and
battle orders.

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