Might the Turkish Military Intervene in Syria?

by Dr. Can Kasapoglu

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 163, February 8, 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: With Russia and China vetoing a UN Security Council
resolution seeking an end to the violent repression in Syria, there are
almost no options left for a negotiated end to the crisis. This may bring
Turkey to consider military intervention in Syria in coordination with the
US and Saudi Arabia.

Introduction

The recently vetoed draft resolution of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) obligated the Syrian Army to return to their barracks, allow peaceful
demonstrations, and swiftly hold democratic elections. The rejected offer
also recognized the “sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of
Syria,” and would not “compel states to use force or threat of force.” This
may have been the final opportunity for peaceful transition.

A December 2011 Turkish Supreme Military Council declaration indicates that
one of the discussed agendas was “preparation of war capacity of the Turkish
Armed Forces.” Considering Ankara’s hardening rhetoric towards Damascus’
violent crackdown, which has continued to intensify since the UNSC double
veto, there looms the possibility of Turkish military intervention to end
the turmoil in Syria.

In an Al-Arabiya interview, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said
that he hoped an intervention wouldn’t be required but “if there is a
humanitarian tragedy, a disaster, of course the international community and
the UN cannot be silent.” He added that if the Arab League (AL) initiative
fails and killings continue, Turkey would not tolerate it.

Turkey has reportedly sought two major parameters for the legitimacy of a
possible military operation: the full failure of the AL initiative and a
UNSC decision. At this point, two critical questions should be raised:
first, whether Moscow and China can be “convinced” at least to abstain in
another UNSC vote, and second, if the bloody crackdown continues to
intensify in Syria, whether Turkey can play a role in a non-UNSC approved
military mission?

Encouraging Factors for Turkish Intervention

Ankara has already openly recognized the legitimacy of the Syrian National
Council (SNC), indicating that it is a peaceful opposition platform.
However, while the UNSC resolution draft was being vetoed by Russia and
China, Damascus’ atrocity has cost additional lives. Given the current
circumstances, Turkey’s shift to a rhetoric emphasizing the right of
self-defense of the peaceful Syrian opposition would not be a surprise.
There are four main factors that might pave the way for Turkish military
intervention, even without a UNSC resolution.

The first parameter is Turkey’s position in the larger sectarian power
struggle between the new-born Sunni bloc and the Shiite –
Iran-Syria-Hizballah –alliance in the region. Anti- and pro-regime rallies
in Syria have become a show of force by Sunni groups and pro-government
Alawites. Other groups, such as the Christians and Druze, worry about
possible religious oppression and much uncertainty after Assad’s potential
demise. Electoral results in Egypt and domestic violence in Iraq consolidate
these worries.

Second, Syria's Kurdish presence in the PKK terrorist organization can be an
exacerbating factor. One of four or five PKK militants is of Syrian-Kurdish
origin and holds a significant place in the HPG, the armed wing of the PKK.
HPG members include notorious figures like Fehman Hussein, who is in great
part responsible for the recent violent activities against Turkey.
Additional turmoil in Syria will allow greater freedom of action for the
Syrian Kurds. The terrorist organization is ready to wage a proxy war
against Turkey, and the Baathist regime is preparing to back this action. It
should be emphasized that PKK violence has always provoked Turkey into
cross-border military operations.

Third, the rising mistrust between Ankara and Damascus has greatly harmed
the relations, so much so that an official Syrian news agency labeled the
recent Turkey-GCC meeting a “conspiracy” against Syria. Under current
circumstances, Turkey cannot allow the Baathist rule to continue running the
country.

Finally, Turkey's new foreign policy paradigm promotes "geocultural
integrity" with the societies in Turkey’s historical hinterland and
emphasizes a soft power concept, which aims to win hearts and minds on the
Muslim street. Thus, Ankara cannot allow Damascus to create a more deadly
version of the 1982 Hama massacre right on its borders, as it will be
tantamount to the collapse of the perception of Turkish guardianship over
the “oppressed” Muslim communities and to the fall of Turkey’s
political-military leadership in the Sunni bloc.

Abstention from Military Intervention

There are also several considerations that would lead Turkey to abstain from
military intervention in Syria.

First, preserving national and territorial unity has always been Ankara's
most critical security agenda. The 2003 establishment of the regional
government in Northern Iraq has caused significant worries among the Turkish
strategic community, as this could produce a viable autonomy model for
Kurdish separatism. A possible Turkish military intervention in Syria might
actually create the second Kurdish autonomy in Qamishli, which would
encourage Kurdish separatist movements and augment Turkish concerns.

Second, Turkey would not commission its armed forces to overthrow the
Baathist regime and then simply stand aside. After the Libya operations,
Ankara was displeased with the surprise joint visit of French President
Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron, just one day
before Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s scheduled visit.
Moreover, Turkey would have preferred greater economic and political shares
of post-Gaddafi Libya. According to some analysts, the Arab Gulf states are
now encouraging Turkey to launch a military intervention in Syria by
promising economic rewards. However, Ankara would expect more than economic
guarantees from the Gulf States or the West – it would demand political
influence over the next regime in Syria.

Finally, Turkey is concerned over whether such an intervention will
exacerbate a regional war, especially when Turkish-Israeli relations are
poor and the Gulf states are “military dwarfs” and cannot provide effective
security cooperation. Clearly, Turkey is becoming hawkish in its indirect
rivalry with Tehran – Syria and Iraq – but is still hesitant and indecisive
in the direct confrontation. Ankara would not like to see its military
efforts overlap a possible Israeli strike against Iran and certainly does
not want to be perceived as aiding Israel by destroying a key ally of Iran.

Conclusion

Without Turkey's cooperation, any military intervention in Syria would be
impossible, as such an operation cannot exclude the second largest land
force in NATO and its 877 km-long border with Syria. Furthermore, the Gulf
states would still need a regional guarantor to counterbalance Iran, Syria's
close ally, in military and geostrategic aspects.

Will Turkey await a UNSC resolution for military intervention? This would be
preferable, though any non-UNSC approved action would likely force such a
resolution. However, if Russia or China insist on vetoing UNSC decisions,
and if the Assad dictatorship continues to physically destroy the
opposition, then Turkey can deploy its armed forces to stop the humanitarian
tragedy. Again, Turkey's preference is not for unilateral action, thus it
would probably seek cooperation from the US and the Gulf states.

At this juncture, the activities of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Ankara’s
relations with it are expected to become more important. The first meeting
between the SNC and FSA took place in late 2011 near Turkey's Hatay
province, where Syrian refugees have settled and Colonel Riyad Al-Asaad of
the FSA resides. Integrating the SNC and FSA was a critical move, as
peaceful demonstrations had no viable chance against Assad’s security
apparatus, which was familiar with leveling guns to its own citizens.

Now Turkey will probably foster its support of the FSA in order to prevent
the destruction of the opposition groups. However, such a move could provoke
Damascus to engage in heavier crackdowns on the Syrian people. In turn, the
humanitarian tragedy may trigger a Turkish military intervention. Actually,
it is argued, this scenario is not far from becoming a reality.

Can Kasapoglu, who holds a Ph.D. from the Strategic Research Institute at
the Turkish War College, is a visiting post-doctoral researcher at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family